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ABSTRACT 
Contract Norms and Contract Enforcement in Graeco-Roman Egypt 
David M. Ratzan 
 
This dissertation explores the ethics and norms associated with contracting in Ptolemaic and 
Roman Egypt as a contribution to the institutional study of ancient contract and its relationship to 
the economic history of the Roman world. Although ancient contracts in the Hellenistic tradition 
(i.e., non-Roman law contracts) have been studied rigorously from a legal perspective, there has 
been no systematic study of contract as an economic institution in the eastern half of the ancient 
Mediterranean. The first three chapters argue that such a study is a historical desideratum and 
seek to establish the theoretical and methodological basis and scope of such a project. 
Theoretically, the most decisive factor in determining the nature, extent, and success of contract 
as an economic institution is actual enforcement, as opposed to mere legal ―enforceability.‖ 
While the modern (Western) state has been justly credited with having had a transformative 
effect on contract by publishing clear rules (i.e., contract law) and providing effective ―third-
party‖ enforcement, even modern contracts depend on the enforcement activities of the 
individual parties and the power of social norms. Historically, there is no question that the 
ancient state, Rome included, was less invested and less effective in its support and promotion of 
private contracting than its modern counterparts. Ethics and norms therefore played a larger and 
more important role in ancient contracting than they have in the last century and as such need to 
be studied in their own right. The nature of the project also argues for Egypt being the primary 
locus of study, since the papyri afford us the most complete access to ancient individuals and 
organizations using contracts to organize transactions. After the theoretical and methodological 
  
discussion, there follow explorations of several important social values and norms with respect to 
contracting in Graeco-Roman Egypt, including trust (pistis), ―respect‖ (eugnōmosynē), and 
―breach.‖ The results show how ―personal‖ contracting was and reveal some of the ways in 
which individuals bridged the inevitable ―trust gaps‖ in their efforts to build credible 
commitments with those outside the immediate circle of their trusted intimates. It also 
illuminates the discourse of reputation, a key lever in ancient contract formation and 
enforcement. Finally, the notion of breach is shown to have become both more common and to 
have evolved conceptually in written contracts over time. It is argued that these changes in the 
idea and drafting of breach should be interpreted in light of a larger pattern of historical and legal 
development spanning the second century BCE to the second century CE, a period which 
witnessed an increasing ―moralization‖ of contract, itself an adaptation to an enforcement regime 
heavily dependent on ethics and norms. The last chapter offers a synthesis of the findings and a 
prospectus of the next phase of the project, which turns to the role of the state, arguing that it was 
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CHAPTER 1: LAW, ECONOMY, AND CONTRACT IN ROMAN EGYPT 
 
Approximately 2,500 written contracts have thus far been published from Roman Egypt, or 
nearly one in every ten published documents for the first three centuries CE.
1
 This, of course, is 
only the tip of the iceberg: documents on papyrus have survived only in particular locations, 
mostly from the provincial cities and villages of the Egyptian heartland, or chōra, and 
consequently the pattern of survival is anything but representative of Egypt as a whole, 
regionally or socio-economically. Indeed, it is almost shocking how few documents remain from 
Alexandria, a cultural capital of the Roman Empire and an important commercial nexus of the 
Eastern Mediterranean. Typically, this last statement is uttered with a sigh: ―If we only had the 
documents of Alexandria!‖ True, there is no denying that we should have learned a great deal 
had they survived, but I am certain that we would not have been surprised to find a good number 
of contracts among them. The same holds for the larger, wealthier, more sophisticated and 
politically connected poleis, like Ptolemais, whose documents also do not survive in numbers 
that accurately reflect their socio-economic importance. But would we have ever guessed that 
tens of thousands of middling provincials and illiterate peasants went to the trouble and cost of 
writing leases every year for agricultural land that had been farmed quite literally for millennia?
2
 
Or would we have imagined that they would have had professional scribes draw up and register 
                                                 
1
 Derived from keyword searches of the Heidelberger Gesamtverzeichnis der griechischen Papyrusurkunden 
Ägyptens (hereafter the HGV). Included in this number are some documents which are not themselves contracts, but 
letters, petitions, registers, etc., related to contracts. Of course, behind such documents were almost always written 
contracts that did not survive. 
2





loans, deposits, and other financial transactions for sums as small as 12 drachmai?
3
 As it turns 
out, the sheer range of what was settled by contract in the pre-industrial villages and towns of 
Roman Egypt is surprising: beyond major financial transactions and marriages, we find contracts 
for wetnursing, apprenticeship, various forms of economic and legal representation, construction, 
transportation, entertainment, lodging, renunciation of claims, partnerships, etc. In short, there 
would seem to have been few areas of economic life in Roman Egypt that one could not or 
would not regulate by contract. The evidence thus suggests that the culture of contract extended 
far beyond the boundaries of urban areas and the upper classes.  
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., P.Mich. 123r, col. x.36 (Tebtynis, 45/46), on which see immediately below. All dates are CE unless 





1.1 Contracting in Roman Tebtynis  
Though we shall never have anything other than an impressionistic sense of the numbers of 
contracts written in Roman Egypt from the actual papyrus contracts that survive, we are 
fortunate enough to have discovered a telling window onto the world of ancient contracting in 
the grapheion registers from Tebtynis in the Michigan collection.
4
 P.Mich. II 123r, for instance, 
contains a register, or     ρ φή, of documents concluded through the local notarial office (the 
grapheion) for Claudius‘s sixth regnal year (45/46). The register, which theoretically lists all the 
official documents drafted and issued at the grapheion, including receipts, memoranda, petitions, 
and returns of various sorts, contains approximately 800 entries for the year, of which the lion‘s 
share, 673, are contracts.
5
 This number immediately puts our 2,500 records for the whole of 
Roman Egypt into a sobering context. Yet how should we assess these 673 contracts? Was this a 
lot or a little?  
 Most scholars estimate the population of Roman Tebtynis, a large village in the Arsinoite 
nome, or the modern Fayyum, at about 4,000 to 5,000 people.
6
 According to our current 
demographic model for Roman Egypt, approximately 60% of the population would have been 
                                                 
4
 See Husselman 1970. 
5
 For the total number of contracts as opposed to other document types, see Rowlandson 1999: 141. We should not 
confuse this document for a full record of contracting activity in Tebtynis. First, the record itself is incomplete, as 
we see mistakes in the transcription of documents from source records, like the   ρό   ο , or running list of contract 
abstracts, in P.Mich. II 121r, to the     ρ φή on the other side (P.Mich. II 121v). For instance, the compiler 
omitted contracts by mistake (e.g., the abstract of P.Mich. II 121r III.xiv is omitted from the register for Pachon 26). 
Second and more importantly, as will be suggested below the     ρ φή is not a full record of private documents 
drawn up in Tebtynis, and perhaps not even within the office itself, cf., e.g., P.Mich. V 266, 338, 353, and 354.  
6





between the ages of 15 and 65, the ages at which one might expect a person to be party to a 
contract.
7
 P.Mich. II 123r therefore suggests that nearly half of the residents of the area who 
were of age to be conducting business visited the grapheion in 45/46 in order to execute a 
contract.
8
 It is clear, however, that some people were repeat visitors, and so perhaps we should 
think of the pool of grapheion customers as smaller and less random than a cross-section of the 
entire village population. Also, not all contracts were made between villagers, since there are 
indications, both in the registers and in the contracts that survive, that residents of other localities 
made contracts with villagers through this grapheion.
9
 Then again, many contracts involved 
more than two parties. We should also perhaps include more than the contracts themselves in our 
index of contracting activity, since so many of the non-contract documents listed are in fact 
related to the wider process of contracting. If so, we could include such documents as: (i) 
                                                 
7
 Bagnall and Frier 1994: 103-5.  
8
 Assuming 4,500 residents, 60% of whom were of age to execute a legal contract, or 2,700. The 673 contracts 
means at least 1,346 parties, or 49.9% of the adult population, or 29.9% of the total population. The ages of the 
parties only appear in the abstracts of the   ρό    , not the     ρ φ ί. P.Mich. II 121r contains a partial 
  ρό   ο  covering an entire month in 42, and there is only one minor recorded (II.x), while the next youngest party 
is 22, though he also appears with his parents in his acknowledgement of a dowry (IV.i). The oldest party was 
apparently 72 (I.ix: this abstract is fragmentary and the editors suggest that this man was likely a guardian). The rest 
of parties were all between 24 and 55 years old. This suggests that the pool of active parties may have been 
functionally smaller than the 2,700 or so that is captured by the theoretical limits of 15 and 65.  
9
 The Tebtynis documents do not typically record place of residence. However, deep connections revealed in the 
contracts and other documents between Tebtynis and the nearby villages of Theogonis (cf. Crotti 1962), 
Kerkeosoucha Orous, and Talei suggest that ―non-residents‖ used the grapheion at Tebtynis on a fairly regular basis. 
These other locations at times had their own record offices, which sometimes appear shared with each other or as 
branches of the main grapheion in Tebtynis. See the Fayyum Project for articles on each village: 
http://www.trismegistos.org/fayum/index.php. Also, the definition of ―resident‖ for the purpose of such counting is 
difficult, as many families had property in more than one locale. Cf. P.Mich. V 276 [Arsinoite, 47], a sale of part of 
a house in Ptolemais Euergetis, in which the sellers promise to register the sale via a particular kind of contract in 
the mnēmoneion of Ptolemais whenever ordered to do so by the buyer. The papyrus was found in Tebtynis and 
belongs to cache of documents from an extended family that had holdings in and around Tebtynis (and apparently 






receipts cancelling a fulfilled obligation under a previously executed contract (e.g., an agreement 
of receipt, or   ο ο ί   ποχ ς, or the rarer   ο ο ί  π ρ   σ ως, an outright cancellation of 
a debt); (ii) secondary agreements confirming or renewing existing contracts (e.g., a   ο ο ί  
   ο ήσ ως: P.Mich. II 121r IV.xii, cf. P.Mich. V 282 and 283); (iii) official annulments of 
contracts (i.e., to make a document   υρ σ  ος: P.Mich. II 123r vii.14, xviii.14, xix.29, cf. 
P.Mich. V 298); or (iv) petitions concerning contract disputes (cf. P.Mich. V 232, a petition 
written in the Tebtynis grapheion to the exēgētēs on behalf of a widow concerning a mortgage 
adjustment and a foreclosure). Taking such documents into account would represent a 
countervailing tendency to the ―repeat-customer‖ and ―out-of-towner‖ phenomena, since along 
with the rise in documents comes a rise in the number of unique individuals. More importantly, 
however, it suggests the intensity of the contracting relationship in Roman Egypt: in the vast 
majority of cases it was not an act confined to a single afternoon in the grapheion when the 




 The register, moreover, is equally interesting for what it does and does not report. The 
following is a complete list of the sales and cessions
11
 executed through the Tebtynis grapheion 
in 45/46:  
                                                 
10
 Cf. P.Mich. V 266 (Arsinoite, 38), a cheirograph, or private document, that serves as a preliminary commitment to 
go to the grapheion to arrange a formal sale via an official document (p.8 below) and the discussion of contract as 
―framework‖ and relational contracting in Chapter 2. 
11
 Cession or parachōrēsis was a mode of land conveyance that approximated common-law lease-hold (as opposed 
to free-hold via sale). Already by the late Ptolemaic period, cession was for all intents and purposes tantamount to 
sale. Cession as a mode of conveyance and a category of land tenure, however, outlived the Ptolemaic order by two 






Table 1.1 Sales and cessions recorded in P.Mich. II 123r 
Object Number Citation 
Agricultural land      8 
iii.8; iv.10; xv.12; xvi.11, 17; xvii.7; xviii.32; 
xix.39 
Fodder/Hay land      3 xi.7, 8; xiii.11 
Undeveloped land      7 iii.29; vi.14; ix.38; x.8, 15; xvi.27; xxi.30 
Residential property    13 
v.31; viii.21, 41; xii.33, 42; xiv.24, 25; xv.17, 
32; xvi.3; xix.33; xxi.15, 36 
Pastophoria      4* vi.34; xii.14; xviii.39; xix.31 
Slaves      3 vii.48; viii.18; xiii.24 
Bulls      1 v.34 
Donkeys      8 v.19, 21; vi.1, 4; vii.14; xii.25; xiii.17; xv.18 
Sheep/Goats      2 ii.9; ix.42 
Looms    10 
ii.20; iii.19; vii.18; viii.29; xi.5; xiv.12, 15; 
xv.13, 24; xvi.10 
Anvils      1 vii.10 
Unknown      4 xx.28; xvi.14; xxi.16; xxii.30 
TOTAL    64†  
 
*  Most of these transactions seem to relate to a single pastophorion; cf. P.Mich. V 238r ii.66, 87 (Tebtynis, 46).  
 
† The state of preservation necessarily means that we do not have a full record: there many missing and illegible 
entries. 
   
When we recall that the total number of contracts for the year was 673, the number of sales and 
cessions strikes one as quite low—just 64 for the entire year—and the list of things sold or ceded 
is surprisingly small and stereotyped—just eleven categories. Even more surprising is the 
distribution among the categories and the glaring absences. Why should there be so many 





Camels were sold via contract in the first-century Arsinoite, as BGU XI 2112 attests: could it be 
that no camel was bought or sold in Tebtynis for an entire year?
12
 Again, why are there so many 
looms being sold through the grapheion? And why is there a deed of sale for an anvil, of all 
things? Could not the latter just have been bought and sold on the open market?  
 No one expects contracts to be written for all objects, but what explains why certain sales 
were recorded via written contract here in the grapheion while others were evidently sold 
without one on the market or perhaps transferred via some other means? Similarly, we may note 
that leases appear to represent more than 20% of the contracts executed in the Tebtynis 
grapheion in the mid-first century, but it is important to note that many, if not most, are in fact 
subleases, often of public, imperial, or temple land.
13
 Interestingly, the original terms on which 
public land was held by the sub-lessor were not, apparently, contractual at all.
14
 Thus, while the 
register and our surviving contracts demonstrate the importance of leasing in the system of land 
tenure and management, this was in some sense a secondary market (if we may call it that), 
overlying a primary system of land tenure that was in large part not regulated by written notarial 
contract at all, but by other, older social and political structures.
15
 In other words, what does this 
                                                 
12
 The Greek Law in Roman Times (GLRT) database created by U. Yiftach-Firanko and hosted by the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem reveals that there are 35 documents relating to camel sales, all from the Roman period, but 
none from Tebtynis. 
13
 Cf. Rowlandson 1999; cf. Yiftach-Firanko 2007. The category of land and the nature of the lease is usually only 
visible from the contracts themselves or when we have the abstracts of the   ρό    , e.g., P.Mich. 121r II.v, vi and 
III.viii record subleases of public land, but the     ρ φή on the verso at ii.9-10 and iii.2 does not specify type of 
land. Cf. 121r IV.xii (verso iii.18); III.x (verso iii.4); IV.v (verso iii.12).  
14
 Rowlandson 1996: 70-71, 80-88. 
15
 On Ptolemaic land tenure, see Manning 2003; for the patchwork system inherited by the Romans and its 





register—and the mass of contracts we have for Roman Egypt—tell us about the relationship of 
contracting to marketing and other modes of exchange in Roman Egypt? 
 It is also worth remembering when looking at documents like this register that it purports 
to record only officially drafted contracts: it does not include cheirographa (contracts recorded in 
letter form, nominally in the handwriting of the issuer), or any other ―privately‖ drafted 
documents, nor does it (obviously) include unwritten contracts. With respect to the first category, 
we know such private documents constituted an important and growing category of written 
contract throughout the Roman period.
16
 We even have evidence that some were drawn up in the 
grapheion of Tebtynis itself, drafted in the hand of the principal lessee and chief scribe of the 
grapheion, Kronion. One of these private documents is particularly interesting with regard to the 
relationship of private and public contracting. In P.Mich. V 266 we have an example of a 
cheirograph from a certain Lysimachos to his sister Hero, wherein the former states: 
 
  ο ο ῵  ἐπά    ο   π  ί      ἐά   ο  συ τάσσῃς   τ  ράφ    σο        τοῦ 
ἐ Τ βτ     ρ φίου   τὴ  ὑπάρχουσ  17  ο  ...  | ...   -   π  ῵   ... | ... ὅ π ρ   
ἐ       π ρ  Δ    ου τοῦ |   φοτέρω      φοῦ, ὄ τος    έ σου    ρός … 
 
I acknowledge that, as soon as you command me, I must convey to you through the 
grapheion at Tebtynis the vineyard ... in my possession ... which I have purchased from 
Didymos, our common brother, who is also your husband ... (lines 5-14).  
 
Here, then, is a private contract recording an obligation to frame the agreed-upon transaction as a 
public document at the grapheion, or a contract to contract.
18
 This cheirographon and others, 
                                                 
16
 On private documents and their growing importance in the Roman period, see generally Wolff 1978: 106-27, but 
also now Yiftach-Firanko 2007 (on the hypomnēma) and 2009a (on the cheirographon). Three cheirographa survive 
that were written in the grapheion: P.Mich. V 266, 338, and 353.  
17





such as the camel sale mentioned above, or P.Mich. V 354, written to Kronion by a certain 
Ptolemaios, i.e., a truly autographic ―cheirograph,‖ point to a hidden universe of private 
contracting going on outside the official purview of the grapheion and the government archives 
in the nome capital and Alexandria to which it reported. Indeed, Kronion‘s personal accounts tell 
us as much, since there are loans recorded that were either not documented in public contracts or 
were not entered onto the grapheion‘s books or both.19 That said, depending on the transaction 
and the period, contracts did not necessarily have to be written in order to be valid, and so the 
body of oral contracts constitutes a potentially even greater mass of dark material in the universe 
of contracts than that suggested by the private documents. Indeed, one interesting question about 
the document above is why it was felt necessary to reduce an oral agreement to go to the 
grapheion as a written agreement. In other words, what force or purpose could this document 
qua document have and in what context? 
 This brief glance at contract practice through the grapheion records of Roman Tebtynis 
suggests that the culture of contracting in Roman Egypt, though extensive, also had a definite 
shape, or particular characteristics and boundaries demarcated by other social and economic 
                                                                                                                                                             
18
 Technically, this cheirographon is a commitment to go and register (katagraphein) the property as sold at the 
grapheion (see also P.Mich. V 276 [above n9]; SB VI 9108 [below p. 482]; and BGU II 543 [Hawara, 27 BCE], an 
oath in which a man swears to carry out a land cession). In the Ptolemaic period, or so argues Wolff (1948: 60, 77-
89), a contract for the sale or cession would have been drawn up first (or made orally), and then registered, whereas 
by the Roman period the drafting and registration functions of the agoranomos or grapheion had merged such that 
the registration was effectively the contract and no longer a separate act. For this reason, we may see this 
acknowledgement as an agreement to contract, and not merely to register (cf. ibid. 87-88, cf. 91-96 on this papyrus 
and the changed meaning of katagraphein in the Roman period). See now also Wolff 1978: 111n19 and Yiftach-
Firanko 2009b: 544-45. 
19
 For instance, we have a series of loans made to Kronion in order for him to be able to pay the central 
administration for his right to operate the grapheion (e.g., P.Mich. 123v iv.16-19) that appear nowhere in the official 





institutions, such as markets, the family, and the state. This raises a host of intriguing questions, 
such as, what was the relationship between the marketing and contracting? And, on another 
level, how and why did people decide on private versus public documents for their transactions? 
From the perspective of contracting itself, however, perhaps the most pressing historical question 
is: What should we make of the character and quality of the provincial justice system that was 





1.2 Papyrus Contracts, Roman Justice 
The older view of Roman provincial justice, still current in many places, is that the Empire was a 
more or less lawless place. Typical of this view is the characterization of Ramsey MacMullen in 
his interpretation of P.Mich. VI 423-424: 
 
Throughout all our evidence, scattered though it is over several centuries, the methods 
employed and their openness point to the existence of extralegal kinds of power to a 
degree quite surprising. However majestic the background of Roman law and imperial 
administration, behold in the foreground a group of men who could launch a miniature 
war on their neighbor—and expected to get away with it! ... Brute strength ... counted for 
much in the minor quarrels of the village. The only defense lay in one‘s family. Had 
government cared more, no doubt their subjects would not have taken the law into their 





This sentiment was shared by one of the greatest papyrologists of the twentieth century, Naphtali 
Lewis. Though he emphasized that ―there is no reason to suppose that village life was more 
crime-ridden in Egypt than elsewhere‖ in the Roman world (1983: 77), his understanding of 
Roman justice, based as it was on the detailed evidence of the papyri, was more nuanced, but 
ultimately no less damning than MacMullen‘s in its assessment of its effectiveness. Lewis 
sketched a system that was slow, riven with delay, unpredictable (―One did what one could and 
took one‘s chances‖), skewed towards the rich, and beset with implementation and enforcement 
problems at all levels.
21
 Times have changed, and with them opinions as to the nature of violence 
in the ancient world and the character and possibilities of Roman justice and government. Local 
                                                 
20
 See Ratzan forthcoming b on the dispute that served as evidence of this position. 
21





violence, for instance, is more likely to be understood in explicitly sociological, instead of purely 
legal, terms (i.e., as ―crime‖),22 and Dominic Rathbone has recently characterized Roman 
provincial justice in Egypt as ―flexible,‖ open to ―local legal traditions,‖ and ―prepared to judge 
cases by precedent and common sense‖ (2007b: 718). Rathbone‘s vision of provincial justice is 
articulated as part of an overall re-assessment of the attitude of the Roman state towards ―the 
economy,‖ which he sees as having ―deliberately fostered a general climate of probity and equity 
in public and private business‖ (718), and driven in part by an ―ideology of good government, 
protecting individual property rights against officials and other individuals, whose effect was that 
documents about legal disputes constitute a high percentage of the surviving papyri‖ (717).23  
 Rathbone‘s basic position on the character and quality of Roman justice is gaining 
ground in Roman history generally,
24
 but the case now needs to be made on a detailed 
examination of the evidence. Many of the assertions, like the Roman preference for a system of 
private property, are unassailable historically, but such high-level assessments need to be 
matched against the evidence for how such preferences and ideologies were translated into 
practice ―on the ground,‖ for there were competing ideologies and preferences, both within the 
government and without. The negative view of Roman justice epitomized by MacMullen and 
Lewis (who would in fact have disagreed with MacMullen on several points) is one that is, in 
essence, built from the ground up on the basis of the evidence. The question, then, is how and 
                                                 
22
 E.g., Bryen 2008. 
23
 Cf. Frier‘s earlier view of the attitude of Roman law and the Roman state to private contracts and contract 
disputes: 1980: chs. 5 and 6; 1985: 236-52, esp. 243. 
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where do these two perspectives meet? They most certainly meet in the realm of contracting, for 
it is precisely here that individuals encountered the state and its agents and tested the state‘s 
interests in and capacities for good government, the rule of settled law, and the protection of 
property or other economic rights by asking for help in enforcing their contracts. The culture of 





1.3 Of Enforcement and Enforceability 
How was a contract enforced in Roman Egypt?  
 This would seem a straightforward question, one for which there should be a ready 
answer after a century of research into the law, society, and administration of Roman Egypt as 
revealed in the now thousands of published documents on papyrus. And, after a fashion, a ready 
answer exists: there are two handbooks dedicated to the law and legal instruments of Ptolemaic 
and Roman Egypt, as well as numerous monographs and articles on specific contract types and 
how they were enforced.
25
 The majority of this literature, however, is written for an audience 
whose chief interest is either papyrology or the history of the law. One curious, if not entirely 
unpredictable result of this perspective is that enforcement is usually narrowly defined as legal 
enforceability, with actual enforcement more or less assumed or postponed—to be discussed 
elsewhere, much as it is in a modern casebook on contracts in an American law school.
26
 The 
scholarly literature is therefore dominated by discussions of the legal nature of contractual 
obligation in Roman Egypt and the various legal remedies, which in turn accounts for the 
centrality of such debates as that surrounding the alleged ―dispositive‖ status of written 
documents, the legal effect of certain clauses (e.g., the infamous   θάπ ρ ἐ   ί  ς-clause), or 
the effective differences between ―public‖ (notarial) legal forms and ―private‖ forms.27 If one 
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reads further, one will also find useful historical reconstructions of the various contractual forms 
and procedures. So, for instance, Raphael Taubenschlag‘s The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt offers 
a succinct, step-by-step description of ἐ β   ί , a procedure by which one foreclosed on real 
property in the case of contracts for secured loans.  
 Legal enforceability, however, never completely coincides with actual enforcement. Nor 
does the existence of legal forms, procedures, and remedies necessarily tell us the whole story 
regarding the manner or extent to which such things mattered or operated in practice. If our aim 
is to determine how a contract was actually enforced, ―on the ground,‖ we will need to consider 
factors that lay alongside, or indeed outside, the law. To continue with the example of ἐ β   ί  
and similar enforcement procedures (different types of security were subject to slightly different 
forms of execution), in addition to the legal procedure we also should like to know how 
expensive foreclosure was and who bore the cost? What steps did one usually take before 
proceeding? Did creditors ever choose modification over foreclosure, and, if so, in what 
circumstances and why?
28
 Again, to what extent and how did the provincial administration 
defend a creditor‘s newly acquired rights to foreclosed property (or, for that matter, protect 
debtors from illegal foreclosures)? How did relative social standing in the community affect 
enforcement substantively and strategically? Similarly, how did the administration‘s reliance on 
government by local elites shape the ways in which one went about enforcing legal agreements, 
either on the part of the parties themselves or the government agents who were charged with 
enforcement? After reading the description of execution procedures in the handbooks (e.g., 
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Taubenschlag 1955: 531-35), one might find it surprising to happen upon PSI XIII 1328 
(Oxyrhychos, 201), a wonderfully complete document illustrating every step of the legal 
foreclosure process, but with the unexpected twist that the creditor apparently waited four years 
between securing official permission to proceed and exercising his right to foreclose.
29
 Indeed, 
the creditor in this case seems to have delayed at each stage. Why? And what does this suggest 




 Such observations or questions, of course, did not escape the scholarly giants of the past 
century; their interests and training as lawyers, however, drew them more to historical problems 
in the development of the law of contract itself and therefore away from the place contracting as 
a whole occupied in the wider social and economic matrix of Roman Egypt. For example, the 
orthodoxy on the right of praxis, or execution, is that winning a judgment at trial in the case of 
breach or default did ―not lead to ordering the debtor to provide the performance, but rather to 
authorizing enforcement first by means of a controlled private initiative, then by compulsory 
enforcement through the official. The judgment only confirmed the prosecutor‘s right of 
compulsory enforcement; it did not bring about enforcement.‖31 As suggested above, and argued 
in Chapter 2, it is precisely the nature of the ―controlled private initiative‖ and the ―compulsory 
enforcement through the official‖ that matter the most to contract as an economic institution. 
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This difference in emphasis or perspective perhaps justifies a study of contract enforcement in 
Roman Egypt in its own right, one which attempts to recover more of the full spectrum of 
contract enforcement, including extra-legal and illegal strategies and actions, and contextualizes 
them alongside the legal ones.
32
  There is, however, another compelling reason to study contract 
enforcement in Roman Egypt in just such a wider context: the relatively new and growing 
appreciation of the economic growth experienced by the Roman economy.  
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 The neglect of actual enforcement is still prevalent in ancient legal studies. For example, Connolly 2010, an 
interesting and highly informative social history of the law on the basis of the rescripts collected in the third-century 
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doubt, some truth in this, but what happened when the verdict or imperial pronouncement required actual, physical 
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institution in dispute resolution. For example, we have a good example of precisely this sort of ―pressure to settle‖ 
being applied in BGU II 614 (Arsinoite, 217), on which see pp. 202ff. We should think, as Hobson 1993 suggests, of 
petitions as an opening salvo (Sec. 2.3); cf. Williamson on court orderings as delimiting ―threat positions‖ (Sec. 2.2). 
Though this is certainly a difficult topic to tackle from the evidence of imperial legal codices and the Digest, I do 
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1.4 Contract and the Ancient Economy 
Until quite recently, there were three general answers to the question, ―What role did contract 
play in the economic history of the Roman Empire?‖ The first follows a traditional, implicitly 
neo-classical, micro-economic analysis of certain types of contracts. One may see such an 
analysis at work in the discussions of various forms of apprenticeship contracts, classifying them 
as ―teaching‖ contracts or ―apprenticeship‖ contracts depending on how the costs of 
maintenance, instruction, and wages were balanced between the parties.
33
 The analysis thus 
focuses entirely on the underlying transaction and tends to take the fact that it was concluded by 
contract for granted. The contract itself becomes a given, a transparent vehicle for the 
transaction, like the vacuum of space through which light travels.
34
 Since this perspective does 
not consider the contract as a separate component or element of the transaction, and is in any 
case rarely expressed in terms of, or with reference to, any explicit overarching model of the 
ancient economy, it ends up assuming that ―contracts‖ were a natural part of the economic 
landscape of antiquity without ever defining what a contract was or what relationship it had to 
other types of economic activity.
35
 
 The second response is more explicit in seeing contract as an ―important‖ development 
arising from the growing sophistication and importance of trade and commerce in the late 
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Republic and early imperial periods. This answer flows from an appreciation of the historical 
development of Roman law, which there is no disputing: over the course of this period Roman 
law became more ―efficient‖ with respect to the ways it dealt with agency, contractual 
arrangements, insolvency, and many other economically important functions, such that it 
constituted ―[o]ne of the most striking illustrations of the high development of economic life in 
the Empire in the first two centuries of our era.‖36 This is a response, then, that unlike the first 
links law to economic performance generally, but not in a way that explains the dynamics of the 
relationship between social and economic change and legal change.
37
 In other words, why was 
Roman law so responsive to economic needs in this period; and how did Romans come to rely on 
it so heavily for organizing their affairs; and what reciprocal effect did this have on transactional 
efficiency and business practice? Furthermore, the fact that for most of this period more than half 
of the Empire did not use Roman law in its economic arrangements, even as it depended on 
Roman authorities for justice, is frequently passed over in silence. So the question remains: what 
was the relationship of this particular history of Roman private law to the economic history of 
the Empire as a whole?
38
 To answer such a question involves not only a renewed engagement 
with the old problem of the relationship of Reichsrecht to Volksrecht (though with different 
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parameters and goals than those established by Mitteis 1891), but also a model of how law 
related generally to economic activity in the Roman world. Absent such a theory, the relationship 
between law and economic performance becomes the assumption, and contracting becomes by 
default an index or ―illustration‖ of economic development. 
 Finally, the third response could perhaps be summed up as: ―Little to none.‖ Perverse or 
counter-intuitive though it may seem, this is the only real attempt to ―answer‖ the question, since 
it takes economic, instead of legal history as its point of departure. Nevertheless, it comes (and 
was meant to come) as a shocking conclusion, especially in light of the history of Roman law 
and the evidence for contracting from Roman Egypt and sundry other corners of the Roman 
world, whether it is the Frisian coast, central Romania, or Dura Europos on the modern Syrian-
Iraqi border.
39
 How could it be thought that all that contracting and contract law had so little 
economic impact, when contracts are today widely thought of as vitally important instruments in 
the generation of the fantastic economic growth of the past three hundred years?
40
 It is, in fact, 
the undeniable difference between the performances of the ancient and modern economies (to 
speak in grand generalities) that explains the negative or indifferent assessments of law generally 
in this tradition of ancient economic history, for until quite recently adherents of this line of 
interpretation understood the ancient world to be structured in such a way as to all but preclude 
properly ―economic‖ behavior and so any possibility of real economic growth.   
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 The great articulator of what has been dubbed the ―structural‖ view of the ancient 
economy was Moses Finley. His general model of the ancient economy is widely known, and the 
impact of his views on the trajectory of modern ancient economic historiography has been 
appraised in a number of recent excellent publications.
41
 Here, therefore, we need only briefly to 
review his account with a view to the particular place he accorded to law and legal instruments. 
This may be done conveniently from his influential Sather Lectures (The Ancient Economy), 
since he re-published them shortly before his death with a post-script replying to his critics, in 
which he added one substantial amendment to his generally dim view of the economic role or 
potential of the law. The orthodox assessment of Finley is that he ―vigorously argued that the 
values and beliefs of ancient social and political élites ... constrained their economic actions, and 
that this obstacle helps to explain why the ancient economy remained fairly static in comparison 
with that of late medieval and early modern cities.‖42 This is certainly how Finley would have 
summed up his own position, yet somewhat to the detriment of his own argument, as it fails to 
take into account the importance of other, non-ideological constraints on ancient economic 
behavior in his thinking.  
 In Finley‘s view, the ancient economy—for there was essentially one—was characterized 
above all by a lack of ―economic rationality,‖ which for him was both a mentality and a 
behavior: one understands exchange in primarily material terms (the mentality), and therefore 
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enters into exchange in order to maximize one‘s material return (the behavior).43 For economic 
rationality to develop and become the defining mentality of exchange, several supporting ideas 
and institutions must already be in place, such as, for instance, private property.
44
 Another 
precondition, or so Finley frequently implied, is the requirement that there be a sufficiently wide 
set of alternatives in order to stimulate one‘s faculty of analysis. Without real options, there is no 
scope, and so no reason, to attempt to tease out the specifically economic dimensions of material 
and financial decisions. It was the lack of alternatives that for Finley held such profound 
implications for ancient economic behavior and performance. 
 Specifically, Finley argued that the real structural limitations on transport and 
manufacture in the ancient world left most capital with no place to go but into land or ―non-
productive‖ consumption.45 Given these restrictions, the popularity of land as an investment was 
a reasonable, if not always an economically rational, choice. Even so, the comparative dearth of 
options neutered this act of choosing so as to obscure any specific character it might have had as 
an economic ―investment‖ per se. In other words, the purely economic nature of the 
―investment‖ never stood out as distinct from or above the social and cultural associations 
traditionally bound up with ownership of land.
46
 In a similar fashion, the ineluctable 
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precariousness of ancient life guaranteed that at the center of the ideal of self-sufficiency was a 
definite economic reality; but again it was the lack of options for productive investment that 
helped translate this ideal into a common and ―non-rational‖ management strategy. With no 
incentive to identify, analyze, and implement the most economically efficient use of their 
resources, ancient individuals instead strove to cut the costs they could readily see and control, in 
the process missing out on economies of scale and other efficiencies that would have maximized 
their return on property.
47
 Finally, the absence of real options meant that the disposition of labor 
in agriculture, certainly the largest ―sector‖ of the ancient economy, was organized not on the 
basis of negotiation or market forces, but more or less dictated by traditional status arrangements. 
For a variety of structural reasons, most ancient landlords were often left with little real choice as 
to which form of labor to deploy on their land (i.e., slave, free, or dependent), and by the same 
token, most free peasants worked either by force or by force of custom, with the only real 
alternative before them being to leave the land altogether.
48
  
 The hallmark of Finley‘s ancient economy, then, is a fundamental and ramifying lack of 
choice. This basic condition of what we may call ―effective unfreedom‖ existed, moreover, on 
multiple levels. As per the traditional view, Finley indeed understood social constraints as not 
only the most important, but perhaps also the original, limitation on choice, with the result that 
oppressive non-economic ideologies and social relations—status in particular—shaped what we 
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now see as economic life at every level of society.
49
 Yet, in making his central argument one 
about the nature and dynamics of choice, he reasonably and insightfully suggested other, non-
ideological limits, both material (e.g., transport) and institutional (e.g., labor pool), yet without 
ever suggesting how these three different sources of limitation might relate to each other. Our 
aim here is not a critique of Finley so much as to point up the fact that in his and other structural 
interpretations of the ancient economy, ―the issue is,‖ as he put it, ―one of choice,‖ with effective 
unfreedom the defining condition of ancient economic life.
50
  
 This basic stance explains Finley‘s otherwise surprising silence with regard to the 
economic function of the law.
51
 In the whole of the Ancient Economy he mentions law only a 
handful of times, with his most extended discussion devoted to public law.
52
 His view was that 
laws were passed either with non-economic ends in mind or aimed merely at maximizing state 
revenues with no regard to likely overall economic effect (both conclusions follow on his views 
of the economic rationality of the legislators).
53
 Of private law, there are but a few brief notices. 
Typical are his remarks on the oppressive nature of ancient debt law and his observation on the 
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disappearance of the Roman law of locatio conductio rei, or leases, in the course of the fourth 
century CE.
54
 The leases, in his view, disappeared along with the notional freedom of peasants 
who took them, and this for Finley showed the extent to which the law was merely 
epiphenomenal to pre-existing labor relations. The historical change, in other words, was in form 
only: the legal formality of lease died with the merely juridical formality of ―freedom.‖55 This is, 
in fact, the same basic understanding that informs his view of debt law as custom or status in a 
different guise.
56
 Elsewhere he denies—without argument—the laws that required guardians to 
invest the property of their wards any economic impact.
57
 If choice was more or less illusory or 
nonexistent, then ancient law, private or public, had no economic impact of its own, partly 
because those who wrote it and used it did not pursue economically rational ends, and partly 
because the law had no independent institutional existence, but was instead merely a formalized 
or codified version of underlying social relations.
58
 In the end, Finley was convinced of the 
economic irrelevance of law, and particularly so of private law.
59
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 Finley was a self-conscious and skilled polemicist, and his work succeeded in attracting 
impassioned partisans both for and against his model and his method.
60
 In the ensuing debate, 
several elements of his model have been challenged successfully (though the same is not true of 
his method), and one of the most important of those challenges is the case that has been put 
forward for ―significant,‖ and perhaps ―intensive,‖ economic growth during the Empire.61 The 
case is not air-tight, and the proper characterization of the growth that did occur is still hotly 
debated, as the recent exchange between Walter Scheidel and Andrew Wilson forcefully 
demonstrates.
62
 Yet whatever the outcome of this debate, it now seems abundantly clear that 
there was not one ―ancient economy‖ as Finley would have had it, and more specifically, that the 
Roman economy was not of a piece with the ―Greek‖ one that preceded it.63 Ancient economic 
history, therefore, is in a real sense not what Finley supposed it be. Had he been correct in this 
instance, that for structural reasons there was essentially but one ancient economy characterized 
by a persistent lack of growth, then ancient economic history would been have reduced to the 
history of ancient social structures and their effects on the distribution of wealth. In such a 
history, law can have no independent economic effect because there is no change in performance 
to explain: why ascribe economic potential to the law if that potential is never realized? If, 
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however, we believe that there was change over time in the performance of the Roman economy, 
then real economic history remains to be written (i.e., the history of production), and the roles of 
all factors need to be reconsidered, including that of law.
64
  
 The question, then, must be asked anew: how are we to relate the evidence for 
contracting that survives from this period to the economic performance of the Empire? One 
possibility is that we interpret the evidence of contracting as merely a passive index of economic 
activity. There is, no doubt, a good deal of truth to this: if more economic activity took place in 
the Roman period (which would not have necessarily entailed intensive growth), then it stands to 
reason that more contracts were concluded, and this in turn would have likely driven the 
development of contract law, since each contract has within it the seeds of litigation. Yet, as 
above, this interpretation does not help us to understand the nature or mechanics of the 
relationship between economic activity and law or contracting in the Roman world. There is, 
however, a second possibility: that contracting was part of a suite of social and legal institutions 
that, while not of Roman invention, nevertheless spread and flourished with Roman power and 
helped to support and promote economic growth in a dynamic fashion. This is Rathbone‘s 
implicit suggestion in his assessment of the provincial administration of Roman Egypt, and one 
which motivates the following project (see Sec. 6.2).  
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1.5 The Argument 
What follows is the first installment of a larger study of the institution of contract in one region 
of the Roman Empire, the province of Roman Egypt, with a view not only to its inner workings 
but also its economic potential. As will be argued in subsequent chapters, the best way to 
approach this question is to study the possibilities and modalities of enforcement. Since the value 
of a contract is directly related to the perception of its actual (not merely legal) enforceability, 
actual enforceability (and the perception thereof) represents a controlling factor in the decision 
whether or not to organize an economic exchange by contract. This approach in turn 
recommends Roman Egypt as the locus of study: it is only in the papyri of Egypt that the 
complex interactions involved in actual contract formation and enforcement in the Roman world 
are most thoroughly and consistently brought to light. In them we may witness not only the role 
played by the state, but also those played by real individuals and multiple sources of power and 
authority, and further how all these actors, organizations, and institutions came together into a 
system of social and legal control that individuals and organizations navigated, with varying 
degrees of success, in negotiating, drafting, and enforcing contracts.
65
 The ultimate aim of the 
larger project, then, is two-fold: (1) to elaborate the full spectrum of contract enforcement that 
operated in Roman Egypt; and (2) to assess what this spectrum meant with respect to the 
economic potential of contract as an institution in the Roman world. This larger project is beyond 
the scope of a dissertation, which presents just the first two steps: a discussion of the theoretical 
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perspective and goals of an institutional study of contract, and an exploration of the foundational 
elements of the spectrum of enforcement, the norms and ethics of contracting.  
 Chapters 2 and 3 seek to define the theoretical perspective underlying this approach to 
contract more precisely. The sorts of questions asked above, questions that seek to understand 
the relationship of institutions, and in particular of law, to economic choices and performance, 
are ones that have been asked in a systematic fashion by lawyers and economists of modern 
contracting over the last four decades, often in light of one of two theoretical traditions now 
known as ―Law and Economics‖ and the New Institutional Economics, or NIE. Law and 
Economics, pioneered by Richard Posner and others, has aimed to discover the economic 
foundations of law (usually the common law).
66
 Such scholars tend not only to read the law in 
economic terms, but presume that the law primarily exists in order to further economic ends, that 
it should, in a word, be economically efficient. The NIE project, on the other hand, has been 
precisely that of understanding the relationship of institutions, law among them, to economic 
performance and decision-making.
67
 Both movements aim attempt to forge a descriptive model 
of the relationship of law to economics writ large in service of prescriptive goals (i.e., to improve 
the law such that it becomes an economically more efficient institution). My interest in each has 
nothing to do with their prescriptive aims but rather their ability to describe contract as an 
economic ―institution‖ instead of merely a legal one. However, given their explicitly prescriptive 
goals and the modern assumptions on which their theories rest, to my mind it repays the effort to 
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come to grips with this sort of thinking in a comprehensive manner, with attention to its models, 
assumptions, possibilities, and limitations, before attempting to apply it to Roman Egypt. This is 
the aim of Chapter 2, reviewing modern theories of contracting with an eye to establishing what 
an ―institutional‖ economic analysis of contract in Roman Egypt might profitably entail.  
The main conclusions of Chapter 2 may be summarized as follows. First, we may only 
arrive at an institutional understanding of contract and an assessment of its economic efficiency 
if we set out to understand contract as a process (i.e., as contracting), the boundaries of which 
stretch beyond the law of contract itself. Second, contract must be understood to represent but 
one mode of organizing exchange, as opposed to other ―governance structures,‖ namely 
―marketing‖ and ―hierarchies‖, each with its own characteristics and modalities. Contract as a 
governance structure does not exist side-by-side but interlocked with these other structures. 
Third, as suggested above, enforcement matters; in fact, it defines the efficacy and efficiency of 
contracting as a governance structure. Fourth, since contract as an institution is ―larger‖ than the 
law of contracts, we cannot think of contract enforcement as coming from the state alone, even 
as it was an admittedly important source of enforcement; instead, there were other sets ―rules‖ 
beside law that helped to control the formation and enforcement of contractual relations, and 
these rules were policed by sources of authority or power other than the state. 
Chapter 3 presents an institutional ―map‖ of contract on the basis of the framework set 
out in Chapter 2. When viewed from the perspective of enforcement, contract is articulated by 
three overlapping zones, each with a different topography generated by the intersection of three 
broad sets of ―rules‖: ethics, social norms, and law. I explore the implications of this approach 





thought of in relationship to each other, both from the perspective of ―formality‖ (i.e., the 
―informality‖ of norms and the ―formality‖ of law), as well as from the perspective of the parties 
themselves. Specifically, I suggest that the analysis of contracts from the perspective of actual 
enforcement, which is nothing more than the attempt to follow the calculations ancient parties 
made in navigating these sets of overlapping rules, provides fresh insight into the degrees of 
effective freedom and choice in the ancient world.  
The institutional map I draw largely follows the pioneering work of Robert Ellickson. I 
thus suggest a system of enforcement for ancient contracts that begins with ―first-person‖ 
enforcement, or the ―self-sanctions‖ one administers in maintaining one‘s own ethical 
commitment to keeping one‘s obligations. For methodological reasons, ethical enforcement is 
difficult to trace and interpret in the papyri, and I therefore conclude that we focus on norms, 
since these are much more easily and securely discovered from our sources. Social norms are 
―third-person‖ sources of enforcement in that they are the rules of the community at large, 
controlled by neither party to the contract. Theoretically, so are those of the state. Importantly, 
both sources of third-person enforcement can be invoked, deployed, even captured, by parties in 
their efforts to enforce their contracts. Chapter 2 argues that contracts are written with the 
possibilities and modalities of enforcement in mind, and that this is no less true of the third-party 
enforcement of norms than it is of the third-party enforcement of law by the state.  
The final zone of enforcement is that of the contract itself, or the monitoring and actions 
of the parties over their mutual performances. This Ellickson calls ―personal self-help.‖ For 
reasons I discuss in both Chapters 2 and 3, ancient contracting relied far more on the power of 





in studying ancient contracts, and certainly more than is the case for modern contracts. 
Accordingly, any true appreciation of contract as an economic institution must incorporate the 
historical evidence for these vital sources of enforcement and how they related to the law and 
state enforcement.  
Chapter 4 begins the study of contract norms in Graeco-Roman Egypt, starting with two 
key values, trust (πίστ ς) and ―respect‖ or ―consideration‖ for the other party (    ω οσ   ). 
Trust has been studied from a juridical point of view, which is to say as a legal standard akin to 
the role fides played in Roman law.
68
 As is typical of juristic work of the twentieth century, this 
study grounded its definition of pistis in the literary sources of classical Athens. Given the 
historical development of law in the Hellenistic age, such evidence is certainly relevant insofar 
as it illuminates one of the key points of departure for the role of trust vis-à-vis the perspective of 
the Greek immigrants who brought their legal and cultural constructs with them to Egypt. 
However, such sources only tell us, at best, part of the story. In order to understand what 
contracting parties might have meant in inscribing pistis into their contracts as a fiduciary legal 
standard, we also need to know what they meant by pistis in a social and business context. 
Furthermore, since contracts are in essence relationships of trust, we need to study the dynamics 
of trust as they relate to the formation and enforcement of contractual relationships as such, not 
merely in connection to those contracts that explicitly invoke some legalized version of trust. 
One may consider eugnōmosynē, or ―respect,‖ as the outward face or manifestation of 
pistis. Pistis is a subjective evaluation of another person; it is, in a word, a measure of the stock 







one puts in someone else. Eugnōmosynē, on the other hand, is a characterization of another 
person‘s gnōmē towards oneself. Those who are eugnōmones have the proper respect for others. 
One who was considered pistos was therefore usually interpreted to be eugnōmōn, while one 
who was agnōmōn was almost certainly not to be trusted. Like pistis, eugnōmosynē was not 
exclusively a business concept, though it appears predominantly in that context in the papyri. As 
we shall see, the determination of another‘s gnōmē, whether it was ―good‖ (eugnōmōn) or non-
existent (agnōmōn), was crucial to the decision whether or not to enter into a contract with 
someone, as well as to the rhetorical stance of those who litigated broken contracts. Both pistis 
and eugnōmosynē were thus important concepts in the reputational discourse of contracting, the 
terms in which people evaluated potential contract partners and threatened backsliders on the 
verge of breach. Finally, while it is difficult to trace an evolution in the notion of pistis over the 
Ptolemaic and Roman periods, the same is not true for eugnōmosynē, wherein the sense of 
obligation moves from one tied directly to the person to one tied to the debt that exists between 
people. By the later imperial period, the notion of eugnōmosynē is so closely tied to one‘s 
business reputation that it has become a word for credit-worthiness, with eugnōmonein often 
meaning ―to repay.‖ 
Chapter 5 moves from what one might call the ―positive‖ to the ―negative‖ norms of 
contracting. Instead of looking at what contract parties meant by trust and respect, we turn to the 
notion of breach. This chapter is far more legal than the one before it, a reflection of the source 
material we have for the study of breach. I argue that the notion of breach per se was inchoate for 
the first hundred years of Ptolemaic rule, despite the fact that one can find evidence of it in 





documents, namely π ρ συ  ρ φ    and π ρ β ί    , they do so in a particular sequence and 
exhibit a differentiated pattern of usage, both significant for the legal, social, and economic 
history of contract in Graeco-Roman Egypt. Parasyngraphein appears first in the late third 
century BCE and remains the dominant word for ―breach of contract‖ until sometime around the 
turn of the first century BCE. Parabainein is first attested in a documentary setting to mean 
―breach of contract‖ ca. 140 BCE, but grows over the course of the next two and a half centuries 
to become the only word for breach. I argue that both the tendency to inscribe breach per se in 
contracts, and the shift from parasyngraphein to parabainein, or from ―breach‖ to 
―transgression,‖ is part of a broader ―moralization of contract.‖ This, in turn, participates in an 
even larger shift which includes the displacement of oaths from private legal transactions and the 
eventual success of the homology at the expense of the protocol. On a smaller scale, I also argue 
that the conception of breach per se was implicated in, and perhaps instrumental to, the evolution 
of a set of consensual contracts, which I have called ―transactional agreeements.‖ In these 
contracts, the ―transaction‖ they record is nothing more than the agreement of the parties to the 
terms of contract (i.e., there is no other causa), and the contract gains legal force by a mutual 
agreement not to breach, which is at heart an extension or reinterpretation of a common clause 
penalizing litigation (the so-called Nichtangriffsklausel). 
Chapter 6, the conclusion, draws together the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 in light of the 
theory elicudated in Chapter 2 and 3, and then sets out a prospectus of the next phase o the 
project, evaluating the nature and quality of state enforcement in Roman Egypt. My general 
contention in the present study is that we have spent too little time understanding the moral 





enforcement. The thesis I intend to prove in the next phases is that many scholars of the past 
generation have been to quick to dismiss the quality of state enforcement in the Roman world, 
particularly with a view to what had proceeded it in many parts of the Greek East, if we may take 
Egypt as an example. 
Finally, a word on the period selected for this study. Although I have couched this study 
in terms of what it might be able to tell us about the Roman economy, it is in fact impossible to 
study contract as an institution purely in the Roman period. Or, rather, one could do this, but the 
experience would be akin to interpreting a single cross-section of a geological stratum: one is 
likely to get the synchronic relations between deposits correct, but have no sense of trajectory or 
of the significance of the particular relations. Is one deposit waxing or waning? How might we 
interpret this deposit differently if we knew that it disappeared in the stratum above, or appeared 
here only for the first time? Since institutions are human creations and evolve over time as agents 
and organizations change the rules in the act of using and abusing them, so we must study them 
diachronically in order to understand any particular moment in time. Such considerations, taken 
together with the fact that the Roman period papyri, though numerous, are not so rich as to afford 
us the luxury of being able to rely on them alone for evidence, has led me to broaden the scope to 
include the Ptolemaic period in this inquiry.  
It is, for the reasons given above, almost always justifiable to begin one‘s research earlier 
than the period of interest, and indeed, as I indicate in Chapter 3, a systematic study of 
contracting norms before the Ptolemaic period would be interesting, and no doubt useful to the 
understanding of the norms in the subsequent periods. Beginning with Ptolemaic rule, however, 





evolution of contract in Egypt, as Greek notions, language, and bureaucratic control of contracts 
entered the stage en masse. It was this accommodation and assimilation of the Greek and 
Egyptian traditions that the Romans inherited when they finally took control of the country as a 
province in 30 BCE. Understanding the trajectory established under the Ptolemies is therefore of 
prime importance for the interpretation of contract under the Romans.  
Ending points, on the other hand, are more difficult and often arbitrary. I chose a rough 
date of 300 CE for the terminal point. At the end of the third century and through the beginning 
of the fourth several trends, each of which observable to some extent throughout the Principate, 
combined to produce what is arguably a qualitative change in the institutional landscape for 
contracting by the mid-fourth century. First, the system of grapheia seems to have disappeared 
sometime after 300, with the bibliothēkē engktēseōn following suit shortly thereafter. From then 
on drafting, registration, and publication of documents occured through other processes.
69
 
Second, though people still petitioned on the basis of their contracts, changes in the 
administrative hierarchies meant that their petitions went to different people. Also, there were 
profound changes at the level of state mechanics underlying the enforcement one could expect 
from such petitions and litigation. To mention but one, it appears that the local police system, 
which existed for the first three centuries of Roman rule and played a role in producing 
defendants, was progressively transformed over the course of the third century.
70
 At the same 
time as this administration re-organization there appears to be an increase in the use of mediation 
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to resolve disputes, and the two may be connected, or perhaps both products of a more 
fundamental social change. While such changes may have amounted to nothing more than 
bureaucratic reshuffling, and the increase in arbitration perhaps an artifact of our evidence, such 
assertions need to be proved rather than assumed.
71
 Third, it was precisely over the course of the 
later fourth and fifth centuries that Roman law ideas and forms with respect to contracting appear 
to take hold.
72
 Fourth and finally, the growing importance of Christianity produced not only new 
social arrangements and power structures relevant to contracting (e.g., monasteries and church 
hierarchies), but also the possibility of new conceptions of old ideas fundamental to contract, like 
pisits and parabasis, now words for faith and sin as must as for trust or credit and breach.
73
 
Again, we might wonder what substantive effect any of these developments had on contract, but 
together they paint a picture of a social, moral, legal, and economic landscape sufficiently 
different from that of the centuries which preceded to justify the study the institution of contract 
in the fourth century and beyond in its own right.  
 
                                                 
71
 See Bagnall 1993: 162-64; Gagos and van Minnen 1994 (with review by Bagnall 1995); and Feissel and Gascou 
2004, esp. the chapters by Zuckermann and Gascou (cited in bibliography below). 
72
 Wolff 1956a; cf. Schmitz 1964: 101-11; Mélèze-Modrzejewski 1970: 347-77; Wolff 2002: 191-200; Maehler 
2005. From the perspective of the sixth and seventh centuries, as Beaucamp 2007 argues (in part on the basis of her 
earlier work), the impact of Roman law appears to have been uneven. Certain areas, like property transmission, 
appear to have been more susceptible to the influence and penetration of Roman law than many areas of family life 
and social mores (e.g., divorce). 
73





CHAPTER 2: THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT 
 
Why do we believe that contracts have the potential to promote economic growth? And is this 
potential particular to modern contracts or a feature of all contracts? In other words, to what 
extent does the growth-promoting potential of a contract have to do with the contract itself, and 
to what extent does it have to do with the institutional environment in which the contract is 
made, and how do both relate to enforcement? A significant body of legal and economic theory 
has been built up over the last century to answer these questions in a modern context, and 
reviewing the answers will help us to assess what questions we should and can ask of the ancient 
evidence.  
2.1 Contracts and Exchange 
First, what is a contract?  
 The common law has settled on the following definition of a contract: it is a voluntary 
promise of future exchange that is enforceable by law.
74
 These three elements—voluntariness, 
futurity or the existence of ongoing rights and obligations, and legal enforceability—all 
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contribute to the economic importance of contracting as opposed to other forms of exchange. 
However, it is important to see first that free or voluntary exchanges in themselves can create 
wealth by allowing ―resources [to] gravitate toward their most valuable uses‖ (Kronman and 
Posner 1979: 1-2). Kronman and Posner give the following example: 
 
If A owns a good that is worth only $100 to him but $150 to B, both will be made 
better off by an exchange of A‘s good for B‘s money at any price between $100 
and $150; and if they realize this, they will make the exchange. By making both 
of them better off, the exchange will also increase the wealth of society (of which 
they are members), assuming the exchange does not reduce the welfare of 
nonparties more than it increases A‘s and B‘s welfare. Before the exchange—
which ... takes place at a price of $125—A had a good worth $100 to him and B 
had $125 in cash, a total of $225. After the exchange, A has $125 in cash and B 
has a good worth $150 to him, a total of $275. The exchange has increased the 
wealth of society by $50 (ignoring ... any possible third party effects). 
 
 
In this example the wealth-maximizing effect is not dependent on any contract; what we are 
witnessing is the efficiency of free exchange. Built into this example are several basic 
assumptions of neo-classical economics, namely (i) that the participants can find each other, i.e., 
there is a market; (ii) that they can accurately and instantaneously assess the value of the good 
vis-à-vis their respective positions; and (iii) that willingness to pay is an accurate assessment or 
gauge of value. I will return to some of these assumptions below. For the time being, however, 
the point is that contract is not coterminous with exchange. Of course, a contract may be implied 
in the situation above or in any market situation, and the evidence of this would be the ability of 
B to enforce rescission of the object due to some defect for which A was legally liable. While the 
legal implication of contracts does have important economic effects,
 





economic characteristics of express or formal contracts.
75
 What economic value do these add and 
in what circumstances? Indeed, there are situations in which one can easily imagine that stopping 
to draw up a contract would be positively detrimental to the gains of exchange, e.g., buying a cup 
of coffee. 
Simultaneous exchanges of simple goods and services in general have no need of an 
express contract. If one purchases a glass of wine to drink on the spot, a simple cash transaction 
or barter exchange will suffice: there is no need for contract per se as the transaction is 
effectively completed in the moment. Sequential economic activity, on the other hand, is 
inherently riskier by virtue of the time it takes to complete the transaction. For instance, if A pays 
B to build a house for A to live in, the fact that it takes a certain amount of time in which to 
complete the building means that there exists the potential for B to act opportunistically. For 
example, B may ―hold up‖ A after building half the house by demanding more than the originally 
negotiated amount to complete the work.
76
 Similarly, unforeseen circumstances may intervene in 
the time between the performance by one party and the completion of the reciprocal performance 
by the other. For example, B breaks his leg and cannot complete the job, leaving A out in the 
cold. We should also include in this category transactions that appear to be simultaneous, like 
sale, but are in fact not. Of course, in one sense, a sale is simultaneous: at a real estate closing, A 
hands over money, and B the title to a house, both at the same time. Done deal, end of story. But 
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what if the title is defective in some way, or the boundaries are not as they were advertised? 
Unlike an apple or the money A handed over, B will own and use the house for a comparatively 
long time, such that his ownership or use is in fact open to risk should the house, e.g., turn out to 
sit on someone else‘s land. This is why some sales are concluded by contract, even though the 
transaction itself appears to be simultaneous: the durative nature of the consumption of certain 
items brings with it some of the same risks as a more obviously sequential transaction. 
Sequential transactions thus carry with them certain inherent risks, and unless one can 
effectively protect against them, these risks will tend either to inhibit such transactions from 
taking place, like those that entail long-term agency relationships, are based on credit or payment 
on delivery, or operate as a form of insurance or speculation—in short a range of economically 
important, but more complex, exchange.
77
 Protection against these risks is the basic function of a 
modern contract: it formalizes an agreement as to rights and responsibilities for a certain period 
of time extending into the future such that the original bargain can be enforced in the event that 
those risks materialize and one party refuses or fails to perform to the other party‘s detriment. A 
world without contracts is thus a world more or less confined to simultaneous transactions; or put 
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another way, contracts help to expand the world of possible exchange to include sequential 
transactions, and in doing so increases the percentage of resources that can be put to efficient 
ends via free exchange.
78
 
To sum up thus far, contracting is not exchange, but rather a mode of exchange. 
Specifically, it is a mode of exchange that relates to sequential economic transactions, which are 
inherently vulnerable to the intrinsic uncertainty of future events, as well as the uncertainty of the 
opposite party‘s potential to renege, cheat, or otherwise fail to carry out its obligations. The 
efficiency of contracting per se is therefore distinct from the efficiency of the underlying 
transaction. If the efficiency of voluntary exchange is measured by the extent to which it 
maximizes wealth, the efficiency of contracting is measured by the success with which it 
mitigates or reduces the inherent risks of sequential transactions. Similarly, just as the efficiency 
of any exchange is not absolute (e.g., if there were a C in the example above for whom the object 
was worth $170 and would have paid $135, C‘s exchange with A would have been more 
efficient), so must the efficiency of contracting be measured against that of other modes of 
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2.2 Contract and NIE: Contract as Governance Structure 
NIE‘s historical and intellectual point of departure is the realization that neo-classical economics 
fails to explain the current economic landscape.
80
 For instance, if markets are the most efficient 
way of organizing exchange, as neo-classical economics posits, why is it that firms exist, since 
they allocate resources via hierarchies instead of markets?
81
 Why haven‘t they simply 
disintegrated, disaggregated into a series of independent actors and transactions on the open 
market? Or better yet: how did they ever evolve if they are inherently inefficient? One response 
is to see the firm and the market as representing two different modes of exchange in the modern 
economy, or in Oliver Williamson‘s terms, the market and the firm represent ―governance 
structures,‖ each designed to organize and promote a different type of transaction.  
The type of transaction varies with three basic dimensions of exchange. First, counter to 
the assumption of neo-classical economics, actors are imagined to have a ―bounded rationality‖: 
they enter into transactions intending to act in their self-interest but have only a limited capacity 
for understanding it (in the absence of perfect knowledge, there can be no perfect rationality).
82
 
Second, parties to an exchange will, in certain circumstances, act opportunistically. Perhaps 
better put, if there is the possibility of opportunism, parties will in most cases be alive to it, such 
that it is a constant source of risk.
83
 The third dimension pertains to what is called ―asset 
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specificity,‖ which is a measure of the degree to which the value of assets involved in a given 
transaction is tied to that specific transaction (I give an example below).
84
 
These three factors are present in different degrees in different types of transactions 
(there are other dimensions to consider as well, such as the frequency of transactions between 
parties), and particular suites of these characteristics in turn suggest particular governance 
structures. For instance, the ―market‖ is a useful governance structure for buying oranges, since 
(i) there is low asset specificity (i.e., the oranges can be quickly and cheaply ―redeployed,‖ or 
sold to another person if the first buyer decides that he does not want them at check-out); (ii) 
limited possibility of opportunism (i.e., the structure of the market itself helps to defend against 
opportunism through conspicuous competition, keeping the seller honest as to quality and price); 
and (iii) one needs little knowledge and planning in order to select and use oranges (i.e., bounded 
rationality converges for all practical purposes with complete rationality). On the other hand, if 
Amazon seeks to have a certain technology company build the Kindle as a medium for its 
electronic books, this is a transaction that has high asset specificity (i.e., were Amazon to pull 
out, these companies could very well be left having invested heavily in equipment and 
technology which no one else wanted), and so great potential for opportunism (e.g., Amazon 
might renegotiate after the company had already invested because it knows that there are no 
other buyers), as well as for the impact of bounded rationality to make itself felt (e.g., in good 
faith Amazon discovers that the Kindle is not the wave of the future, or the company 
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manufacturing the device drastically underestimated its costs). In such a transaction, the open 
market would offer no protection at all; in fact, this transaction would be so fraught with risks 
and unknowns that Amazon might very well decide to produce the Kindle entirely ―in house.‖85 
In other words, a transaction with this sort of asset specificity might require the hierarchical 
organization of the firm in order to proceed, even though this organizational structure comes 
with its own costs.
86
  
Finally, there is a third way of organizing transactions, which is contracting, a 
governance structure distinct from both the ―market‖ and the firm.87 Seen in the light of NIE, a 
contract is not limited to the positive law of contract, but rather serves as a ―framework‖ for a 
particular kind of economic transaction.
88
 The particular purpose of contract as a governance 
structure is, as suggested in the previous section, to allow sequential or more complex economic 
activity to go forward by offering a protection against the risks inherent in these transactions at a 
cost lower than that which hierarchical integration imposes. From this perspective, as opposed to 
the legal perspective, the transaction is the basic unit of analysis, and the contract is merely a 
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device, or ―framework,‖ which structures it. This in turn suggests that we must analyze 
contracting in a wider lens than lawyers, ancient or modern, have typically done, investigating it 
―in its entirety.‖ In practical terms, this means looking at all the costs associated with organizing 
transactions via contract (as opposed to a market or a hierarchy).
89
  
If the transaction is the basic unit of analysis in NIE, then transaction costs (TC) are the 
basic units of measure. There are several ways in which to conceive of and categorize TC. 
Perhaps the most common conception of them is as the ―friction‖ of the world of exchange.90 
The costs associated specifically with contracting as a governance structure may be grouped in 
any number of ways, but for our purposes here the best way is to relate them chronologically to 
the formation of the contract, but with a view to the transaction as a whole, or to think of them as 
ex ante (before the fact) and ex post (after the fact), with the defining moment of the contract 
representing a fulcrum.
91
 The ex ante costs include the cost of negotiating, drafting, and 
―safeguarding‖ an agreement. This last category could potentially include the cost of notarizing, 
or of discovering one‘s legal rights with regard to the contract, or warranties, guarantees, or 
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earnest money incorporated into the contract designed either to limit the other party‘s exposure 
or to signal a ―credible commitment‖ on one‘s part. Ex ante costs are therefore assumed largely 
for the purpose of aligning the parties‘ interests before performance begins.  
Ex post costs, on the other hand, are those involved in getting the other party to perform 
after the contract is signed. As such, they include, among other things, the cost of monitoring or 
measuring performance, or enforcing the contract should measurement of performance reveal a 
breach, or even of renegotiating or modifying the contract. They are thus the costs assumed in 
adapting to unforeseen circumstances, or, to paraphrase Williamson, of getting to Y after having 
contracted for X.
92
 Ex post costs are clearly the costs of enforcement, but this is in fact too 
narrow a view. Since the purpose of a contract, whether at law or as ―framework,‖ is to protect 
against the inherent risks of sequential, complex transactions, it is important to see that even the 
ex ante costs are incurred with an eye to enforcement.
93
 Aligning interests, in other words, is but 
the anticipation of enforcement, a cost of making the contract enforceable according to the 
conditions (or the perception thereof) in which the bargain is struck: ―[A] contract will be written 
with enforcement characteristics of exchange in mind.‖94 As noted in the first chapter, however, 
not all contracts are enforced legally, or merely legally; indeed, as private agreements all 
contracts begin as extra-judicial relationships, and all will therefore have some, if not a 
predominantly, extra-legal character to their enforcement.  
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As suggested in the first chapter, ex post activities (and their costs) are not typically 
viewed as the domain of contract proper by lawyers and legal scholars precisely because they are 
ex post. In fact, classical contract law and neo-classical economic theory both generally assume 
enforcement by assuming that: (i) access to courts is cheap and easy; (ii) legal knowledge and 
skill evenly distributed; (iii) the courts capable of accurate and costless measurement of 
performance and of compelling a resolution; (iv) the courts apply the law in an even-handed 
fashion; (v) the authorities are willing and able to enforce decisions. In such a world ex post costs 
will indeed be negligible: parties will litigate, and the correct resolution will be discovered and 
implemented. Of course, none of these assumptions is true, certainly not in antiquity nor even in 
the twenty-first century: litigation is anything but easy or automatic; access to courts is often 
difficult and expensive; legal knowledge and skill, like any other sort of knowledge and skill, are 
unevenly distributed and usually expensive; the risk of error or incompetence on the part of a 
court is significant and can make the already expensive process of litigation potentially 
disastrously so in its results; etc. Given these realities, it is unsurprising that many parties 
negotiate or arbitrate contractual differences instead of litigating them.
95
 They are, after all, 
better placed to understand the original agreement and measure performance than a third-party, 
and moreover have an obvious stake in discovering a mutually advantageous resolution. They are 
also less likely than legal professionals in most cases to be bound by rules that can get in the way 
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of a reasonable and satisfactory resolution.
96
 Therefore, it is often the case that a ―court ordering 
is better regarded as a background factor rather than the central forum for dispute resolution. 
Thus, although the legal technicalities of contract law remain useful for purposes of ultimate 
appeal, thereby to delimit threat positions, legal centralism (court ordering) gives way to private 
ordering as the primary arena.‖97 For all these reasons, part and parcel of the recognition of 
contract as ―framework‖ is an accounting for ex post costs. We must therefore move beyond the 
assumptions of classical contract law in analyzing our ancient legal documents and recognize 
that there is more than one source of enforcement, with the necessary conclusion that the 
interpretation of contracts must seek to read ex ante design and costs in light of ex post costs and 
the full system of enforcement.  
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2.3 Contract Enforcement and Self-help 
In the next chapter I will draw a full model of contract from the perspective of enforcement, but 
here I would like to concentrate on the main source of contractual enforcement other than the 
legal system (―official third-party enforcement‖), which is the self-help the parties exercise 
themselves (―second-party enforcement‖). Third-party enforcement in the form of official or 
state enforcement is, of course, the most familiar type in the modern context, and therefore needs 
no special discussion here: as implied immediately above, it is no more than the law of contracts, 
which sets out which contracts have legal force, and the remedies therein prescribed, coupled 
with the actual capacity and execution of the state in the promulgation, application, and 
enforcement of its laws and judgments.
98
 Second-party enforcement, or self-help, on the other 
hand, is recognized by legal professionals and scholars, but often tends to be disregarded even by 
the laymen who exercise it, since it is conceptually, if not always actually, outside the law.
99
 For 
related reasons, it has also been fairly narrowly conceived by scholars of ancient law over the 
course of the twentieth century. When they have considered self-help at all, it was usually with 
respect to violent acts that appear antithetical to the rule of law, or Eigenmacht. This tendency is 
the natural counterpart to the widely-adopted evolutionary model of Roman law developed by 
Jhering, who speculated that ―the origin of Roman civil procedure ... resulted from the State‘s 
imposition of restraint and order upon the régime of self-help and private vengeance which in 
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primitive times was the only known way of enforcing supposed rights and redressing supposed 
wrongs.‖100  
To take discussions of law in Graeco-Roman Egypt as a relevant illustration of the last 
point, in the last half century there have been only two significant discussions of self-help for the 
imperial period. Sixty years ago Raphael Taubenschlag sketched a brief account from a purely 
legal perspective. He argued that there was a general prohibition against self-help in Ptolemaic 
and Roman Egypt, with the exception of a few discrete areas of law in which self-help was 
permitted either by a positive grant of the legal authorities or in ―cases where legal selfhelp [was] 
admitted by private agreements.‖101 He then proceeded to catalog these exceptions. Several 
decades later, Deborah Hobson approached the concept obliquely from a sociological angle in a 
paper in which she sought to describe the typical villager‘s relationship to ―the law.‖102 Of the 
two, only Taubenschlag offered an explicit definition of ―self-help‖: 
 
Selfhelp in the technical sense of the term exists when somebody unilaterally secures or 
satisfies his real or pretended claim; that means that somebody takes the law in his own 
hands without the permission of his adversary and without the intervention of the court 
and proceeds against the person or the property of his adversary. (1959: I, 135) 
 
 
Several elements of this definition are problematic when tested against the evidence, chiefly the 
strong opposition he erects between self-help and the law and the concomitant exclusion of state 
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participation in acts which are nonetheless best described as ―self-help.‖ The most troubling 
element of Taubenschlag‘s definition, however, is one that remains implicit in the passage above 
but is evident in his treatment as a whole, namely that self-help rises to the level of a legal 
doctrine in antiquity. This notion is not only historically false, but also leads Taubenschlag into 
conceptual difficulties which obscure the nature and role of self-help generally, and particularly 
in particular with regard to the manner in which it functioned in the legal culture of Roman 
Egypt.  
As stated above, Taubenschlag interpreted the instances of self-help he collected against 
the backdrop of a general, legislative prohibition. For such a prohibition, however, there is no 
evidence. For the Roman period he cites but a single document, P.Flor. 61 (=M.Chr. 80 
[unknown, 85]), a transcript of official proceedings in which the Prefect threatens to have the 
plaintiff whipped, apparently for his having imprisoned an   σχή ω  and his wife in an attempt 
to collect on a debt (ll. 8-12; 59-66). The document obviously speaks to self-help, and indeed at 
one point the rhētor for the defense refers to term-limits on certain actions as embodied in a 
―general rule‖ (τὸ   θο   ό , ll. 44ff.), but nothing in this papyrus suggests the existence of a 
general prohibition of self-help.
103
 So far from it being a specific ―punishment‖ for the ―crime‖ 
of self-help, the threat of whipping rather appears to be the spontaneous reaction of a piqued 
Prefect, frustrated with what he clearly considers a frivolous or fraudulent plaintiff.
104
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Taubenschlag also adduces two fourth-century papyri in support of his notion of a 
prohibition, SPP XX 88 (unknown, 337) and P.Oxf. 6 (Herakleopolite, 350), in which the 
plaintiffs assert that others have acted ―illegally‖ by proceeding ―without a court decision‖ or 
―order,‖ ἄ  υ     στ  οῦ     ίου and ἄ  υ     στ  οῦ προστά   τος, respectively. In these 
phrases, Taubenschlag heard a verbal echo of an imperial decree of Marcus Aurelius (Dig. 
48.7.7; cf. 4.2.13 [Callistratus]), and asserted that the ―same principles‖ articulated in these two 
petitions ―underlay the decretum divi Marci and were applied in Egypt in the Roman epoch.‖105 
The echo is indeed striking, but so are the dates of the papyri. The decree, at the time that it was 
issued, was intended to affect only those who dealt with each other on the terms of Roman law, 
which is to say, Roman citizens, not the mass of Egyptians who were allowed by and large to 
conduct their affairs according to traditional legal practices, particularly in business matters. 
Even after the implementation of the constitutio Antoniniana in 212 CE, the influence of Roman 
law on legal transactions in Egypt, at least as far as they are documented in the papyri, increased 
only marginally, and superficially at that.
 106
 Indeed, the fourth century is precisely the period in 
which we begin to see Roman law leaving a more profound impression on the private legal 
documents of ancient Egypt.
107
 These two papyri, then, in no way attest to any formal legal 
prohibition of self-help in the first three centuries of Roman Egypt. Rather, if they do in fact 
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attest to the application, or at least the dissemination of Marcus‘s decree in Egypt, they thus bear 




The theoretical problems associated with conceiving of self-help as a legal doctrine, 
however, are at least as profound as the historical ones. Even if such a prohibition had been 
decreed, with the authorities subsequently carving out and reserving certain areas for self-help, 
by what authority or on the basis of what legal theory could individuals by merely private 
agreement ―opt out‖ of areas of law not so designated and thereby establish new legal 
competencies for self-help? In other words, what other status but ―illegal‖ could a private 
agreement have that created an idiosyncratic law of process or execution in an area not already 
marked out for self-help by positive law? Taubenschlag‘s conception of self-help as the product 
of official waiver from a blanket prohibition would seem to exclude the possibility of the 
individual having the right to establish the limits of self-help. And yet, he very rightly 
documented a number of important instances in which we may see individuals engaged in just 
this sort of activity in contracts of various sorts.
109
 Significantly, the principal provisions and 
actions he collects, namely personal execution and the foreclosure of pledged or mortgaged 
property, are not only common in the papyri and clearly regarded as ―legal‖ by the authorities 
when litigated, but were just as clearly the primary methods by which such contracts were 
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 That is to say, if personal execution and foreclosure are at least in part self-help 
mechanisms, then far from being a marginal or exceptional or epiphenomenal to the system of 
legal enforcement—the impression with which Taubenschlag leaves us—self-help would seem 
to constitute one of the foundations of legal economic transactions in the Roman Egypt. The two 
foci of Taubenschlag‘s account, the official and the private, are thus left unintegrated, and so his 
idea of self-help remains broken-backed, regardless of the historicity of his prohibition.  
In the larger perspective, Taubenschlag‘s short article would hardly seem to merit even 
the attention given to it so far, despite its being the only direct treatment of the subject. And yet, 
the fact that it stands vitually alone in the scholarship is itself noteworthy and indicative of how 
comparatively little attention the topic has generated. How could scholars all too aware of the 
defects and deficiencies they themselves saw in the ancient legal systems neglect to study the 
ways in which those defects were made good, the ways in which force and power were given to 
the legal agreements and processes they studied? How, in other words, could this short article be 
the only article on self-help in the legal literature of Roman Egypt, particularly when we bear in 
mind just how small the Roman ―government‖ in Egypt was?111  
In one sense, the answer is simple: since these forces and mechanisms were neither those 
of the state nor those of the law per se, so they were either irrelevant or regarded as antinomian 
by the lawyers who studied them. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries produced 
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historians and legal scholars who inherited and by and large embraced progressive theories of the 
state and the law, having witnessed the fantastic and undeniable growth in power of both. 
Contemporary history and progressive theory thus combined to produce a general tendency to 
overestimate the importance of positive law and the power of central authorities to dictate the 
norms of lawful behavior, an attitude that has been dubbed ―legal centralism.‖112 An essentially 
legal centralist perspective permeates not only Taubenschlag‘s work, but much of late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century historiography of the ancient world, e.g., the common view of 
Ptolemaic Egypt and the later Roman Empire as proto-totalitarian regimes.
113
 Taubenschlag, 
however, was, if anything, quicker than most of his contemporaries to posit positive legal 
authorization in order to explain the evidence which ancient legal systems left behind. His 
alleged prohibition of self-help is thus echoed by his similar recourse to a legislative codification 
and reception of    ό ος τ῵  Α  υπτίω  in the beginning of the Roman period. As with the 
general prohibition of self-help, so also there is no positive evidence of such a codification or 
reception, and neither seems likely prima facie given what is known of the nature and practice of 
Roman provincial administration in Egypt and elsewhere.
114
  
Though many of Taubenschlag‘s historical theories have been discarded, the historical 
and intellectual paradigm on which they were based was and is still widely held. And the impact 
has been significant with respect to the study of self-help, since such a perspective can only be 
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hostile to it, as its zone of action necessarily lies in the penumbra of the law. Indeed, in this 
tradition—which is essentially the Roman law tradition, the primary training of the majority of 
twentieth-century juristic papyrologists—the use of self-help has often been considered an index 
of legal primitivism, barbarism, or decline, set in direct opposition with ―law.‖ It is a major 
limitation of the literature on Roman law that it tends to consider self-help as largely coincident 
with an early evolutionary phase left behind with the institution of the Twelve Tables and the 
subsequent development of Roman society.
115
 No legal system could ever afford in practice 
(whatever it pretended to in theory) to crowd self-help out entirely with official enforcement, not 
even truly totalitarian regimes.
116
 In point of fact, neither the Greeks nor the Romans ever 
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The lack of the sort of regulation Taubenschlag envisioned does not mean that the Roman 
provincial government was unconcerned to regulate self-help (for it was), nor that self-help 
operated independently of state enforcement (which it did not). Yet, given the discussion above, 
we clearly need to rethink our basic set of questions with regard to enforcement so as to integrate 
a fuller, more realistic view of self-help into our discussion of ancient contracting. For instance, 
at what point did ―rights‖ to self-help created in contracts run afoul of the prerogative of the state 
and positive law, and how did this notion evolve over time? By the same token, how and to what 
extent did the self-help provisions drafted in contracts relate to the modes and possibilities of 
state enforcement in Roman Egypt? We also need a better understanding of the psychology and 
calculation involved in self-help: how and when did our contract parties in Egypt decide to 
attempt to ―unilaterally secure their real or pretended claims‖ instead of seeking state 
enforcement, or pursue some mixed strategy? Indeed, how did they conceive of their 
enforcement actions? Did they see themselves as ―taking the law into their own hands,‖ as 
Taubenschlag would have it, or did they perhaps understand themselves as agents of the law in 
that moment? Again, how did the authorities relate to self-help measures set out in private 
contracts, and what was the difference between what they (or the community) saw as legitimate 
self-help, vigilantism, or outright ―crime‖?118 
These are all important questions, and ones for which we need a new model for self-help, 
one which enables us to make sense of its complicated relationship to law and the legal 
authorities. Hobson‘s work leads us toward the sort of framework we are searching for. Her 
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essay is not a study of self-help per se, but rather a wider-ranging exploration of the ways in 
which villagers and Egyptians higher up the socio-economic ladder, though still only of 
metropolitan status, related to ―the law‖ in the period with which we are primarily concerned. 
Accordingly, her first goal was to understand the sociological place of positive law in Roman 
Egypt. She concludes that most of the inhabitants of the Heptanomia and the Thebaid (whence 
come the vast majority of our papyri) would have been aware of law ―in its manifestation as 
bureaucracy rather than legal codes, ... whether or not the individual villager perceived this as 
law,‖ a finding, as she remarks, that is inescapable on the basis of the papyri since they are 
themselves largely the product of this bureaucracy.
119
 Within this broad conclusion, however, 
she also finds that most people would have been oblivious to the technical differences between 
the various fonts of positive law that have been of traditional importance to scholars and jurists 
(e.g., edicts versus rescripts), as well as perhaps of the various competencies of governmental 
officers (if, indeed, the officers understood such differences themselves).
120
 Finally, all of this is 
carefully qualified according to socio-economic status: the relationship and use of positive law 
by the comparatively wealthier and more centrally-located inhabitants of Oxyrhynchos is 
predictably be shown to be more profound and sophisticated than that of the inhabitants of the 
village of Soknopaiou Nesos, a small, almost entirely Egyptian temple village on the far 
northwestern edge of the Fayyum.
121
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The rest of Hobson‘s analysis is given over to petitions, since in her view these 
documents ―give us the most direct information about how and when village inhabitants 
appealed to legal bodies to assist them in settling disputes, and ... therefore ... the most realistic 
insight into how individuals actually experienced the judicial system in their everyday lives.‖122  
Here she advances several important conclusions concerning the nature, role, and efficacy of 
petitions in Roman Egypt. First, she understands these petitions as ―the end of the disputing 
process rather than the beginning,‖ finding many indications that complainants had made 
previous attempts to ―rectify the situation before calling for outside help.‖123 In her view, the 
petitioning process thus ―exists on the perimeter of what is essentially a system of self-help 
rather than a penal system as we know it.‖124 Second, she finds that the petitions rarely, if ever, 
clearly differentiate between ―criminal‖ and ―civil‖ complaints; instead, ―the frame of reference 
is not ‗the law,‘ though a violation of some law may be involved, but rather the belief that the 
rights of ... the petitioner have been violated in some way.‖125 Third, she imagines that a 
―satisfactory resolution‖ to a typical complainant‘s problem via this route was ―improbable‖ 
given the evidence for multiple petitions and multiple referrals for the same suit, as well as the 
lack of evidence for concrete measures either requested of or performed by the various officers 
who were petitioned. After all the steps involved in bringing a suit (e.g., finding the culprit, 
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drafting and filing the requisite documents, compiling evidence and collecting witnesses, 
traveling to the audience, etc.), ―it seems that enforcement depended on the moral authority of 
the judgment for its efficacy.‖126 
The value in this approach to the law for this historian is the obvious one associated with 
sociology generally, in that it seeks to understand the operation of the law on the basis of 
observed behavior instead of the prescriptive pronouncements of jurists and officials. This 
approach also incidentally serves to redress the important imbalance inherent in the dominant 
legal centrist perspective of the earlier, and still influential, historiography of ancient law. 
Furthermore, it jibes with the theoretical proposition that contracts need to be interpreted from 
the perspective of enforcement. What is needed, then, is an integration of Hobson‘s perspective 
into discussions of contract, a sort of ancient legal realism. Specifically, this will mean: (i) 
recognizing a conceptually wider notion of self-help as an integral feature of the landscape of 
actual contract enforcement; (ii) paying greater attention to non-legal evidence, substantively 
(i.e., understanding motivations, attitudes, norms, etc.) and therefore generically (i.e., reading our 
contracts in light not only of legal documents, like petitions or trial transcripts, but also of letters, 
which reveal non-legal evidence); and (iii) establishing the relationship of ―crime‖ to contract 
disputes. Before we attempt this, however, we need a better understanding of the relationship of 
contract to the various sources of enforcement suggested both by the theory laid out in the 
beginning of this chapter and the historical observations of scholars like Hobson. This is the task 
of Chapter 3. And since self-help will be found to be defined or constrained not merely by the 
                                                 
126





ethical sensibilities and physical capacity of the contract parties, but also by social norms and 
law, so must each of these elements—ethics, norms, and law—be established before we may 





2.4 Contracting in the State of Nature 
The legal centralism of both the historiographical tradition and, more justifiably, of modern 
experience has left us at a disadvantage with respect to ancient contract parties, who were 
profoundly and practically aware of the potential, modes, and costs of official and second-party 
enforcement when they went to the local grapheion to ink their contracts. Given the importance 
of extra-legal sources of enforcement described above, it is incumbent upon us to refocus our 
sights on the non-legal aspects of contracting, attempting to read ancient contracts through 
ancient eyes. It will be helpful, then, to distinguish in the abstract those features of contract 
design with an eye to second-party enforcement.  
Anthony Kronman has helpfully explored this topic by considering contracting in a ―state 
of nature.‖ By ―state of nature‖ Kronman means the following: 
 
When two individuals (or groups) exchange promises and neither has the power to 
compel the other to perform, and there is also no third party powerful enough to enforce 
the agreement on their behalf, I shall speak of them as being in a state of nature vis-à-vis 
one another … .When I say that neither has the power to compel the other‘s performance, 
I mean that neither possesses such power on his own or can acquire it without the other's 
cooperation (for example, by the voluntary transfer of a hostage). In a state of nature, the 
parties to an agreement must establish, by themselves, the conditions of whatever 
enforcement powers they hope to enjoy—these powers do not exist by nature and, more 
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Kronman‘s state of nature is thus a heuristic device for modeling contracting in the absence of 
third-party enforcement, or in other words, under the condition of pure second-party 
enforcement. That said, there are historical situations that have approached this scenario, like the 
Gold Rush of 1848 in California, when fewer than a thousand US troops occupied the territory 
and Mexican law pertaining to mineral rights had been formally abolished. Despite, or perhaps 
because of, the potential for anarchy, miners drew up contracts defining their prospecting rights, 
and the design of these contracts responded to the nature of the enforcement possibilities and 
changed over time as more and more miners flocked to California in search of gold, altering the 
balance of power on the ground.
128
 Now, Roman Egypt may have had a ―small government‖ of 
limited capacity when compared to the modern technological nation state, but it was clearly no 
state of nature or as anarchic as California during the Gold Rush. Indeed, characterizing the 
Roman government and its attitude towards and capacity for contract enforcement is itself an 
important task,
129
 and our contracts, and the extent to which they can be shown to rely in their 
very design on self-help, obviously constitute an important piece of evidence in this analysis. It 
therefore repays the effort to investigate some of the primary methods by which contracts can be 
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made to be ―self-enforcing‖ in the mental laboratory of a state of nature.130 Drawing on earlier 
economic and legal literature, Kronman isolates four techniques for crafting ―self-enforcing‖ 
contracts: (a) hostages, (b) collateral, (c) ―hands-tying,‖ and (d) union. As pointed out below in 
the text or notes, we have examples of each strategy in ancient documentary contracts. 
A party may give a hostage in order to ensure his own performance, and the key to this 
technique is that the hostage is of idiosyncratic value to the giver (for otherwise, the taker might 
simply abandon the contract and make off with the hostage).
131
 As Kronman puts it: 
 
Hostage-giving is, in fact, simply a means for achieving a simultaneity that would 
otherwise be unattainable; the hostage acts as a bridge between two temporally distant 
moments of performance and brings them into an artificial union with one another. In this 
sense, the function of hostage-giving is to transform exchange back into barter. (1985: 
13)  
 
In other words, this technique takes direct aim at the root problem of contract enforcement, the 
sequential nature of the underlying transaction, by splitting one sequential transaction into two 
simultaneous transactions: a performance for a hostage and the hostage for the reciprocal 
performance. There are problems with this solution, however. For example, the giver could 
overstate the value of the hostage, leaving the taker with little real leverage over the giver; or the 
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hostage-taker could not return the hostage at the time of performance, and then the positions 
would be reversed. Thus, the hostage becomes itself a source of opportunism.  
The use of collateral, which by definition is of value to both the giver and the recipient, 
solves the particular opportunism problem of hostage-giving (i.e., you give me a hostage of little 
actual value to yourself), but it raises a different strategic problem in its place. It is now 
necessary to match the level of commitment and expectation in the contract to the level of 
security. If the recipient is under-collateralized, he thus effectively ends up in the hostage 
position again (i.e., he has too little leverage over the giver‘s performance). If, on the other hand, 
he is over-collateralized, he may simply walk away or bargain to extract more of the giver‘s 
performance in exchange for returning the collateral (the ―hold-up‖ problem all over again). In 
fact, this will be true even if the recipient is perfectly collateralized: presumably the collateral 
still means more to the giver than it does to the recipient, otherwise it would have been the basis 
of the transaction instead of merely collateral. This state of affairs, in fact, represents a 
structurally unavoidable incentive to the giver to resist full collateralization. Finally, the obvious 
strategic potential in this form of security clearly necessitates some bargaining and measurement 
costs, which even when expended cannot remove all possibility of the risk of opportunism they 
are meant to mitigate.
132
  
The third technique, ―hand-tying,‖ involves prescribing ―actions that make a promise 
more credible by putting it out of the promisor‘s power to breach without incurring costs he 
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could otherwise have avoided‖ (Kronman 1985: 18). In other words, a self-executing sanction is 
inscribed in the contract such that the effect is more or less automatic upon breach and does not 
involve any action on the part of the promisee (like destroying the hostage or defending 
possession of the collateral). Kronman‘s example is having a tailor cut cloth for a suit at the time 
of order. By agreeing to do this, the tailor effectively turns his own cloth into a specific asset: 
unless the tailor makes the suit, he will have to wait for someone with the exact same order to 
come in or otherwise be forced to use it for a lower value use, e.g., re-cutting it for a smaller suit. 
The contract thus makes the tailor hold his own cloth hostage for his performance. Of course, 
such devices are not necessarily available for every transaction, and in any case there is still 
room for opportunism as in the hostage technique: for whatever reason, the action could turn out 
to be worth less to the promisor than the promisee calculated. For instance, if one ordered a dark 
blue wool suit, size 42 Regular, this will not tie the tailor‘s hands very effectively, as it is a very 
common suit size, color, and material. Hence, it will be no great hardship for the tailor to wait for 
another customer with the same order to appear (though of course in this instance he might as 
well make it for you).
133
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These three techniques, hostage-giving, collateralizing, and hands-tying, all ―assume an 
opposition of interests on the part of those involved; their aim is to moderate the effects of this 
opposition by altering the costs and benefits of breach, but the existence of the opposition is a 
fact that each of these techniques takes for granted‖ and so cannot fundamentally resolve.134 The 
fourth technique, union, differs insofar as it attempts to unite the two parties such that they are no 
longer independent, thereby extinguishing the possibility of opportunism. ―Hands-tying, hostage-
giving, and the use of collateral are methods for transacting within the state of nature; union is a 
method for abolishing it‖ (Kronman 1985: 23). Attempts at union may be seen in the structures 
and ideology of family life, which encourage members to subordinate personal interests or 
identify with one another. Marriage, for instance, is just such an institution, and one frequently 
deployed in order to handle complex and extended political and economic relationships at all 
levels in ancient society, whether seen from the perspective of papyrus marriage contracts or the 
ill-starred marriage of Caesar‘s daughter Iulia to Pompeius in 59 BCE. Though union as a strategy 
would seem to provide the ultimate solution to the problem of contracting in a state of nature, 
there are two significant problems. The first, of course, is that it is simply very hard to achieve; it 
is rarely a practical strategy. The second problem is related: when union is not complete, the 
parties are in fact still independent and potentially still strategizing around their respective 
conceptions of self-interest. One party can therefore be caught off-guard all the more easily, 
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particularly in the beginning, if it has made a fundamental commitment to union, while the other 
has not.
135
 This makes union a potentially rewarding, but highly risky, strategy from the outset. 
These strategies may sound familiar: they are but another way of viewing Williamson‘s 
choice of governance structures. Hostage-giving, collateral, and hands-tying are all techniques 
meant to help forge ―credible commitments‖ by parties looking to the end of a transaction. 
Union, on the other hand, is the end of contracting proper and a move towards integration, or the 
―firm‖ (loosely speaking) as a governance structure. Implicit in both models is a certain sort of 
reasoning or strategizing around the basic costs associated with different paths to a transactional 
goal, with the costs not only dictating the choice of path, but the decision to take the first step: 
 
In the state of nature, the parties to a transaction have a choice, generally speaking, 
between the following four alternatives: they can make their exchange simultaneously; 
they can simply accept the risks which nonsimultaneity implies and go forward without 
any security at all; they can forgo the exchange completely; or they can adopt one (or 
some combination) of the techniques ... Which alternative they choose will depend, in 
any particular case, upon its relative cost. If it is very costly to achieve simultaneity, for 
example, the parties may have to choose between an extremely risky exchange, no 
exchange at all, and an exchange supported by hostage-giving or some other form of 
security. If they choose the latter alternative, the parties must also select from among the 
various techniques available to them—again, on the basis of their relative cost. None of 
these techniques is costless and each has its own specific limitations. Indeed, they may all 
be too costly, given the expected benefits of a particular exchange, in which case the 
exchange itself will either be made without security or simply fail. (Kronman 1985: 23) 
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2.5 Contract and NIE: The Historical Perspective 
The second half of Kronman‘s essay is dedicated to reminding his audience that ―the existence of 
the state and an enforceable law of contracts do not put an end to the risks that parties transacting 
in a state of nature face, and in this sense they do not put an end to the state of nature itself‖ 
(Kronman 1985: 24).
136
 In other words, no one writes a contract, even in places today where 
there is effective third-party enforcement, with such enforcement exclusively in mind, since, as 
suggested in section 2.2 above, private orderings are frequently preferable to court orderings 
regardless of the effectiveness of the third party. By the same token, however, the number of 
contracts one would likely enter into were there no effective third-party enforcement, or in 
Kronman‘s state of nature, would be much more limited. And, as Williamson points out, even in 
a world of relational contracting court orderings do have a background function in delimiting 
―threat positions.‖ In other words, they represent a basic assurance of an independent and 
ultimate arbiter, guaranteeing a forum both for being heard (a powerful psychological motive in 
some cases) and for definitively ending the dispute should the private ordering fail. In fact, the 
very incapacity of this forum to resolve disputes in a satisfactory or predictable way may prove 
to be the best incentive for parties to resolve disputes on their own. A good part of the value of 
the third-party enforcer, therefore, is found in its bare existence (though there must also be the 
occasional demonstration of its power).  
Yet one must not discount the fact that the majority of a third-party enforcer‘s value to 
contracting parties resides in the quality of its justice, or its ability to generate fair, predictable, 
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and effective outcomes that serve to end disputes. This is to recognize that contract as an 
institution or governance structure depends on a certain institutional matrix (or a certain 
institutional investment) in order to operate in anything but the most rudimentary and limited 
manner. Specifically, it depends on institutions that help bring down the ex post cost of 
enforcement, which will in turn bring down some of the ex ante costs, since they are interrelated. 
And this is a matter of history, not theory. Not all third-party enforcers are or have been of the 
same quality, and therefore no sense can be made of contracting as an institution in any 
particular time or place without an adequate picture of the state or whatever entities are 
responsible for third-party enforcement.  
To answer this question requires a change in lens. There are (at least) two basic schools 
of NIE, one represented by Oliver Williamson, whose basic model we have recapitulated above, 
and the other represented by Douglass North, who refers to it as the ―University of Washington 
approach.‖ While these two schools share basic assumptions, terminology, methodology, and a 
common point of departure in the foundational importance of TC, they are nevertheless difficult 
to synthesize, even by their own admission.
137
 No systematic attempt, therefore, will be made to 
do so here. Rather, I will employ them as two different frames of analysis.  
The Williamsonian frame of reference is static and given to comparing forms of 
organization horizontally across a stable set of coexisting, synchronic options. For instance, it 
assumes a set of behavioral attributes differing from those of neo-classical economists (cf. 
Section 2.2. above), but for that no less universal. The possibility of opportunism is thus a 
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constant, and no room is made for the effects of different ideologies or institutions which might 
conceivably alter this behavioral assumption. Similarly, it also tends to assume that the TC 
associated with various governance structures are constant, thereby ignoring the power (and 
motives) of states to transform them through time. Of course, given Williamson‘s basic aims, 
this is not only understandable but unexceptionable: he was building a model to clarify the 
organizational working and choices of a fairly developed and stable system, the late twentieth-
century western economy. However, this frame of reference needs to be opened up and made 
more dynamic by the inclusion of ideology, politics, and change in basic institutional relations, 
and therefore TC, over time if it is to be useful for historical purposes. This is the approach 
pioneered by Douglass C. North. 
Over the course of his career, North has attempted to develop a mode of economic history 
based on TC that explains differential performance of economies over time. Thus, instead of 
attempting to answer at any one moment why an actor might choose one form of economic 
governance over another, he seeks to understand what factors led to the fantastic economic 
growth of western economies beginning in the early modern period (or, conversely, what 
explains the relatively poor performance of contemporary developing nations).
138
 This is 
precisely the sort of comparative question at stake in studying the ancient economy, and 
accordingly his approach has begun to be adopted by ancient economic historians. North‘s basic 
observation is that with the change in ideologies and institutions over time, there are 
corresponding changes in the relative levels of TC, which are themselves the origins of 
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institutions, or the ―the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction,‖ defining and 
limiting the set of choices individuals may make.
139
 In his view, institutions may be formal, as in 
the law of contracts, or informal, like an unwritten code of ethics or social conventions.
140
 The 
agents of change in this model are individual actors and organizations, like guilds or the Prefect‘s 
office, which not only play by the rules, but push them at the margins in the pursuit of their own 
interests, and in so doing effect changes in the rules themselves over time.
141
 While alive to 
possible institutional discontinuities brought about by war, revolutions, and the like, North 
instead insists on the incremental, path-dependent nature of institutional change as representing 
the norm over the longue durée.
142
  
The overall question of performance is linked to the extent to which a society‘s 
institutions not only allow parties to capture increasing percentages of the gains from trade (or, in 
other words, to increasing perfect property rights), but also to promote adaptive efficiency.
143
 
The latter may be envisioned as the product of an institution that contains within it a sort of 
feedback loop for capturing the gains of institutional learning by agents and organizations as they 
play by the rules.
144
 In other words, adaptively efficient institutions not only channel existing 
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exchange into allocatively efficient modes, but also incentivize the development of skills that are 
oriented towards new forms of productive, efficient exchange. For example, in enforcing 
contracts, a third-party enforcer promotes contracting as such; and, as more contracts are written, 
more learning takes place in the society as to how to forge better and more efficient contracts. Of 
course, a quick glance at the historical record shows that there is no necessity for efficient 
institutions of either sort, allocative or adaptive, to exist: societies have routinely developed and 
fostered institutions that raise instead of lower aggregate TC, maintaining them for a 
considerable time. ―Inefficiency,‖ then, ―is neither necessary nor sufficient for institutional 
change to occur.‖145 This is largely because formal institutions are designed by particular 
individuals and organizations with myopically personal interests in mind (self-interest wrongly 




As with Williamson, the engine driving North‘s model is TC, though he adopts a slightly 
different definition of TC as the cost of information:  
 
the costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which consist of the 
costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of 
protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements. (1990: 27) 
 
 
North‘s point is not so much that one must exclude from the category of TC concrete costs such 
as filing fees, but rather that such costs are of secondary importance: the controlling cost is that 
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of information precisely because it is so difficult and costly to collect and value.
147
 One pole in 
North‘s information spectrum of TC is represented by measurement costs (cf. the need to 
measure asset specificity in Williamson‘s model), while the other is represented by enforcement 
costs. In contradistinction to Williamson‘s organizational model, North‘s historical model holds 
that TC and production costs are neither independent nor static, but interdependent and variable. 
Specifically, he notes the importance of recognizing that enforcement costs are not constant, as 
Williamson‘s static model assumes, but have changed throughout history, and most dramatically 
with the invention of the modern Western state, which lowered the costs of enforcing contracts 
and property rights to a historically unprecedented level.
148
 Thus, for instance, the state may 
standardize weights, measures, and currencies, or establish guarantees as to the quality of 
products, or license dealers. Each of these acts could lower the cost of information to a potential 
buyer as he sought to compare products or prices, discover latent defects, determine the 
reputation of a potential partner, and facilitate enforcement of the transaction in the face of 
malfeasance. These actions thus have the effect of altering the prevailing landscape of TC, and 
so the differential calculus of the sort that Williamson engages in as an individual deciding how 
to proceed with his or her transaction. Enforcement costs can therefore be seen generally to 
depend in large part on politics and ideology, or on how and why a state does what it does with 
respect to the institutions that shape economic life.
149
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More specifically, North has repeatedly stressed that the ―most distinctive feature of the 
cost of transacting in the pre-modern world [has] centered on the cost of enforcing contracts‖ 
(1985: 560). His particular interest has been the historical process by which European states 
turned the state into an impartial, effective third-party enforcer, thereby lowering the TC 
involving in contracting to such an extent as to foster productive impersonal exchange, or 
transactions between parties that do not depend on pre-existing, often non-economic, personal 
relationships.
150
 Just as contracting is an institution that widens the zone of efficient exchange 
from merely simultaneous transactions to sequential transactions, so effective third-party 
enforcement increases the number of potential contracting partners, representing both an 
enlargement as well as a deepening of efficient exchange. North‘s basic evolutionary model is 
one that begins with exchange through networks of personal relationships, wherein the 
participants have a high degree of knowledge about each other. Put another way, North sees the 
ancient condition as essentially contracting in the state of nature (above section 2.4), wherein one 
either contracts on the basis of union (his personal connections), the few limited strategies for 
forging credible commitments, or (usually) not at all.  
One adaptation to such a world, one route to greater impersonal exchange, is via the 
bazaar.
151
 In one sense this represents an advance: the bazaar is a market in which impersonal 
trading is possible. In another sense, however, it defines the limits of exchange in a world 
without effective third-party enforcement, as the bazaar is itself an expensive institution. The 
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constant haggling and bargaining and the attempts to ―clientelize,‖ or foster repeat transactions 
between partners, all point to the fact that ―[o]ne makes money by having better information than 
the adversary.‖152 The bazaar is thus a solution to the problem of impersonal trading, but not a 
socially efficient one. Moreover, it is ultimately self-defeating, insofar as its participants aim at 
re-personalizing exchange in order to escape its associated TC. It is only with the invention of 
the modern state that North sees a quantum shift to third-party enforcement by a political entity, 
which allows impersonal contracting on a large scale with increasingly productive returns, since 
the gains from trade are not dissipated by the parties on enforcement, as in the bazaar, but rather 
encourage adaptive efficiency. This, however, is possible only when the state has an effective 
monopoly on coercive power and ―the interest of the rulers of the State [are] coincident with that 
of furthering exchange‖ (1985: 563).153  
Avner Greif has recently critiqued this evolutionary model by suggesting that it falls 
down when ―trying to describe how economies make the transition from reputation-based 
personal exchange to law-based institutions‖ (2006a: 222).154 In other words, North‘s model does 
not adequately account for the quantum shift from purely personal enforcement to efficient third-
party enforcement and the rise of impersonal contracting. In response, Greif has suggested that 
the ―community responsibility system‖ that operated in medieval Europe represents just such a 
link. Briefly, this was a system of control whereby autonomous political communities, whether 
                                                 
152
 North 1985: 565. 
153
 Cf. 1990: 54-60. 
154





Italian city-states or religious communities, like the Baghdadi Jewish community of Cairo, held 
other communities responsible for the debts of their members. While this system could result in 
trade wars when one community failed to honor the request of another for satisfaction on a debt, 
on the whole it tended to work because communities understood that their common welfare was 
linked to their ability to trade with each other. Also, the community was often better placed to 
police its own members than were foreign merchants. Finally, the success of the system 
depended not on the impartial justice of some overarching third party, but rather on the partiality 
of the community, but operating on a community level. The institution only worked, in other 
words, to the extent that the political elite saw itself as the community, and so its interests 
aligned, if only temporarily or situationally, with those of a foreign merchant with a legitimate 
claim (self-interest rightly understood). This institution thus differed from third-party 
enforcement, on the one hand, in that there was no third party; on the other, it differed from the 
mere private ordering of individuals in a state of nature in that the individuals did not need to 
take each other‘s personal qualities into account so much as that of each other‘s communities. 
The system was, therefore, a form of personal ordering on a grander scale, which set the ground 
rules for lower-order contracts within the context of an overarching relational contract, itself 
established in a ―state of nature.‖ On the basis of this study, Greif rightly concluded that we need 
―to consider the developmental ramifications of social structures that, like the communes, fall 





2.6 The Economic and Institutional Study of Ancient Contract: An Agenda 
This chapter suggests that in order to study the institution of ancient contract from an economic 
perspective, we need to study enforcement, but in such a way that moves beyond mere legal 
enforceability to actual enforcement and enforceability, since it is in light of the realities of 
enforcement that contracts are negotiated, drafted, and enforced. To do so is to look at contracts 
as ―frameworks‖ and our parties as economic agents more interested in the transaction than in 
the contract itself. We must build a model, therefore, that takes into account not only the law of 
contracts (itself a difficult topic when it comes to Greek East and one in need of consolidation), 
but also other salient rules, such as ethics and norms, and integrate them into a system of 
enforcement. Our discussion also suggests that self-help, or second-party enforcement, is a vital 
component of contract enforcement, especially so in antiquity, given the comparative weakness 
of the state. Self-help therefore deserves particular attention, specifically in the ways in which it 
related lawfully, if not legally, to official third-party enforcement (i.e., not in its overtly anti-
social Eigenmacht manifestation).  
Our model must be both capable of explaining synchronic choices across 
contemporaneous governance structures (i.e., Williamsonian questions), as well as be alive to 
diachronic changes in TC through time (i.e., Northian questions). In order to accomplish the first, 
we will need to see contracts in relation to other ancient governance structures (cf. the questions 
asked in Section 1.1). With respect to the second type of analysis, we should seek to understand 
just how close Roman Egypt was to a functional ―state of nature,‖ and what the state did in 
defense of contract and why. Additionally, following Greif, we should look for evidence of 





Greif‘s communes. We do not have far to look, but they are under-appreciated and under-
studied.
155
 And finally, we should ask—to the extent that this question is answerable—what role 
and what effect contract had on the performance of the Greek and Roman economies.
156
 
As a final note, it is worth pointing out that virtually all of the major practitioners of NIE 
or historical law-and-economics have generally refrained from discussing or theorizing about the 
institutional development of the Roman Empire. Posner specifically excluded it in his discussion 
the economics of ―primitive‖ law since he limited himself to pre-literate societies.157 More 
significantly, North largely avoided the Roman world, concentrating either on the so-called 
―First Economic Revolution,‖ which saw the invention of property rights and the state in the 
Neolithic era, or on the medieval and early modern periods leading up the Industrial 
Revolution.
158
 The few comments he has made with respect to the Empire are so broad-brush as 
to be cartoonish and show little appreciation for the texture of Roman history or the reality of life 
in the Empire.
159
 For instance, his discussion on law shows little knowledge as to the extent 
Roman law actually controlled exchange in the Empire and even less interest in the 
administrative procedures or ideologies of the Roman state. Moreover, his interest is almost 
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exclusively on the demise of the Roman Empire, which he takes for the demise of the ancient 
state in toto. While some of his observations as to the fall of Rome may be apt from the 
perspective the Middle Ages, there is no recognition that the Roman world was in any way 
different from that of Classical Greece. This is a position that no ancient historian is likely to find 
acceptable from a social, political, or, increasingly, economic point of view, as it echoes, 
ironically if quite unconsciously, Finley‘s position.160 We therefore need to test North‘s theory of 
the state (among others; cf. Manning 2009), which depends on competition and is largely 
modeled on the early modern period, against the history of the imperial period when the Roman 
state had few serious competitors, in order to see whether it can account for the development of 
the Roman state and not merely the demise of the ancient state in its Roman manifestation.  
Greif‘s work, on the other hand, is more rooted in the particular history of his period—
and, indeed, his challenge to North is basically historical—yet there remains the question 
whether the community responsibility model, which seems a plausible parallel for some 
international trading activity in the classical world, is one that fits the Roman situation with 
respect to domestic contracting. Also, unlike the situation in medieval Europe, there was an 
overarching state in the Roman world to which people everywhere could and did appeal,
161
 and 
more importantly for the purpose this study, a unified provincial administration in Roman Egypt. 
As suggested above, there is no doubt that there were other sources of third-party enforcement in 
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the Roman world and the province of Egypt: the question is how did they relate to the Roman 
state, and how did ancient individuals negotiate between the two?
162
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CHAPTER 3: THE INSTITUTION OF CONTRACT IN GRAECO-ROMAN EGYPT AND THE STUDY OF 
NORMS 
 
As we see from surviving documents on papyrus, a contract in Graeco-Roman Egypt went by 
any one of a host of names:   ο ο ί , συ  ρ φή, χ  ρό ρ φο , συ ά      , συ βό   ο , 
 ρά   ,  σφά    , συ χώρ σ ς,     ρ φή, ο  ο ό  ο ,    όσ ος χρ   στ σ ός, and 
ὑπό      are the most common words used specifically to refer to a ―contract.‖163 Many of 
these terms are generic (συ ά      , ο  ο ό  ο ,  ρά   , συ βό   ο ,    όσ ος 
χρ   στ σ ός), often meaning little more than a legal ―document‖ of any sort. Others describe 
very specific instruments (e.g.,     ρ φ ί), while still others describe types or forms of 
contracts (συ  ρ φ ί, συ χωρήσ  ς, χ  ρό ρ φ , ὑπο  ή  τ ). This last category may be 
divided roughly into ―public‖ or notarial documents (i.e., those drafted by scribes and registered 
in public archives,such as συ  ρ φ ί and συ χωρήσ  ς), and ―private‖ documents 
(χ  ρό ρ φ , ὑπο  ή  τ , and the so-called ―private protocol,‖ which, so far as we know, had 
no ancient term consistently associated with it). Documents of this latter class could in theory be 
drafted by anyone—the parties themselves, a slave, an agent, or a scribe authorized to write 
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public documents. What made them ―private‖ was that they were not registered except pursuant 
to a subsequent and separate act of registration, either ekmartyrēsis or dēmosiōsis.164  
To complicate matters further, each of the types above has a particular and regional 
history within Egypt. For example, synchōrēseis appear to have been uniquely Alexandrian 
documents.
165
 Private protocols were drafted in both the Oxyrhynchite and Arsinoite nomes, but 
on different templates, and they appeared much earlier in the Oxyrhynchite.
166
 The history of the 
cheirographon is one of increasing importance vis-à-vis notarial forms throughout the period in 
all regions.
167
 Hypomnēmata as contracts (they were originally petitions or applications), on the 
other hand, become popular relatively late and have been associated with growing socio-
economic distance between parties in the third century.
168
 And so on. And this, again, is only to 
treat the words that refer to specific contractual forms that have been subjected to intensive 
study: there are a host of other words that signify contracts more abstractly as ―agreements‖ or 
the like, which, as I shall argue, are at least as illuminating for the study of contract as are set 
forms like the synchōresis or cheirographon. In the face, then, of this constantly changing 
patchwork of contractual forms and in the absence of a single word in Greek that corresponds to 
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the idea of ―contract‖ or ―obligation,‖ how far may we speak of ―contract‖ as a uniform or 
coherent legal or social institution in Roman Egypt?
169
 
In one sense, it is of course redundant to prove that contract was an institution in Roman 
Egypt: the evidence leaves no doubt that contracts were, as we saw in the very first instance with 
the Tebtynis registers (Sec. 1.1), used to help organize exchange on a regular basis, and so 
constituted a widely recognized set of ―rules of the game‖ of exchange, to use North‘s simile.170 
What is needed is a better sense of the character, boundaries, penetration, and relative 
importance of contract as an institution, or just what the rules were, and where and how the 
―game‖ was played in Roman Egypt. The suggestion of this and subsequent chapters is that we 
think of contract in Roman Egypt as a coherent instititution that encompassed or sat atop the 
multiplicity of contractual forms listed above; but that it was nonetheless a thin institution, one 
that in many circumstances was susceptible to being pushed into the background or liable to 
dissolve in the face of more vivid or concrete institutions. Of particular importance, then, will be 
a thorough understanding of just what a ―contract‖ was, so that we may compare it to the concept 
of contract developed in the previous chapter.  
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3.1 Contract in Egypt 
Egypt had a long history of written contract before the Greeks arrived. Documentary examples, 
in fact, stretch back well into Pharaonic times.
171
 By the time the Romans gained control of 
Egypt in 30 BCE, contracting had undergone three major phases of development in recent history. 
First came the consolidation of demotic in the Saite and Persian periods, with it becoming the 
predominant language of legal and administrative documents and introducing new forms and 
revealing new conceptions of obligation.
172
 Then, in the second phase, Greek legal forms were 
introduced by the immigrants who arrived with the Ptolemies, after which Egypt appears to have 
been in regular legal and commercial dialogue with the wider ambit of Hellenistic practice until 
the end of antiquity, if not beyond. In both phases contract was but one of several areas in which 
economic and institutional innovations were directly precipitated or specifically introduced by 
the new hegemonic powers and populations effectively in control of the state.
173
 In the third 
phase, the Ptolemies attempted to exert wide-ranging control over legal instruments as part of 
their overarching plan of rule. They were specifically interested in controlling the legal processes 
and instruments tied to revenue streams vital to the regime, such as those related to the 
conveyance of land or sales.
174
 The system of legal and judicial control which they established in 
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turn had a decisive influence on the elaboration of the basic relationship of contracting parties to 
the state, especially in the use of written contracts, with lasting impact on contracting practice 
throughout the Roman period. In Egypt, then, the Romans inherited a well-established and 
mature institution of contract, and because their aims at the time were not substantially different 
from those of the Ptolemies vis-à-vis Egypt as a province (i.e., revenue extraction), this was an 
inheritance they were more than content to accept, and there was no attempt to impose or 
encourage the use of Roman law contracts for non-citizens, or even citizens for that matter.
175
  
    ―Well-established,‖ however, should not be taken to mean that contract was necessarily a 
highly ―formal‖ institution. With respect to contract, ―formal‖ has been used in several ways. It 
will therefore be useful to identify and distinguish three different uses of the word, or legal, 
economic, and institutional ―formalism.‖  
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3.2 Formalism, Credibility, and Choice 
In legal terms, formality denotes qualities or acts prescribed by law that must accompany the 
formation or recording of a legal act, in this instance a contract, so as to make it enforceable at 
law. Examples of legal formality include the Roman requirement that a stipulatio be given with 
precise wording in order to be considered effective, or the requirement set out by the celebrated 
Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3 [1677]), which dictated that most common law contracts, 
particularly those involving sales of land and goods, personal sureties, and employment contracts 
lasting longer than a year, be reduced to writing and signed.
176
  
 ―Formality,‖ or perhaps more often the lack of it, is also frequently attributed to an 
economy. Indeed, most of us find discussions of ―informal‖ economies at the ―margins‖ of 
society a familiar concept. In this discourse, the ―formal economy‖ is the ―legal‖ one, ―out in the 
open,‖ ―regulated,‖ ―sophisticated,‖ etc., as opposed to the ―informal‖ economy, which can be 
characterized as ―non-observed, irregular, unofficial, hidden, shallow, parallel, subterranean, 
informal, cash economy, black market, unmeasured, unrecorded, untaxed, non-structured, petty 
production, and unorganized.‖177 This use of ―formal‖ has no direct application to contracting, 
except insofar as legal contracts are considered part of the ―formal‖ economy. I will never use 
―formal‖ in this sense.178  
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This leads us to the final context, the institutional. Many scholars speak in terms of 
―formal‖ and ―informal‖ institutions, among them D. C. North, who generally understands 
―formal‖ institutions as those that are ―designed‖ and articulated in a set of written rules.179 Such 
institutions are often created, and typically policed by, relatively sophisticated organizations 
within a society, like the state, guilds, the army, etc. Typologically, they are set against 
―traditional‖ institutions, like customs or norms, which are seen to evolve ―spontaneously,‖ and 
whose rules are almost always unwritten. Thus, contracts may be considered either ―informal‖ or 
―formal,‖ depending on the extent to which they conform either to law (formal) or norms 
(informal), and therefore (theoretically) go without the state‘s protection.  
One may see at a glance how the three uses of ―formal‖ overlap with each other, and how 
they differ. Legal formalism, for instance, is indeed an expression of ―formal‖ contracting, or 
contracting according to the rules of contract law set out by the state (institutional formalism), 
but only incidentally so: the state could just as well abolish legal formalism, as was in fact the 
tendency in Roman law over the course of the late Republic and early Empire.
180
 For this reason, 
among others, some scholars have questioned the usefulness of the formal/informal dichotomy. 
As Alice Sindzingre has recently pointed out in her review of the concept, it would appear 
analytically irrelevant in many countries, since ―formal‖ institutions are in fact less credible and 
effective than ―informal‖ ones, though of course the reverse is usually taken to be the norm. She 
similarly points to research that shows that contracts in countries with strong states are not 
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supported purely by ―formal‖ rules, but indeed rely on ―informal‖ mechanisms like trust, 
reputations, etc. in order to operate effectively.
181
 She concludes that the formal/informal 
opposition is an essentially useless distinction, at least with regard to a correlation with the 
effectiveness of rules, and that we are therefore better off speaking in terms of the credibility 
afforded a rule or set of rules, whatever the origin and however articulated: ―The various 
mechanisms underlying the credibility and compliance with rules have more explanatory power 
as to the effectiveness of rules than the dichotomy of formality versus informality.‖182  
Sindzigre‘s analysis and conclusion are particularly pertinent for the study of ancient 
contract for two reasons. First, in Roman Egypt we are dealing with a society ruled by a state far 
weaker than almost all modern comparanda,
183
 and particularly those which served as the basis 
for the development of NIE analysis. One consequence of this difference is that there was 
naturally far greater scope for other, ―informal‖ institutional structures at the local level to affect 
the practice and enforcement of contracts than we see in our day. In other words, with Sindzingre 
we should see individuals (in our case, ancient individuals) making decisions on the basis of the 
credibility they (often correctly) attached to the rules they saw as functionally operative, with 
less attention to the type or source of rules than their perceived usefulness or applicability.
184
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Again, this is not to say that the state and its rules, particularly as regarded the registration of 
certain contracts—all ―formal‖ elements of one sort of another—were not important in Roman 
Egypt when it came to contract: clearly the evidence says that the reverse was true (see Sec. 6.2). 
By the same token, however, they were not therefore the only, or even self-evidently the most 
important, elements to contracting simply because they were ―formal.‖  
Second, there is the curious fact that even the ―formal‖ rules of contract in Roman Egypt 
were strikingly ―informal‖: there was, in fact, no such thing as ―contract law‖ per se.185 There 
were, of course, legal rules governing contracting, but these laws were primarily administrative 
and procedural (e.g., the evidentiary value of written evidence of a contract), and at their core so 
under-theorized and as a body so unsystematized that, at least so far as we can tell, there was not 
even an explicit legal definition of what a ―contract‖ was.186 Such a state of affairs complicates 
any modern attempt to arrive at a definition or doctrine of contract in Roman Egypt, but it also 
necessarily means that contract was a more amorphous or ―fuzzier‖ legal institution than that to 
which we are accustomed, since there was no core theory around which contracts gravitated, and 
a lesser role for authorities to articulate and enforce doctrinal purity than there was to some 
extent in Roman law.
187
 The economic implications of which binding agreements the law 
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recognized and on what basis—whether, e.g., consensual contracts were legally binding, as 
opposed to merely real or purely formal contracts—are vast (cf. Chapt. 2); but in large part the 
law here followed a social ―definition‖ of what constituted the sort agreement one could bring 
before the authorities and receive ―justice.‖188  
There is thus no reason to expect all of our evidence of practice to conform to any 
―doctrine‖ that we might be able to extract from it, and we should expect custom to play what we 
might consider an out-sized role in formal, legal contracts. Such a state of affairs goes beyond 
even the modern scenarios Sindzingre envisions, yet in such a way as to sharpen the relevance of 
her main conclusion: the rules governing the enforcement of contracts cannot profitably be 
distinguished on the basis of their ―formality‖ or ―informality‖ if only because the state in 
Roman Egypt itself did not do so, but instead relied on a core of customary rules and definitions 
as to what a contract was when issuing its rules or rendering its judicial decisions.
189
 While there 
is nothing particularly strange about this in itself—American and British courts, for instance, 
have for centuries piggy-backed on ―prevailing business practice‖ or ―merchant codes‖ when 
writing new law or re-interpreting old law
190—the extent of the intermixture of custom and law, 
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and the (legal) informality of the reception of custom into law, resulted in a situation in which 
custom often carried ―formal‖ weight. Certainly, there was no simple, constant relation—
parallel, complementary, or antagonistic—between what most would see as the ―informal‖ and 
―formal‖ institutional components of contract in Roman Egypt.191  
Given the conceptual problems with the formal/informal dichotomy in institutional 
analysis, its particular irrelevance to the situation in Roman Egypt, and the potential confusion 
between institutional and the legal formalism, I will restrict my use of the word to refer only to 
legal formalism, where the label has a clear and intelligible meaning. This dichotomy, however, 
is deeply rooted in institutional literature (not to mention conventional historiography), and so on 
occasion it will be necessary to speak in these terms with respect to the institutional aspects of 
contracting. When I do so (as immediately below), I will use scare quotes so as to keep the 
problematic quality of the term in mind.  
Finally, a note about replacing ―formality‖ with credibility as a central criterion or 
dimension of institutional analysis. Doing so obviously and quite intentionally privileges the 
individual or organizational actor‘s vantage point, and as such fits hand-in-glove with the current 
appreciation of individuals‘ ―satsificing behavior,‖ characteristic of their ―bounded rationality,‖ 
as they choose between immediate economic alternatives by the lights of their subjective 
experience. A major difference in the ancient and modern conditions, of course, is the extent to 
which our modern consciousness of satisficing matters; that is, the extent to which our behavior 
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changes with the knowledge that (i) there is, theoretically, an optimal solution, and that (ii) we 
have a tendency to discount the future. Certainly, ancient actors had no such knowledge, and 
therefore no such consciousness; but I think it safe to say that satisficing is the original, if not the 
still dominant, behavior. Here I want to draw attention to two implications of focusing on 
subjectivity when it comes to economic institutions that will become important in subsequent 
chapters. 
First, there is no reason why an apparently satisficing solution may not be the most 
efficient for the actor, given the actual TC involved. We, of course, are in a relatively poor 
position to measure the distance between a merely satisficing solution and a truly optimal one in 
antiquity, since our grasp of the institutional matrix (and associated TC) in which ancient people 
operated is only partial and indirect. This would suggest that we need to let ancient people be our 
guide, that we, in the words of one legal scholar whose ideas we will explore more fully below, 
start from the premise that 
 
people are smart. Not necessarily informed. Not necessarily literate. Smart. That workers 
are smart. That people who work in personnel offices are smart. That these people are 
smart enough to understand intuitively that transaction costs are large, even though it is 




Of course, instead of ―workers‖ we may have peasants; and instead of bureaucrats in ―personnel 
offices‖ we may have phrontistai managing private estates, or hypēretai carrying out judicial 
functions in contract disputes. Since satisficing is the original condition, however, such social 
roles change nothing with respect to the mechanics of individual decision-making. Assuming 
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that ancient people are ―smart‖ prompts us to take their decisions seriously from the outset as we 
attempt to understand why they made the decisions they did, which is to say why they found 
certain rules more credible than others in certain circumstances, and what costs they were 
balancing off each other when they chose between different options or sets of rules. 
The second implication is that individual agency and freedom of action are considered 
both real and central to understanding how institutions work. This is obviously problematic for 
the ancient world, since it was full of all sorts of barriers to all manner of freedom (as Finley and 
others stress).
193
 Therefore, we must ask: how were ancient actors free and how free were 
they?
194
 This question will be a motif running through the rest of this study, but here it is 
appropriate to ask how we might conceive in the abstract of a ―meaningful‖ choice, since one‘s 
right and ability to make choices would seem to mark the boundaries and degrees of an 
individual‘s effective freedom. 
To my mind, Aristotle‘s discussion of the nature of choice and its role and implications 
for morality are helpful here. He asked whether or not acts proceeding from various forms of 
duress, such as a tyrant‘s threat to kill hostages or the threat of capsizing unless one jettisoned  
cargo, were voluntary or not (NE 1110a1-11b3). For him involuntary acts had as efficient causes 
external forces acting upon passive ―agents.‖ For example, someone who falls into someone else 
only because he was pushed can be called an ―agent‖ in only a formal sense: such an ―agent‖ was 
not the origin of the act, but merely an instrument in its execution. In this circumstance, one 
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cannot even call his falling an ―act‖ as such. On the other side of this line are the vast majority of 
acts properly so called, since they originate with the agent himself. So long as one does not act in 
ignorance (1110b18-11a21), acting as such is voluntary, even if no one would choose to act in a 
similar way absent the particular circumstances (1110b5-9, cf. 1110a18-19). Duress, therefore, 
merely qualifies the choice as significantly constrained with respect to our moral feeling but does 
not alter the fundamentally voluntary nature of action (by the nature of reality all choices are 
constrained or ―particular,‖ as Aristotle recognized, e.g., 1110b8-9, 1112a18-13a14, 1140a24-
b8). In his system, then, it is choice that creates and defines moral meaning: it demarcates the 
realm of the moral, since it is an expression of the agent‘s will (1111b6-1112a17), and its scope 
is the yardstick by which we may measure degrees of responsibility. Crucially, there is no 
requirement that the alternatives be good ones in order for the act of choosing to qualify in itself 
as a ―choice.‖ Jettisoning cargo or facing near-certain death is an admittedly terrible choice, but 
it is nevertheless a choice. 
 I see no reason why Aristotle‘s discussion of the role of choice in ancient ethics cannot 
be helpful in thinking about the role of choice in ancient economic matters.
195
 As in Aristotle‘s 
examples of ethical duress, so many economic choices both now and in antiquity are 
―involuntary,‖ or not choice-worthy in and of themselves but nevertheless capable of being 
ranked, or susceptible to preference, given the circumstances. Thus may we understand a 
peasant‘s decision to decamp (anachōrēsis) rather than pay taxes or rent, or Germany‘s decision 
to bail out Greece in 2010 rather than risk the currency union. Furthermore, adopting a strict 
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definition of choice in no way prevents us from recognizing that some choices are more 
economically meaningful than others. For Finley, anachōrēsis was the paradigmatic example of 
a meaningless ―choice.‖196 Certainly, it is not to be doubted that ―duress‖ of one sort or another 
in the economic realm produced a series of economic ―Sophie‘s choices‖ for the majority of 
ancient people in the Mediterranean, and one should not romanticize or gloss over this 
historically important dimension of ancient life. At the same time, however, one must also not 
forget an equally important and competing element of ancient reality, namely that its history, like 
any other, is nothing but the sum of individual choices, no matter how constrained. To lose sight 
of this reality is to risk missing not only the many hard, but revealing choices, but also 
potentially a wider range of options indicative of more meaningful choices than one might have 
assumed to have existed.  
Focusing on credibility, then, avoids a misleading and illusory emphasis on ―formality,‖ 
but also pushes us to give priority to the choices, good and bad, that ancient people made in their 
economic lives as the basic units of analysis. Starting from the presumption that people are 
―smart‖ is not the same as presuming their infallibility,197 and a strict definition of choice 
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proceeding from the historical reality of agency does not necessarily mean that all choices were 
equal good or equally free. Indeed, it is this degree of freedom that we need to uncover and 
characterize in a more subtle way than is possible if we begin from a priori assumptions of 
effective unfreedom. And again, we shall only be able to assess the quality of economic choices 
if we recognize them as choices and weigh them from the ancient perspective, taking them 
seriously in our reconstruction of what the alternatives were, and why certain alternatives were 
believed to be better than others. As I and others have shown elsewhere, a ―meaningful‖ degree 
of economic choice can often (but not always) be recovered in the contracting of Roman Egypt, 
with ancient actors strategizing around several different layers and types of alternatives.
198
  
                                                                                                                                                             
reference have not been sufficiently distinguished. The interesting moments, to my mind, are those in which the 
ancient and the modern perspectives of what is economically ―correct‖ align. Dem. 56 (Against Dionysodoros), for 
example, is a perfectly cogent and self-conscious argument for the economic importance of strict interpretation of 
contracts to credit markets, an argument made in a public forum and calculated to resonate with its audience (cf. 
Cohen 1973: 133 and Sec. 5.2 below). My suggestion is that we need to distinguish between the two perspectives 
and more systematically evaulate ancient decision-making against its own yardstick. Ancient ignorance of 
economics is in some sense matched by our ignorance of the context of their economic decision-making.  
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3.3 An Institutional Map of Contract 
The problem of ―formality‖ aside, we still stand in need of a way of conceptionalizing the 
theoretical relationship of the various elements of contracting to each other, or of how the 
various sets of rules related to each other apart from their credibility, which can only be 
demonstrated empirically. That contract was not a unitary but a composite institution is 
guaranteed by the fact that the law of contracting in Roman Egypt, as mentioned above, relied so 
heavily on norms. We therefore need a model of contract that incorporates and relates a range of 
rules of different types. Here I turn to Robert Ellickson‘s model of social control, not only for its 
general institutional analysis, but also for its emphasis on enforcement, which renders it a useful 
model for the subsequent chapters on the various modes of contract enforcement.  
In Order without Law, Ellickson studied the social, economic, and legal interactions of 
ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California. His aim was first to describe the norms that 
controlled decisions to invoke the law or legal authorities or not in the settlement of disputes; and 
second, to theorize about the rules that define the content of those norms. In other words, why 
did ranchers or farmers call in the authorities in some cases and not in others? And when they did 
decide to solve the problems themselves, what rules were they using if not the rules of law? 
(Indeed, one of the most fascinating portions of Ellickson‘s study is the one in which he shows 
the extent to which the rules of self-help depart from the rules set down by law.) In order to 
answer these questions and others, Ellickson built a model of social control that posited 
particular relationships between norms (―informal‖ public rules), law (―formal‖ public rules), 





Ellickson‘s model consists of a tripartite taxonomy with five subdivisions, each 
articulated by the identity of the controller (see Table 3.3 below).
199
 ―First-party control‖ is 
exercised by an actor over him- or herself. This is the realm of ethics, wherein a person‘s 
personal system of values erects a system of rules and purely psychological sanctions. A purely 
personal commitment to ―fair dealing‖ would be an example. ―Second-party control‖ is the world 
of contract or private orderings: ―[a] promisee-enforced contract is a system of second-party 
control over the contingencies that the contract covers; the person acted upon administers 
rewards and punishments depending on whether the promisor adheres to the promised course of 
behavior‖ (126-27). ―Third-party control‖ consists of non-hierarchically organized social forces, 
organizations (nongovernmental hierarchies), or governments (state hierarchies). Third-party 
social control is thus characterized by the application of rules to which the primary actors may 
not have agreed, and enforced by people not involved in the transaction. Both of these 
characteristics distinguish it from second-party control wherein the rules are negotiated and 
enforced by the parties themselves. 
Each of the sources of control is a source of rules. The rules of second-party controllers 
Ellickson calls ―contracts‖ in a broad sense, i.e., he would include arrangements based on norms; 
the key determinant is whether or not the parties themselves establish and enforce the rules of the 
relationship. The rules established by decentralized social forces are called ―norms,‖ while 
organizations establish ―organizational rules‖ and governments, ―laws.‖ (One can see here the 
influence of the formal/informal dichotomy.) Finally, each source of control is also a source of 
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sanctions. Second-party controllers administer sanctions under the rubric of ―personal self-help,‖ 
while from social forces emanates ―vicarious self-help‖ (the difference will be explained 
shortly). Organizations provide ―organization enforcement‖ and governments ―state 
enforcement.‖ This taxonomy is best understood visually, so I reproduce Ellickson‘s table 






Table 3.3 Elements of Ellickson’s comprehensive system of social control  





























































As the table implies, the controller responsible for the rule is usually the one which 
administers the corresponding sanction (but not always; see below). For instance, promisees, 
who negotiate the terms of ―contracts,‖ generally take steps to protect themselves against breach 
by engaging in self-help actions, like malicious gossip aimed at devaluing the reputation of the 
opposite party (thereby making it more difficult for him to engage in subsequent transactions in 
the same community), refusing delivery or payment, unilaterally exacting small retaliatory 
―payments‖ for failures to live up to agreements fully, etc. This is called ―personal self-help‖ 
because it is the parties themselves that engage in such sanctions in order to enforce the contract. 





enforced in a decentralized manner by ―society‖ at large, or the community as a whole, in the 
form of social pressure to conform, hence the term ―vicarious self-help.‖200 It is ―vicarious‖ 
because no individual or organization is capable of controlling it, even though they may actively 
attempt to benefit vicariously from the pressure exerted by society. A recent and very public use 
of vicarious self-help was the Obama administration‘s attempt in early 2009 to shame executives 
of companies rescued by public funds who then received ―outrageous‖ bonuses.201 In employing 
such rhetoric, the administration hoped to activate a norm of ―fairness,‖ and so achieve by the 
pressure of public opinion what they were loath to attempt by law.  
Lastly, we have organizations and the state. Both establish the rules and administer 
sanctions in response to what they perceive as deviant behavior. We find examples of 
organizational rules in Roman Egypt in the charters of metropolitan gymnasia or priestly 
organizations, which regulate the dues and behavior of their members.
202
 The state, in one sense, 
operates like a very big organization; however, it is distinct from mere organizations by virtue of 
its overarching authority and overwhelming capacity to deploy physical force.
203
 As a 
consequence, its rules are usually invested with a particular dignity and called ―law,‖ though, as 
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 Iustum pretium was not a requirement of legal contract in classical Roman law, though we may be sure it was a 
social norm. It was later received into law, forming the basis of laesio enormis. See Zimmermann 1990: 255-67.  
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 For quotes, see ―Obama, Dodd Slam Wall St Bonuses,‖ by K. Philips for The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2009 
(http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/dodd-slams-wall-st-bonuses-warns-firms/). 
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 Weber‘s famous ―monopoly of violence.‖ This monopoly, however, was far from perfect in antiquity. See now 





above, the status of the rules as law does not necessarily mean that they are always the most 
credible or salient rules in every situation. 
Finally, the rules of each controller may themselves be divided into five categories 
according to the level at which they control decisions or behavior.
204
 ―Substantive‖ rules define 
primary behavior as either ―good‖ or ―bad‖ (in the case of norms), ―legal‖ or ―illegal‖ (in the 
case of law), etc. ―Remedial‖ rules define rewards or sanctions on the basis of the substantive 
rules. For example, lying could be considered ―bad‖ (as per a substantive rule), but the remedial 
norm for lying about one‘s weight will likely prescribe a very different sanction from that for 
lying about damaging a neighbor‘s property. Next, there are ―procedural‖ rules. These guide 
decisions as to the application of remedial rules, defining, for instance, the way in which one is 
to weigh particular types of evidence when deciding whether or not to apply a particular 
sanction. For instance, before punishing a lie, which qua lie is always ―bad,‖ the usual practice is 
to assess the ―badness‖ of a lie by attempting to discover its context and motivation. At a very 
different level, there are ―constitutive‖ rules that govern the internal structures of controllers, like 
a charter providing for the election or appointment of officers in an organization. Finally, there is 
what Ellickson calls ―controller-selecting rules.‖ These are master rules which help to define 
which substantive rules an individual or organization are to apply. They are to the world of 
substantive rules what jurisdiction is to the world of law.
205
 The content of these rules was 
Ellickson‘s ultimate goal, as he was interested in the rules that guided his ranchers and farmers in 
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one set of circumstances to apply various forms of ―informal‖ control (i.e., the full universe of 
self-help, personal and vicarious), while in another set of circumstances the third-party control of 
the state (i.e., law).  
From the perspective of Ellickson‘s controller-selecting rules, we are justified in seeing 
the whole model as one complex institution of dispute resolution, with branching pathways 
leading to so many sub-routines, as in a complex computer program. These sets of rules intersect 
at distinct nodal points depending on the nature of the dispute and the relationships between the 
disputants. One of these nodal points is contract.
206
 We have already seen in the last chapter that 
one way of looking at contract as an institution is to understand it as a ―framework,‖ or a 
structure that attempts to facilitate a transaction, with the transaction itself being of greater 
importance than the contract. To see contracts in this light is to see them as instruments designed 
to anticipate potential disputes, and indeed this is true of all governance structures: the potential 
for different types of disputes explains in large part the choice of one governance structure over 
another. Contract as framework, then, is but another way of expressing the idea that contract is a 
node in the larger, complex institution of dispute resolution. If this is so, it should be possible to 
take Ellickson‘s model and reorganize it around the node of contracting, thus arriving at an 
institutional map of contract that can be represented visually by Figure 3.3.
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 Another node would be what we call tort or delict; the prime difference, of course, is the nature of the 
























































The circles in Figure 3.3 represent zones of first-person control, or the ethical rules of 
acceptable behavior particular to each party as it enters into a contracting relationship. The 
overlap between the two parties represents the area of second-party control. This is the zone of 
rights and responsibilities agreed upon by the two parties. This zone can be wide and relatively 
undefined, even to the extent that one party might think they have an agreement (i.e., that they 
are within the zone of contracting relations), when they do not. Of course, this possibility is not a 
result of the merely private or extra-legal (―informal‖) nature of the agreement, but of the 
inherent possibility for miscommunication in the act of agreeing itself. Uncertainty as to the 
existence or establishment of contractual relations is for this very reason a major area of modern 
contract law (e.g., the doctrines that surround the definition of offers and acceptances in common 
law) and one of the chief drivers of legal formality (one of the main functions of formality is to 




The areas of first- and second-person control are shaped both by the immediate controller 
(i.e., idiosyncratic personal morality and the explicit terms of an agreement between two parties), 
as well as by norms, the latter represented by the shaded area that surrounds the entire 
relationship. This is to say that no one‘s personal morality exists in a vacuum: norms may 
support or run counter to one‘s sense of right and wrong, but either way the influence of 
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 It was also a major preoccupation of the Roman jurists, whether touching on the conditions of a valid stipulation 
with respect to offer and response (Zimmermann 1990: ch. 3), the need for a certain price in a sale (ibid, pp. 253-





society‘s views will exert a perceptible pressure to conform. Similarly, the intersection that 
constitutes the zone of contracting relations may be more or less explicitly defined according to 
the time and care the parties take to craft their agreement, but all aspects of what it is to make a 
binding agreement, e.g., what one can agree to, whether or not it should be legally formalized, 
whether or not certain terms ―go without saying,‖ etc., also depend in part on social norms.  
Finally, within the zone of contracting relations there is a smaller zone which represents 
the positive law of contracts. As the figure suggests, the state generally, but not always, 
recognizes only a restricted area of potential agreements as legal contracts, thus leaving a 
significant area of agreement outside the protection of law (the portion of the overlap between 
the two spheres not included in the box).
208
 In fact, this gap between second-party or normative 
rules and the official rules of contracting can generate some significant misunderstandings if the 
parties do not understand where the boundary of the law is. For instance, a party may try to use 
the law to enforce what is merely a contractual agreement (but not a legally recognized contract), 
or, vice versa, persist in using second-party sanctions when in fact legal remedies are available 
which might prove more effective.   
What this model suggests, then, is the importance of ethics and norms to contracting 
generally, and that we should accordingly expect a significant amount of enforcement to happen 
―outside‖ the law in two senses (cf. Ch. 2). First, and most importantly, since contracting 
relations are private orderings made against the backdrop of public norms, the first line of 
enforcement is likely to come from the other party, which not only has the greatest interest, but 
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also is likely in the best position to monitor the other party‘s actions. Contracts between all but 
the most sophisticated parties are made first and foremost in the social arena, and most often the 
state only becomes aware of contracts in the event of a dispute. Contracts are therefore by their 
nature essentially extra-legal in the strictest sense of the term: they are law-like agreements, but 
they conform in the first instance to the ―laws‖ of norms and personal ethics. Hence they are 
almost always enforced, at least at first, by opposing parties engaging in personal self-help, often 
with the aid of vicarious self-help, and indeed these forces combined are usually strong enough 
to preserve a contract without the aid of the state. The fact that comparatively so few contracts 
are litigated, both then and now, is an eloquent, if silent, testament to just how powerful such 
extra-legal enforcement is. Second, given the reasons above we can appreciate how and why 
agreements that have no legal protection may nevertheless be enforced: extra-legal sanctions, 
which often have the weight of social norms behind them, may be just as successful in enforcing 
contracts not recognized by law as they are in enforcing legal contracts, which is but another way 





3.4 The Evidence for Norms 
Such a view of the relations of contracting to ethics, norms, and law may seem counter-
intuitive—for what could be more ―legal‖ than a contract? Here we do well think in terms of 
Theresa Morgan‘s recent caveat that we not think of ethics and norms ―as ancillary to political, 
social or economic phenomena ... Ethics must, for the most practical reasons, be among the first 
systems to evolve in any developing human society ... There is as much justification for 
speculating that political and social structures come into being to encode, protect and enforce 
ethical structures as the other way around.‖209 But how well does the map of the previous section 
fit contracting in Roman Egypt?  
Ideally, we should like to begin to measure the fit by starting with the ethics of 
contracting, asking what sort of first-person commitments the people of Roman Egypt made 
when they entered into contracts, and how binding they were in general, before moving on to 
second- and third-person rules and enforcers. This, sadly, is all but impossible due to the nature 
of the evidence. Unlike Ellickson or other modern legal anthropologists, we cannot (obviously) 
interview our ancient contracting parties. Instead, the majority of our evidence comes in the form 
of isolated contracts, letters, petitions, trial proceedings, and decrees, scattered over place and 
time, wherein we find either an expression or attribution of ethical or normative values attached 
to contracting. Such expressions or attributions, however, are difficult to interpret for several 
reasons.  
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First, many of our documents are by their nature stereotyped. This is obvious and 
particularly true of standardized legal documents drawn up by scribes, such as contracts or 
petitions. Yet, even when not stereotyped, many of our documents show signs of scribal 
intermediation. Thus, although transcripts would seem to present a record of the precise words 
parties used in litigating their contracts, the evidence suggests that, at a minimum, the record was 
typically compressed, if not altered in other ways.
210
  This, in combination with the fact that the 
context, facts, and precise legal nature of the disputes are often uncertain, renders interpretation 
precarious. We are on firming footing with ancient letters. Most personal letters, if not written by 
the person themselves, were dictated to scribes, and the voice of the sender often comes through 
quite clearly.
211
 The same may also be said of petitions occasionally, although drafts allow us to 
see just how much crafting went into the art of the petition.
212
 
Second, our documentary evidence is highly tendentious. Petitions and trial statements—
and often even letters—as to the propriety of either keeping or breaching a contract naturally aim 
to justify certain actions or persuade the reader or hearer as to a particular point of view. Any 
ethical position evinced will therefore, almost of necessity, correspond to some norm that the 
reader or hearer is expected to recognize and endorse. This quality represents both a liability and 
a strength. On the one hand, there is always the chance that a party is merely saying what needed 
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 Cf. Montevecchi 1985, esp. 239-40, on BGU IV 1139 (a scribe clearly controlling a story by a low-status, 
uneducated, and oppressed couple); and P.Oxy. XXII 2342 (from a savvier petitioner of higher station). In both 





to be said in order to prejudice or persuade another other party in its favor.
213
 Consequently, 
purely ethical actions (if such things can be said to exist) are revealed with certainty only when 
they run counter to prevailing norms, a situation that in itself suggests the limited evidentiary 
value of such positions, as they are by definition highly idiosyncratic. On the other hand, ethics 
are useful when discussing particular situations, while norms are broadly shared values which we 
can expect to be in operation more or less across a group (and one question is how we define our 
―groups‖; see below), and so useful to the interpretation of every situation. Since, as per Edward 
Cohen‘s principle of ―forensic attestation,‖ we may reasonably assume that the rhetorical 
purpose of forensic evidence guarantees that at the center of every assertion as to a general 
practice or norm there resides a hard kernel of truth, without which the attempt at persuasion 
would fall flat,
214
 then we are entitled to believe that our evidence—precisely because it is so 
tendentious—is a reliable witness to general norms and expectations. Of course, this principle 
does not relieve us of the necessity of interpretation: we still must thresh the wheat from the 
chaff, but it is a comforting fact to know that there is seed to be found in all that sifting. 
Third, while the absolute number of papyri is impressive, often overwhelming for the 
ancient historian, the record is nevertheless spotty and meager in the final analysis—at least 
when compared the richness the modern anthropologist or sociologist can achieve through field 
work. For example, we should expect there to have been a range of ethical positions and norms 
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given the social structure of Roman Egypt. Did contracting ethics or norms change as one went 
from the chōra to the mētropoleis, or from the mētropoleis to Alexandria? Did different 
standards, rules, or expectations apply when one dealt with a slave versus a freedman, a peasant 
versus a social equal or a social superior?
215
 Did social and juridical categories such as Roman, 
Greek, Jew, and Egyptian have significant effects on contracting behavior or practice in the 
notoriously divided and fractious Alexandria or elsewhere in Egypt? All interesting questions, 
yet few answerable to any satisfying degree given the surviving evidence.
216
 Here I make no 
systematic attempt to do so.  
Instead, I attempt to reconstruct some of the broad ethical and normative standards that 
most inhabitants of Roman Egypt were likely to share, those that nearly anyone would 
understand or associate with a ―contract.‖ In so doing, it is important to recall that we shall never 
be able to tell precisely how important or powerful either personal ethics or normative values 
were in most cases (for the reasons above), or in the system of enforcement as a whole: we have 
no sense of the total number of contracts, informal or formal, or of the number of stressed or 
breached contracts as a percentage of the whole in which ethical and normative forces were the 
decisive factor in enforcement. This is to say that we cannot quantify the number of cases in 
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 Perhaps the most disappointing element of Morgan 2007 is not so much the fact that she fails to recover 
differences of this type in her study of the ethics of the Roman Empire, but her insistence that they were more or less 
irrelevant (e.g., pp. 2, 17, 55-56, etc.). At one level it is, I suppose, true that there was a shared ethical culture in the 
ancient Mediterranean, but such broadly shared norms for which this is true are accordingly of comparatively little 
interest (cf. Finley 1975 [1966]: 137 on the emptiness of an overly-broad notion of ―Greek law‖). Moreover, it 
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antiquity and who the intended audience was, at least to the extent that she does in her effort to construct a popular 
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which contracts were enforced primarily by extra-legal forces versus those that needed legal 
enforcement. In fact, we do not even have a sense of the distribution of cases in any official‘s 
docket (i.e., what percentages of an official‘s administrative or judicial work was given over to 
what we might call contract disputes), nor an accurate idea of how many of the disputed 
contracts which we happen to know about were successfully enforced via the law.
217
  
Finally, just as we should expect there to have been different ethical positions and norms 
between various groups in Roman Egypt, so should we naturally expect some change with 
respect to the ethics and norms of contracting over time.
218
 Indeed, such changes become 
increasingly visible starting in the fourth century as Roman legal ideas and Christianity began to 
exert a new influence on core ideas in contracting, like the importance of the Roman law notions 
of consensus or bona fides.
219
 Some of these historical movements in the norms and law of 
contracting will be traced over the next two chapters, and in order to better appreciate those 
changes—as well as the continuities of the institution—the discussion will necessarily involve a 
good deal of Ptolemaic material, since this is the period in which, as above, the institution has its 
particular origins, its Tocquevillian point de départ. Indeed, one major area for further research 
is to integrate the material in the following chapters more systematically with the demotic 
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evidence. Since contract in Roman Egypt was a composite institution from its inception, such 
documents testify to norms that informed, and in many cases persisted, into the Roman period.
220
 
With these caveats in mind, the remainder of this study is devoted to the investigation of the 
basic norms of contracting, and to a lesser and more speculative extent, to the personal ethics of 
contracting, which together with law constitute one of the twin bases of our institutional 
―definition‖ of a contract in Roman Egypt. 
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3.5 The Norms of Contract in Graeco-Roman Egypt 
As we saw in the previous chapter (Secs. 2.1 and 2.2), the fundamental risks that contracting as a 
governance structure is meant to overcome are those associated with sequential transactions, 
namely opportunism and unforeseen circumstances. The fundamental ethical value associated 
with contracting is therefore trust. Is one‘s partner to be trusted to keep his or her agreement, 
regardless of changes in objective conditions or in perceptions of subjective advantage? From 
this core value of trust ramify two subsidiary ethical and normative values, namely the opposed 
notions of freedom and obligation.  
Though it may remain implicit or under-developed, there can be no conception of 
contract without some recognition of freedom, for the economic essence of any contract is choice 
(cf. Sec. 3.2 and Apps. I and II). What distinguishes a contract from a tax, or some other sort of 
obligation (e.g., tort or delict), is precisely its essentially voluntary nature, wherein one agrees in 
some significant or substantial way to commit oneself or recognize oneself as bound to a course 
of action.
221
 The idea of freedom is also present, if latent, in the idea of breach: only free actors, 
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 Ulpian‘s assertion in Book 4 Ad Dictum as to the fundamentally (if not juristically) consensual nature of contracts 
is worth quoting in full in this regard (Dig. 2.14.1): Huius edicti aequitas naturalis est. quid enim tam congruum 
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pertains to everything consented to by those who make some contract or settlement with each other; for just as those 





or those capable of having independent intentions and acting on those intentions, can ―breach‖ an 
agreement. This freedom, at once integral to the economic utility of contract, is also a threat to it. 
The dilemma is that one wishes to deal with free agents because they supposedly can and will do 
something one cannot or will not do for oneself, such as provide grain or credit or land or 
transportation, etc.; yet one needs these agents to exercise their freedom within the bounds 
prescribed by one‘s interest. Hence, we return to the question of trust: how can one trust a free 
agent? One can, provided he or she is sufficiently ―bound.‖ And so we come to the seemingly 
contradictory (but in reality complementary) notion of obligation. In the final analysis, a contract 
is the channeling of the power of one party‘s freedom for another‘s gain. 
Now, although freedom of action is essential to the idea and operation of contract, it does 
not therefore follow that the relationship of freedom to contract is constant. This is largely 
because freedom is an idea or value that has a prior, independent social and political existence. In 
a word, it is larger than contract, such that contract operates within the framework of social and 
political freedom. It is this larger notion of freedom that establishes differing notions of legal 
capacity to contract on the part of women, children, non-citizens, slaves, wards, the insane, etc., 
as well as differing standards of consent. The first aims to clarify the extent to which a potential 
party is free to bind him or herself, and so to be held accountable, while the second seeks to 
define the extent to which the binding was the product of volition. Similarly, though the essence 
                                                                                                                                                             
motions of the mind, come to be of one mind on one thing, that is form one opinion, [can be said to ‗consent.‘]. 
Moreover, so true is it that the word ‗covenant‘ has a general significance that Pedius neatly says that there is no 
contract, no obligation which does not consist of such ‗coming together,‘ whether it is achieved by the handing over 
of something or by the use of certain words. For a stipulation, which is made by the use of certain words, is void 
unless there is consent. But most covenants are called by some other name, for example ‗sale,‘ ‗hire,‘ ‗pledge,‘ or 





of a contract is to bind or channel personal freedom in a particular way, the source of that 
obligation is not identical in all legal cultures. Again, the fundamental notion as to why someone 
is obligated under a contract is derived not from the law so much as from basic social notions of 
what is just. For these reasons, these three fundamental ideas or values, trust, freedom, and 
obligation, are to be seen as rooted not in the law, but in the ethics and norms of contracting, 
with the law representing a particular interpretation or reflection of them from the perspective of 
the state (cf. Morgan‘s observation above in the beginning of Sec. 3.4 and Apps. I and II). 
In the subsequent chapters I will trace several norms associated with contracting that bear 
on trust, freedom, and obligation via philological analysis of the papyrological evidence. I begin 
with two positive expressions of such norms, namely ―trust‖ (πίστ ς and its derivatives and 
cognates) and being ―considerate‖ (      ω ). From there I move to  negative values, studying 
the words for ―breach‖ (π ρ β ί     and π ρ συ  ρ φ   ) and fraud (   οτ χ ί ). I end by 
briefly investigating the one attestation of a word that signifies the condition of ―being under 
contract‖ (ὑποσ   ρ φος) and some of the norms of litigation. This final cluster of words 
illuminates not only more negative values associated with breaking contracts, but also attitudes 
towards involving third parties or the authorities in contractual disputes. Certain words and 
values I leave for a later discussion of the law of contract since they are best discussed in the 
context of the legal or ―formal‖ side of contracting. I thus postpone investigations of:  
   ξ  ί, or verbal pledges, since they are best discussed in light of the role of writing;  
 explicit mentions of ―freedom‖ or ―willingness‖ in contracts and contracting, given 






 ―consent‖ (e.g.,   π  θής,    ο    ), since this was not only a norm associated with 
the inherently voluntative idea of contracting, but also potentially a formal 
requirement for drafting legally binding contracts;  
 and finally, for obvious reasons, notions of ―right‖ or ―legitimacy‖ (e.g.,  ί   and 
 ό   ος).  
This, clearly, is not an exhaustive list of the norms or values (or words) pertaining to 
contracting,
222
 and, as indicated above, it would be profitable to trace all these norms further 
back through their demotic and Egyptian counterparts. Similarly, the method employed does not 
uncover all important values.
223
 Focused studies on the actions of individuals through dossiers 
and archives would reveal other values, norms, and indeed particular ethical positions, somewhat 
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time. 
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 Cf. Dover 1974: 46-50 on the ―lexical approach‖ to studying ancient morality. 
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CHAPTER 4: PISTIS AND EUGNŌMOSYNĒ 
4.1 The Study of Pistis 
It might seem a banal observation that contracts involve or are based on ―trust.‖ So one man 
complained in a Ptolemaic petition that his landlord had ―put aside the trust that exists among 
men‖ when the latter ―refused to carry out what was in the document‖ and collected the rent 
twice.
225
 But what exactly was ―trust‖ in Roman Egypt? What was its color and its content, and 
how was it imagined as working in the contracting process?  
While there is a dissertation on the word pistis in Greek legal papyri from Egypt (Schmitz 
1964, to which I will return), there is no sustained discussion of the norm of trust in Graeco-
Roman Egypt on the basis of the papyri.
226
 There is, of course, a scholarly literature on trust in 
antiquity, though it is scattered across six broad areas: (1) the philological study of Roman fides; 
(2) the study of fides and bona fides in Roman law; (3) research into ancient epistemological and 
rhetorical theories and techniques intended to induce belief; (4) the study of ancient credit and 
trade; (5) the study of ancient friendship; and (6) scholarship on belief and faith in ancient 
religion, predominantly in early Christianity. Notable in the list above is the missing counterpart 
to the scholarship on Roman fides in the literature on Greek culture, which is largely restricted to 
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 P.Erasm. I 1.16-17 (Oxyrhyncha, 148/147 BCE):  θ τήσ ς τὴ    ἐ    θρ πο ς ὑπάρχουσ   πίστ   . . . 
 ρ  ο ῦ τ     . . . ἅ τ  ἐ  χρ   τ σ ῵       ξά  σθ   (16-17, 26-8). 
226
 At certain points, Schmitz does connect the legal meanings of pistis to its wider social meaning  (e.g., 1964: 1-2, 
5), but only with reference to classical Greek sources, not contemporary evidence from Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt. 
There is a short but interesting discussion in Boyaval 2001: 70-73, 74-76, which accords with the interpretation put 





the relationship of pistis to oath and the relationship between pistis and fides.
227
 There is, for 
instance, no analysis of the concepts pistis/pistos in Pearson‘s Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece 
(1962), and Dover devotes but one page to the idea of trust in his Greek Popular Morality in the 
Time of Plato and Aristotle (1974).
228
 Similarly, Theresa Morgan in her recent Popular Morality 
in the Early Roman Empire (2007) has little to say about trust, and that which she does say 
comes mostly from Latin sources and in the context of friendship.
229
 One reason for this 
scholarly state of affairs may reside, as Heinze proposed, in a cultural difference, namely that 
pistis was not as central a concept to the Greeks as fides was to the Romans,  suggesting that the 
analog to Roman fides was the Greek preoccupation with dikaiosynē.230 Be that as it may, it is 
also certainly a product of scholarly interest: the Demosthenic corpus has quite a bit to say about 
the role of pistis, though it has rarely figured in discussions of the concept.
231
 As Edward Cohen 
asserted nearly forty years ago, ―there is abundant opportunity to see from the sources that, in the 
Greek business world, good faith and fair dealing, not litigation, were the lubricants of 
commerce‖ (1973: 133, citing Dem. 56.2 as evidence of the importance of reputation and 
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 Cf. Wolfgang Polleichtner‘s entry in Der Neue Pauly (1996: ix, 1046-48). On pistis, fides, and oath, see Hirzel 
1902: ch. 14; Boyancé 1972 [1962]; 1972 [1964]; cf. Gruen 1982.  
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 Dover 1974: 194-95.  
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 Substantive passages: pp. 68 (cf. 82), 99, 136. 
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 Heinze 1929: 163-65, with compelling examples from Cicero taking over Greek passages about justice and 
reinterpreting them as fides. 
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 The type of evidence preserved in the papyri, however, affords us an even greater 
opportunity, as it brings to light the discourse of trust outside the courtroom as well. 
From the various scholarly threads above a general picture emerges, against which we 
must plot our own investigation of trust in the papyri. First, most ancient historians, regardless of 
period or scholarly interest, see the ancient world as one marked by personal connections.
233
 The 
highly personal nature of ancient society thus helps us to make sense of topics as diverse as 
credit markets in Classical Athens, Roman Republican politics, and late antique theological 
controversies.
234
 The concept of trust, naturally, should reflect personal nature of ancient society. 
Fraenkel (1916) and Heinze (1929), for instance, disagreed fundamentally as to the ethical aspect 
of fides, yet both saw it as originally a word that denoted the quality of trustworthiness or 
reliability of a person.
235
 The most important consequence of the personal nature of antiquity for 
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 I interpret the importance of this particular speech differently (cf. Sec. 5.2), but agree with Cohen in general. For 
instance, see also the evidence of Dem. 33.6-8, 12; 34.30; and 36.44. The most important recent discussions of trust 
in Greek culture have been largely legal, e.g., Vélissaropoulos-Karakostas 1994, Jakab 1994, and Vélissaropoulos-
Karakostas 2002. While valuable and suggestive of a new interest in pistis, all are nonetheless brief. Cf. also Cohen 
1992: 147-48 and Carter 2007: 67-69. 
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 Cf. the assumptions of North, Greif, and others discussed in Chapter 2. 
234
 For this view of Athenian credit, see, e.g., Millett 1991. Any work on the political history of the last century of 
the Republic will reveal the importance of knowing one‘s prosopography. For an application of social network 
theory in the explanation of the fourth-century Origenist controversy, see Clark 1991. For a recent application of 
network theory in ancient history, see Ruffini 2008. 
235
 E.g., Fraenkel 1916: 188, 196-97: ―In alle diesen Fällen [i.e., attestations before Cicero] wird mit fides eine 
Eigenschaft dessen, dem man vertraut, oder genauer die Art seines Verhaltens den andern gegenüber, nicht eine 
geistige Tätigkeit oder eine Stimmung des Vertrauenden bezeichnet‖ (188); Heinze 1929: 148-49: ―Der alte Römer 
würde aber wohl dem Satze zugestimmt haben: fide data ita confirmantur dicta promissa pacta, ut boni viri sit 
utique eis stare aliique recte eis confidant; auf deutsch: fides ist das im Menschen, was seine gegenüber einem 
anderen eingegangene Bindung oder Verpflichtung zu einer sittlichen Bindung macht und so das Vertrauen des 
anderen begründet. Eine solche sittliche Bindung kann für einen Einzelfall einem einzelnen gegenüber eingegangen 






the idea of trust is its relationship to experience. As we shall see, trust was a category of 
empirical knowledge of particular people, nothing like what we might associate with ―faith.‖ 
Trust, in other words, required proof in antiquity. This conclusion finds an analog not only in the 
study of Roman fides, but also in some of the scholarship on religious pistis.
236
 Though I do not 
explore this angle here, it also seems to me that one sees a negative reflection of this idea in the 
theorizing about the rhetorical creation and manipulation of pistis: persuasion depends on 
leveraging categories of knowledge so as to have the hearer accept mere representations as the 
truth. In other words, it aims to induce trust in the absence of experience.
237
 
Heinze also noted that law had essentially nothing to do with fides, at least early on: the 
law produced security on the basis of impersonal (i.e., third-party) rules and sanctions (hence the 
heavy emphasis on formality, the very essence of a rule), whereas fides was a security based in 
personal relations.
238
 For Heinze, this observation served to demonstrate the essentially moral 
quality of fides against Fraenkel‘s thesis that fides was ―morally indifferent,‖ meaning only ―a 
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 Cf. Heinze 1929: 143: ―Zunächst ist fides niemals unser ‗Glauben‘, im Gegensatz zum ‗Wissen‘, als nicht 
gesicherte Überzeugung: sondern ausschliesslich das feste Vertrauen auf die Wahrheit oder Richtigkeit einer 
Behauptung oder einer Überlieferung oder auf die Zuverlässigkeit eines Menschen und dgl. mehr, im Gegensatz zu 
‗Misstrauen‘ oder ‗Zweifel‘.‖ Intriguingly, several attestations of fides in Plautus (e.g., Rud. 953; see n267) map 
quite well onto the uses of pistis, as Lombardi saw (1961: 22). Schmitz suggests that this may not be a coincidence, 
but the consequence of translation of Greek originals (1964: 121n1). Cf. also Hay 1989 on the use of the word pistis 
as a ―ground for faith‖ in Philo and Josephus; and Lindsay 1993. 
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 Cf. Grimaldi 1957; Lienhard 1966; Mirhady 1991; Schmitz 2000. See Rapp 2010 for up-to-date bibliography of 
the philosophical discussion of the Rhetoric. Nothing I have read thus far has read the concept of rhetorical pistis 
against the background of a cultural understanding of trust. Cf. Polyb. 8.36, below n248. 
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 Heinze 1929: 145-49, esp. 146: ―Die objektiv sicherste Garantie einer Leistung ist die rechtliche Verpflichtung ... 
so genügt es dem anderen, dass er sich durch das Gesetz vor Schaden gesichert weiss: ob er mir ‗traut‘ oder nicht, ist 






guarantee in the widest sense.‖239 Heinze‘s insight as to the different manner in which fides and 
the law established obligation brings us an important methodological point. It is true that in 
Roman legal history, one sees the notion of fides progressively taken up into the law as a sort of 
standard, specifically bona fides, a notion which made progressive inroads into the contractual 
language and law of Roman Egypt over the course of the later Empire.
240
 But what does such a 
history show? Attestations of the word fides (or pistis) in legal contexts are of use only in 
assessing the role or importance of the concept of trust within the law: they tell us comparatively 
little about how trust actually functioned beneath or outside the law. It is, for example, 
significant that certain legal relationships came to be predicated on trust, like fideicommissa, or 
that pistis should be invoked in legal documents wherein someone is bound to do something τῇ 
  υτοῦ πίστ   or τῇ   ί  πίστ  ;241 but the creation of legal relationships based on ―trust‖ or the 
use of ―trust‖ as a legal standard provides us with no insight as to why or how the two particular 
parties came together in such legal relationships in the first place. How did one decide whom to 
choose as a trustee and with whom to contract on the basis of good faith? For without trusted 
people one can be sure that neither trusts nor good faith standards will be of much use. How did 
the norm of trust and the rules of law relate when it came to contract? Were they alternatives, 
parallel tracks, intertwined, arranged in some sort of hierarchy, or was the relationship shifting 
depending on the precise situation?  
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By far the most useful discussions of trust for our purposes are those that study it in the 
context of Greek philia and in the realm of credit.
242
 Philological research reveals that philia was 
largely coextensive and coterminous with the notion of pistis in archaic Greece.
243
 One trusted 
philoi, and philoi were in some sense by definition ―trusted people.‖ Indeed, the reciprocal nature 
of Greek philia framed it as something of a bilateral contractual relationship in itself.
244
 Millett in 
his work on credit in Classical Athens (1991) understood pistis and philia to run in parallel with 
law and contract: one first turned to credit from philoi, and only when this avenue had been 
exhausted or trust betrayed did one turn to bankers, who charged interest and secured their loans 
with law instead of by the norms of philia and pistis. Such an account, however, is 




A more dynamic, plausible, though impressionistic, account has recently been sketched 
by Julie Vélissaropoulos-Karakostas (1994; 2002), who reasonably sees the growth of 
contractual relations in fifth- and fourth-century Athens as a response to social and economic 
complexity, the product of the growth of mistrust. This mistrust accounted for the predominantly 
―real‖ character of Greek contracts, for only in this way did one preserve the right to a dikē for 
damages on the basis of partial performance or unjust enrichment (or more precisely, Wolff‘s 
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 Millett 1991; Cohen 1992; Konstan 1997. Dover‘s comments on pistis are largely framed in the context of 
friendship (1974: 194-95) as are Morgan‘s (2007: 68, 99).  
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 Taillardat 1982. 
244
 Contra: Konstan 1997. 
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 Cf. Cohen 1992. Moreover, Millett and others who hold similar views seem to assume that legal agreements were 







 Neither purely consensual contracts (contracts based on promises) nor a 
dikē for breach of contract per se developed in Athenian society because promises rested on 
pistis and philia, and friends did not sue. But this did not mean that there were parallel paths, 
pistis or contract. Instead, complexity opened up a wider range of possible relationships, or 
degrees of mistrust, from friends relating in the old aristocratic mode of philia, to associates 
trusting each other and relying on norms to maintain contracts, to more formal contracting 
between parties who had no other way to bridge the gap in trust. Contract was in this way 
progressively normalized even between associates, if not philoi, as an acceptable backstop to 
economic relations.
247
 To this account, I might offer a further observation. Significantly, it was 
the idea of trust, not friendship, which was extended or analogized in economic relationships as 
time went on. In a more complex world with an increasing number of transactions, one had to 
operate at the margins or limits of personal knowledge more frequently, and though contracts 
speak to mistrust, one still had to trust something (the immediate delivery of goods and the 
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 See Wolff 1957. 
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 Cf. the renewed discussion of consensual contracts in classical Athens, Cohen 2006 and Jakab 2006. 
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 Arist. Prob. 950a-b asserts that deposits are held on the basis of trust and friendship, with no thought to profit, 
whereas if ―a debt is involved there is no friend; for if a man is a friend he does not lend but gives‖ (   ὲ  οὖ  τὴ  
π ρ   τ θή     ποστ ρ῵  φί ο        · ο   ὶς   ρ π ρ   τ τίθ τ    ὴ π στ  ω . οὗ  ὲ τὸ χρέος, ο  
φί ος· ο    ρ     ίζ  , ἐ   ᾖ φί ος,       ί ωσ  ). Precisely the same logic led to the notion of security as pistis 
since there is no true pistis (i.e., personal experience) on which to base the loan, as lending was already not the act of 
a friend. On pistis as ―credit‖ and ―security,‖ see Schmitz 1964: 5-8, 32-64. Cf. the connection drawn at Polyb. 8.36: 
  ὸ   ὶ το ς  ὲ   σ έπτως   υτοὺς ἐ χ  ρίζουσ  το ς ὑπ    τίο ς ἐπ τ   τέο , το ς  ὲ τὴ  ἐ   χο έ    
πρό ο    πο ου έ ο ς ο   ἐ    τέο · τὸ  ὲ    ρ      ὶ π στ        ς τέ ος ἄπρ  το , τὸ  ὲ   βό τ  τ ς 
ἐ   χο έ  ς πίστ  ς πράττ    τὸ   τ   ό ο     π τί  το .   σὶ  ’ ἐ   χό      πίστ  ς ὅρ ο , τέ   ,  υ     ς, 





Schmitz‘s work on pistis in Greek legal papyri is useful and thorough, but stands in need 
a prolegomenon, a grounding  in the ways in which pistis worked before and during a contract, 
its mechanics and its content. In other words, who is trustworthy and why? In what 
circumstances, and to what extent, or for what purposes? If there are two things the papyri tell us 
on this score, it is that trust was neither won easily nor in great supply. In fact, the papyri tell us a 
good deal more than this: they illuminate who was considered trustworthy, the sort of things for 
which trust was valued or needed, and its role and potential when it came to business and 
contracting.  
The following discussion therefore deals with instances of trust largely outside of legal 
documents. It begins with an exploration of trust entirely in the social realm, in various settings 
and between people of varying stations (4.2). From there, it moves to the discourse of trust in 
what we might call ―business‖ settings (4.3). On the basis of the evidence presented in these two 
sections, I argue that trust is a species of knowledge based on one‘s personal experience of 
another person‘s capacity (as opposed to will) to perform or execute a task or promise. I then 
turn to the language of trust in contractual settings (4.4), some of which are informal, with the 
aim of demonstrating the essentially moral quality of contractual relations. Vélissaropoulos-
                                                                                                                                                             
     τ῵  πρ ξά τω  ἐστὶ         .   ὸ   ὶ  ά  στ   ὲ  το   τ ς ζ τ    πίστ  ς (   ),   ’ ὧ    π στ υθ ὶς 
ο   υ ήσ τ   τὴ  πίστ    θ τ   . ἐπ ὶ  ὲ σπά  ο   ὑρ    ἐστ  τὸ το οῦτο,    τ ρος ἂ   ἴ  π οῦς τὸ τ῵    τ  
 ό ο  φρο τίζ   , ἵ ’ ἄ  του   ὶ σφ      θ , τ ς π ρ  το ς ἐ τὸς συ      ς  ὴ      ρτά ω    (―While, 
therefore, we must censure those who incautiously put themselves in the power of the enemy, we should not blame 
those who take all possible precautions. For it is absolutely impracticable to place trust in no one, and we cannot 
find fault with anyone for acting by the dictates of reason after receiving pledges being oaths, wives, and children 
held as hostages, and above all the past life of the person in question; thus to be betrayed and ruined by such means 
carries no reproach to the sufferer but only to the author of the deed. The safest course of all therefore is to seek for 
such pledges as will render it impossible for the man in whom we trust to break his word, but as these can rarely be 
obtained, the second best course is to take reasonable precautions, so that if our expectations are deceived, we may 





Karakostas suggests that in classical Athens that the development of the institution contract 
speaks to a growth of distrust in the society or community. This may be to look at the glass half 
empty. The following discussion shows that trust was considered basic elements of informal and 
formal contractual relationships, and so we should rather look at contract as an institution that 
allows one to transact on the basis of an imperfect level of trust. 
The discussion of eugnōmosynē follows the same general pattern. It begins with the 
social uses (4.5), distinguishing three basic sources of obligation, familial, social (i.e., respect for 
authority or higher status people), and promissory, through which the quality of someone‘s 
gnōmē was revealed. One was thus expected to show the requisite ―respect‖ to one‘s parents, 
superiors, and peers, and in doing so, one would win a reputation for eugnōmosynē. Interestingly, 
superiors were also expected in certain cases to show ―respect‖ for others, and one area in which 
this respect was made manifest was in promises. Next, I turn to the business uses (4.6-4.7), and 
show that one was expected to ―honor‖ both debts and contracts, though it is difficult to 
determine whether the respect one showed to contract was due primarily to the notion of debt or 
promise. Over these two sections, I also trace the historical development of the term, as it 
increasingly moves from a subjective mode of evaluation in which ―respect‖ is mediated by the 
type of obligation (e.g., by respecting this debt or my status as your father, you are respecting 
me) to an objective quality, with eugnōmosynē coming to mean ―creditworthy‖ and 
eugnōmonein, ―to repay.‖ I suggest that this development is in part related to the use of the term 
as a coin in the currency of reputation: in becoming an act or characteristic of a person as he 
relates to obligations per se, eugnōmosynē necessarily becomes less of a subjective quality of a 





The chapter ends with the exploration of several letters in which we see the discourse of 
reputation at work in both contract formation and enforcement, as well as two petitions which 
include this language of norms. These last documents show the connection, conceptually, 
ideologically, and rhetorically, between norms and law in contract enforcement as one moved 
from personal and vicarious self-help to official enforcement. This final topic will be picked up 
again in Chapter 6. 
Of the numerous attestations of pistis and its cognates which appear in the papyri from 
the third century BCE until the mid-fourth century CE, many are technical terms in legal 
documents, most of which are discussed by Schmitz. For the reasons set out immediately above, 
the discussion below will tend to refer to such uses only infrequently. I have also ignored 
attestations that relate to Christian faith. Finally, one more sub-set may be put to the side: the use 
of pistis in describing relations with or to the state. These are, of course, related: the trust one has 
in another person and the trust one exhibits or has in relation to the state, and at various points I 
make these connections (e.g., pp. 133f., n290). However, the use of pistis in these settings, 
usually liturgical, and in highly stylized documents, like oaths, deserves to be studied in its own 
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4.2 The Social Dynamics of Pistis  
Trust in Graeco-Roman Egypt was conceived of in terms similar to light: it radiated from a 
central point and diminished geometrically with distance.
250
 At the center, of course, was 
oneself, a condition expressed by the old and ubiquitous saw that people trust their eyes more 
than their ears, for trusting one‘s eyes is tantamount to trusting oneself.251 This condition also 
accounts for the fact that the single most common circumstance in which we hear about the issue 
of trust in the documents is the need for or lack of some trusted person to deliver something. In 
the ancient world travel was comparatively slow, and information travelled at the speed of 
people.
252
 Letters could be lost, stolen, or tampered with en route, and one would only know of 
this in a return letter, weeks, perhaps months later, when the initial carrier might be long gone. 
This, then, was the most common instance in which one needed to act at a distance and depend 
on reports, the most routine and quotidian experience of this sort of risk and consequent need for 
trust.  
The post, as informal and potentially risky as it was, seems in fact to have been fairly 
reliable, at least insofar as we may infer from the tendency of letter-writers to reproach each 
other for not responding or reciprocating with a return letter. In other words, people generally 
assumed that their letters arrived in a timely fashion and that silence was the fault of their 
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correspondents, not their couriers.
253
 Objects, however, were another matter. While most letters 
were of little value to anyone but the intended recipient (and the couriers were as likely to be 
illiterate as not, though some were in fact the letter-writers), almost all objects had an obvious 
and intrinsic value.
254
 Such things therefore needed to travel with trustworthy people. Money, for 
instance, could only be sent ―if you can find someone very trustworthy from those with you.‖255 
Such people, however, were evidently not often to be had, as a common excuse for not sending 
money was that the would-be sender had no one to hand whom he could trust.
256
 This solicitude 
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 E.g., P.Mert. II 82 (unknown, late II). Winter 1933: 82-3 gives a lively sketch of the postal ―system‖ and people‘s 
attitudes towards delivery and answering letters. The post was apparently reliable enough that some people even 
charged those who did not respond with having torn up their letters, e.g., SB XVIII 13867.52-6 (Arsinoite, II BCE): 
π ρὶ τ ς ἐπ σ- [το ] ς ἧς  ο  ἐπέ ψ τ , [ο ]  ο  σά   ος  ἶπ  ὅ  · ο     τὸ  Σάρ π < > ο -   [ ]σ χ σ · ο  
 άρ         θής. (―Concerning the letter which you sent to me, since I did not receive it I said: ‗I did not tear it up, 
for I am not an idiot!‘‖). 
254
 Sometimes, however, letters were valuable and one could not trust that they had been passed on by interested 
intermediaries, e.g., Cic. ad Att. 1.13.1: quibus epistulis sum equidem abs te lacessitus ad rescribendum; sed idcirco 
sum tardior, quod non invenio fidelem tabellarium. quotus enim quisque est, qui epistulam paulo graviorem ferre 
possit, nisi eam pellectione relevarit ? (―And in these letters [you sent], I am indeed urged by you to reply; I am 
rather slow to do so, however, because I find no trustworthy carrier. How many men are there who are able to carry 
even a vaguely heavy letter without lightening it with a perusal?‖ He goes on to mention the other logistical trouble 
of coordinating the timing of the arrival of letters and the whereabouts of recipients.), cf. SB XVI 12579 (Toka 
[Oxyrhynchite], late II), on which more below. On a very different level, Symmachus could pride himself that his 
letters were thought worthy of stealing: quae [sc. responsa nostra], ut confido, iam tradita sunt, nisi forte denuo 
aliquis ex urbanis divitibus insessor viarum scripta nostra furaverit (Ep. 2.48: ―And [our responses], as I trust, have 
already been delivered, unless perchance one of those rich ‗highwaymen‘ from the city stole our writings again.‖).  
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 E.g., P.Fay. 122 (Euhemeria, ca. 100), lines 20-2: ἐά  τ - |     ὕρῃς    τ  π ρό[ τ ς]  χο τ |π ίστ   (l. 
πίστ  ) πο   ή  . Cf. P.Oxy. II 269 (Oxyrhynchos, 57):   ὶ ἐ    ὕ[ρ]ῃς  σφ -  ὴ  (i.e.,  σφ    [Gignac 1977-81, 
I: 135])
  ὺς (l.  ὸς)   τῶ τὸ  ρ-|  ρ ο  ἐ έ      ο  (ii.10-12). P.Mich. III 203 (Karanis [but sent from Pselkis in 
Nubia], 114-16), is interesting in this connection. The writer Saturnilus reassures his mother that everything she 
sends (including his allowance or epimnēnidia) via a certain Julius in fact arrives, saying that the latter has 
―promised‖ to act as a courier: ο]ἶ  ς ὅτ  τί ἐ    ῦς (l.  ο ς) Ἰου ίῳ φέρ    ο  ὃ   ὶ   ο ό  σέ  ο  (28). Von 
Soden classes this as one of the few Roman examples of the non-technical uses of homologein to mean ―to promise‖ 
as opposed ―to acknowledge,‖ a meaning much more common in the early Ptolemaic period (1973: 34). By the 
second century, however, this word must have sounded more ―legal‖ compared to other more common words for 
promise (e.g., tattesthai or hypischneisthai), and was perhaps chosen for this reason, to impress on upon the mother 
the seriousness with which Julius took his courier duties.  
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 but indeed 
all items of any worth whatsoever, as we see, e.g., in P.Yale I 80 (unknown, II), a σ  υ ρί  ο  
 φρο   [?],  and P.Mich. VIII 514 (Alexandria, III), an infant‘s chiton. It also extended to 
important legal functions, which were either carried out by trusted agents or not at all.
259
 The 
state, naturally, had similar concerns.
260
 Thus standard instructions in orders for grain shipments 
from the Arsinoite to Alexandria toward the end of the Ptolemaic era provided that the ―usual 
documents‖ and the samples attesting to the quality of the wheat were to be given over to ―the 
most trustworthy klerouchic phylakitai.‖261 Similarly, the state put a premium on ―trustworthy‖ 
local agents when it came to administration and taxation.
262
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 E.g., SB XIV 12106 (Oxyrhynchos?, II): [. . .τὴ  τ ς] θυρί [ο]ς σου         χ  Π ρ [σὶς] ἡ  σω ἐ   ·     ή, 
 πότ  ἂ  \      ρ ί [ ]/ ἦ[ ], σή   [ο] . ο    ρ ἄ  ο  \τ   / ἕξω  τὸ    υ ά   ο   π  έ      ο      ς 
   ξά  ρ     π στ῵ς,  ὥστ   ὴ     ήσῃ ς. (1-7: ― . . .  Persis, the women who is in there, has the key of your 
wall cupboard. Otherwise, whenever an opportunity [i.e., of finding a trustworthy person] arises, let me know. For I 
shall not have anyone else who can reliably bring it to Alexandria for me, and so do not neglect it.‖ Trans. of the ed. 
pr. by Youtie (ZPE 24 [1977]: 128). 
258
 P.Mich. XII 657.11-14 (unknown, II-III): [σ]ὺ  ὲ τῶ  σφ -    έστ ρ[ο ] φέρο τ  τ    φο  ί    [ ] σ  ς ἵ     
 ὴ    [ο]υρ  θῇ (―But you, give the dates to someone who will transport them safely, in order that they will not be 
pilfered.‖). On kakourgein, cf. n629 below. 
259
 E.g., P.Oxy. XXXIV 2726 (Oxyrhynchos, II), a request by one friend and business partner to give documents in 
need of registration to the agent who brought them or ἢ ᾧ ἐ    ο   άσῃς|  τέρῳ  σφ     (22-23). For asphalēs as 
a synonym for pistos, see P.Oxy. II 269 (n255 above). For the full semantic implications of dokimazein in this 
context see pp. 142ff. below. 
260
 See Kehoe 2007 and Manning 2009 in particular on the ―agency problem‖ in the ancient administration. 
261
 ἐπ β β σθέ τω  φυ    τ῵       ρουχ  έ ω  τ῵    ὶ  ά  στ  πίστ   ἐχό τω  οἷς   ὶ τὸ        
  τ σφρ   σ έ ο  ἐπ τ θήσ τ   ἐ    ΐ ο ς ὠ ο ς     ίο ς   ὶ π ρ  ο  οῦσ  π ρ  τοῦ πρὸς τῇ σ τ ρᾷ τ ς 
ἐξ  ρέσ ως τοὺς   θή ο τ ς χρ   τ σ οὺς ... (―After the most trustworthy klerouchic phylakitai embark, to 
whom the sample, sealed in unbaked, earthen jars, is given, and who convey the usual documents from the one in 
charge of the sitaria at the dock, ...‖). See BGU XVIII 2736-2738 for examples and discussion of the type. 
262
 E.g., P.Tebt. I 27=W.Chr. 331 (Kerkeosiris, 113 BCE), which contains reprimands and instructions from the 
dioikētēs to subordinates in charge of revenue collection, passed down the chain of command to the basilikoi 
grammateis and thence to the topogrammateis and kōmogrammateis. A chief complaint throughout is the lack 





In the latter two examples, the state was not content to employ people who were 
trustworthy, but also took security for performance, either in the form of property, which was 
liable in the event of failure or malfeasance, or oaths, or (as often) both. Private individuals, of 
course, also took security in many cases, but such ―trust‖ in objects and others (security and 
sureties, mortal or immortal, were both often referred to as pisteis in a transferred sense)
263
 was 
secondary to trust in the individuals themselves: pistis was first and foremost a personal quality. 
It is for this reason that no one would ever normally ―trust‖ an ―unknown‖ person. A nice 
example of this comes in a letter which a certain Aquila, likely a procurator, wrote to Ptolemaios, 
a landholder of a large estate, reporting that some of the latter‘s dependants in the village of Toka 
(Oxyrhynchite nome) were protesting that they were not about to hand over some cypress wood 
to an adēlos.264 In order to clarify the order, they sent a letter to Ptolemaios through their 
phrontistēs Athas. So troubled were they at not receiving a direct reply that they apparently 
―attacked‖ their overseers and ―harassed the entire neighborhood,‖ assuming that Athas had 
pocketed the letter instead of passing it on. For whatever reason, they needed confirmation 
                                                                                                                                                             
dioikētēs thus commands at ii.47-iii.54:   ὶ π ρ  τ῵[   ω ο ρ  ]  τέω  ἐπ   βὼ |τὴ   ρ φὴ  τ῵  
 υ   [έ] ω  ἐπ [σ]π[ σθ]       ς τ ς     -|  τοφυ   ί ς  πό τ  τ[῵]  στρ τ υο έ ω    ὶ τ῵  ἄ  ω  
|τ῵  τόπους   τ[ο]  ο  τω    ὶ ἐ  π ρ στάσ       έ ω |  ὶ πίστ     ὶ  σφ  [ ]ί      φ ρό τω    ὶ τοὺς 
ἐπ τ   ίους|  τ στήσ ς πρὸς τ  ς   τ          ὶ π ρ   ὲ  το τω |  ὶ τ῵  ἐ    άστ   φυ [ ]   [τ῵ ] 
   [β]ὼ  χ  ρο ρ φί ς ὅρ ου β σ    οῦ   σσ ς|ἐπὶ τοῦ β  τίστου προσ τ ή σ σ [θ   τ] ς φυ    ς ... (―And 
procure from the kōmogrammateis the list of those who can be made to undertake the custody of the produce from 
those in the army and the other inhabitants of the district who are living in the neighborhood and are conspicious for 
honesty and steadiness, and appoint those fit to the posts in the villages; take from them and the phylakitai in each 
village two written oaths by the sovereigns that they will provide in the best possible manner for the custody‖ And 
he continues by specifying particular measures of good custodianship. Trans. adapt. from ed. pr.). Cf. i.5-7, 13-15, 
21-22; ii.34-41. 
263
 Cf. Schmitz 1964: 5-7, 36-44. Pistis was also a word for oaths in the Ptolemaic period, see Seidl 1933: 32-36; 
Schmitz 1964: 10-17; and now P.Heid. VI 376 (Herakleopolite, 220 BCE), note to lines 15-16. Cf. n248. 
264
 SB XVI 12579 (late II), lines 20-22: τ   υπ ρίσ-|σ  [     ρ] τῶ   ή ῳ ο   υ ά  θ     [             ]         . On 





directly from the top: ―Since he is our landlord, on this account we wrote to him, so as not to 
write to an unknown.‖265 Aquila mocks the simple men of Toka for assuming that Ptolemaios‘s 
silence was due to the corruption of his men rather than the relative unimportance of their 
request, but their attitude of distrust is revealing nonetheless.
266
 One simply did not trust those 
one did not know in important matters, even on the say-so of those one did, like Athas.
267
 
In the shadows, then, were the adēloi; who was on the inside, and how far did the light of 
trust shine? The inner circle, of course, usually included one‘s family and closest friends. Thus 
we find a certain Sarapias requesting that her brother Sarapion alias Alexandros be appointed 
guardian of her recently orphaned daughter, since Sarapias had ―determined on the basis of his 
goodwill, fidelity, and ties of kinship that he would protect the revenue of her child 
honorably.‖268 However, while one was perhaps most likely to trust one‘s most intimate 
relations, family members were not trusted as a matter of course. Trust had to be earned and 
maintained, even within family.  
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 18-20: ἐ]πὶ (l. ἐπ ὶ) ἡ ῵    οῦχός ἐ-|στ  [ ],     τοῦτο ἐ ράψ       τῶ ἵ    ὴ [τῶ   ή]  ῳ  ράψω   . 
266
 11-14: τῇ  ωρί    τ῵   έ ο τ ς | [ὅτ]    τ  ρ φ[ὴ]  θέ ο    τῇ{ς} ἐπ -|[στο] ῇ   ὶ τάχ        τ  
  τὸ   ὶ ο  | [ἐπέ] ψ τ    τῶ. (―... saying in their folly: ‗We want an answer to the letter. You probably opened 
it and did not send it to him.‘ ‖) 
267
 Cf. Plaut. Rud. 951-53, where the joke is that anyone should be fidus to an unknown person (do fidem tibi, fidus 
ero, quisquis es.). 
268
 P.Tebt. II 326=M.Chr. 325 (Tebtynis, 266-267), lines 7-12: ὑπὲρ οὖ       ο ί ς   ὶ   ο  ήσ ως τ῵  ὑ-| 
π[ ]ρχό τω  τῇ π   ὶ τὸ  ΐ  ο  ἐ  υτ ς     φὸ  Α -|ρή  ο  Σ ρ πίω   τὸ    ὶ   έξ   ρο    ὶ   τὸ  
  τ  οέ  |    οί    ὶ πίστ    ὶ τῇ τοῦ  έ ους ο    ότ τ   ο   άσ σ  προ-|[ ο]ήσ σθ   \   σίως/ τοῦ 
π   ίου τὴ  πρόσο ο  πο ου έ      τοῦ    | τῶ ΐ ίῳ       ῳ ἐπίτρ[ο]π[ο]  τῇ π   ὶ  ποφ  [  ]  . 
Sarapias‘s petition also suggests that her brother‘s Antinoite citizenship, which he shared with her late husband and 





We have a vivid example of this in a difficult letter that nevertheless succeeds in 
revealing the sort of ties that bound friends and families, as well as the stresses such ties came 
under. In P.Mich. VIII 485 (Karanis, ca. 105) a certain Ammonios writes to Gaius Iulius 
Sabinus, a signifer (most likely) of the legio XXII Deiotariana, ostensibly to congratulate him on 
the elevation of his son Apollinarios to the position of secutor under one Valerius Pius. 
Ammonius‘s real purpose, however, was to exhort Sabinus to take his own son in hand—
confusingly also called Valerius—with the aim of having Valerius fils follow the advice of his 
friend (the aforementioned Apollinarios) and write to Pius in order to accept a post that he 
(Valerius fils) had been offered on the same staff.
269
 We therefore have two families, linked by 
friendship at two levels. In the younger generation, one son (Apollinarios) attempts to help the 
other (Valerius fils) navigate the channels of power and preferment in the army (Apollinarios 
wishes Valerius to accept the post in part ―to have him with him,‖ i.e., to be ―under his 
protection‖ (9-10),  so that both will rise through the ranks together). In the older generation, one 
father (Ammonios) relies on the other (Sabinus) to get his own son (Valerius fils) to follow the 
advice of the other‘s son (see fig. 4.2 below). 
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 The relationships are confusing due to the coincidence of names and a rather inartful use of pronouns (cf. 





Fig. 4.2  Map of relationships in P.Mich. VIII 485 
 




Valerius fils       Apollinarios 
 
 
Ammonios‘s particular request of Sabinus is as follows: 
 
 [ ὸ] π ρ    ῵ σ ,     φέ,   τ’ ἐ οῦ  
 πά [ ]     έσθ     ὶ προτρέψ σθ   τὸ   
12 Ο  [ ]έρ [ο ]  ρά ψ   τ῵  Π ίω  π  θό   ο   
τῇ ἐ [ῇ] πίστ     ὶ   ξ ᾷ, ΐ   πά τοθ    
ᾖς ο[ ]  ὴ [ ό] ο  βο θὸς τοῦ πρά   τος  
       ὶ    θὸς  υβ ρ ήτ ς, υἱὸ  π τρὶ  
16 χ ρ[ ]ζό   [ο]ς. 
 
Wherefore I beseech you, brother [i.e., Sabinus], to stand in my stead once more and urge 
Valerius [fils], trusting in my faith and pledge, to write to Pius, so that you may in every 
way be not only a help in this matter but also a ―good pilot,‖ restoring a son to his father. 
 
 
The phrase π  θό   ο  τῇ ἐ [ῇ] πίστ     ὶ   ξ ᾷ has ever since the editio princeps been 
interpreted as agreeing with σ  in line 9, i.e., Sabinus.270 But this makes little sense: why should 
Sabinus need to rely on Ammonios‘s pistis and dexia to urge a course of action on Valerius? 
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 Stated explicitly at Strassi 2002: 168. 
Apollinarios suggested that Valerius write to his 
commanding officer, Valerius Pius  
Ammonios hopes Sabinus will sway son to listen to 
Apollinarios and write to Valerius Pius 






Strassi suggests that in using the language of trust Ammonios is attempting to underscore the 
relationship of trust that characterizes his friendship with Sabinus.
271
 Yet pistis and dexia are 




Compare, for instance, a letter already alluded to above, P.Tebt. II 418v (Tebtynis, III). In 
this letter Soterichos writes to his friend Horigenes, asking among other things that Horigenes 
provide for his wife on their joint journey to him:   ὶ | [οὕ]τ  ος ἐ   χρ ί    χῃ  έρ-|[ ] τος 
  σ  ς   τῇ ἕως   σέ θῃς | [ ] ὶ  πο άβῃς π ρ’ ἐ οῦ    ῇ | πίστ  , ἐπ ὶ ο    ὶ ἐπίστ υσ  
| [ὥ]στ    τῇ  ο ίσ  . (―And give her whatever money she may have need of until you arrive 
[sc. in Tebtynis with my wife] and receive it back from me in good faith, since I have trusted no 
one to take it to her.‖). The position and tone of friendship here echoes that of P.Mich. VIII 485, 
as we may hear in the form of address (A to B τῶ τ   ωτάτῳ π   στ  χ ίρ   ), the 
punctuation of the central requests with the apostrophe     φέ (P.Tebt II 418v.8 and P.Mich. 
VIII 485.9), and the address on the verso (both style themselves as φί ο ). Each of these 
elements is conventional in personal letters of the Roman period, and so tells us very little about 
the degree of intimacy in and of themselves, but as a suite they mark the letters as ones written 
between friends.
273
 The difference, of course, is that the role trust plays in P.Tebt. II 418v is 
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 Strassi 2002: 167-68. 
272
 Cf. Schmitz 1964: 5: ―Πίστ ς ist stets dort anzutreffen, wo die Ausgestaltung der Rechtslage in der Zukunft 
ungewiss ist oder für einen der Partner einem Risiko verbunden ist.‖ Cf. p. 125. 
273
 On the opening formula, see Exler 1923: 31, 62-63 (note that this particular formula does not extend to business 
documents drafted in epistolary form (cf. 36-42, cf. 63-68), cf. Zilliacus 1949: 33-34.  On the use of the term 
adelphos, see Dickey 2004, esp. 144, 154-56. She cautions her readers that ―the term carries no necessary 





clear: Soterichos is asking Horigenes to trust him by advancing money to his wife on credit. The 
friendship is the foundation on which that trust is built, but the particular act of trust is invoked 
only because of the introduction of a definite and specific risk (i.e., the advance).
274
 In the case 
of P.Mich. VIII 485, then, we must ask: cui periculo?  
Immediately after the portion of the letter quoted above there is a lacuna in what starts off 
as an alternative (ἐ    έ πως ...), but ends with Ammonios promising to sail down to Sabinus at 
once ―when the moment comes‖ (15-17). Why Valerius fils is with Sabinus and why he is 
ignoring the advice of both Apollinarios and his father, we have no idea; but it is clear that this is 
not the first time Sabinus has been called on to play the role of father to him (  τ’ ἐ οῦ | 
πά [ ]     έσθ  , 9-10), and that this rift has, in Ammonios‘s eyes, left his son rudderless (i.e., 
in need of a proverbial ―good pilot‖), though not so wayward as to rule out all hope of 
reconciliation (υἱὸ  π τρὶ | χ ρ[ ]ζό   [ο]ς, 14-15). The only person taking a risk here, 
therefore, is Valerius fils in trusting his father, something he is clearly loath to do, perhaps 
generally, but certainly with respect to this particular matter.
275
  
                                                                                                                                                             
with whom the writer has little or no real emotional involvement‖ (155-56). Given the sheer number of attestations 
in Roman papyri, Dickey may be forgiven for giving us no sense of how often it was so used.  In any case, this is no 
argument against seeing its use in some circumstances as a way of suggesting the intimacy and connections of 
brotherhood (whatever the specific cultural or ideational content of Greco-Egyptian ―brotherhood‖ might have 
been). The same might be said of the epithet timiōtatos. No doubt it had come to be applied ―rein mechanisch‖ over 
the course of the Roman period (Zilliacus 1949: 34), but this does not necessarily rob it of its obvious meaning when 
appropriate. 
274
 Κ  ὴ πίστ ς in this instance not only clearly has a quasi-technical meaning of ―credit,‖ as opposed to simple 
―trust,‖ but is also just as clearly a gloss of, or at least influenced linguistically by, the Latin bona fides (see Schmitz 
1964: 101-12; cf. Wolff 2002: 198-200). The circumstances of the letter justify seeing this as non-technical use of 
the concept: this is a one-time temporary arrangement, not a formal contract invoking a fiduciary standard. It is the 
equivalent of saying to a friend, ―Trust me, I am good for it when you arrive.‖ 
275





There is, moreover, no grammatical objection to construing the participle π  θό   ο  
with τὸ  Ου  έρ ο , which is after all the closest accusative. The argument for construing it 
with σ  rests largely, it would seem, on the contrast affected by the adjective ἐ ῇ qualifying 
πίστ  , a contrast heightened by the return to the second person in the purpose clause that 
follows. The contrast is real but misinterpreted. Writing to his friend about an important favor in 
what was likely his own hand, Ammonios naturally reached for ἐ ῇ instead of the more objective 
and unnecessary τοῦ π τρός.276 The proper translation, therefore, is: ―Wherefore I beseech you, 
brother, to stand in my stead once more and urge Valerius to trust in my faith and pledge, and to 
write to Pius ...‖ 
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 To judge from Youtie‘s description (no image is available online), it would seem that the letter was penned by 
Ammonios himself, since the subscription is in the same hand as the body and the address of the letter. From Cicero 
we know that autography signalled not only authenticity and confidentiality, but also constituted a sign of intimacy 
and esteem (e.g., ad Att. 8.13.1, 5.17.1, 4.16.1, etc.; cf. Bagnall and Cribiore 2006: 42). Given the circumstances and 
the general emphasis on respect and friendship throughout Ammonios‘s letter, we certainly would have expected an 
autographic letter had Cicero been the author. Sadly, our evidence for the cultural value of autography in Greek 
letters, documentary and literary, is almost entirely negative (Bagnall and Cribiore 2006: 42, cf. the extended 
version in the ebook, paragraph 203). Two documents, however, suggest that autography might have carried a 
similar meaning. BGU II 423 (=SelPap 1.112; Misenum?, II), preserves a famous letter from a young naval recruit 
to his father, in which he begs his father to write him a letter so that he might have news of his family and ―kiss your 
hand(writing)‖ in gratitude for his education (ἵ   σου προσ υ ήσω τὴ    χέρ   [l. χ  ρ ], 15-16). Such a 
sentiment would make no sense unless a person‘s hand was seen as an extention of his personality, a physical 
embodiment of the individual capable of evoking, in this instance at least, an correspondingly intimate and physcial 
response. In a different vein, St. Paul clearly used his handwriting not only to authenticate his letters (e.g., 2Thes. 
3:17, cf. 1Cor. 16:21), but also to communicate emphasis (Gal. 6:11: ἴ  τ  π  ί ο ς ὑ     ρά   σ     ρ ψ  τῇ 
ἐ ῇ χ  ρί; cf. Martin 1998: 560). Of course, Paul could have told the scribe to do this, but the exhortation—and the 
fact that he evidently did not—indicate that special authority and effort could be invested and recognized in 
handwriting, not particularly surprising given the clear importance of styles in epigraphy and bookhands. I know of 
no example in the papyri where emphasis is so added, nor any discussion of graphic emphasis in ancient letters. The 
closest parallel might be the routine order from Prefects to post edicts in ―clear‖ letters (e.g., P.Oxy. VIII 1100 
[Oxyrhynchos, 206]:    τά   ]-   τος προτ θέ τος ὑπʼ ἐ οῦ ἐ  τῇ    προτάτ[ῃ    ξ   ρ ί    τί ρ φο  
 π  ψ  ὑ    ὃ] | ὑ   ς φρο τίσ τ     ή ο ς  ρά   σ  ἐπὶ τ [῵    τροπό  ω    ὶ ἐ  το ς τ῵   ο ῵  φ ]- | 
  ρωτάτο ς τόπο ς προ<θ>      ... (―I sent you a copy of the edict posted by me in most illustrious Alexandria, 
which you will take care to post in clear letters in the metropoleis and the most most conspicuous places of the 





Once lost, trust was hard to rebuild, and it is not surprising that Ammonios attempted to 
heal the divide via alternate avenues of trust, namely through his son‘s relationship with ―uncle‖ 
Sabinus. The first line of defence, of course, was not to let the cracks appear in the first place; 
hence the constant reciprocal demonstrations of trust in word and deed that characterized ancient 
friendship and social relations generally.
277
 However, if one did see trust beginning to flag or 
fail, it was best to intervene immediately. Thus an unnamed woman wrote to Kopres (SB III 6264 
[Arsinoite, late II]), hoping to maintain his trust even as Kopres‘ wife was attempting to 
undermine it: 
 
τῶ Κοπρῇ  
χ ίρ   .  
τὸ  ὲ   ορ ό   
4 σου οἶ  , ἡ  ὲ  
  υ [ή] σ   ά    
   ο[ῦσ ] πᾶσ    
ὥρ[  ], ὅτ  σο   
8 ο  ὲ   ί ω.    ρ-  
χό   ος278  ὲ   ω-  
  ά σο    ρ άτ ο ,  
ὅτ   έξ σ  τ   
12 σ τάρ   ἐ    τῶ  
  ρ τῶ    ὶ [ο ]-  
χ  ὗρο   ῵  ί σ [ο ].  
 ο  έ  σ    ρ  
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 Cf.  Millett 1991: 109-26 and passim. 
278
 l.    ρχο έ ῳ? The letter is rife with extraneous  άρs and vernacular forms (e.g.,  ί ω and  έξ σ , cf. Gignac 
1976-81: II, 382 and 325-56 resp.). Bagnall and Cribiore 2006: 282 reasonably suggest against Bell, the original 
editor, that it is more likely that the writer made a mistake of case than gender. This would, however, create a sort of 
interlocking word-order that strikes me as out of line with the mode of expression in the rest of the letter, which is 
entirely linear. Cf. similar uses of this particple as an immediate adverbial modifier of a conjugated verb: P.Fay. 
121, P.Heid. II 215, P.Oxy. XIV 1757, P.Prag. I 111, P.Vind.Sijp. 26, SB XIV 12083 and XX 15165. My translation 





16 ὑποστέ  ο  ,  
πά τ  σο    ρ  
π στ  ω. ἡ   ρ  
 υ ή σου  έ  , ὅτ   
20 ο  ὲ  π στ    (l. π στ    ) 
πο              υ  
[ - ca. ? - ]  
 
Text breaks, but on the left margin it continues: 
  
23 ο  ίς σ      τ  φ   σ  (l. φ   σ  .), ἐ ί     ρ  ς τὸ σ  φο(ρο )   τ ς ξ    
[σ ( )     ]            ά ρ σου τ  σ τ ρ φ .   
 
 
To Kopres, greetings. I know your temper, but your wife inflames you, saying every hour 
that I give you nothing. When I came up, I gave you pocket change because I did not find 
(anything) to give you, since I received the grain that same month. I am cheating you in 
nothing, for I entrust you with everything. Your wife says, ―She entrusts nothing ...‖ (In 
the left margin) Nobody can love you, for she shapes [you(?)] according to her advantage 
...  
 
As usual with these ancient letters, the precise context cannot be reconstructed. What seems 
tolerably clear is the following: The writer owes Kopres money, and she hopes to persuade him 
that her past, insufficient payments are in fact tokens of her commitment to repay him. Kopres‘ 
wife, on the other hand, is attempting to persuade him that he is a fool for trusting the writer. One 
in fact wonders whether there are competing notions of ―trust‖ in this letter. The unfinished 
complaint in the mouth of the wife beginning in line 19, for instance, may in fact refer to security 
of some sort, with her exclaiming that Kopres should have taken some security in light of the 
writer‘s delinquency, in effect saying ―She has not entrusted anything ...‖279 If so, this would 
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 Pisteuein can mean ―to pledge as security,‖ e.g., P.Cair.Zen. IV 59626 (Philadelphia, mid-III BCE); cf. Preisigke, 





help make sense of the writer‘s response that she she has in fact put ―everything‖ into his hands 
(i.e., she hopes to avoid giving security).  
More interesting for our purpose (and more certain) is the illumination of the sort of 
damage and stress failure to perform could do to a relationship of trust. Some leeway is afforded 
extenuating circumstances—hence the writer‘s resorting to the excuse concerning her own late 
receipt of grain—but we see here the quick leap from failure to fraud, even in the author‘s own 
mind (ο  έ  σ    ρ ὑποστέ  ο   ...). Rebutting the wife‘s every claim, the writer‘s defensive 
rhetorical ploy is to drive a wedge between Kopres and his wife: though he is easily incensed, it 
is she who provides the match; though he is naturally lovable, he is being whittled away by ―that 
one‖ into a tool for her own ends such that no one will be able to love him.280 It was this pointed 
competition between the writer and ―the wife‖ that clinched the sex of the writer (who used one 
masculine and one feminine participle in referring to herself) for Bell, the original editor (1919: 
207). Bagnall and Cribiore expand on the suggestion: ―The general tone of this letter suggests 
that the writer was the mother of Kopres. In replying to her son, who had complained of being 
treated unjustly, this woman puts the blame entirely on her daughter-in-law‖ (2006: 282). 
Whatever relations we infer, in this struggle for trust within Kopres‘ inner circle the writer‘s 
letter can only buy her time, for the problem does not in fact lie with the wife, but with her own 
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 Philein need not imply any particular kind of affection, i.e., sexual or familiar. See examples in LSJ and Preisigke 
Wörterbuch s.v. φ  έω, cf. Ammonios, Π ρὶ   οίω    ὶ    φόρω   έξ ω , s.v. (§ 499): φ      . . . τὸ    πᾶ  





failure—whatever the reason—to keep faith. Actions, not intentions or kinship, were the 
lifeblood of ancient trust, and so the only winning strategy open to the writer lay in repayment.
281
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 Cf. Heinze 1929: 147n1: ―Die fides ‗Credit‘ (im geschäftlichen Sinn) gründete sich ursprünglich gewiss auf die 






4.3 The Business Dynamics of Pistis  
The last example in the previous section mixed business with family, a common combination in 
the ancient world, but now we need to turn to how trust operated at its furthest edges, between 
friends, acquaintances, associates, and business partners. Suggestively, the bright line that 
divided those who were trustworthy from those who were not helped to construct an abstraction 
of a ―trusted‖ person. For example, in P.Yale I 79 (unknown, ca. 150) Harpokras writes to his 
friend and partner Sarapammon about some false coin which they had received from their 
banker, a π στ υό   ος: 
 
4  έ ο τός σου π - 
 ρὶ τοῦ τρ π ζ ί- 
 του ὅτ  ὀφ ί   β - 
 β  χέ    τ [ὸ]  
8 χ   ὸ , σ [πρ]οὺ(ς) 
 στ τ ρ ς (l. στ τ ρ ς.) ὀφ ί- 
  ο     ο  - 
  άσ  . τὸ  [χ]  - 
12  ὸ  ἐ ὼ ἠ έ- 
   σ , θ υ ά- 
 ζω     ἄ θρω- 
 πος π στ υό  - 
16  ος τοῦτο πο - 
   .  ὗρο  οὖ    
 σ προὺς   ὶ    
 τὴ  σωτ ρί   σου 
20   ὶ τ῵  π  - 
  ίω   ου, τοὺς 
   ἐ τ τί  χ . 
  χρήστους ὄ τ ς 
24  π  ψά σο  τοὺς 
  .  ἶ ὀ οσάτω (l. ἢ ο οσάτω.) ὅτ  
 ο     σ    τοῦ ἢ 






Although you were saying about the banker, that he ought to have paid
282
 the bronze, we 
should have tested for rotten staters. [But] I took no thought of the bronze, surprised that 
a trusted man should do this [i.e., pass bad coin]. I then found 8 rotten ones, and by your 
life and that of my children, I disposed of 3. Since they are worthless I sent you the 
(remaining) 5. Either let him swear that they are not his or let him change them. 
 
As Harpocras relates, he did not bother to check the coins himself not only because Sarapammon 
had said that the banker had already done so, but also because he assumed that the banker, whom 
they considered a ―trustworthy man,‖ would naturally have done so. Assaying coin had been a 
standard function of banks since Athenian times, and it is clear that banks in Roman Egypt were 
generally counted on to pass good coin.
283
 In this document the term pisteuomenos seems to rise 
almost to something like a standard of commerical behavior, akin to the Roman Law standard of 
the bonus paterfamilias. Yet this is clearly not a legally defined duty of care: Harpocras and 
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 The editors tentatively translated β β  χέ    as ―checked (?),‖ but ballein nowhere else means ―to check‖ or 
―assay‖ (on the swapping of intervocalic kappa and chi, see Gignac 1978-81: I, 92; the word is not discussed at all in 
the exhaustive work of Bogaert 1968). And what would have prevented Harpocras from using dokimazein twice, if 
this is what he meant (cf. 10-11)? When ballein is used of coin, it invariably means ―to pay‖ (Preisigke, Wörterbuch, 
s.v. 1; cf. Kiesling, Wörterbuch, s.v. 4). Antiballein and prosantiballein are used in papyrological and literary 
sources to mean the ―checking‖ of manuscripts and documents by collation; but the meaning here is generated by 
the prepositional prefixes that describe the act of comparison, not the root verb. Also, now see the recently published 
O.Claud. I 166 (Mons Claudianus, 100-120), where antiballein clearly means ―to repay.‖ The fact that the banker 
was to ―pay‖ and not specifically ―check‖ the coin did not in any way relieve him of the responsibility to check the 
coin before paying it out, as the letter indeed attests. 
283
 On bankers assaying money, see Bogaert 1976: 18-20; 1968: 39-41, 44-47, 317-22. According to Bogaert, 
τρ π ζίτ ς ―[c]hez plusieurs auteurs de l‘époque impériale ... est employé pour désigner l‘essayeur des monnaies‖ 
(39-40). Cf., e.g., P.Oxy. XII 1411 (Oxyrhynchite, 260), an order for balking bankers (οἱ τρ π ζ τ   τ῵  
 ο  υβ στ  ῵  τρ π ζ῵ ) to accept and exchange (katakermatizein) new, devalued Imperial coin; and Jerome, 
Comm. in epist. ad Ephes. 3.5.10 (Migne, PL XXVI, col. 557): in morem prudentissimi trapezitae, qui sculptum 
numisma non solum oculo, sed et pondere et tinnitu probat (―in the manner of an exceedingly careful banker, who 
tests an engraved coin not only by eyeing it, but by its weight and ring‖; this comment derives its point from the fact 
that one could expect a merely prudens trapezita to check coin, if only by one method of testing). Public assayers 
( ο    στ  ί) and the associated tax (the  ο    στ  ό ) disappeared from Egypt in the Ptolemaic period (Boegart 
1976: 24-27). Presumably, the burden of checking coin thereafter lay squarely on the shoulders of the bankers and 
their patrons. Cf. P.Cair.Zen. II 59176.60-64 (Philadelphia, 255 BCE), another instance of a banker delivering bad 






Sarapammon obviously had had dealings with this banker before, and it was on his past 
performance that they relied, not merely his professional capacity  or legally mandated duty as a 
banker. 
Harpocras‘s solution to his problem is interesting and revealing, and reflects on the role 
of trust in commercial relationships, for in fact he had two interrelated problems: the bad coin 
and the damaged business relationship with the banker. With respect to the former, he clearly felt 
no compunction about passing off whatever bad coins he could—presumably to people for 
whom he was not a pisteuomenos himself! Those he was unable to get rid off, he returned with 
the instructions that the banker was either to swear they were not his or exchange them. The 
editor commented that ―Harpocras has no chance of proving any misdeed done by the banker, 
but he can hope that the banker would be frightened by the thought of perjuring himself before 
the gods and would thus admit his wrong-doing‖ (p. 248). True, but this is to mistake the purpose 
of the oath, I think. It is being used in its quasi-evidentiary function for a past act, as is familiar 
from Egyptian custom,
284
 but it also—and more importantly—a test of the banker‘s interest in 
the future of the relationship. If he swore the oath, Harpocras and Sarapammon would of course 
be stuck with the bad coin since there would be no winning a judgment against him, but more 
importantly they would know that the business relationship was over; if, however, the banker 
wrote off the cost of the bad coin and exchanged the staters, he would redeem the relationship by 
accepting responsiblity—and the cost—for his failure to perform up to the standard of one on 
whom others rely. The banker was thus given the choice of proceeding on the basis of law or 
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norms for future relations with Harpocras and Sarapammon, with the oath serving as a decisive 
nodal point between the two. In other words, he had to decide which was the more expensive 
route, a lost customer, who would not deal with him if he insisted on a relationship based only on 
the law, or swallowing five staters, which earned him a continued reputation as a pisteuomenos. 
In this instance, then, the oath is as much—or more of—a test for future relations than a way of 
resolving the immediate dispute. Just as the ancients assayed the quality of their coin, so they 
tested their partners when in doubt.  
The picture of trust that emerges from these documents is one of a quality firmly based 
on actions and personal experience. This aspect perhaps comes through most clearly when 
people talk about those whom others would trust, as in the case immediately above. Another 
illuminating example comes in PSI IV 377 (Philadelphia, 249 BCE), in which a person known in 
some capacity to the recipient, whom we assume to be Zenon, writes in the hopes of landing a 
contract to pasture his sheep: 
 
           ... π ρ  οθ ήσ -  
4 τ    έ  ο    ὶ ζ      , ἃ ἐ ὼ θρέψω,   ὶ τ   
  ο π   ὲ  τή     ὶ ἡ ἅ  ξ .   ὶ πρόβ τ   ὲ  
σά, ἄ   ο  π ρ  οθ  ,  θά  τ  π ρέξω   ὶ  
[ ] άστου σο    σω   τ         πό ο  ἕ    
8   ὶ τ ς ἵππους   ἐπ τό ους π ρέξω.     ’ ο ἷ ο   
   π στ  <ς> τ   ξ ῵ σ ,  ἴ σο   ο   , συ  ποστ     ί  οί τ     
 ὃ  ἂ   ο   άζ  ς, ἕως ἂ  το του τοῦ ( τους) π  ρά  σο   πο ῵   ,  
    ὲ  ὴ,     σ   πόφ σί   ο   οῦ    ἵ    ὴ ἐ τ ῦθ    τ -  
12 φθ ίρω   .   τ χ  . 
 
But also let four teams be given over to me, which I will feed, along with the rest of the 





as ―immortal,‖285 and for each one I will give you one fleece every thirteenth month and 
three horses for transport. But if you distrust me in some way, I ask that you, if it seems 
good, send someone with me whom you have tested until I return a specimen of this year 
[i.e., the first payment under the terms proposed]; if (this does) not (seem good to you), 
then you should give me an answer so that I may not be ruined here. Farewell. 
 
 
We have no reason to suspect that Zenon (for our purpose the precise identity of the recipient is 
inconsequential) distrusted the writer in particular; indeed, the fragment of the sentence before 
the section quoted above suggests that Zenon knew and potentially respected the writer‘s 
opinion, since it contains news and an endorsement of another person as  ξ όχρους with respect 
to some business about a bath. The writer, then, was something of a known quantity. The 
―distrust‖ (diapistein) may simply arise the fact that two had not entered into this sort of 
arrangement before, or perhaps did not have a ―business‖ relationship at all: as we have seen, one 
did not properly ―trust‖ another absent personal experience. Then again, there may have been a 
personal reason, based on some negative experience with the writer, or perhaps a report of his 
inexperience or incompetence. Whatever the case, a deal was stillborn unless this trust-gap could 
be bridged. 
The writer therefore suggested two ways to bridge this gap. First, they may limit the risk 
of exposure or reliance to a trial period; second, Zenon may send someone with him whom he 
has ―tested‖ (dokimazein) and therefore trusts. Here we should consider the implications of this 
notion of testing. Although dokimazein may mean simply ―to approve‖ or ―to think fit,‖ along 
the lines of dokein (to which it is etymologically related), its original sense is precisely to test, 
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 I.e., he will return the same number of sheep as he receives. In other words, he is leasing a flock of a certain size 





used very early for assaying the quality of metal or coin.
286
 Thence it was transferred to people, 
both in a general sense (i.e., determining true worth) and in a technical sense (e.g., to test by 
examination).
287
 In the case above we obviously have the idea of testing personal, moral worth. 
Zenon either had had no opportunity to test the writer himself or (less likely) had come up with a 
prior bad result; either way the writer understood that Zenon did not truly know his quality and 
therefore could not trust him. The solution was to send a ―tested‖ person, one on whose proven 
quality both could rely until such time as the writer proved himself.
288
 The first proof, which also 
marks the first step away from reliance on surrogate trust to personal trust, will be the π  ρ . In 
one sense, the peira is the first remittance under the terms of the lease, or so many fleeces 
delivered on time, on which basis Zenon will judge the writer‘s reliability. Semantically, 
however, this ―specimen‖ completes the discourse of trust through experiment and experience, it 
being the physical proof of this first test of trust.
289 Though this is an early example, we often 
find dokimazein in the same complex of ideas as pistis and its derivatives.
290
 In fact, this is the 
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 Cf. Bogaert 1976: 13-14. 
287
 Cf. Chantraine 1968-80, s.v.  ο άω III (p. 291).  
288
 Cf. O.Claud. 134 (Mons Claudianus, 107), in which the curator Domitius, in response to some dispute about how 
much oil should be used for a job related to the hydrophoria, suggests that Successus send someone to monitor his 
usage:     ὲ ἐ οὶ ο  π στ    ς, ὅτ  τοῦτο  ό ο      π  ᾷ, πέ ψο  τ    τ῵  σ῵    θί-   σ    ί   ἡ έρ   ϊ   
π ράσῃς (8-10). The status and relationship between the two is not clear (cf. ed. pr., p. 111), but obviously 
approximates the conditions of, or at least contains many of the same tensions as, a contractual relationship. 
289
 Incidentally, these various devices appear to have worked: the verso of the papyrus contains an account of sheep, 
by all indications the very flock the writer was offering to lease on the recto. 
290
 Cf. P.Oxy. XXXIV 2726 (n259 above) and P.Oxy. XII 1415 (Oxyrhynchos, ca. 280-300): Ε   ί ω  ἐξ   τὴς 
 ἶπ(  )· Πτο     ος π]  ρ   τ ς προ  ρέσ ως  ὑτοῦ πο  ά  ς  έ ω    (29). At this meeting of the 
Oxyrhynchan boulē, Eudaimon the exēgētēs attempts to support a certain Ptolemaios in his request not to be 
appointed to a second liturgy. Eudaimon points out that the boulē  had already had proof of Ptolemaios‘s ready good 





very word Sarapias used five centuries later in P.Tebt. 326 (see n268) when she testified to her 
brother‘s fitness to be guardian to her daughter.291  
One curious word confirms this picture of trust since it expresses the idea of trusting on 
insufficient grounds, i.e., without testing, akin to Plautus‘s eis qui subito credas male in the 
Temple of Castor (Curc. 481): προπ στ     . The word appears but once in the papyri, P.Freib. 
IV 69 (unknown, II-III): 
  
Γέ    ος Σί  ω   χ ίρ   . 
 θ υ άζω{ } π῵ ς π ά    ἠ έ  σ ς 
    έσθ   π ρ [         ]   ω . ὑ   ήσο- 
4   ί (l. ὑφ  ήσο   ) σο    θὼς   [ ρ] ψ άς  ο  π ρὶ τ῵ 
  ο άρχω (l. τοῦ  ο άρχου).   ὶ ἄ [  οτ]έ σο    ρ ψ  
 ὅτ  ο    β    [ -   .   - ]       τί ο ο ς . 
    ῵ς πο ήσ  ς    [         ] Κυρί  ῳ προ- 
8 π στ ῦσ    ό [ο       ]τ  ω  ω  ὧ  
φέρ   ο  φο     ί ω  .  ὴ οὖ      ήσῃς. 
 ἐρ῵σθ ί σ    χο[   ]. 
 
Gemellos to Simon, greetings. I am surprised that again you neglected to be with NN. I 
will explain to you, since you wrote to me about the nomarch. Even another time [i.e., 
―already once before‖] I wrote to you that Philantinoös did not pay the 30 [ ...]. You will 
                                                                                                                                                             
offices at the same time. After some remark by the bouleutai about Ptolemaios not refusing the wishes of his phylē, 
Eudaimon says to them ―you elected him [Ptolemaios] on account of his pistis‖ (Ε   ί ω  ἐξ   τὴς  ἶπ(  )· 
πίστ ως ἕ        τὸ   ἵ  σθ ), meaning either that Ptolemaios was indeed elected against his will to the second 
liturgy (Grenfell and Hunt, ed. pr.) or that he was elected to the office he already holds on the basis of his pistis 
(Bowman 1971: 101). Pistis is an important norm governing the relations between individuals and the state in 
Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt, but has not been sufficiently explored (pp. 124f. above). 
291
 Cf. SB XX 14585 (unknown, 319), a similar document wherein a woman appoints her brother-in-law to represent 
her before the Prefect in a dispute over the disposition of an inheritance (or perhaps the administration of a 
guardianship), saying θ ρροῦ[σ  τ]ο ῦ  έ     σ     βρό   ου ὄ τ  πᾶσ   πίστ     ὶ    ο[ ]    πο- | [  ίξ    
π]ρὸς ἐ έ (―being confident that you will display full faith and goodwill towards me, since you are my brother-in-
law,‖ 9-10). Unlike Sarapias, she has not ―tested‖ him, but merely hopes that he will prove true. This statement, 
then, is aspirational and rhetorical, meant to pressure her brother-in-law into doing the right thing by communicating 





do well [ ...] to entrust to Kyrillos before only [...] of the dates which he brings to me. Do 





Unfortunately, the lacunae render the sentence in lines 7-9 all but unintelligible, but, as the editor 
suggests, propisteuein appears to mean something like ―to entrust beforehand,‖ relating to the 
giving or receiving on credit (i.e., trusting before paying). Just such a business meaning appears 
in Pollux‘s Onomasticon (7.194), when he uses the word while relating a joke about credit made 
by the fifth-century comic Hermippos: Ἕρ  ππος  ὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ προπ στ υθέ τος ἄ  υ  ρ υρίου 
πί     ἐ    π   ίου “πρό οσ   πί    ”  ἴρ     (―Hermippos said of one who was trusted 
beforehand that to drink at a tavern without money was ‗to drink credit‘.‖)293 But why ―pre-trust‖ 
and not just ―trust‖ or pisteuein? Indeed, one could use pistis to mean ―credit,‖ as we see from a 
first-century tavern or brewery account, in which several patrons are recorded as drinking on 
―trust‖ (pistis), i.e., on subscription (P.Tebt. II 401, esp. lines 27 and 39ff.). What, then, does it 
mean to ―pre-trust,‖ and what did this word communicate beyond the idea of mere pistis?   
Propisteuein can have a purely temporal meaning, literally ―to trust something before 
something else,‖ though it usually only means this in the passive (see, e.g., citations from Sextus 
Empiricus in LSJ). Most often, however, ―trusting beforehand‖ carried with it a decidedly 
negative connotation, since trusting beforehand was often tantamount to trusting blindly or 
undeservedly.
294
 Demonsthenes, for instance, in his speech against Aristocrates, in which he 
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 Trans. slightly adapted from the ed. pr. 
293
 PCG vol. 5, Hermippos fr. 78. 
294
 One in fact wonders whether or not it has this meaning in Sextus Empiricus as well, since all three attestations 
occur in discussions of circular reasoning (i.e., some premise that must be ―pre-trusted‖ or taken for granted, which 





argues against putting Athens‘s reputation and resources on the line for mercenaries like 
Charidemos, says that there is no trusting those who are out only for themselves, since they are 
not axiopistos, and that ―he who is thoughtful ought to get the better of such men by guarding 
against them, not by indicting them after having trusted them upfront‖ (23.127:          
το τω , ὅστ ς  ὖ φρο   , φυ  ττό   ο  π ρ      ,  ὴ προπ στ  σ  τ    τ  ορ   ).295 
Similarly, Philo uses the word several times, each time with the sense that propisteuein is to trust 
too early or without proof, representing in effect unearned trust (e.g., Vita Mos. 1.174, In Flac. 
89, and esp. De confusione linguarum140 where he equates the act of  propisteuein with trusting 
hearsay instead of autopsy, cf. p. 131 above).
296
 This, presumably, is the vein in which Pollux 
understood the wit of Hermippos: the barkeep should be serving wine, not ―advances‖ on the 
mere expectation of payment.
297
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 Cf. Ael. Arist.‘s Fourth Leuctrian Oration (Or. 14), where the advice to the Athenians is not to lose sight of what 
each side, the Spartans and the Thebans, had done in the past when deciding on what an alliance with each might 
bring. The speaker here insists that pistis is based on past acts, and that one must therefore discount the future in 
one‘s deliberations since ―many things may come about in the fullness of time which are impossible to foresee and 
cannot be trusted beforehand‖ (πο      ρ ἐ  τῶ π  τὶ χρό ῳ  έ ο τ’ ἂ  ἃ   ὶ προ   έ      ήχ  ο    ὶ 
προπ στ      ο      στ  , § 11). I count only 12 attestations of the word before the fourth century, one of which is 
Dion. Hal. reworking Demosthenes‘ sententia by placing it in the mouth of Lucius Valerius Potitus at the end of his 
speech against the Decemvirs (Rom. Ant. 11.20). 
296
 Of the 12 imperial citations, seven are from Philo, but the sentiment can be found in other contexts and texts, e.g., 
Ben Sirach 6:7:     τᾶσ   φί ο , ἐ  π  ρ σ ῶ  τ σ     τὸ    ὶ  ὴ τ χὺ ἐ π στ  σῃς   τῶ (If you would 
acquire a friend, acquire him by testing and do not trust him too quickly‖). Trans. Lindsay 1993: 46, and see ch. 3 
for more examples and discussion. Cf. Hay 1989. Christians subsequently (and predictably) made ―pre-trusting‖ into 
a virtue: e.g., Photius, Ep. ad Amphilochia 205.52-55 concerning the significance of Abraham‘s circumcision: 
      ο  έ σο     ο  οἶ      θ στά   , ὡς τὴ  π ρ το ὴ    θ σπέσ ος  βρ    ο τ  πίστ ως  σχ     τί  , ο  
 ὴ  ο  ’   τό    τοῦτο τάξ   ἐπέχουσ   πίστ ως (προ πίστ υσ   άρ),      τ ς προϋπ ρξάσ ς   τῶ 
 ό ο  σφρ      τ  τ   ἐ έξ το (―I think that the point has been settled clearly for you now, that the divine 
Abraham received his circumcision not as a cause of his faith, nor again for this reason, that it upheld a rule of faith 
(for he pre-trusted), but rather he received it merely as a sign of (the faith) which already existed in him.‖). This was 
the beginning of the historical relationship of God with the Jews in particular; Abraham had no evidence, as others 
would have later, of God‘s intentions and fidelity, and so in trusting God for the first time he was actually ―pre-
trusting.‖ 
297





From the modern perspective trust is often conceived of in opposition to knowledge, in 
that often one trusts because there can be no proof or in circumstances that are inherently 
uncertain.
298
 The ancient perspective tended to conflate, or at least associate, the ideas of trust 
and knowledge, since the former was properly constituted in the accumulated personal 
experience of another person, duly tested.
299
 To act on this firm basis was pisteuein, while what 
most of us do every day in our economic lives would be propisteuein. To return to P.Freib. 69, 
perhaps we should understand Gemellos‘s use of this rare word as a way of coloring the nature 
of the credit that was being extended, particularly if some form of  ό ος is to be restored in line 
8: Simon, evidently prone to failure and needing to be told things twice, must be sure to limit the 
―credit‖ with respect to those dates.  
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 On the capacity for pistis to mean ―faith‖ in antiquity, see Lindsay 1993; cf. Rad‘s influential distinction between 
human trust as Erfahrungsweisheit and the development of faith or theologische Weisheit in the Old Testament. 
299





4.4 Pistis and Contract  
From the outline sketched above, it is hardly surprising that trust was an essential element to 
relational transactions or contracting. In order to see precisely how it informed both the 
contracting process and enforcement, let us turn to the following letter of Ptollas to his dilatory 




Πτ<ο>  ᾶς Ἰσᾶτ   
π   στ  χ ίρ     
  ὶ ὑ   ί    .  
4  ί  ωσ   ὅτ  
 ἐ  τῇ ἐ<π> στο ῇ 
ἣ   πέστ   ά σο   
ο   ἐ <  > τ ο  ς ἐ    
8    ρ[ ]  έ ο ς 
ὅτ   ός τ    τό ο< >.  
 ο   ὲ   φά<   ο >.  
 έ ρ φ  [ έ] σο   
12 〚τ 〛  έ ω   
ὅτ  ἐ<στ>ὶ   ο  τ   
ἐξ ὅτου  έχρ σ   
 τὸ   ρ άτ <ο >,  
16 ο   ὲ φάσ    
 πέστ  < > <ς> ἐ οί.  
ἐ ὼ   ρ  ή    ἤ    
ὅτ  π στὸς  ἶ ο   ἂ   
20  χρ σά σο .    ὼς  
τὴ  σὴ  πίστ    
ο    ὶ   ω    
τὸ  ρά   . <ἄ>   ὕρῃς  
24 τ    π στὸ   
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 Ptollas was a ―slow writer‖ (cf. Youtie, Scriptunculae II, ch. 30) and this letter has errors and phonetic spellings 
in more than half of the words. Ease of reading therefore requires that I reproduce Youtie‘s corrected text. A 






   σουζ υ           
φήσ  τ  τ[ὸ]  τό ο   
  ὶ τὸ   φά   ο   
28  πόστ   ο .  
( τους)  ζ Κ ίσ ρος Θ ὼ [θ]  .  
  ρρω[σο]. 
 
Ptollas to Isas, abundant greetings and good health. Know that in the letter which I sent 
you, there was not included in what was written there the statement: ―Give the interest to 
someone but not the principal.‖ I wrote saying that it is two years since you borrowed the 
money, but you sent me no word. For if I had not known that you are trustworthy, I 
would not have lent it to you. Knowing your good faith, I gave the note to no one. If you 






Ptollas had lent Isas a sum of money over two years ago, but Isas seems only to have made some  
interest payments without returning the capital—or at least this is best sense I can make of 
Ptollas‘s sardonic remark that his first collection letter did not instruct Isas to send the interest 
but not the principal.
302
 In any case, Ptollas begins by upbraiding Isas for not responding to that 
first letter, even though two years had elapsed (the loan was almost certainly overdue), and then 
warns him that he is now risking his reputation as well as a visit from some sort of collection 
agent to whom Ptollas might give the gramma (lines 22-23). Although we might regard such a 
step as the ―real‖ threat, it was not the only—or even necessarily the most serious—threat. 
Instead of proceeding directly to collection procedures (and again, it is worth noting how long he 
had already waited), Ptollas attempted to enforce the contract in the first instance by writing a 
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 Trans. ed. pr. 
302
 Pace Youtie, who insists that the ―letter maintains from start to finish a smooth, courteous, friendly tone‖ (ZPE 





series of letters aimed at helping them both avoid the unpleasantness and expense of forced 
collection.  
This letter is the first arrow in Ptollas‘s enforcement quiver: the threat of loss of 
reputation. In reminding Isas that the only reason he had loaned to him in the first place was that 
he ―knew‖ him to be pistos, Ptollas insinuates not only that he is unlikely to loan to Isas again, 
but also that no one else will loan to him if it gets about that he is not pistos, for trust is the basis 
of credit (a distinction difficult to convey in Latin or Greek). Ptollas hammers this message home 
by saying that it is only Isas‘s pistis that has kept him from handing over the debt to a collector. 
Here we may cite Boyaval‘s recent argument (2001: 70-73) that the use of pistis in a Jewish 
metrical inscription from Leontopolis in Lower Egypt (Bernand 1969, no. 70) celebrates not the 
deceased‘s religious ―faith,‖ but rather his ―social credit,‖ or reputation, in his community.303 If 
one‘s pistis was worth commemorating in public, then here we should see both forms of ―credit‖ 
as at stake (and indeed, perhaps one and the same). Indeed, it is easy to see how pistis came to 
mean ―security,‖ for Isas‘s reputation in every sense is Ptollas‘s hostage.304 The same property 
that makes trust the foundation of contracting also made it an important and effective tool in the 
enforcement of contracts.  
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 Cf. Heinze 1929: 150: ―[D]ie fides ist ein für den Wert des Menschen sehr wesentlisches Stück von ihm, für seine 
Stellung unter seines gleichen ebenso wesentlich wie in anderer Richtung sein Vermögen oder seine Abkunft . . . 
Daher denn res und fides zusammen fast den ganzen Menschen ausmachen können, den äusseren und inneren Wert 
gleichsam erschöpfend . . .‖ 
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We find another interesting example of pistis and reputational enforcement in a letter 
from a Jewish woman Johanna to a certain Epagathos (P.Bad. II 35, lines 2-11 [Ptolemais 
Hermeiou (Thinite), 87]): 
 
ο   [  ]῵ς ἐποί< >σ ς ἅπ  τ  ὑπ [   άξ ς] 
  ὶ π  [ρ] βάς σου τὴ  συ τ  ὴ[  τὴ ] 
4   ὶ ἐπ   ξ  έ        [υρί    ἶ   ] 
 ( ρ χ ῵ )     ὶ το  τό ο  (l. τ῵  τὸ ω )· ἄφ ς   φ [ά  ] [ό    ] 
ἴ χσ σσθ   (l. ἴσχ σθ  .)· θ υ άζο, π῵ς τ ὴ  πίστ   
 σου ἤ   ξ  .  ὴ  ’      άσῃς 
8 οὖ , θέ ο πο  σ     ὶ ἐπὶ τόπω  
  τ όπω }    τρέψ   σ     ὲ ἐπ στο- 
   [  ] ίου     π    τ ό ος· σ  ά ἐστ   
 τοῦτο    ο οσ   ς.  
 
You have not done well by having [changed?] everything and transgressed your 
agreement, which accepted that I was the [owner of] the 20 dr. and the interest. Allow me 
to have the principal. I am amazed that you have gone back on your word. Do not force 
me then [...].
305
 This is a sign of your lack of consideration. 
 
Johanna starts in immediately after the greetings with a charge of faithlessness with regard to 
some sort of ―agreement‖ involving a loan. The details cannot be recovered, but it seems 
tolerably clear that Johanna believes Epagathos to have loaned out twenty drachmai in his own 
name, but with the understanding that the money was in fact hers. Now he has apparently gone 
back on his word, and Johanna would seem to have no proof other than his word that the money 
was in fact hers. One surmises this from the fact that she calls their relationship a συ τ  ή, a 
term which nowhere denotes a written contract. No doubt it was improvident of Johanna not to 
have gotten her agreement with Epagathos in writing, or even to have had the loan made in his 
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 Tcherikover and Fuks (C.Pap.Iud II 424), largely following Bilabel‘s suggestions, offer the following translation 
for lines 7-10: ―Don‘t compel me then—I want to make you act on the spot and not by letter, lest I lose the interest 





name at all (if we are to believe her), but there may have been good reasons at the time. 
Whatever the particular circumstances that led to the transaction, the vocabulary of this letter is 
illuminating as to the role trust played in contracting decisions.  
Central to any interpretation will be our understanding of the syntagē. Did Johanna have 
a ―contract‖ with Epagathos, and if so, of what sort? In fact, syntagē is not a usual word for 
contract. To judge from the papryrological record, it is not a word for contract at all: almost all 
instances of the word carry the meaning of ―order‖ or ―command.‖ The only cases in which it 
could be interpreted to mean something like ―contract‖ are much later, e.g., the fourth-century 
P.Kell. 11, 74, and 80, in which the the editor vacillates between translating the phrase   τ  τὴ  
συ τ  ή  in all three as either ―according to the arrangement‖ (11) or ―according to the order‖ 
(74 and 80). Tcherikover and Fuks in their re-edition of the papyrus (C.Pap.Iud. II 424) 
wondered whether σου in line 3 was a mistake for  ου, so as to accomodate a meaning of 
―order‖ here. This could well be correct: Johanna could have given Epagathos something like a 
mandate, which ―order‖ he accepted (cf. ἐπ   ξ  έ   ) but is now disregarding. Nor does such a 
reading necessarily depend upon the pronoun: in saying that Epagathos had ―transgressed his 
order,‖ Johanna could mean that he had trangressed the order he had received (an objective 
understanding of the ―order‖ she had given him).306 While there is some support for this 
interpretation, there are, I think, better grounds for seeing the pronoun σου as correct and syntagē 
as meaning ―agreement.‖  
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 I thank Prof. Bagnall for this suggestion. I have yet, however, to find an example of such an objective use of an 





Before proceeding with this assumption, we might wonder whether the syntagē an 
―order‖ in the sense of a ―mandate.‖  Syntassein was a regular verb for ―to order, to give 
instructions,‖ and most attestations occur in either official contexts or orders given to inferiors. 
While there are no examples of mandators using syntassein to describe their instructions to 
mandatories, we do find instances of prostassein so used. Thus, for example, in P.Oxy. VII 1062 
(Oxyrhynchos, II) a certain Markos rebukes Matreas for not sending some fleeces. Matreas had 
alterted Markos that he was in a position to buy good fleeces, suggesting that ―the summer ones 
are best‖ (4-5). Markos took him up on his offer: π ρὶ τ῵  πό ω  σου ἐπ      [ο] έ ου   
       οράσ   ...   σ [ο]ὶ π [ρ]ο σ τ ξά-      ὅτ  ὅτ         έ  τ   τ ο  [τ]      όρ σο  (3-
7: ―About the fleeces, since you promised to buy good ones . . . I instructed you: ‗Whenever they 
are good, buy.‘‖). Also, the word that was used to translate Roman law mandate in later Greek 
was ἐ τέ  ο    and its derivatives.307 It therefore seems somewhat unlikely that this is what 
syntagē means here. 
Syntagē routinely means ―promise‖ or ―convenant‖ in Christian writings from the fourth 
century onwards (with a small ―c‖: the Covenant of the Law is usually referred to as the 
diathēkē), often denoting a vow made to God or a promise made on the basis of faith. However, 
it appears at least once in the literary corpus with the sense of a more mundane, contractual 
―agreement‖ or ―promise,‖ the promise to betray Jesus for thirty pieces of silver (Eusebius, 
Demonstratio evangelica 10.1). This use is likely paralleled in the Septuagint, Psalm of Solomon 
4:4-5, a poetic discourse on the hypocrite, whose tongue swears false contracts (ἡ   ῵σσ  
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  τοῦ ψ υ ὴς ἐ  συ    ά   τ    θ’ ὅρ ου) and who ―speaks‖ with his eyes to every woman 
―in an agreement of evil‖ (ἐ  ὀφθ   ο ς   τοῦ       πάσῃ  υ    ὶ ἐ  συ τ  ῇ    ί ς). The 
contrast here between synallagma and syntagē could be that between a contract and an order, but 
this section of the poem is characterized by a rich interplay between lying words (spoken 
miscommunication) and knowing glances (unspoken communication), and so it is more in 
keeping with the overall theme of hypocrisy to see the distinction as that between a formal 
contract sealed by an oath and an informal, indeed unspoken, agreement ―written‖ (as we would 
say) ―in his eyes.‖ Sadly, no Hebrew version of the Psalms of Solomon survives to help us 
understand why the translator chose syntagē, though its resemblance with other words for 
contract, e.g., synchōrēsis, synthēkē, synallaxis, and, of course, synallagma, may have 
recommended it as a word that could represent something like an informal ―agreement.‖  
There was, however, another word that the translator could have chosen to have 
accommodated his needs: σ  τ ξ ς. We can see these two near-relatives as rivals for the 
meaning of ―informal agreement/contract‖ during the the Hellenistic period, as attested to by 
section 47 of the Ptolemaic Revenue Laws (Arsinoite?, 259 BCE), which I will discuss below. In 
the middle (and the passive of the middle) syntassein had long meant ―to agree‖ (i.e., 
syntassesthai, cf. LSJ, s.v. συ τάσσω, III). Nouns of the type –ή, –σ ς, and –   (e.g., syntagē, 
syntaxis, and syntagma) are all verbal derivatives, but whereas the first two usually denote 
abstract verbal notions, the third typically designates the result of an action. The –   form 
therefore competed with nouns of the first two types less frequently and intensely, while the first 
two were often in direct competition with each other. The pattern of nouns derived from 





syntagma is never used in the sense of an agreement, which is to say that its various meanings 
represented the products of syntassein (active). On the other hand, in the Hellenistic period 
syntagē and syntaxis appear to have been equally available to denote the action of, or it would 
seem from above, the product of syntassesthai (middle). Given the evidence of P.Kell. and the 
Christian writers—and now P.Bad. II 35—it would seem that syntagē had won out by sometime 
in the late Hellenistic or Roman period. This was not unreasonable result given the plethora of 
technical meanings that had accrued to syntaxis over the same period.
308
   
P.Bad. II 35, then, affords us a rare glimpse into a little-known corner of philological 
history. In a way, we should not be surprised to find such a word in this particular letter, as it 
appears to have been written by Johanna herself (i.e, without the mediation of a scribe who might 
have chosen a different word). In other words, what we hear here is the voice of informal 
business relations—though ―business‖ may be too overdetermined a word in this instance. There 
is also no reason to suspect that it had a ―Jewish‖ ring to it. As stated above, we can do nothing 
but speculate as to why the translator of the Psalms of Solomon preferred it to syntaxis, though 
perhaps his reasons were not so very different from those that contributed to its eventual success 
in the later Roman period (i.e., the other meanings of syntaxis). Similarly, we should see 
subsequent Christian usage as reflecting just the sort of popular speech we have here rather than 
the assumption of some particularly ―Jewish‖ vocabulary that Johanna would have drawn on in 
the first century. Here we are reminded again of Boyaval‘s suggestion that the best interpretation 
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of pistis in the Jewish metrical inscription from Leontopolis is grounded not in the religion of the 
deceased but rather in contemporary linguistic conventions.  
So, why did Johanna use this word, and what would it have likely meant to Epagathos? 
The place to start is section 47 of the Revenue Laws: 
 
[σ  τ] ξ    ὲ πρὸ[ς τοὺς ἐ ]  ουρ οὺς [π ρὶ τ ]ς ῥ σ ως 
τοῦ ἐ  ίου  ὴ πο< > ίσθω  ήτ    ο  ο ό ος  ήτ    πρ - 
   τ υό   ος τὴ  ὠ ὴ  π ρ υρέσ         ᾶ , 
4    ὲ τ  ὄρ     τ  ἐ  το ς ἐρ  στ ρίο ς τὸ   ρ ὸ  
 τοῦ χρό ου  σφρά  στ   πο   πέτωσ  . ἐ    ὲ συ - 
τάξ ω τ   πρός τ   ς τ῵  ἐ   ουρ ῵  ἢ  σφρά  στ  
τ  ὄρ      πο  ίπω[σ]  ,  ποτ[[ ]]  έτω[σ]     ς  ὲ  
8 τὸ β σ    ὸ  ἕ  στος τ῵    τίω   ρ υρίου (τά   το )   
   ὶ ἐά  τ \    ἡ ὠ ὴ     [  ]  πο ῇ. 
———————— 
    ὲ π ρ  τοῦ ο  ο ό [ου  ] ὶ τοῦ   τ  ρ φέως   θ σ- 
 τ  ὼς     ρ ψάσθω τ[  ὀ] ό  τ  τ῵    πή ω  
12 τ῵  ἐ    άστ   πό    ὄ[ τ]ω    ὶ τ῵    τ βό ω  
   ὶ συ τ ξάσ\θ ω πρὸ[ς  ] τοὺς   τ  τ῵  τὴ  ὠ ὴ  
 πρ    τ υο έ ω  π[όσο]          ο    ὶ  ί      βά ο - 
 τ ς \  θ’ ἡ έρ    πω    , ἐ     ξ   ρ ί    ὲ συ τ σσέσθωσ   
16 πρὸς τοὺς π    πρ τ[ο]ῦ τ ς,   ὶ συ  ρ ψάσθωσ   
 [πρὸς] ἕ [ ]στ[ο]  συ  ρ [φ]ὴ , πρὸς  ὲ  τοὺς ἐ  τ   χ [ρ  ] 
 [  τ      , πρὸς  ὲ το]ὺ ς ἐ[   ]  ξ [  ρ ί                    ] 
 
Neither the oikonomos nor the manager of the contract shall make an arrangement 
with the oil-makers concerning the flow of the oil on any pretext, nor shall they leave the 
implements in the factories unsealed during the time when there is no work. If they come 
to an arrangement with any of the oil-makers or leave the implements unsealed, each of 
the guilty parties shall forfeit one talent of silver to the Crown and make good any deficit 
incurred by the contract. 
The agent appointed by the oikonomos and the antigrapheus shall register the names 
of the dealers in each city and of the retailers, and together with the managers of the 
contract come to an arrangement with them as to how much oil and castor oil they are to 
take and sell from day to day; and in Alexandria they shall come to an arrangement with 
the traders; and they shall draft a written contract with each of them, with those in the 







The fact that the regulation speaks in terms of syntaxeis instead of syntagai presents no real 
difficulty: as we have seen, there were simply alternative substantives for syntassesthai in the 
Hellenistic period. Particularly instructive in this section is the distinction drawn between an 
―arrangement‖ and a ―contract.‖ The legislator understands a syntaxis as the product of mere 
agreement, which may in turn be formalized in a syngraphē. The written document prescribed in 
this section of the Revenue Laws is not essentially different from the syntaxis on which it is 
based: the syngraphē is envisioned merely as a legally recognized and defensible record of the 
agreement ( ... ἐ     ξ   ρ ί    ὲ συ τ σσέσθωσ     πρὸς τοὺς π    πρ τ[ο]ῦ τ ς,   ὶ 
συ  ρ ψάσθωσ      [πρὸς] ἕ [ ]στ[ο]  συ  ρ [φ]ὴ  ... ). In other words, its importance is 
procedural: the formalization of the syntaxis in a syngraphē will help protect those contracts for 
which the state was concerned to have a firm record. By the same token, there can be no question 
of a syngraphē in the first portion of this regulation concerning the agents and the producers. The 
point of this section is precisely that it is illegal for the state‘s agents to collude and come to side 
agreements with the producers. No one was going to draft such a syngraphē (as opposed to some 
informal written memorandum of understanding), much less sue on it; the state was merely 
making its position clear by explicitly ruling even such (necessarily) informal agreements out of 
bounds. 
This idea of the syntagē being an informal agreement fits well with the rest of Johanna‘s 
letter, particularly as her language throughout is moral, not legal. This is signalled from the 
outset, as she begins by taxing Epagathos for ―not doing right‖ by having ―transgressed‖ their 
agreement, amazed that he should have ―gone back on his word.‖ As we will see in Chapts. 5 





(i.e., breaching is the opposite of ―doing right‖), while parabainein is a verb often used to denote 
breach of contract in the Roman period. Both, however, were originally moral terms, and while 
they take on a particular legal color in contracts and contracting disputes, they do not for that 
reason lose their primary moral valence. Johanna also says that the syntagē ―accepted‖ that she 
was the owner of the principal and the interest. The verb she uses here is, like syntagē, odd and 
unparalleled, but similarly revealing, since it routinely communicates the sort of moral obligation 
on which proper legal obligations were established, without implying that such an obligation 
existed as such.  
Epidechesthai ranges in meaning from ―to admit‖ or ―allow‖ to ―to undertake‖ in more 
formal legal settings (e.g., as in a liturgy or a contractual obligation),
309
 with all meanings 
stemming from the basic sense of accepting. It comes to be an increasingly common verb in 
applications for leases and contracts of various sorts (particularly but not exclusively in the 
Oxyrhynchite nome) after the middle of the second century—a fact due at least as much to the 
growth of such one-sided applications (often generically called hypomnēmata) as to changes in 
diction over this period.
310
 An ἐπ  οχή signalled an offer to undertake an obligation, on the 
condition that the offer was accepted and confirmed in a legal contract. A good example is 
P.Oxy. II 279 (=W.Chr. 348; Oxyhynchos, 44-45), an early Roman lease application in which a 
certain Theogenes applies to the basilikos grammateus to say that he is willing to undertake (i.e., 
will accept) to pay a proposed rent on the farming of a particular piece of gē basilikē if it should 
                                                 
309
 Cf. Preisigke and Preisigke-Kiessling Wörterbuch and LSJ, s.v. ἐπ  έχο   . 
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be contracted to him (ἐπ  έχο   , συ χωρ θ ίσ [ς  ]ο  ... τ ς   ωρ ί ς, ... τ     311 ...).312 
Epidechesthai must be contrasted in this light with another important verb in the contracting 
process, homologein, which signified that one or both parties have acknowledged their 
obligations. Whereas epidechesthai represents a promise to undertake, which, strictly speaking, 
is tendered prior to and conditional upon a formal contract coming into being, homologein is 
theoretically and typically post eventum, a recognition of the existence of a formal obligation.
313
 
This difference is explicit in documents like P.Oxy. XVII 2109 (Oxyrhynchos, 261), a public 
notice of the offer tendered by Aur. Horiοn son of Kolluthos and Tereus to lease premises 
belonging to the city of Oxyrhynchos. The offer was converted into a binding contract only after 
it was formally accepted, as stated in the original epidochē (ἐ    ὲ  ὴ  υρωθ῵, ο    τ σχ - | 
θήσο    τῇ   τῇ ὑποσχέσ  , lines 52-3, cf. lines 36ff: β β  ου έ  ς  έ  ο  τ ς   ἐπ  οχ ς, 
χρήσο    τῶ ἐρ  -   στ ρίῳ ...     ὶ  πο  σω ... ), and indeed as implied by the 
advertisement period itself (the purpose of which was to solicit other bids before letting out the 
contract) and the extensive use of future verbs in this and most epidochai. Such offers, if 
accepted, were then confirmed (bebaioun) and reduced to legally valid contracts (kyroun) by 
homologiai over the contents of the offer, as we see in the Tebtynis registers, e.g., P.Mich. II 
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 The drafter lost his place in the construction and wrote τ  έσω  (i.e. fut. ind., first person sing.) instead of the 
infinitive. 
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 Cf. P.Mich. 128 ii.19 (Tebtynis, 46-47): ἐπ  οχὴ   ορ ί ς Ἰσχ[υρίω( ος)] . . . πρὸ(ς) Λ β σ  . 
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123r xix.11:   ο( ο ί )  φρο  σί(ου) πρὸ(ς) ὆ρσ ῦ  π ρὶ ἐπ  οχ (ς) ο σ   ῵( ) 
 ρο(υρ῵ ) ϛ 𐅵  ´ (cf. P.Oxy. II 279, with which this discussion began).314  
The entire force of epidechesthai in this context thus revolves around the notion of 
promise, which accounts for the common qualification of the offer to undertake as   ουσίως 
(over 100 examples from the second to sixth centuries, including P.Oxy. XVII 2109). As 
recognized in most legal systems, promises are only meaningful when made by free agents 
(hence the exceptions for duress, fraud, mistake, etc.), and here the explicit characterization of 
the undertaking as ―free‖ or ―willing‖ underscores the promissory nature of the offer. But mere 
promises qua promises did not (and in most legal system do not) of themselves establish a legal 
liability. Technically, there was no legal obligation to do what one had promised (i.e., pay the 
rent, farm the land, etc.), unless and until the offer was accepted and the deal ratified. Only on 
this condition was one to be legally bound by one‘s promise (cf. ἐ    ὲ  ὴ  υρωθ῵, ο  
  τ σχ θήσο    τῇ   τῇ ὑποσχέσ  ), and this binding was signalled by the act of 
acknowledgement, the homologia. In this light, it is perhaps significant that Johanna did not 
write that in his agreement Epagathos had (legally) ―acknowledged‖ (e.g., ὡ ο ό  σ  ; cf. 
P.Mich. III 203, n255 above), or that the syntagē had ―stated‖ (e.g.,     ορ υο σ  ) or 
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 It may be noted that P.Oxy. XVII 2109 mentions that this particular epidochē was itself ―acknowledged‖ ( υρί  ἡ 
ἐπ  οχή, π ρὶ | ἧς ἐπ ρωτ θ ὶς ὡ ο ό  σ , 50-1). This is a different sort of homologia from those recorded in 
the Tebtynis registers. It represents a later formality, the so-called ―stipulation-clause‖ (see Simon 1964: 49-51; cf. 
Maehler 2005). What is being acknowledged in this clause is the formal (i.e., legal) extension of the offer itself, 
which has no bearing on the acceptance of its contents. Before the introduction of the stipulation-clause in the third 






―acknowledged‖ (e.g.,   ο ο ο ου έ   ) that the money and interest was hers; there was 
merely an ―agreement‖ that ―accepted‖ that it was so.315  
Epagathos‘s obligation was moral, not legal, and what he had breached was trust, not a 
formal contract: ―I am amazed that you have changed your faith.‖316 Here, then, we have an 
informal contract—an agreement, a transaction, perhaps even the offer to undertake an obligation 
(if we are to read more into the use of epidechesthai)—existing somewhere in that zone of 
contracting relations, but characterized as outside the law of contract (see Fig. 3.3 above), even 
as it used some of the contemporary language of contract (cf. Chapts. 5 and 6). In keeping with 
that character, it thus depended on trust, not law, for its formation and its enforcement. This is 
not to say that Johanna therefore had no basis for a legal claim, for others in similar situations 
resorted or threatened to resort to going to law (cf. the discussion of P.Fay. 124, pp. 208ff.); she 
did not, however, have the makings of a promising suit. But even this is perhaps to miss the most 
important point: she clearly did not envision such an eventuality when she made her arrangement 
with Epagathos.  
Johanna‘s language was meant to evoke a contractual responsibility that approximated a 
legally defensible contract. However, since her agreement had not been reduced to a legally 
formal contract, her chief weapons—and not merely her opening gambits as in the case of Ptollas 
and Isas above (pp. 155ff.)—were shame and self-interest. Given the tone of the rest of the letter, 
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 I understand ἐπ   ξ  έ    as intended to operate on a sort of forced analogy to the participles used to relate the 
contents of contracts in petitions. For an example of diagorein see P.Enteux. 59 (pp. 260f.); for diomologeisthai, see 
P.Polit.Iud. 9 (pp. 338ff.). 
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which does not suggest an imminent break or a threat of escalation à la Ptollas v. Isas, we should 
see shaming as her primary tactic in this letter. That said, there is an appeal to self-interest here, 
for she says (after a sadly garbled passage) that his behavior would be a ―sign of agnōmosynē.‖ 
This is not a chance word, but one deeply implicated in the language of contracting and trust, 
along with its opposite, eugnōmosynē and its cognate forms.317 Johanna is warning Epagathos 
that his behavior may be interpreted as that of an agnōmōn, just as Ptollas reminded Isas that his 
reputation for pistis hung in the balance with his loan. We may gather immeditately that one did 
not want to become known for one‘s agnōmosynē, but what precisely did this mean, and what 
connection did it have to contracting? 
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4.5 The Social Dynamics of Agnōmosynē and Eugnōmosynē  
Like pistis/pistos, eugnōmōn and agnōmōn are words that originated in the moral realm and only 
gradually took on specific commercial or legal meanings as they were progressively subsumed 
by the world of business and contracting. The following discussion takes into account virtually 
every attestation of the word in the papyri until the mid-fourth century. As far as I have been able 
to determine, the term has never been subjected to analysis.  
Both words speak to the quality of an agent‘s will or intentions with respect to others—
whether, in other words, he or she has a good regard for other people or no regard for them at 
all.
318
 We might translate the pair initially as ―considerate‖ and ―inconsiderate,‖ though this does 
not accurately communicate the characteristically Greek opposition of the prefix   - and the 
alpha privative. So, for example, a man complains of a woman who appears to pay him little 
attention (the editors suggest that he has a ―crush‖ on her) as being ―completely inconsiderate‖ 
(   ω ο  στάτ ), adding later that her failure to bid him good-bye is characteristic of her 
agnōmosynē.319 This points, of course, to a norm as to what sort of regard one owed people. 
Particularly telling in this connection is the parallelism constructed in a petition from the famous 
twins in the Serapeion in Ptolemaic Memphis to Ptolemy and Kleopatra Philometores, with the 
twins praising the previous royal decision to grant their request as emanating from the monarchs‘ 
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 Cf. Pollux, Onomasticon, 4.7-14, where he collects both under the general rubric of epistēmē, presumably a sort 
of knowledge of how to treat others. 
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 SB XVIII 13867 (unknown, mid II), lines 66-8, 98-101. Cf. P.Lond. VII 1946 (Philadelphia, 257 BCE), a letter in 
which the author hopes to have others write a recommendation for a friend so that ―they may treat him with 
consideration‖ (6: ὅπως ἂ  ἐπ   ω ό ως (l.     ω ό ως) χρήσω τ  ; cf. 1945.4-5). Here the editors suggest 
that being ―fairly treated‖ is a euphemism for being allowed to transport items without having to pay duty on them 





―reverence for the divine and their consideration for all mortals‖ (πρὸς τὸ θ  ο    σέβ       ὶ 
πρὸς πά τ ς   θρ πους     ω οσ    ).320 Balanced here are the correct relations with both 
gods and humans, with each relationship constructed upon the recognition of the proper debt one 
owed to each, fear or worship on the one hand, and cognizance or respect on the other.
321
 By the 
same token, those who blatantly and callously disregarded other people‘s ―rights,‖ both narrowly 
and widely conceived (i.e., based narrowly on a particular status, law, or privilege; or widely on 
what we would call ―human rights‖), were open to charges of agnōmosynē, as we see in 
numerous complaints and petitions from the Ptolemaic period.
322
 
While one was always obliged to relate to others of the same status or higher with 
―consideration,‖ it was not always for the same reasons. For instance, one owed a debt of respect 
to one‘s parents because they were one‘s parents. Thus we see a charge of agnōmosynē in a 
petition from the Herakleopolite nome, in which a mother asks an official to force her son first to 
return some grain he had sold in her name but without her permission, and second to delay yet 
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 UPZ I 41 (Memphis, 161-160 BCE): ὑ   ς  ὲ   ᾽ ἣ   χ τ    πρὸς τὸ θ  ο    σέβ       ὶ πρὸς πά τ ς 
  θρ πους       ω οσ     προσ τάξ τ    ᾽ ἧς ἐπο ήσ σθ  | πρὸς τὴ    τ υξ   ὑπο ρ φ ς  πο οῦ    ἡ    
(9-12). Cf. UPZ I 20 (Memphis, 163 BCE).  
321
 Cf. Pollux, Onomasticon 4.7-14, where the eusebeia and eugnōmosynē are also paralleled. 
322
 E.g., UPZ I 6 (Memphis, post 163 BCE):  ]ξ ῵ σ , β σ   ῦ,  ὴ ὑπ ρ   [  ]      π ρ’ ἕ  στ  ὑπὸ τ῵  
προ   ρ   έ ω     ω ό ως πο  ορ ο    ο      ὶ ὑβρ ζό   ο    ὶ   ο{υ} ο\     ο  (32-34, concerning 
what the petitioner saw as an unreasonable search and outright looting of the temple in which he was resident); BGU 
VI 1256 (Philadelphia, post 147 BCE):  ξ ῵  ὴ ὑπ ρ-              ω ο ο    ο  (24-25, concerning the 
petitioner‘s being impressed improperly as a lampadarch); P.Dion. 9 (Hermopolite, 139 BCE; on which see below, 
pp. 172ff.); PSI VII 816 (Aphroditopolis, II BCE):   θὲ   ξ σῃ ὑπ ρ      [ - ca. ? - ] ἠ  ω ο   έ ο    ὶ 
    στ  ω έ ο    ρίτως  (5-6, context unclear); and SB XXII 15546 (Theadelphia, mid-II BCE; see B. Kramer‘s 
comments in AfP 41 [1995]: 297-98 for context.). The word was common in Ptolemaic petitions, e.g., P.Tebt. III.1 
793 iv; P.Heid. VI 382; P.Diosk. 12; and BGU VIII 1865. Compare also the connection of ―consideration‖ with the 
justness of requests (qualified as  ί       ὶ       ο  ) in P.Cair.Zen. IV 59638 (unknown, mid III BCE) and 
P.Petr. III 53(j) (Arsinoite or Herakleopolite, mid-III BCE). Cf. Pollux Onomasticon 8.7, who collects agnōmosynē 





another duplicitous sale, this time of her slave, ―if it seems right to him not to allow her to be 
treated unfairly by her heedless son.‖323 In a similar vein nearly five centuries later (339), a 
mother (Demetria) claims in a deposition that her son (Asynkritios), who died childless, 
―disregarded her‖ ([ἠ  ]ω ό  υ  ) in his will.324 We have no indication of what precisely is 
meant here by ―disregarded,‖ though presumably Demetria was passed over, even though 
Asynkritios had no direct heirs. By the fourth century mothers had gained the right to contest 
wills from which they had been gratuitously excluded (i.e., querella inofficiosi testamenti), and a 
rescript of 321 (CJ 3.28.1-2) confirms this right pursuant to an investigation as to whether the 
mother had been passed over for cause.
325
 Perhaps the deposition we have here is related to just 
such an inquiry. In any case, in both examples we have attempts to use the law to help enforce 
familial norms.
326
 This is not to say that no law had been broken; rather, the point is that the 
rhetorical argument in the first case, and the legal argument in the second (since the norm had 
been received into law as a standard), both depend on the existence of a norm of ―consideration‖ 
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 P.Hamb. IV 238 (pre 159 BCE): ἐ]ά  σο  φ ί  τ   . . .   . . .  ὴ | ὑπ ρ       ᾽ ὑπὸ [τοῦ     ] ο ος υἱ οῦ 
  τ -   βρ π υθ  [ ]  (19-22; see ed. pr., note to lines 21-22 for discussion of katabrabeuein). Compare the 
formula here to those in the preceding note. 
324
 P.Harrauer 42 (Hermopolis, 339):   ἡ έτ ρος    υ-  ρος (l.    ο ρος) υἱὸς  σ υ  ρίτ [ ος]  έ  ο  (l.  έ  ω ) 
τὸ  [βίο    π ]   ἄτ   ος | ὦ     θή  ς ἐ [πο ]ήσ το    ᾽ [ὧ  ἠ  ]ω ό  υ   | τὴ    τέρ   (4-7, see ed. pr. ad 
line 6 for discussion of the form agnōmoneuein versus agnōmonein. 
325
 Krüger 1939: 272; Kaser 1971: 711 and evidence in n15; cf. Kaser 1959: 365-69 (on the law before and after 
Just. Nov. 115 [542]). The (hardly surprising) norm was to include mothers in wills, though comparatively few were 
likely to be alive when wills were made. We do have a couple of later papyrus wills that name mothers as heirs: 
P.Princ. II 38 (Hermopolis, 264) and P.Oxy. XXVII 2474 (Oxyrhynchite, mid-III), cf. P.Cair.Masp. III 67312 
(Antinoöpolis, 567), in which Fl. Theodoros leaves his property to a monastery, a convent, and his (still living!) 
maternal grandmother  (grandmothers were included in Just. Nov. 115). Several wills also leave property to women 
whose relations to the testator is unspecified (Montevecchi 1935: 81); perhaps some mothers lurk in this list? 
326





or ―respect‖ due to one‘s parents that limited one‘s purely ―legal‖ rights in the eyes of others and 
the authorities. 
One could also be heedless of one‘s obligation to authority. Thus a certain Apollonios 
says that one Dikaios has been ―inconsiderate‖ in not following his orders to send a subordinate 
with a key to a storeroom.
327
 Centuries later, we hear hear a Roman centurion bark that ―his first 
letter should not have been ignored,‖ and that he expected the recipient to come immediately 
upon the receipt of the second letter.
328
 On the other side of this sort of relationship, we have the 
writer of BGU XI 2129 (Alexandria?, II), who is forwarding a copy of a prostagma concerning 
veterans issued by a high official to his fellow veteran Agrippianos. He urges Agrippianos to 
share the contents of the order with all their friends ―so that we do not appear heedless before the 
epistratēgos.‖329 Kings did well to render the justice their subjects deserved, but inferiors did 
better to recognize the debt of obedience they owed their superiors. 
A sense of obligation or debt also arose from promises. Hence we hear again from the 
twins in the Serapeion that although Achomarres, the temple supervisor, had been called on the 
carpet by Psintaës, the ―epistatēs of the temples,‖ and ordered to pay the twins what they were 
owed in back wages, this ―most inconsiderate of men‖ nevertheless promptly reneged on his 
                                                 
327
 P.Yale I 39:      ω   έ ο- |   ς  ὴ ο    ποστ ί-     ς Σ ρ πίω     τὸ  π ρ  σοῦ  ο-    ίζο τ  τὴ  
    -      τοῦ Π τ  ρ  -   τ ος τ   ίου,   -   θότ  ἐτάξω. The papyrus has no provenance, and though clearly 
Ptolemaic, the date is now in question since it is unclear as to whether or not it belongs to the Leon archive (see W. 
Clarysse: http://www.trismegistos.org/arch/archives/pdf/131.pdf, Jan. 2, 2007). As the present discussion makes 
clear, there is nothing ―polite‖ about the term, as the editors suggest.  
328
 SB VI 9290 (mid II, unknown):      σ    ὶ τ  πρ῵τ   ρά   τ      βό τ   ὴ    ω ο  σ  ,        ἐ θ    
πρὸς ἐ ὲ   . . .   . . .   ὶ  ῦ   ὲ   τ   ρά   τ  τ ῦτ    βὼ    ἐ θὲ πρὸς ἐ έ (2-9). 
329
 15-19:   ὸ    ῵ς   πο ήσ ς,      φ   , φ   ρὸ    πᾶσ  το ς φί ο[ ]ς ποήσ ς (l. πο ήσ ς), ἵ      ὴ φ       






promise to do so when Psintaës left Memphis.
330
 Achomarres‘ brazen repudiation of his promise 
appears to be the act that wins him the distinction of being superlatively inconsiderate, yet this 
was surely the straw which broke the camel‘s back: by rights he had already earned the epithet 
agnōmōn from his refusal to recognize both what he owed the twins in the first place and the 
obligation to follow the express orders of his superior.  
A clearer example of a promise establishing a sense of obligation comes in P.Giss.Bibl. 
III 20 (=Sel.Pap. 1 117), a letter from Trajanic Alexandria. The writer, after dealing with sundry 
other business, turns to the trouble he is having rounding up documents related to some slave 
sales. At one point he says that a certain rhētoriskos, who had purchased a slave from the 
adressee, ―though frequently having promised to tell us the date of the sale, ignored us‖ (15-17: 
πο  ά-     ς τ ξά   ος τὸ  χρό ο  ἡ      π      τ ς ὠ[  ]ς ἠ  ω ό  σ  ). The sense in 
which this man had ―treated them inconsiderately‖ was by not recognizing that he owed them a 
duty on the basis of his promise. As in the letter of Kopres above (SB III 6264, pp. 141ff.), in 
which her failure to perform shaded immediately into failure to keep faith, so here the 
assumption is that failure to keep the promise was in fact a callous refusal to do so. Or, perhaps 
more accurately, the failure of this ―petty pleader‖ to do what he said he would is perceived 
through a subjective lens: whatever his reasons, he evidently did not have enough regard for the 
writer and his correspondent to keep his promise to them. 
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 UPZ I 42 (Memphis, 162 BCE):   ὶ προσ    σά   ος τὸ   χο  ρρ     συ έτ ξ    πο οῦ    ἡ    τ  
ὀφ   ό    .    ὲ πά τω      θρ πω     ω ο έστ τος ὑπάρχω  ἡ     ὲ  ὑπέσχ το   τὸ προ  ί   ο  
ἐπ τ  έσ   , τοῦ  ὲ τοῦ Ψ  τ έους υἱοῦ ἐ  τ ς   Μέ φ ως χωρ σθέ τος ο  έτ    ο  έ    ό ο  ἐποήσ το. See 





4.6 The Business Dynamics of Agnōmosynē and Eugnōmosynē  
From these sorts of obligations or debts one moves easily to monetary debts and contractual 
obligations. First money. It would seem that a sense of obligation arose directly from the holding 
of another‘s property, not from the promise to pay it back. A good illustration comes in 
P.Cair.Zen. IV 59651 (Philadelphia, mid-III BCE), a memorandum and petition to Zenon from 
Nikarchos. Nikarchos claimed that his partner Dionysodoros owed him for various operating 
expenses and cost overruns associated with the farming of land leased (presumably) out of 
Apollonios‘s estate (hence the petition to Zenon). After reckoning the debt as it then stood, 
Nikarchos made the following request: 
 
12    ῵ς ἂ[  ο]ὖ  π[ο ]-  
ήσ  ς ἐπ     άσ ς, ἐπ   ὴ   -  
τὸς      ω  ἐ[σ]τὶ  〚     ω 〛 \  ὶ ο  θέ -  
       σ  έ    , ἵ     ς τὴ         -  
16  ωθ  , τὸ  ὲ    ό ο ο  ἤ    πο-  
 οῦ   , π ρὶ    < έ> τ  ος   τ  έ            
    σ τ      [     ]   τὸ    [ - ca. ? - ]  
Traces of 1 line 
 
Therefore you would do well—since he is agnōmōn and does not wish to pay—to force 
him to pay the amount he has already acknowledged, in order that it may be spent on the 
land; but if he disputes anything ... 
 
 
Dionysodoros is ―inconsiderate‖ because he does not wish to pay a debt that he has 
acknowledged.  As shown in the discussion above (pp. 166f.), his acknowledgement or 
agreement (τὸ  ὲ    ό ο ο ) as to what he owed is not so much a promise as a recognition of 
the existence of a debt, and to repudiate this is a sign of disrespect for both the person owed and 





trust, p. 121). Significant, however, is the fact that Nikarchos is anticipating a counter-claim 
from Dionysodoros, not as to the fact of indebtedness but with respect to the amount that is 
owed. We see the same thinking in P.Cair.Zen IV 59355 (=C.Ptol.Sklav. I 49), a long and 
fascinating account of a loan by Zenon to Philo, Apollonios‘s baker, for 900 drachmai.331 The 
account is appended to documents relating to litigation over the loan initiated by Philo. In 
Zenon‘s request to be referred to a judge he claims that he has ―been put off for a long time by 
Philo‘s agnōmōsynē‖ (108-9: [π ]   ω   ρ χρό ο[  π]  ρ    υσ   [θ      τὴ ] | [ ]   [ ]ω ος 
   ω [οσ  ]  ), which has in turn caused the usual host of negative consequences (additional 
expense, lost work, etc.). Again, merely the act of disputing the amount apparently exposes Philo 
to a charge of being unwilling to pay, and strictly speaking this is true: he is refusing to honor the 
obligation as his creditor has defined it. Lost in the shuffle in both cases, however, is the notion 
that there may be a good faith disagreement as to the size of the outstanding debt.
332
  
 The other side of this coin is the sort of consideration expected of those who recognized 
their debts. Thus, we have a letter from Teos to Zenon concerning the settling of accounts 
(P.Cair.Zen. III 59516 [Arsinoite, mid-III BCE]): 
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 For the circumstances of the loan, see Würstle 1951 and Orrieux 1983: 36-37. 
332
 Cf. P.Col. IV 121 (Krokodilopolis, 181 BCE), a letter from a certain Lysimachos, who appears to be an official, to 
a group of joint-lessees who were in arrears with respect to their lease of a garden: ο        ρ -   φ  ότ ς τ  
προσοφ   ό     πρὸς τὴ   ίσθωσ   τοῦ π ρ   ίσου   σὺ  οἷς ἐξ  έξ το ὑ ᾶς Ἅρπ  ος, \(τά   τ )   ,/ 
     ο  ς < σ> σθ  (1-3). He then threatens to jail them unless they pay immediately upon receipt. The term here 
sounds quasi-technical: ―If you have not paid the additional amount you owe with respect to the lease of the garden 
(i.e., 13 talents), for which Harpalos stood surety for you, you will be ‗defaulters‘.‖ The letter has been interpreted as 
relating to taxes the lessees owe the state as a consequence of the lease (the garden was located on royal and gift 
land, P.Mich. III 182.18, cf. P.Col. IV 122, a circular concerning Lysimachos‘s visit in order to collect ta 
prosopheilomena in their districts). If so, agnōmōn here, seemingly uniquely, describes their status vis-à-vis the 





Τ ῵ς Ζή ω    
χ ίρ   . π ρ  έ-  
[  ]το Θ όπο -  
4 [πος πρ]ός    βου-  
  ό   ος ὡς π -  
ρ  σοῦ     ο ί-  
σ σθ  . τότ   ὲ \ /  
8 οὖ  ἠ οχ ο    ,  
 υ  ὶ  ὴ ( . ἠ ωχ ο        υ ὶ  ὲ)  πόστ -  
  ο  ὃ  βο  ῃ, ὃς π -  
ρὶ το τω  σο   π  -  
12      .  χω  ὲ  
π ρ  σοῦ τὸ πᾶ  ( ρ χ  ς) σ.  
  ς τοῦτο    έ-  
τρ     έ  τος  
16 χό ς ρ . τοὺς  ὲ   
οὖ    σο    ί     ς  
χρ ί    ί ω  , τ῵   
 ὲ ρ χο῵  ( ί ο τ  ) ( ρ χ  ὶ) ρξ  
20 ἐξ ἐ  έ  ὀβο ῵   
τὸ  χό . ( ο πὸ ) προσ-  
οφ ί ω ( ρ χ  ς)  .  
τοῦτο  ἴτ  βο  ῃ  
24  έ     βέ,  ἴτ  βο -  
  ῃ  ρ  ρ ο ,   ὶ οὕτω  
 ό  σ  .   }   ὶ  ἴ σο   
 ο   ,  ’      σά-  
28    ός    π ρὶ το -  
τω  ἐπ ρ τ σο .  
  ὑρήσ  ς  άρ      -  
    ο   ὄ τ .  
32  ρρωσο.  ϛ. 
 
Teos to Zenon, greetings. Theopompos came to me wishing to settle up for you. At that 
time I was pressed; now, however, send whomever you wish to report back to you about 
this business. I have from you in total 200 drachmai. Against this I have measured out 
150 choes. 50 of them I give to you for your personal use; the value of the (other) 100 
choes is 160 drachmai at 9 obols per chous. I still owe you the remainder, 40 drachmai. 
Take this in honey or money, as you wish, and thus have it back. And if it seems good to 
you, summon and question me about these things. You will find that I am eugnōmōn. 







Here we see Teos establishing his credentials as someone with the proper respect for debts. 
Zenon appears to have pre-paid for the honey, or perhaps more likely had some sort of a running 
account with Teos (hence the need for Theopompos to come and settle accounts and Teos‘s offer 
to pay the rest in honey or cash, according to Zenon‘s wishes). Teos begins by apologizing for 
the delay  and the waste of Theopompos‘s mission, insisting that he is not (as Philo was accused 
of doing) ―putting him off,‖ and then carefully reckons what has been paid and what is still 
owed. The force of lines 23-26 reiterates his concern to return whatever he still owes with 
convenience and speed. Finally, he volunteers to give an account in person if Zenon does not 
wish to send another agent about this debt (cf. lines 9-12). This is the proper conduct for one who 
wishes to be seen as trusted and eugnōmōn by a creditor and a business partner. 
 One might also hope for a proper accounting of the bill by a debtor with a proper respect 
for his debt. At the quoted price per chous, 100 choes should equal 150 drachmai, not 160.
333
 At 
this value, the honey is being sold at a price of 9.6 obols per chous (presumably 9 obols and 5 
chalkoi). In P.Cair.Zen. IV 59570, an account also belonging to the Zenon archive, we find a 
price for honey of 16 silver drachmai per metrētēs, or the equivalent of 8 obols per chous.334 A 
price difference of one obol per chous (8 in 59570 and 9 in 59516) is obviously within the 
normal range of prices (i.e., Teos is not gouging Zenon on his quoted price), but a 10-drachma 
mistake or premium on the total, given the point of this letter, would seem to be embarrassing to 
his claim of eugnōmosynē. Perhaps we should understand the price per chous as quoted in 
                                                 
333
 1 drachma = 6 obols. The quoted price of 9 ob. per chous = 1.5 dr. per chous, or 150 dr. for the 100 choes in the 
letter. 
334
 1 metrētēs =12 choes. Hence the honey is being sold for 1 1/3 dr. or 8 ob. per chous. The author of the account in 





fractions of silver drachmai, but the debt with Zenon reckoned in bronze drachmai. At about this 
time there was an approximate 10% surcharge to convert bronze to silver.
335
 The discount rate 
conveniently attested in the more or less contemporaneous P.Cair.Zen. 59570 is 13:12, giving us 
a slightly low agio of 8.33%. At this rate a total of 150 silver drachmai would equal 162.5 
bronze drachmai. If this is what is going on, the 160 dr. value set on the honey by Teos 
represents an agio of just 6.67% at 9 ob. per chous. On this theory, Teos could be giving Zenon a 
bit of a break on the price, in addition to the 50 free choes, as perhaps another sign of his 
goodwill and respect. 
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4.7 Agnōmosynē, Eugnōmosynē, and Contract  
Contracts were themselves obligations to be respected, regardless of whether they were for loans 
or not. For instance, in P.Cair.Zen. III 59362 (unknown, 243 BCE) we have a letter from Pyrrhos 
regarding a message from Zenon, who had asked him to take care of some shepherds who had 
been assigned some land for pasturage within Pyrrhos‘s demesne.336 The shepherds had 
evidently not gotten satisfaction from Pyrrhos and so appealed to Zenon. Pyrrhos, for his part, 
responded indignantly that not only had he given them the land that they had been assigned, but 
he had also given them another piece which he could have otherwise leased. The shepherds, 
however, ―were so inconsiderate that they ordered (me) to assign them the land which I had 
leased to others in a syngraphē as well‖ (17-21: [  ] ’ ο ὕ τ [ως]      ο ές      [ σ ]  ο ὗτο  
ὥστ    ὶ τὴ    [ ]   [ἣ]     ίσθω   ἄ  ο ς   -    [τ ] σ υ  ρ φὴ  π ρ    -    [ ]      
  το ς \     ουσ  /.) Now, as we have seen, this concept derives its original force from the 
subjective quality of not being treated with consideration. Therefore, it may be that here Pyrrhos 
saw the shepherds as agnōmones because of their high-handed manner (note the use of keleuein). 
This, however, would not account for the inclusion of the information that the land they wanted 
had been disposed by written contract. Pyrrhos, apparently, was not about to set aside formalized 
contracts (as opposed, perhaps, to informal agreements) in order to accommodate the shepherds, 
and he no doubt explained this to them and found them oddly indifferent to this justification 
when they persisted in their ―orders.‖ Of course, these syngraphai were not their contracts, but 
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 Pyrrhos was a tenant and a fairly substantial correspondence with Zenon survives. See the Prosopographia 





more importantly Pyrrhos evidently believed that contracts, and in particular, formalized 
contracts, deserved respect even if they were not one‘s own. The point of this comment in his 
report is to communicate their disrespect not only for him personally, but also for the notion of 
contractual obligation generally. 
We may also wish to include P.Dion. 9 (Hermopolite, 139 BCE) in this category. This 
papyrus contains a petition in which a Kephalos son of Dionysios complains to the king and 
queen that a certain Lysimachos, from whom he had purchased 300 choes of wine, had not 
issued a receipt for the final installment of what he owed, only to shake him down years later for 
a balance he had supposedly already paid.
337
 ―Thus he is attempting to make me pay twice for 
the same thing‖ (24: ὑ π ο   βά ω  τ ῵  το ο τ ω [ ] τρόπω   ὶς τ  τ  π [ρά]ξ      ). 
Kephalos accordingly sought that the authorites ―not allow [him, i.e., Kephalos] to be ensnared 
by a person so wholly lacking in consideration‖ ( ή    ὑπ ρ  [  ]  ἐ   ρ υό    ο  ὑπὸ 
  θρ που    [  ]   ο ος), specifically requesting (i) that his petition be heard by 
Apollodoros, the epistatēs and grammateus tōn katoikōn hippeōn; (ii) an investigation be opened 
into the matter; and (iii) a moratorium be imposed on any and all measures by Lysimachos aimed 
at forcing Kephalos or his sureties to pay up until a decision was reached. Such disputes abound 
in the papyri, and we are in no position here to condemn Lysimachos on the basis of this one 
petition.
338
 Also, as we have seen, the phrase    ὑπ ρ       τ . with some form of 
     ω /   ω ό ως/   ω ο     was common in Ptolemaic petitions (cf. n322), and 
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 The reverse of this situation was dealt with explicitly in Demotic contracts: debtors were forbidden from claiming 
that they had already paid; see, e.g., P.Dion. 1.17, 2.16-17, 3.19-20, etc. Cf. sec. 5.7 below on kakotechnia and 
heurēsilogia. 
338





therefore one cannot press it very far. Yet, insofar as it seems to have been used to signal that the 
accused was trampling on one‘s ―rights‖ or ignoring some sort of moral or legal obligation, the 
question becomes, why was it employed here? Perhaps it refers to the general disrespect of 
driving a free man into slavery, a risk Kephalas says he is running in light of Lysimachus‘s 
purportedly unjust treatment (4-5). But perhaps the formula refers to Lysimachos‘s (alleged) 
failure to abide by his contractual obligation. As the petitioner of P.Erasm. I 1 said in a very 
similar position (i.e., charges of withheld receipts, new contracts, extraction of double payments; 
p. 121 above), Kephalos may be inviting us to see Lysimachos as having ―put aside the trust that 
exists among men‖ by refusing to recognize his obligation to treat him as he deserved under the 
original contract. 
 As we enter the Roman period, we find two interesting developments. First, while the 
purely moral meaning of eugnōmōn and its derivatives is still available (e.g., SB XVIII 13867 [p. 
170], and the examples under the other sources of obligation), the word is rarely found 
characterizing a generalized sense of due justice or respect in legal documents or business 
contexts, but instead almost always specifically associated with one‘s attitude toward monetary 
and contractual obligations. Second, verbal forms become more prevalent.  
 The first shift is interesting precisely for how concrete the notions of eugnōmōn and 
agnōmōn become. As in the Ptolemaic period, one may still qualify an act of repayment as being 
eugnōmōn in the Roman period, as we see in SB XX 14401 (Arsinoite, 147), a petition in which 
Ptolemaios son of Diodoros complains directly to the epistratēgos that a local creditor, also 
called Ptolemaios, is charging exorbitant rates of interest and extracting it by gang violence 






ὅπως ἐ [ ] το ς       στάτο ς τοῦ  υρίου  
ἡ ῵    τω ί ου [ ]   ρο ς < υ  θ῵> ἐ  τῇ   ί  συ  έ     <  ὶ>      σῃς  
 ρ φ     τῶ τ ς 
24   ρ    ί ου στρ [ ]τ  ῶ ὅπως    π ρέ στος   ὶ    βρ στος ὑπὸ τοῦ  
Πτο    ίου 
 φυ  χθ῵   ὶ <οὗ>  π ο έ ω     ς τό ο  π ρ σσὸ  τοῦ  ρ χ   ίου   ς  
  φά   - 
ό   ο  ἐ  ο  θ    ,   ὶ ἐά  τ  φ  ῵   τῶ ὀφ ί ω    τ  τ ῦτ ,  σχ σω  
  τῶ 
 πο ῵        ω ό ως ... 
 
that in the most gracious times of our lord Antoninus (I may be able) to remain in my 
place of residence and that you may order written instructions to be sent to the stratēgos 
of the meris of Herakleides so that I may be kept free from threats and acts of outrage by 
Ptolemaeus, and that the interest (which) I have paid in excess of a drachma per mina per 
month be credited for me against the principal, and if it is apparent that I owe him 
anything after this, I shall undertake to repay him in a reasonable manner. (trans. 
Whitehorne 1991) 
 
Here Ptolemaios the petitioner (who wrote numerous petitions, many of which survive) is not in 
fact promising to repay ―in a reasonable manner,‖ but is stating much more concretely that he is 
willing to pay what he owes and not an obol more. The adverb here signifies his recognition of 
the debt: he is not repudiating it as such, though he is disputing the amount, and hopes to have 
the epistratēgos pressure the stratēgos not only to stop the violence, but also to establish the size 
of the debt. 
 In P.Mil.Vogl. I 25 (Tebtynis, 127), on the other hand, we find a debtor disputing the very 
existence of a debt, and this over time comes to be the dominant meaning of agnōmosynē, the 
repudiation of a debt or obligation outright (cf. Johanna‘s meaning in P.Bad. II 35 above, pp. 
158ff.). The papyrus contains a transcript of a hearing before the stratēgos of the Polemon 





Paulinos son of Patron.
339
 The defendant was the brother of the now-deceased Geminos and 
represents his estate at trial;
340
 the plaintiff was the one-time phrontistēs of the deceased. 
Demetrios had at least two claims against the estate. The first concerned some pledged property, 
the second a deposit for 2,000 drachmai Demetrios had purportedly made with Geminos in the 
name of his ―friend,‖ Deios son of Atrenos. To support this second claim, Demetrios submitted 
two cheirographa, one of deposit made out to Deios by Geminos and one by Deios apparently 
ceding the right to collect the debt to Demetrios.
341
 The case turned, as Wolff astutely pointed 
out, on the validity of the documents presented at trial and the manner in which the plaintiff 
came to possess them.
342
 The status of both documents were disputed vigorously by Paulinos‘s 
lawyer, who accused the plaintiff of stealing the original document and falsifying his connection 
to Deios, alleging that Demetrios did not even know who this Deios was. In the event, Demetrios 
was able to produce not only the document of deposit with Geminos but also the document 
executed between Deios and himself, thus completing the paper trail from Deios to Geminos to 
Demetrios.  
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 See Wolff 1956b: 355-67 and now Heath 2004 for rhetorical analysis of the trial. This document is part of a large 
archive formerly known as the Laches archive, on which see the online article by R. Smolders, ―The Archive of 
Patron‘s Descendants‖ (written in 2005: http://www.trismegistos.org/arch/archives/pdf/66.pdf). 
340
 Against the plaintiff‘s claim that he is the executor of his brother‘s estate (ii.12), Paulinos asserts that he is not 
liable for the debt in the first instance, since he is not the guardian of his brother‘s children, but consents to rebut the 
claim in the interest of justice (ii.21-25). 
341
 The lacuna in iii.23 renders precision as to the nature of the second document impossible; but see iii.32 and n344 
below.  
342
 The majority of the scholarly literature on this document revolves around the question of whether or not there 
were freely circulating negotiable debt instruments in antiquity and the so-called ―dispositive‖ nature of Hellenistic 
legal documents. See the original commentary by Arangio-Ruiz in the ed. pr.; contra Wolff 1978: 148, 166-69; cf. 





However, there were still some troubles for the plaintiff‘s case, most significantly that the 
document with Deios post-dated the deposit by more than a year. After having the documents 
read out, the stratēgos enquired: 
 
    τί ο χ ἅ   [το] ς το[ῦ Γ ]   ί ου  ρά [ ] σ     ὶ π ρ  
iii.32 τοῦ Δ ίου ἐξο ο ο ου έ ου τὴ  πίστ   τὸ χ ρό ρ φο  
  ἴ  φ ς; Δ  ήτρ ος· ἐφ’ ὅσο    Γέ    ος π ρ    ὑπ  σ- 
χ[ ]  το  πο  σ [  ],   τ   ὲ τ   υτὴ  ἐ  ί [ο]υ  [ ] ω ο- 
  ο  τω  τ῵    τ [ ί ω ] ἐ έ[ σ]       ὶ  ρά[ ]  τ[ ] τοῦ 
Δ ίου [ ] β   . 
 
     ―Why did you not take a cheirograph from Deios acknowledging the trust (i.e., 
the money made over in trust for the deposit) at the time you got the document from 
Geminos?‖ 
     Demetrios: ―As long as Geminos was alive, he was promising to pay, but after 
his death, I had to get documents from Deios as well since the defendants were 
refusing to recognize the obligation.‖ 
 
The defense followed up by pointing out that this statement was contradicted by the evidence of 
the documents read out only moments before on two grounds: first, the document with Deios was 
dated to before the death of Geminos; second, it characterized the transaction with Geminos as a 
loan, not a deposit (iii.36-iv.5). The first discrepancy is probably explained by a lack of precision 
on Demetrios‘s part. It could very well have been the case that Demetrios had attempted to 
recover the funds on Geminos‘s deathbed when his heirs and executors were more or less de 
facto administrators of his estate, and when they refused to honor the debt ( [ ] ω ο- | 
 ο  τω ), he went back to Deios in order to secure a better legal position and bolster his 
claim.
343
 But even this interpretation is unnecessary: whatever the precise timing of the drafting 
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of the second document, the imminent death of Geminos (presuming that he did not die 
suddenly) had to have worried Demetrios since his name was not the one of record on the 
deposit. In his testimony, then, he might naturally have concentrated on the motive (i.e., 
Geminos‘s death) rather than the precise sequence of events. The second problem was even less 
significant. It was perhaps technically incorrect for Demetrios to have recorded the transaction 
with Deios as a loan, but hardly a fatal mistake as we may surmise from the stratēgos‘s 
subsequent actions, impounding the documents and postponing the trial until Deios could be 
produced to corroborate Demetrios‘s testimony.344  
 Significant in this case are the several layers of normative and legal contracting, and how 
they relate to each other. If we trace the chain of events as laid out by the plaintiff (and for our 
purposes we do not need them to be true so much as plausible), he made a formal deal with his 
―employer‖ (for lack of a better term), who came from one of the wealthiest families in the 
Arsinoite nome, whereby he ―deposited‖ the hefty sum of 2,000 drachmai with him, but was 
apparently content to put up a straw man in his place. Wolff ingeniously suggested that this 
fiction might have been at the instance of Geminos, who found the thought of being formally 
indebted and liable to praxis by his freedman phrontistēs distasteful, and so sought to have the 
person of record be of higher status.
345
 Regardless of the motive, it seems that Demetrios found 
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 The stratēgos characterizes Deios‘s cheirograph as a pistis (iii.32: ἐξο ο ο ου έ ου τὴ  πίστ  ). This is best 
interpreted as his understanding the document read out as a cession of the right of praxis against Geminos on the 
deposit; cf. the same language in M.Chr. 247.11 (=P.Flor. I 86, Hermopolite, post 86). See Wolff 1956b: 360; 
Schmitz 1964: 52-64 (with reservations about Wolff‘s interpretation based on his reading of an earlier cession, BGU 
IV 1171: 61 and 64n2). On the ―confusion‖ of the nature of the transaction, deposit or loan, see the following note. 
345
 Wolff 1956b: 361n16. Cf. Smolders (n339) for the relevant literature on the archive and the status of the family 
of Geminos. We might also wonder if the same motive accounts for the form of the transaction: presumably it was 





such a person, a ―friend‖ and merchant from the Hermopolite nome (iii.19, iv.6). No doubt 
Demetrios informed Deios that he was using his name, but it seems that he saw no need to 
formalize this relationship at the time (i.e., between Demetrios and Deios). The result was that 
Demetrios had but the most meager of formal evidence for his transaction, and what he did have 
was indirect.  
We see here two norms in dynamic operation with contracting, social status, and trust, 
and a calculation of transaction costs with respect to formalization and enforcement. First, if we 
accept Wolff‘s explanation as to the existence of the straw man in the original transaction, we 
may see contracting as in some sense deformed by social relations. Doubtless Demetrios would 
have preferred to have his name be the one of record on the deposit, but he was willing—or 
induced—to accept a less advantageous position in light of his relationship to a man of much 
higher status. Though the contracting relationship was deformed and obscured by status and 
power relations, it is significant that two people of such different stations still used a formal 
contract in order to conduct their business.  
Second, we may see the formalization that Demetrios did insist upon as representing a 
minimum of sorts. Clearly, 2000 drachmai was far too substantial a sum to go without any 
documentation, but the level of trust (power relations notwithstanding) was such that between 
Demetrios and Geminos an oblique formalization of their contract sufficed,
346
 and between 
                                                                                                                                                             
discrepancy in between the documents as to the nature of the transaction. If it was a loan, the interest would like 
have been bundled in, as Pestman (1971) has suggested for some atokos loans (cf. Mitteis 1912: 257-59). 
346
 Cf. P.Oxy. I 71 (Ptolemais Euergetis, post 303), a petition to the Prefect in which a woman complains that two 
phrontistai, whom she hired to help her manage her affairs while her son was away on military service, failed to 
keep faith with her:  ο ίζουσ  το τους τὴ     ή   ο  πίστ     ποσῴζ    (11). Cf. Schmitz 1964: 105-11; Wolff 





Demetrios and Deios nothing at all. This state of affairs, and indeed his subsequent actions, can 
be explained only with reference to Demetrios‘s understanding of the probabilities and 
modalities of enforcement. As Wolff noted: 
 
In der Tat wird gerade so ihre nachträgliche Austellung dieses Umstandes [sc. of the 
document with Deios] glaubhaft: solange Geminos lebte, konnte sich Demetrios auf ihn 
verlassen und sich mit einem bloss formellen Anerkenntnis begnügen, das ... einem 
Strohmann [i.e., Deios] gegenüber abgegeben worden war. Als aber der Tod sienes 
Dienstherrn herannahte, musste ihm an einer Legitimation gelegen sein, die ihm 
gegebenenfalls ein klageweises Vorgehen dessen Erben ermöglichte. (1956b: 360) 
 
The trust upon which the contract primarily relied (cf. 33-34: ὑπ  σ-  χ[ ]  το) died with 
Geminos, and it was only when the heirs repudiated the debt (34-35:  [ ] ω ο-    ο  τω  
τ῵    τ [ ί ω ]) that Demetrios backtracked and converted his wholly informal agreement 
with Deios into a formal one—what the stratēgos called his πίστ ς (32)—so as to be able to 
enforce the purely formal contract to which the original transaction had been reduced with the 
loss of the personal connection. What the first cheirograph represented, then, was not the 
―normal‖ path to official enforcement, but a legal lifeline, an option to formalize, should the need 
ever arise. Of course, Demetrios could have, as the stratēgos suggested, gotten his supporting 
document from Deios simultaneously or immediately thereafter, but not only did Demetrios 
evidently trust Geminos to keep his word, but obtaining the second document also involved some 
―cost‖ that Demetrios saw no need to incur. Granted, there was no need to pay a scribe (the 
cheirograph is purportedly in Deios‘s hand), and in any case the cost of a scribe paled in 
comparison to the amount deposited. More significant, perhaps, was the fact that Deios was not 
resident in the Arsinoite (at the end of the trial, Demetrios promises to produce Deios from 





were likely to have been in regular contact, and no doubt they could have created a paper trail 
soon after the deposit was inked, for in the end Demetrios did, in fact, get ahold of Deios as soon 
as he saw the need. But this is precisely the point, however slight the absolute cost, it is clear that 
in relative or marginal terms, it was not worth incurring so long as Geminos was alive. For 
Demetrios Geminos‘s promise and the foothold in the law which the cheirograph of deposit 
provided sufficed, given the foreseeable future; the advantage of full formalization was not worth 
the additional time or money. Yet, when confronted by the agnōmosynē of Geminos‘s heirs, 
which by definition is the defiance of the norms of trust, respect, fair-dealing, and obligation on 
which contracts rested, Demetrios braced himself for enforcement actions that went beyond 
personal self-help, exercising the option of official enforcement he had preserved.   
 By the third and fourth centuries the predominant meaning of eugnōmōn in legal and 
business documents was something like ―willing to repay,‖ with eugnōmonein meaning simply 
―to repay,‖ while agnōmōn/agnōmonein meant ―to refuse to repay‖ or ―to repudiate a debt or an 
obligation.‖ An English translation with something of a similar trajectory would be ―to honor‖ an 
obligation or a debt.
347
 A couple of examples will suffice.
348
 In P.Oxy. LIX 3993 (Oxyrhynchos, 
II-III), Koprys and Sinthonis write to their children about a debt of 500 drachmai they are 
collecting on their behalf from Petosiris and his associates. Petosiris disputes the amount, 
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 According to the OED, the first attestations of ―to honor‖ in this sense come from the beginning of the 18th 
century. I would like to thank Prof. Bagnall for suggesting this English parallel. 
348
 Cf. M.Chr. 93.15-17 (Hermopolis, ca. 250); PSI IV 303.14 (Mendes, 245-303; pace the translation of Lewis in 
BASP 16 [1979]: 118); III 222.10-12 (Herakleopolite, III-IV); P.Oxy. I 71 i.20 (Oxyrhynchos, post 303); P.Amh. II 
142.17 (Herakleopolite?, post 341); P.Oxy. XLVIII 3400.20-22 (Oxyrhynchos, 359-365); and P.Neph. 6.11-18 





insisting that he owes merely 448 drachmai. In contrast to their Ptolemaic analogues, Koprys and 
Sinthonis assure their children that the debtors are not agnōmones:  
 
ο    ρ    ω ο οῦσ  .  ἶπ    
   ρ ἡ     ὅτ , “συ  έ ο      τά.”     ο    ρ ὅτ ,  
16 “  σὶ  ( ρ χ  ὶ) υ  .”    [ο]ὖ   άρ   σ    ὗτ  ,  ή ωσο  ἡ-  
    . π ρὶ   ρ   το ς ἐσ    ὅτ ,    θέ  τ  π ρ’ ἡ-  
 ῵  τ ς ( ρ χ  ς) φ   ὶ ἡ     τὸ  ρά     οῦ   . 
 
They are not refusing to pay. For they said to us: ―We are collecting it.‖ They were 
saying: ―(The debt) is 448 drachmai.‖ If this is (what they owe), make it clear to us. For 
we are working on them, (saying): ―If you wish to have the 500 drachmai from us and 




Koprys and Sinthonis wish to confirm the amount they are to collect, and if the original amount 
was indeed 500 drachmai, they propose to pay their children and transfer the debt into their 
name for the full amount, presumably on new terms with Petosiris and his associates. Unlike in 
the Ptolemaic cases, we here have a distinction being made between late payment in the context 
of a dispute about the size of the debt and outright repudiation. This is only possible because of 
the newly restricted sense of what it is to be ―inconsiderate‖: it has moved from being a 
subjective term denoting a lack of consideration for the creditor personally, a relationship 
mediated by the debt, to an objective term describing one‘s relationship to the debt itself. The 
result is that only wholesale repudiation of the debt, a complete unwillingness to repay, and not 
the disrespect of quibbling about terms with one‘s creditor, counts as agnōmosynē. Hence 
Koprys and Sinthonis apparently had no real trepidation about transferring the debt: they saw the 
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debtors as fundamentally eugnōmones, or the sort that (eventually) honor their obligations and 
repay what they owe.  
 Although the words were used primarily with reference to actual monetary debts in the 
Roman period, they were still extensive enough to refer to any and all obligations established by 
contract. A particularly telling example comes in P.Mil.Vogl. VI 264 (Tebtynis, 127), another 
document from the achive of the descendants of Patron (cf. P.Mil.Vogl. I 25 above). Briefly, 
Herakleides, the father of Geminos‘s wife, had passed away and left a portion of his estate to 
Patron junior and Satorneilos, his minor grandsons by Geminos, and to his daughter Thaubarous 
(Geminos‘s sister-in-law and Patron junior‘s aunt). Some dispute arose as to the inheritance 
between the brothers and Thaubarous, and they struck what seems to have been an interim 
agreement by which some property was locked away and sealed by all parties, with the keys 
deposited with Paulinos (Geminos‘s brother, or Patron junior‘s uncle and Thaubarous‘s brother-
in-law) until the minor heirs came of age (lines 3-14, cf. P.Mil.Vogl. I 25 iv.18-v). Here Patron 
junior applies to the archidikastēs because Thaubarion had petitioned the Prefect  to set aside the 
―agreement‖ brokered by Paulinos in order to claim her entire inheritance immediately.350 She 
had then been referred to the archidikastēs and so it is to him that Patron makes his request. 
After reprising the situation set out above in his petition, Patron characterizes his aunt‘s appeal to 
the Prefect thus: ―Therefore, since Thaubarous repudiated (the agreement) and petitioned his 
excellency the Prefect ... (15-16: ἐπ< >ὶ [ο]ὖ  ἡ Θ  υβ ροῦς    ω ο οῦσ    ἐ έτυχ  τῶ 
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 The agreement seems to have been called a συ   τάθ σ ς (8), cf. P.Mil.Vogl. I 25 iv.36: π ρ [ ]   θέ τ  [ὑ]πὸ 
  φοτ έ [ρω ]   σ ίτ [ ]. See Mélèze-Modrejewski 1952 on private mediation. The parties were still engaged in 





 ρ τίστῳ [ἡ ]     ).‖ Though two years later Patron would claim that his aunt owed him for 
the property and revenues she appropriated (P.Mil.Vogl. I 27 [Tebtynis, 129]), there was no 
question at this point of a debt as such, i.e., it was no monetary debt that she was ―disrespecting.‖ 
Instead, the language of the petition suggests that Patron sees her act of petitioning as the product 
of her attitude toward the mediated settlement he just described. Instead of doing what she had 
promised and what she ―owed‖ Patron under the terms of the agreement, she went outside of it 
and petitioned a third party, in effect breaching the agreement.
351 
As mentioned above, the restriction of meaning seen in the Roman period coincides with 
the increased use of the verbal forms.
352
 Besides the participial form in BGU VIII 1865 (an 
intriguing, but enigmatic case) and UPZ I 144 (discussed immediately below), there is only one 
other attested instance of the verb eugnōmonein before the Roman period, P.Grenf. II 14a, a 
letter between two bureaucrats from 232 BCE. The reading of the line in question is uncertain, 
though according to BL I, both Grenfell and Wilcken corrected the original edition, 
independently as it would seem, to arrive at the infinitive:   ό, ἐ   σοὶ  όξ       ω ο    ,  τ    
τὴ  ὄ ο    ὶ τ ς    ρ(τάβ ς) τ῵  πυ(ρ῵ )   ἅ    , π ό ρ  σ ό   ο .353 This, if correct, appears 
to be the first attestation of the verb (as opposed to the participle) in the entire Greek corpus, 
literary or documentary.
354
 That said, there is nothing particularly inappropriate about the use of 
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 Cf. the participial use of verbs of breach, sec 5.4.1 and the ―transactional agreement,‖ sec. 5.4.2. 
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 Compare the evolution of the verb    οσ όω: see P.Col. X 254, note to line 8. 
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 The original reading was     ω ο   ἶ   . 
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 The earliest literary references I have found are in the proem to Anaximenes‘ Ars rhetorica and Epicurus, VS, no. 





the verb in this document—it is an almost cravenly polite request of a superior, a relationship in 
which we have seen eugnōmōn used.355 There are also no papyrological attestations of 
agnōmonein before the Roman period besides participial forms in petitions.356    
  The two phenomena, the restriction of meaning and the increased use of verbal forms, 
are perhaps to be connected. The growth of verbal forms would seem to signify a shift in 
conception from the notion as a condition to an action and a predicate. In other words, being 
―considerate‖ came to be seen increasingly in objective terms as an act in an of itself or a 
character trait rather than the manifestation of a subjective relationship between two people. 
Since contracts and debts are by their natures the most concrete and visible sources of obligation 
associated with eugnōmosynē, and moreover the ones about which one is most likely to complain 
in petitions to the government or in business letters, they accordingly account for the majority of 
our discrete acts of eugnōmosynē. Thus, while in the literary and even legal corpora the general 
notion of being just, fair, or considerate is still current throughout the imperial period,
357
 in the 
papyri there is this marked shift to these more concrete acts of justice and injustice. Yet this shift 
does not seem to be a artifact of documentary preservation or an idiosyncrasy of regional usage: 
Christian texts from the fourth century onwards also show a tendency to equate eugnōmonsynē 
                                                                                                                                                             
13.22.8. Plutarch uses the verb frequently, and there are a couple of attestations in Strabo and Josephus. It is 
relatively common from the fourth century onwards. 
355
 Even so, it strikes me as a bit odd: this line should no doubt be checked again from the original or a photograph. 
356
 See n322. 
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with repayment (though, as befits the context, in gratitude rather than money).
358
 Although such 
linguistic changes areunot reducible to simple explanations, the role of eugnōmosynē in the 
communication of reputation may have been a factor, as will be discussed in the next section. 
                                                 
358





4.8 Of the Importance of Being Pistos and Eugnōmōn: Reputation and Contract 
We may now pull the threads of this discussion together with the previous one concerning pistis. 
One may easily imagine that people expected to be treated     ω ό ως by those whom they 
trusted, in all arenas, not just in business matters. Also, as we have seen, both pistis and 
―consideration‖ were originally subjective values, the former a measure of confidence based on 
personal experience, and the second a judgment of one‘s own value in the eyes of others (i.e., 
―are they treating me as they ought?‖). The ways these norms worked in business and legal 
matters suggests just how ―personal‖ business was in antiquity, in every sense of the word.  
We find a particularly interesting collocation of the two concepts in UPZ 144 (perhaps 
164/163 BCE). This document is a ―letter,‖ which, as Wilcken saw, was some sort of exercise or 
model for those learning the niceties of elite or chancery correspondence.
359
 Not only is there the 
tell-tale hand of a corrector (which I have not indicated in the extract below) and other evidence 
of copying from an exemplar (e.g., lines 13, 20, 46), but the sentences are also ponderously 
periodic, the language elevated (containing several hapax legomena for the papyrological 
record), and there is a studied avoidance of hiatus. Also, the sentiments are entirely stock, and 
there are no details of the sort that would point to this being an actual letter. For all that, Wilcken 
is probably right to see it as cobbled together from extracts of actual letters scrubbed of purely 
personal elements. The ―letter‖ itself purports to be from someone who has suffered an 
―injustice‖ in the form of a broken contract at the hands of an erstwhile friend: 
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 ἐ ὼ τ   έ  στ  ἠ  ω ο   έ ος ὑπό σου 
         θ  ὼς  τ  πρότ ρο  το ς  ὲ  
     ή  σ    π ρ     πτως [ὀ]ρ ίσζ σθ   
4   ὶ  υσχ ρ ί    : πρὸς  ὲ τοὺς   ωσ  ποτοῦ  
 ἠ  ω ο   έ    φάσ ο τ ς        τως 
   ὶ πρ έως    τίθ σθ  ,    ῵ς  χ    
 ὑπέ  βο  τ  τ    τ  τὴ  π <ρ>ρ σί   
8         πρὸς σέ, ο χ οὕτως προ  ρο    ος, 
 ἵ     τ    θῇς  τ  πρὸς τὴ  ἐ ὴ  
  ἵρ σ  , τ  τ   (l. τοῦτο)   ρ  πέ  ω  :   ’ ὅ\ / προσ- 
 φάτως πορσ ί  ψ   φί ο ,      τοῦ    ῵ς 
12  χο τος στοχ ζό   ος: ἐ ὼ   ρ π στ  σ ς 
 σοί τ    ὶ το ς θ ο ς, πρὸς ο ς  σίως   ὶ    [[  ]] 
     ίως πο  τ υσά   ος ἐ  υτὸ      - 
 ψ  οίρ το  π ρέσχ    : ὑπὸ  ὲ σοῦ  υ  ὶ 
16 π ρ σπο    έ ος (l. π ρ σπο    έ ος) προ      πέ ψ   σο  
 τὸ   πο ο  σ ὀ  τοῦτο .       ὲ  οῦ  <σ > 
    ο      π   ή   (l.    οτ     π    ί  ) προσ     ρω έ ο  
   ὶ       έ ο  τ ς ἐ  π   ὸς πρός τ  
20 τὸ  ἡ έτ ρο  π τέρ    ὶ τὴ  ο  ί   [[ἐ   ]] 
 ἐ  ί    (l. ἐ  ί ου) φ  ί ς,   οί\ω/ς  ὲ   ὶ τὴ  (l. τ ς) πρὸς τ τ  ς360 
 ο   ότ τ  (l. ο    ότ τος),  ὴ ἐ   τ ωθ     τ   πρὸς 
 ἡ ᾶς ἐπ   ίζ  ,  π  τ   ’  [ ]σέβ     
24  σ ήσ  τ    ὶ τὴ  ἐ  χρό ῳ βου  υο έ    
 ψ φο  ἐ[ξ ]τάσ  τ  π ρὶ τ[ο το]υ(?) \ἐ / θ[ . . ] ... . .  
 τὸ (l. τῶ) τ     υτὶ  στ  ότ   [ο  σ] ῵  [πά ]π   
  ὴ π ρ β ί     τ    τ  [τ ς] συ θή  ς. 
28 ἡ   ο    τ το    ρ   ὶ  έ  στο     θὸ  
 ἐ  πρά   σ   τὸ πά τ’ ο  ο ο   σθ     θ ρ῵[ς] 
   ὶ     ίως: τοὺτο  ’ ἂ  ἐφ ί  το    ὸ    ὶ  ... 
    σὺ  τ῵      ίῳ ὑπό σου ἐτέτ  το. 
 
I, who have been treated with the utmost thoughtlessness by you and who have learned 
already before this both to be openly angered by and resentful of your injustices, but also 
to comport myself with an air of reconciliation and mildness towards those who admit 
their thoughtlessness, I understood it as right to adopt even this freedom of speech with 
you, not so choosing so with the aim of your being recalled once more to my way of 
thinking—for of this I despair because of the friend you have lately acquired—but rather 
as one who aims at what is right. For having trusted you and the gods, before whom I 
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have dealt in a holy and just manner, I conducted myself with no grounds for complaint; 
but now, suffering a breach of faith at your hands, I have been led to send you this 
reckoning. You, the recipient of a humane education and mindful of the friendship since 
childhood towards our father and his house, as well as of your familiarity with them (?), 
you ought not to have set yourself against dealing with us; and moreover, having 
exercised piety and examined the long-considered decision about ... with the already-
established reasoning, you ought not to have transgressed anything in the agreement in 
any way. For everything to be managed purely and justly is the most important and 
greatest good in business matters. This would have seemed good ..., if it (?) had been 
borne by you with justice. 
 
 
The ―author‖ goes on to speak of the hard times that had befallen him, with more about some 
court trial, before moving on to commonplaces about the role of the gods and nemesis punishing 
those who do not ―live in the best manner‖ (47-51). The scenario, then, is one in which the writer 
had a contract (cf. τ    τ  [τ ς] συ θή  ς) with respect to some business matter (ἐ  
πρά   σ  , τ   πρὸς ἡ ᾶς ἐπ   ίζ  ) with a person who had a long-standing personal 
relationship to his family. That ―friend,‖ however, ―breached his trust‖ (π ρ σπο    έ ος, a 
hapax in the papyri) and ―transgressed‖ (π ρ β ί    ) their agreement (see Sec. 5.6), induced 
or suborned, it would seem, by a new friend (10-11). Though the narrative is difficult to follow 
precisely, it also appears that there had been one attempt at mediation or litigation (24-26, cf. 
46), with perhaps further legal action in the offing. The writer insists that he has no practical aim 
in writing, not even that of reforming his wayward friend; instead, pure moral conviction drives 
him to write, almost as if he were the herald of nemesis, delivering  divine judgment: the former 
friend is utterly in the wrong; the writer himself has dealt honestly before gods and men. That 
said, the writer is open to an apology freely given by those who ―admit their agnōmosynē‖ and 





The tenor of the letter is emphatically moral, and one of the few instances we have of the 
invocation of the divine or religion in business matters or contract enforcement from Graeco-
Roman Egypt outside the use of oaths.
361
 Breaching the trust involved in a contract was a serious 
business, and displayed not only an utter disregard for people (as the ―letter‖ opens), but also 
revealed a certain species of atheism, of which the writer rather pompously accuses his former 
friend throughout.
362
 The genre of this document renders the sentiments it contains an intriguing, 
but difficult type of evidence. On the one hand, it is obviously not a real letter (though bits of it 
likely are); on the other hand, the fact that the whole complex of notions regarding the moral and 
religious basis for making and keeping contracts could be assembled into something like an 
exercise is powerful proof of their normative status. One question we should ask ourselves is: 
what is the status of the religious ―argument‖ with respect to trust and agnōmosynē? Does it 
represent an opening gambit, a form of normative pressure on the party in breach before turning 
to the law, or a last-ditch return to moral suasion in the face of unsuccessful litigation? The text 
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 Cf. Ratzan forthcoming b. Cf. Sec. 5.6.2-5.7. 
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 Cf. Versnel 2002: 44 on this relationship in Classical Athens. Cf. also Surah 83.1-11 of the Koran:  
 
Woe to those that deal in fraud—  
Those who, when they have to receive by measure from men, exact full measure,  
but when they had to give by measure or weight to men, give less than due.  
Do they not think that they will be called to account?—  
on a mighty day, a day when mankind will stand before the Lord of the Worlds? 
Nay! Surely the Record of the Wicked is in Sijjīn.  
And what will explain to thee what Sijjīn is? 
A Register inscribed. 
Woe, that Day, to those that deny,  
those that deny the Day of Judgment. 
(Trans. Yusuf-Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an. 11th ed., Amana Publications).  
 
Fulfilling contracts is a religious duty (Surah 2.177) and the Koran legislates the basic terms of contracting, 







 As in the contemporaneous UPZ 41 (above, p. 170), asebeia and 
agnōmosynē are seen here to go hand-in-hand. The particular reason for linking them in this case 
seems to be the recipient‘s disregard for some ―long-thought-out judgment‖ (τὴ  ἐ  χρό ῳ 
βου  υο έ    | ψ φο ) in the breaching of his contract. The friend has thus broken not only the 
writer‘s personal trust (π στ  σ ς | σοί; π ρ σπο    έ ος), but he has disregarded a legal 
decision of some sort. The only source of enforcement left to the writer is divine vengeance. This 
is, of course, an old theme, one that predates formal law (e.g., Hesiod‘s Works and Days, 248-
55). Yet, as Hobbes was only too keen of note, divine vengeance is much less effective than 
earthly justice, for ―though the [power of Spirits Invisible] be the greater power, yet the feare of 
[Men] is commonly the greater Feare‖ (Leviathan xiv.31). If religious sentiment or belief had 
failed with respect to first-person enforcement (i.e., personal ethics and self-control; sec. 3.3 
above), it was unlikely to succeed now, when things had progressed so far. Rhetorically, the 
religious ―argument‖ represents a final ―elevation‖ of the dispute to the ultimate arbiter in a 
cosmic court, but in reality it is a return to the primary field of norms and first- and second-
person enforcement in a final attempt to secure performance. 
 Turning now to the documentary evidence, we find a lively reputational discourse in 
pistis and eugnōmosynē. Since one generally engaged in long-term relations of economic risk 
only with those whom one trusted (i.e., personally) or over whom one had some personal power 
(i.e., not merely the force of law), so one looked out for people who were known to be 
eugnōmones, or the sort to recognize the necessity or obligation of promises, contracts, and 
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debts. By the same token, people worried about their reputations for eugnōmosynē as an element 
of their general reputation for being pistos. With the restriction of the sense of eugnōmōn in the 
fourth century, the connection was a tight one: one could trust someone who was eugnōmōn, or 
someone who recognized and made good on obligations. In a sense, it was repeated acts of 
eugnōmosynē that established one‘s ―credit‖ or status as trustworthy. Thus in P.Oxy. IX 1223 
(Oxyrhynchite, ca. 370), Hermias writes to Horion to send money quickly, ―for we owe so many 
debts and I am not longer trusted, unless I repay‖ (25-8: τοσ  τ ς τ ρ προσ οχ ς χρ - | 
ωστοῦ   ,   ὶ ο  έτ  π στ υ-   ό  θ , ἐ    ὴ     ω ο ή-   σω   ). He has, in other words, 
run out of credit, and it will take repayment to re-establish his reputation for being trustworthy. 
Similarly, in PSI IX 1081 (Oxyrhynchite, late IV), a pronoētēs informs a landowner that a group 
of men from Paomis have arrived in the epoikion of Psankerma looking to borrow ―a few solidi‖ 
(7: ὀ ί ω   ο  σ  τίω  ἕ    ), a fairly substantial sum. As it turned out, the landowner was 
not there, so the pronoētēs sent a letter, noting that the villagers had come ready with the contract 
and the interest (perhaps the first installment?) ―in their hands,‖ and further that the entire village 
had signed on to the loan (10-11:   ὶ ὅτ  οἱ  ο οῦ τ ς ὅ ο  οἱ  πὸ   τ ς      ς ἐ ράψ  το). 
The pronoētēs then gives his recommendation:     ο < >  | σο  [ο]ὖ ,  έσποτά  ου,  οῦ    
  το ς,    έ  ουσ      ω ο  σ  (l.     ω ο  σ  )·   ὶ ἄ  ο- | τ    ρ ἣ     β      ῵ς 
 π   - | τέστ σ   (11-15: ―Therefore, if it seems good to you, my lord, give (it) to them; they 
will pay (it) back. For even at other times they have returned what they have received just as they 





past with regard to ―all the impositions laid upon them with respect to relations with their 
landlords‖ (16-17: πά τ  τ  ἐπ τ τ’τό         το ς το ς   ουχ  ο ς πρά   σ ).364 Here the 
relationship of trust precedes the villagers: they have shown themselves to be trustworthy and the 
amount asked for is small. All this adds up to an assessment of their credit-risk: they are ―good 
for it.‖  
The examples above illustrate how the communication of reputation helped to drive the 
verbalization and the objectification of eugnōmosynē. One would, like the pronoētēs, extrapolate 
from past personal experience and interpret the performance of an obligation by party B as 
evidence of B‘s being eugnōmōn toward oneself (A). But, if asked by a third party C whether or 
not he should deal with B, A can only really say, ―Well, B has always been eugnōmōn to me.‖ A 
has no insight as to B‘s gnōmē towards C. Upon hearing this C may decide to interpret B‘s 
eugnōmosynē as evidence of his capacity and ethical commitment to performing ―as he ought‖ in 
an absolute sense, independent of the person whom he owes. With enough evidence and time, 
one could speak of B to others as simply being eugnōmōn in an abstract sense, and ―honoring,‖ 
eugnōmonein, could mean an act of repayment regardless of the identity of the payee or the 
precise personal relationship between creditor and debtor. 
 Anyone relying on reputation engages in an inherently risky act of induction, even if the 
reputation is true and well deserved, since he cannot be sure that all the conditions surrounding 
the prior acts on which the reputation is built obtain in the present instance (i.e., the reputation 
may be irrelevant). The development of the abstract notion of objective obligation, however, 
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means that reputational discourse can be more accurate. If B can be seen (and sees himself) as 
socially and legally beholden to the obligation he assumed, and not to A personally, this 
theoretically means that an important variable in the construction of reputation has been 
eliminated. A and C, in other words, may communicate fairly precisely about B‘s relationship to 
obligation instead of to either A or C personally. (In reality, however, the identity of the party to 
whom he owes the obligation may still make a difference to B‘s performance. For instance, 
modern legal abstraction notwithstanding, people may be more inclined to repay friends and 
neighbors than large, national, impersonal institutions.) What is fascinating about tracing the use 
and evolution of eugnōmosynē in the papyri is the extent to which we find a personal or status 
reputational discourse about subjective relationships transformed in part through repeated acts of 
extrapolation into a more abstract or objective discourse about a person‘s relationship to 
obligation per se. Significantly, the discourse of eugnōmosynē never seems to have become 
entirely objective. Even in an era when eugnōmonein most often meant ―to repay,‖ the pronoētēs 
is still careful to couch his advice in the framework of the personal relationships: in his 
estimation they are to be trusted ―with respect to relations with their landlords.‖ The relevant 
experience was still personalized.  
We have one clear case of the reputational role eugnōmosynē played in deciding with 
whom one would enter into a contractual relationship. P.Ross.Georg. III 1 (Alexandria, ca. 270) 
contains a letter from a young doctor, Markos, to his parents, in which he relates a recent battle, 
after which he attended to some wounded soldiers, before moving on to discuss some routine 






  ὶ    πο     ος   τυφ ὸς ἦ θ   πρὸς ἐ  ὶ (l. ἐ ὲ.) 
20  έ[ ω   ο  ὅ]τ  ἐπ φίω    (l. ἐπ φέω   .) Σ ρ π   ὸς τῇ   τρί σου τ ς  
  ο ρ( ς) [l.  ρο ρ( ς)].  
ἐ [  οὖ  ἦ ( )] ἐπ [φ] ὶς   ὶ    ῇς τὴ  τοῦ  πο  ω[ ίου] το του τοῦ τυ-  
φ οῦ        ὅτ        ω  ἐστὶ ,   [ίσ]θωσο    τῶ  
  τ ς, ἐ    ή σο  ἦ  ἐ    ος, π  ρῇς365  οῦσ  [τὸ]  σ  το . 
 
And Apollonios the blind came to me, saying, ―Serapiakos has released the arourai back 
to your mother.‖ If he has released (them) and you know the gnōmē of this Apollonios 
the blind, that he is eugnōmōn, lease them to him; if he has not been (eugnōmōn) to you, 




This short passage is interesting on several counts. First, it is perhaps somewhat surprising how 
far news of available acreage owned by Antonia, the mother, has spread. Markos is certainly in 
Alexandria; and while we have no sense of where his parents are, they are clearly some distance 
away in the chōra, for in another letter of about the same time Markos‘s brother Serenos asks his 
Antonia and his sisters to join them (the father had likely passed away in the meantime), telling 
Antonia dispose of her property in such a way as to suggest that the journey was long enough to 
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 Presumably for π  ρᾷς (present subjunctive). Gignac does not list this as a common confusion, though alpha-
contracts occassionally do have epsilon-contract endings (1977-81: II, Ch. IX); there is, however, no other example I 
can find in the papyrological corpus of this phenomenon with π  ράω (Gignac himself mistakenly took π  ρ ς for a 
genitive noun, 1977-81: II, 5). This also presumes that the original reading was correct. In any case, the editors 
understood this to be a jussive subjunctive (i.e, ―Wenn er dir nicht zur Verfügung stehen wird, so mache den 
Versuch mit der Veräusserrung des Getriedes.‖), matching the imperative in the prior condition. Such subjunctives, 
however, are almost always aorist, though in the centuries that followed this letter the present became more common 
(cf. Mandilaras 1973: §§ 554-59). Finally, the use of a supplementary participle with π  ρᾶσθ   is well attested in 
classical Greek (Kühner-Gerth, § 482, Anm. 8 [II, 58-59]), but not in the papyri, in which we find only the 
dependent infinitive (cf. Mayer 1970: II.1, 165-66). Kühner-Gerth (§ 484.30) suggests that there is a difference in 
meaning between the constructions in the classical era, which perhaps suggests that its use may be meant to 
communicate some particular shade of meaning. More curious and troubling, however, is the use of the active here 
instead of the middle, which is by far better the better attested voice in the papyri. On balance, however, the 
translation above seems to be the most natural interpretion. 
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 The recent translation of this passage in Hirt Raj 2006: 336 is impossible, as it depends on inapposite attestations 
of ἐπ φί    in Preisigke‘s Wörterbuch, where it is attested as meaning ―to release (an animal to graze).‖ She 
apparently ignored Krüger‘s translation in the ed. pr., which Kiessling adopted in his volume of the Wörterbuch. 
―To you‖ is no doubt too strong for the dative of reference in line 23, but its presence is important to the 





merit an extended stay (P.Ross.Georg. III 2, esp. lines 29-31). In any case, Apollonios the blind, 
who must also be in Alexandria, but also has connections back home (wherever that is), has 
heard that Serapiakos had ―released‖ the land he had previously held on lease from Antonia. He 
now wants to know if this is true, and if so, whether he could lease it himself. Instead of merely 
having whoever sent him the information go and ask Antonia directly, Apollonios goes to 
Marcus to confirm the report, or perhaps to have him put in a good word.  
The two obviously know each other, though intriguingly Markos does not, apparently, 
know Apollonios‘s gnōmē when it comes to business matters.367 In other words, one might have 
expected that like the pronētēs in PSI IX 1081 above, Markos would have extrapolated from his 
experience, in essence asking himself whether he would trust Apollonios and lease him the land, 
and advise accordingly. Instead, he instructs his mother to consult Apollonios‘s local reputation, 
in effect suggesting that she do her ―due diligence‖ and find out whether he is the sort to abide 
by a contract or not (Markos clearly had his doubts). The alternatives stemming from the 
judgment of Apollonios‘s gnōmē are also revealing. If she knows that Apollonios has not been 
eugnōmōn ―to her‖ from personal experience (note the past tense and σο  in line 23), then she 
should attempt to ―give‖ him the grain instead of the lease. I take this to mean that if he is not the 
sort to be trusted with a lease, one could still sell him the crop.
368
 This would probably be less 
lucrative, but also less risky, as a long-term contract of tenancy would be replaced with a simple 
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 Cf. BGU II 531, business letter from the late first-century Arsinoite, in which the author, after issuing a series of 
instructions, ends: ἐ    ὲ  στοχήσῃς   [  ω] ί    ο   οίπ   ( .   π  ) π ρέχ    έ   ς, πέπ  σ     [  ρ]  οῦ τῇ 
    ῃ, ὡς ο τ     ὶ ἄ   ος ο τ     [ ] οτρίω  ἐπ θυ  τής (―But if you fail me [in carrying the previous 
instructions], you will cause me eternal grief, for you trust in my gnōmē, that I am neither unjust nor desirous of 
other people‘s things.‖ Πέπ  σ   here effectively has the force of ―know,‖ cf. the discussion in Secs. 4.2-4 above). 
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 Here we clearly see the dynamics of eugnōmosynē as they factored into the decision-
making process surrounding contracting, and the extent to which it had been partially objectified. 
Nearly a century earlier we have a business letter (P.Oxy. XLI 2996 [Oxyrhynchos, II]) 
that revolves about the attempt of one Anthestianos to get Psoïs the potter, who is massively in 
arrears, to live up to his obligations and act with respect. The letter begins with Anthestianos 
complaining that he had just sent his agent Sarapammon ―once more‖ to Psoïs so that he might 
pay ―what has already been testified to (as being owed) time and again‖ (ὅπως ἤ     ποτὲ τ  
προ   ρτ  έ-      σο    ὶ ἅπ ξ   ὶ    τ -   ρο    ορθ σῃ) for the price of some chaff and 
the hire of the animals and containers to transport it. The debt now stood at 700 drachmai, to 
which he added some wheat Psoïs had received from Horion, his fellow-potter. Anthestianos 
then accuses Psoïs of behaving ―once again‖ in such an ―insulting‖ (27: πά  [ ]  ἐπ ρ άσ ς τῶ 
 ρ ῳ)370 fashion as to hinder or obstruct production by taking no account of Sarapammon, 
instead giving him some excuse about having just returned from abroad with some pitch.
371
 
Anthestianos quotes Psoïs‘s excuse to Sarapammon verbatim as an explicit sign (sēmeion) of his 
knowledge of recent events.
372
 He also informs him that he has, for these reasons, found it 
necessary to make alternative arrangements, asking Psoïs‘s friend Dionysios either to pay the 
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 Cf. P.Oxy. III 533.11-14, a slightly older letter from Oxyrhynchos, in which we see a different set of equally 
personal characteristics informing a leasing decision: τὴ  ο -    ί   Τ [     ]   β ου  ὴ   σθ σῃς      ὶ     ή τ <  > 
 υ    ὶ     ο σῃ ἐ    τῇ ο -           [         ] τ[   ]   ρ [   ]τ    [       ]   ρ    [     ]ο  ἐστὶ  το   [τ]   ο  ί   
π ρ [β]ά   [ ]      ίσ-    ο ς ἵ[ ]   ὴ  χω    στο άχου[ς]    ὲ φθό ο  (―Do not  lease the house of T...bios to 
anyone except a woman who intends to live in it . . . for it is (wrong? foolish?) to throw away such a house on young 
men, so that we may not be the cause of anger or envy.‖). 
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 See Youtie 1970: 109 n10. 
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 Cf. Mayerson 2004 on the importation of pitch into Egypt (he discusses this papyrus on p. 203).  
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debts or for Psoïs to supply Dionysios with jars in lieu of payment (34-38: ἐ έ  σ   οὖ       
ἐρωτ σ   τὸ  φί ο  Δ ο-     σ ο  ὥστ  σ   π  τ [[σ]]-   σ   τ ῦτ  ἃ ὀφ ί   ς ἢ  οῦ  ί 
 σ    τῶ ἐ   ο φο ς). The editors of P.Oxy. XLI 2996 followed the ed. pr. in assuming that 
Dionysios is Anthestianos’s friend. However, the article (i.e., τὸ  φί ο  Δ ο-     σ ο ) is just as 
likely to mark the friend as Psoïs‘s,373 and it would make more sense for Anthestianos, after 
having sent Sarapammon twice, to turn not to his own friend, but to Psoïs‘s friend, who would be 
put in the uncomfortable position of acting as a de facto surety. As a friend, Dionysios was, 
perhaps, in a better position to dun Psoïs (certainly Anthestianos believed that Psoïs was less 
likely to ―insult‖ him); and, if he was unsuccessful, Dionysios would pay up and (it seems) 
accept repayment from Psoïs in pots.  
Such an interpretation fits with the overall strategic aim of the letter: to get Psoïs to 
respect his obligations and those to whom he owes them, without escalating the conflict to the 
authorities. Indeed, this is a threat that is meant to induce him to deal with Sarapammon, whom 
Anthestianos is sending one more time before he proceeds to official enforcement: 
 
  ρ -  
ψ   ὲ   ὶ Σ ρ πά  ω   ἐ -  
40 θ    πά    πρὸς σ[ὲ]· ΐ    ὴ  
     ο  χῇς  [  ]ω ο-  
 ῵  πρὸς τὴ   π  ίτ σ    
προφ σ ζό   ος,       
44 π ά τως     ω ό  σ[ο]   
  ὴ   ὶ ἄ [ ]ω ς πως πράξω  
πρὸ ς σὲ,    τ π  ψά  [ ]ός  
σ       ο [ ο]φ [  ]  ο ς [ - ca. ? - ] 
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 The papyrus breaks off. 
 
And I also wrote to Sarapammon to go to you once more. So do not argue
374
 shamelessly 
(with him),  refusing to recognize your obligations
375
 and making excuses about the 
request, but just honor it, or else I suppose I will proceed in a wholly different manner 
against you, having you summoned by the nomophylax ... 
 
It is difficult to translate eugnōmonein here, since it clearly encompasses a wider sense of 
obligation than mere repayment (though this is indeed part and parcel of what it will mean to act 
with eugnōmosynē here). Anthestianos wants to effect a total change in attitude from Psoïs‘s 
present one of agnōmosynē and all that it entails (i.e., ἐπ ρ άσ ς ,      ο  χῇς, 
προφ σ ζό   ος, etc.). Psoïs, moreover, has no legitimate dispute with the existence or size of 
the debt—or at least not most it, since it had ―already been witnessed one and twice before‖; he 
is instead merely (and shamelessly) putting Anthestianos and his agent off. As with the letter of 
Kopres above, excuses might buy Psoïs time, but they are ruinous to his credit: the life-blood of 
trust and reputation were deeds, not words. Anthestianos‘s quotation of Psoïs‘s excuse serves as 
sign of the heightened atmosphere of distrust and scrutiny in which the latter must now operate: 
Anthestianos thus reveals himself to be counting the excuses and by now Psoïs cannot have 
many left.
376
 In any case, Anthestianos has elevated the dispute by moving on to Psoïs‘s friends, 
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 I prefer to punctuate after σ[ ] in line 40 and read the following negative ἵ  -clause as imperatival, since (a) 
purpose makes little sense here (Antithestianos is sending Sarapammon so that Psoïs will not cavil about the debt?); 
and (b) it correlates more naturally with the imperative set off by    ά in the next phrase. Imperatival ἵ  -clauses 
often are paired, as here, with true imperatives: see Mandalaras 1973: 263-64. 
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 Pace the translation of the ed. pr. and P.Oxy. XLI 2996, there is no other instance of    ω ο   ν with πρός (as 
we have seen, it takes an accusative directly); it is more likely being used absolutely here, cf.     ω ό  σ[ο]  in 
line 44 and P.Mil.Vogl. I 25.34-35 (above, pp. 175ff.). 
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and surely this must disturb Psoïs, not only because of the trouble and expense to which his 
friends might be put and the obligation he would then be under, but also because it was a sign 
that the destruction of his reputation had commenced in earnest. Finally, Anthestianos signals 
that unless Psoïs act as he should, the next step would be legal proceedings. He has made 
repeated attempts to collect in a reasonable manner, applied direct and indirect social pressure, 
but if faced with total shameless, immoral intransigence or agnōmosynē, he will be forced to 
―proceed in a different manner‖ by going to the authorities.377 Again, as in the case of Paulinos 
and Demetrios (P.Mil.Vogl. I 25, pp. 183ff.), when personal morality and social pressure fail to 
enforce an obligation and the transaction is sufficiently valuable, the next resort is law—if one 
had the requisite documentation and resources.  
 Here we should also adduce a very interesting second-century letter from Theogiton to 
Apollonios (P.Fay. 124, Euhemeria):  
 
[Θ] ο ί[τω   π]ο  ω ίω  
[χ ίρ]  [ ] .  
[π]ά     [             ]  ράφ< >   σο        
4 [   ]    φ[           τ῵]   ρ  ω  σ [ου]  
      σ     ς [   ]  ὴ   θ σ έ ου  ου  
το ς [ ]ρ[ά ]  σ ,   ὶ  ῦ  οὖ   
πά     ἐπ< > ράθ    ράφ< >   σ[ο]   
8 πρὶ  ἤ τ  π ρ  ότ ρ[ο]  ἐ χ< > -  
ρήσω πο[ ]   , ἐά π ρ  ὴ   -  
 [ ] ο ω ῇς τ  πρὸς τὴ    -  
τέρ . πά υ  άρ  ο   ο   ς  
12 ἄφρω  τ ς  ἶ[ ]   τοῦ ὄ τος    -  
  [ὸ]ς  ὴ φυ άσσ[< > ] 〚τ . 〛σου τὴ    -  
ξ  ά ,   ἴπ ρ      ὶ  ρά   τ   
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 It is difficult here to communicate the ambiguity of πράξω here: it is almost as if he were saying, ―I will now 





   ὴ ἦ       το [ς] θ [ ο] [ς] ἐ σ τ [ ]   
16 χ άρ ς ὅτ  ο    ί  ἐστὶ  πρό-  
   ψ ς ἡ            έ    
 ἵ    όξῃς ἄ  υ  ο ί ω   
ἡ ᾶς  ποθ  σθ  .378   ὶ  ῦ   
20 [ο]ὖ      ὴ πίθῃ   ὶ τὴ  χορ  ί-  
   τῇ   τρὶ      ο   ως 
 πο ί υς (l.  πο ί ο ς) τὸ   ό ουθο  το -  
τω   στ     ὶ   τά   ό   
24 σ[ο]  πά < >     σο[ίσ]   ἡ π  ο  -  
 ξ[ί]  σου.  ὴ   ρ ὑπο άβῃς  
τ[ὴ]    τέρ   σου π ρὶ το τω   
[ἠ]ρ     .  ρ[ρ]ωσω. 
 
Theogiton to Apollonios, greetings. (Again your deed compels me to write to you), 
though I am not accustomed to writing, and so now again I tried to write to you before I 
take it in hand to do anything further, if you do not act with consideration with respect to 
your mother‘s affairs. For you seem to me to be an utter fool for not keeping your pledge 
this month. Even though there were no documents, thank god there is no a priori reason 
(that inhibits us) such that you should believe that we are to be pushed aside without our 
rights. If you now do not comply and pay the allowance to your mother as you are 
obliged, there will be consequences for this and your greed will once more cause you 
regret. For you should not suppose that your mother is taking these matters quietly. 
 
 
As in the previous letter, here we have a person attempting to get someone to live up to his 
obligations, backed by the threat of ―further‖ action (cf. also the letter of Ptollas above, pp. 
155ff.). Sadly, we know nothing more of the persons in this letter. Even though it was found with 
other documents in the so-called ―Gemellos archive‖ (really the archive of his phrontistēs 
Epagathos), no connection has been established between it and the people therein attested.
379
 
Hence, we have no clue as to the particular interest Theogiton has in the affairs of Apollonios 
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and his mother (perhaps he was her second husband or her brother?), though he clearly identifies 
with her (note the shift to the second person plural). Regardless of the connection, Theogiton 
chooses to express Apollonios‘s agnōmosynē not in terms of his personal or familiar obligation 
to himself or his mother, but with respect to his personal pledge (dexia). This was, as the letter 
makes clear, purely an oral and informal ―contract‖: the pledge to provide his mother with a 
monthly allowance was a mere promise, never reduced to writing. Something like Johanna‘s 
syntagē (see above, pp. 158ff.), it was a contract based entirely on trust and the expectation that 
the parties would act as they ought. Nonetheless, it created an obligation that he was morally 
bound to recognize as a sign of the respect he had for his mother. To go back on it now was not 
only immoral, but ―foolish,‖ since the lack of documentation was not going to hinder Theogiton 
and the mother from pursuing their ―rights‖ (nomima). However one takes prolēpsis (and no 
particularly apt translation comes to mind), the meaning is clearly that nothing stands in the way 
such that they seem themselves as blocked before they get out of the starting gate of legal 
proceedings and official enforcement.
380
 Though his mother and Theogiton had not anticipated 
the need for a document, they nonetheless feel confident that justice stands on their side, and so 
the better course for Apollonios is to return to his senses (cf. 12: ἄφρω ) —and his pledge—and 
pay his mother what he promised. If not, there will be ―consequences‖ and ―cause for regret,‖ 
because Theogiton is prepared to go ―one step further‖ (peraioteron). This may mean the courts, 
but not necessarily, and perhaps this threat was left intentionally vague. This is a game of 
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chicken, and Theogiton wants Apollonios to know that he is prepared to raise the stakes and that 
he has his mother‘s full support, since ―she is not taking this lying down.‖381  
 Before concluding this section on trust and ―consideration,‖ it is worth looking at two 
Roman petitions to the authorities about the agnōmosynē of others. First, BGU II 614 (Arsinoite, 
217) contains a request by a soldier, Marcus Aurelius Julius Ptolemaios, to the stratēgos of the 
Herakleides division of the Arsinoite in April of 217 to serve a copy of hypomnēma on his 
former brothers-in-law concerning a debt.
382
 Ptolemaios had several financial ties to the family 
of his wife (technically, his concubine or phōcaria), the nature of which are now unclear. They 
appear, however, to have included an advance of some sort (a prochreia), seemingly connected 
to his mother-in-law‘s public obligations, for which he might have stood surety (13-15). He may 
also have had separate dealings with his brothers-in-law (28-29).
383
 Sometime after his wife‘s 
death, Ptolemaios demanded repayment of the advance from her brothers, apparently on the 
grounds that they were ultimately responsible for the debt as the heirs to his late wife‘s portion of 
                                                 
381
 On a final note, we may wish to read [π]ρ[ά ]  σ  in line 6. There is nothing about the hand of this letter that 
suggests that the writer was uncomfortable or unaccustomed to writing, and it is an almost inconceivable sentence to 
dictate (note also that the subscription is in the same hand as the body). Theogiton‘s rhetorical strategy is to 
demonstrate his patience and good faith efforts to get Apollonios to abide by his word. It would therefore make 
sense for him to say that although he is not used to ―law suits,‖ and that he would like to avoid them (hence, his 
writing ―again‖), he was nonethless prepared to go beyond moral suasion and remonstrance and bring the matter to 
the courts. The traces, however, are slightly better for the orginal reading: the space for the intial letter is a bit 
constrained for pi as opposed to gamma, and the trace before the extant mu accords better with a preceding mu than 
a gamma. 
382
 Cf. Anagnostou-Canas 1991: 114-15; Foti Talamanca 1979: 221-25; Kreller 1919: 37; Mitteis 1910: 97-98; 
Gradenwitz 1900: 32-46. 
383
 Or, the phrase π ρὶ ὧ   ο    ίως ὀ[φ] ί      ἷς τ῵  προ  [ ρ]   έ ω   σ   π ά  ς may represent a claim 
on a penalty for breach. Cf. P.Köln III 147 (pp. 234ff.) and Berger 1911: 56 on the phrase ὡς ἴ  ο  χρέος (though 





their father‘s estate (17-18).384 The family refused to recognize his claim (on what grounds, we 
do not know), and so Ptolemaios proceeded to write to the authorities in order to initiate legal 
proceedings.  
Ptolemaios‘s first move was to petition the Prefect sometime before Dec. 26, 216, the day 
on which he received a vague subscription to his petition, ―If you have any right, you are able to 
avail yourself of it‖ (18-19:  ἴ τ   ί   ο   χ  ς,   [τ]ο τῳ χρ σ[θ  ]     σ [ ]). Mitteis 
interpreted this Delphic response, paralleled elsewhere (e.g., P.Oxy. II 237.v.37-38), as one given 
to an ―abnormale Verfügung,‖ in this case perhaps because the soldier petitioned for a hearing 
before the Prefect in Alexandria instead of waiting for the conventus in his home district.
385
 The 
Prefect was thus in effect inviting the soldier to pursue his rights by petitioning anew via the 
appropriate venue, namely when the conventus came to his area. Ptolemaios, however, responded 
by petitioning the archidikastēs, apparently citing his military service as the reason for wanting 
Alexandria as the venue (19-21). He also likely suggested in this petition that the Prefect‘s 
response was ambiguous, if we accept the restoration of the archidikastēs‘s subscription, which 
Ptolemaios received on Jan. 26, 217: [σ φής ἐστ   ἡ] τοῦ    προτάτου ἡ   ό ος ὑπο ρ φή 
(21: ―The subscription of the illustrious Prefect is clear.‖).386 While Ptolemaios might have been 
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 Cf. Taubenschlag 1955: 218-19 and citations to there to Kreller 1919. 
385
 Mitteis 1910: 97-99, cf. 1912: 37 and Foti Talamanca 1979: 218-25. Ptolemaios must have been in Alexandria 
the whole time, since (a) he was able to submit and receive a response to his second petition to the archidikastēs on 
the same day; and (b) in his first petition to the archidikastēs he requested a hearing in Alexandria because his 
military service prevented him from travelling to the Fayyum for trial. 
386
 The restoration, first suggested by Wilcken, is supported by the language in lines 21-22 and 26, which comes 





legitimately puzzled by the Prefect‘s order,387 there is little doubt that this response represented a 
flat-out denial of his specific request: there would be no hearing before the archidikastēs in 
Alexandria.
388
 Not a promising start, then, for Ptolemaios‘s suit.   
Undeterred, Ptolemaios proceeded to petition the archidikastēs yet again on Feb. 16, 217. 
This time he did not request a hearing, but rather that the archidikastēs authorize the serving of a 
copy of this, his third petition, on his brothers-in-law. To this the archidikastēs assented and so 
ordered the very same day (cf. the date of the petition in line 29 and the authorization in lines 7-
9). Two months later, on April 7, 217, Ptolemaios submitted through a local agent his request to 
the stratēgos for service of his authorized hypomnēma, and this is the document we have today, 
the body of which is taken up with the contents of the third petition, his second to the 
archidikastēs.  
One particular aspect of this hypomnēma stands out: Ptolemaios did not include copies of 
the first two petitions to the Prefect and archidikastēs respectively, but only their responses. 
This, in fact, is one of the reasons why it has been so difficult to determine what the Prefect 
might have meant by his response: there is no petition by which to measure it.
389
 It was, 
however, standard practice to include more or less intact all former documents in legal orders of 
this sort, as we see from countless examples. The point of creating such an embedded dossier 
was to demonstrate clearly what had been sanctioned by the authorities. Indeed, this explains 
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 Certainly other petitioners found this sort of response ambiguous or obscure: cf. P.Oxy. XLIII 3094.30-31 
(Oxyrhynchos, 217/218), in which a certain Gaia calls a similar direction   φί ωξος (see Foti Talamanca 1979: 
225-29). 
388
 Foti Talamanca 1979: 223. 
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why we have the third petition embedded in our present document: by virtue of the 
archidikastēs‘s response to the third petition, the hypomnēma and its contents now carried an 
official imprimatur. With respect to the first two petitions, however, we have every reason to 
believe that they were effectively denied, even if in on technical grounds (e.g., wrong forum or 
lack of jurisdiction) and in ambiguous language. Including the first two petitions, therefore, 
could only have served to highlight the fact that his specific requests had been rejected. There 
were thus good strategic grounds for selectively paraphrasing them instead.
390
 But if that is the 
case, why should Ptolemaios have included the subscriptions to these singularly unsuccessful 
petitions at all? Once disassociated from the precise context of the petitions, these responses, 
both from high officials, did not prima facie suggest a rejection of Ptolemaios‘s claims on 
official enforcement per se. Indeed, Ptolemaios attempted to make their very ambiguity work to 
his advantage by writing a hypomnēma re-presenting the responses in a more favorable context. 
He thus introduced the Prefect‘s rescript as an endorsement of his interpretation of the facts and 
legal argument in lines 12-18, while the archidikastēs‘s subscription establishes that the Prefect‘s 
order was in fact ―clear.‖391  
But what was ―clear‖? Ptolemaios (or his notary) suggested the following: 
        
ἵ ’ οὖ   ὴ 
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 This is not to say that the above document is the only one in which a previous petition is paraphrased rather than 
appended (see, e.g., BGU III 970 below), only that the choice of paraphrasing versus including was one that was 
likely in part driven by tactical concerns as much as custom or proper form. 
391
 One wonders why Ptolemaios includes the details he does about the second petition, as they do not seem to help 
him. Did he see the points set out in lines 19-21 as important in themselves and validated by the archidikastēs, or 
were they merely the least inconvenient elements of the contents of the second petition available to introduce the 





    ωσί  ᾖ,      το ς    [   ]    προσ  θο      [       ἐπ  ί ω  ]   ὶ  ξ ῵ συ τάξ      
 ράψ   τῶ τ ς ρ   ( ί ου)   ρί ος τοῦ ρσ  οίτου στρ( τ  ῶ) 
   τ  οῦ      το ς [το]ῦ   τοῦ ὑπο  ή [ τος   τί ρ φ]ο , ἵ ’    ῵σ  τ     
προ ί    · \ [ἂ] /  ὲ      ω ο ῵σ —ὑπ  τ῵σ  
24 πρὸς τὴ   πό οσ  , ὧ  [π]ροέχρ σ    ς τὴ  [ - ca. 14 -  ]ρ χ ῵    
τ τρ   σχ   ίω —τ ς ἡσυχί ς    ἄξο τ · 
     ὲ  ή,   τ  τὴ   οθ[  σά]   ο  ὑπὸ τοῦ   [ προτάτου ἡ   ό] ος  
ὑπο ρ φὴ ,   ’ ἧς   ὶ σ  \ ο /   ω  ς ὑπο ρ φ   [l. υπο ρ φ ς]  
ἐ ή ωσ [ς] 
 σ φ   ἶ   , χ[ρ] σο [  ό]     πρὸς   τοὺς     [               ἐπὶ σοῦ τοῦ ἱ ρ]έως   ὶ   
 ρχ   [ ] στοῦ ἢ ἐφ’ ὧ  { }ἂ   τέρω   έῃ     στ῵  
 ᾧ   χω     ίῳ·   ὶ χρὴ   τοὺς  ὴ ὑπ  [τήσ  τ ς πρὸς τὴ   ]πό οσ   
 φ  [έσ]θ   ἐπὶ τὴ  ἐσο έ     ο  πρὸς    τοὺς 
28   τάστ σ  ,  ρ [ο]υ έ ου [ ο]υ τῇ   τῇ    στο [ῇ,  ὴ ἐ  ττου έ ]ου  ου  
ἐ  οἷς ἄ  ο ς  χω     ίο[ ]ς   ὶ π ρὶ ὧ   ο    ίως ὀ[φ] ί   
    ἷς τ῵  προ  [ ρ]   έ ω   σ   π ά  ς ...392 
 
In order, then, that there may be no obscurity in the matter, if I approached them [i.e., the 
defendants]  ... I petition and ask that you [the archidikastēs] issue an order to write to the 
stratēgos of the Herakleides division of the Arsinoite nome for him to serve them [i.e., 
the defendants] with a copy of this memorandum, in order that they might know that 
which is set out above, (namely): [1a] if they should recognize their obligation, i.e., 
respond to the request for the 4000 drachmai I advanced to ..., that I will be appeased; but 
[1b] if they do not (recognize their obligation), that according to the subscription given to 
me by the illustrious Prefect, and also through the subscription you gave to me in which 
you declared that is was clear, I am to use against them ... before you the priest and 
archidikastēs or whatever other judges necessary, the right which I have; and [2] that 
they must come to the proceedings I will initiate against them. I am satisfied with this 
order, without prejudice to any other rights I have or to whatever the aforementioned 
Asklepeiades owes me personally ... 
 
 
The purpose of this hypomnēma is to add persuasive content to the Prefect‘s ―clear‖ instructions, 
ostensibly so that there may be no more ―obscurity.‖ Ptolemaios thus sketches out in his own 
terms what ―using his right‖ will mean in practice, an interpretation he then has certified by the 
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 I have re-punctuated this passage in an effort to make Wilcken‘s suggested reading clearer (see AfP 1 [1901], p. 
130n2; cf. Gradenwitz 1900: 32-46). Personally, I wonder whether it might not be preferable to read with 
Brinkmann     ω ο οῦτ ς for     ω ο ῵σ  in line 23, with the latter influenced by ὑπ  τ῵σ  (cf. Gradenwitz 
1900: 41n1). Cf. the participial use in P.Oxy. I 71.i (Ptolemais Euergetis, 303), P.Mil.Vogl. VI 264 above (pp. 182f.), 





archidikastēs and grandly elevated to the status of a diastolē, or an officially delivered order.393 
Indeed, this may be one reason Ptolemaios turned to the archidikastēs: his was the office through 
which creditors had diastolai or diastolika formally issued in all manner of debt proceedings.
394
 
Serving the notice in this way effectively presented the debtors with what appeared to be an 
officially sanctioned road-map as to how the rest of the dispute would, theoretically, play out: the 
brothers could either recognize their obligation (eugnōmonein) and respond to the request (note 
that, as above, it cannot simply mean ―to pay‖); or, if they persist in their agnōmosynē, they may 
run the risk of a trial. The first route is a settlement out of court, a return to the world of mutual 
respect and normative social relations governing contracting relationships; the second represents 
the necessary consequences of agnōmosynē, and with it the risk of putting the matter before a 
third party. Never mind that the one thing Ptolemaios has not been able to secure is precisely the 
hearing (  τάστ σ ς)395 he here threatens—he has discovered in these subscriptions what 
amounts to a blank check to be drawn on the authority of the Prefect, endorsed by the 
archidikastēs, and deposited by the stratēgos. This bluff takes us as close as one can go to the 
border of official enforcement without actually crossing it, this document being in essence no 
different than the letters of Anthestianos or Theogiton above, since Ptolemaios has yet to follow 
the Prefect‘s order by submiting a petition that either he or the archidikastēs will recognize. All 
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 In Meyer‘s formulation: ―jede Eingabe, in welcher um amtliche Zustellung des in Betracht kommenden 
Schriftstückes gebeten wird‖ (Jur. Pap. 47 note to line 36, p. 156). Cf.    το   ό  in Preisigke 1915. 
394
 A convenient summary in English of the procedure with references to recent literature is found in the introduction 
of P.Mich. XI 614 and now Yiftach-Firanko 2003: 253-54. For interpretations of the possible juristic reasons 
Ptolemaios might have applied to the archidikastēs, see Foti Talamanca 1979: 223-24 and n507. 
395
 A   τάστ σ ς is a legal proceeding at which each side presents its case (―kontradiktorische 





told, then, this ―order‖ is nothing more than a threat to go to the authorities written on imperial 
letterhead, and for his brothers-in-law one last chance to settle out of court as eugnōmones.396 
 We find a similar situation in BGU III 970 (=M.Chr. 242 [Arsinoite, 177]), another 
petition about business matters between in-laws. In this case, Tapetheus is complaining that in 
violation of imperial law her sister-in-law Helene is denying her rights as a dowered wife after 
the death of her husband to be ―first creditor‖ (prōtopraxia). From this petition we learn that 
when Tapetheus married Helene‘s brother Limnaios more than twenty years earlier in 151/152, 
she gave her dowry over to his control, but secured its return against some real property of his by 
an    ρ φος  σφ   ί  (13-19). Set out in this asphaleia, she claims, was the condition that she 
repay a loan of 100 drachmai to one of Limnaios‘s creditors out of the pledged property, should 
she should survive him. In the event, Limnaios died sometime around 173/174, and Tapetheus 
duly upheld her end of the bargain by repaying the loan. Helene, however, was Limnaios‘s heir 
and disputed Tapetheus‘s claim. The matter thus ended up before the authorities: 
 
ἐπ ὶ οὖ  οὗτος  
20  ὲ    τή   ξ  , ἐ[ ὼ]  ὲ  πέ ω   τ ς  ρ[ χ]  ς    τὸ    ὶ  σχο   ποχὴ .  
 ἐ   ί<ος>ω-  
σ    τ ς (l.   τὸ) τὸ    ο    ο  τοῦ    ρός  ου χ  ρ[ό ρ ]φο  τῶ    ( τ  )  
τοῦ  υρίου ἡ  ῵  Α το ράτορος  
Α ρ(  ίου)   τω  ί ου   ὶ   τέ ω   τῇ το του  [   ]φῇ   ὶ    ρο ό ῳ τῇ  
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 ―[L]‘approssimazione più plausibile che si possa fare è quella un‘intimazione stragiudiziale ad adempiere, 
particolarmente solenne, in quanto avallata dall‘ufficio del katalogeion‖ (Foti Talamanca 1979: 223-24). 
―Stragiudiziale‖ in one sense, to be sure, but I take this instance to be at least as revealing as to how litigants 
generally used the law and the litigation process. Indeed, it is quite amazing the extent to which Ptolemaios succeeds 
in dressing up his threat in the language and form of law, for he has, after a fashion, a legal document, and the 
previous rejection of the archidikastēs does not suggest that his office was in the habit of carelessly granting 
requests, i.e., this hypomnēma was apparently an ―order‖ he was willing to give, while he was unwilling to give 
Ptolemaios the bargaining chip of a hearing in Alexandria. It is also a good example of a use and strategy Connolly 





 προ   ρ   έ ῃ{ς} 
 έ [ου]σ · “ ἴ   ὲ  οὖ    τὴ    ο ο θως τ  ς ἡ   ο     ς   ὶ  
   το ρ τορ    ς    τάξ -  
24 σ       ω [ο]       ὶ ἢ  πο  τ στ σ ί  ο  τ  ὑπάρχο τ  ἢ τὸ  ρ  ρ ο   
  πο ῵   .” ἡ [ ]ὲ ἐτό - 
   σ     τ  ῵  ί  ο    τίρρ σ     ’ ἧς ἐ           τ    πρὸς τὴ    ί   ἐπ θυ ί  . 
 
When he [i.e., my husband Limnaios] died, then, I repaid the 100 drachmai and got a 
receipt. I published this, the stated cheirographon of my husband [i.e., the asphaleia], by 
dēmosiōsis in the 14th year of our lord Emperor Aurelius Antoninus [173/174] and I 
served it on his sister and heir, the aforementioned [i.e., Helene], saying: ―May it be that 
she, in accordance with the prefectural and imperial decrees, recognizes her obligation 
and either returns my property or repays me the money.‖ She, however, dared to serve me 
with an antirrhēsis though which ... for her personal desire.  
 
Tapetheus then begins to recount her actions with the praktōr xenikōn, the official in charge of 
praxis, before the papyrus regrettably breaks off.  
Having repaid her husband‘s loan, Tapetheus fulfilled the obligation set out in the 
document she had executed with her husband two decades before, and then immediately 
published the document, which she then had served on Helene. Note that as in so many other 
instances before the third century, eugnōmonein is used here in a wider and still personalized 
sense and does not mean simply ―to repay‖; in fact, Tapetheus helpfully spells out what being 
eugnōmōn in this case entails: returning the value of her dowry or letting her proceed with 
execution on the pledged property, i.e., honoring the obligation established by Limnaios‘s 
written agreement. Although Tapetheus does not put it as starkly as others have done, her 
presentation has the same rhetorical aim of painting herself as eugnōmōn in light of her having 
upheld the provisions of the asphaleia and Helene‘s agnōmōn in her disregard of it. The dispute, 
however, had already passed beyond the bounds of normative and second-party enforcement: 





response, or antirrhēsis. In Yiftach-Firanko‘s interpretation, Helene had likely already disposed 
of the specific property that formed the basis of the security agreement between Tapetheus and 
Limnaios, leaving Tapetheus with no other option but to proceed as a general creditor against her 
husband‘s estate, hence the importance of Tapetheus‘s claim to prōtopraxia.397 This is likely the 
correct interpretation, but why does Tapetheus assert two claims simultaneously, one contractual 
and the other statutory, and why does she use the language of norms?  
One key to the relationship between norms and law here is the role dēmosiōsis plays, or 
the official registration of private documents (―publication‖). Dēmosiōsis was voluntary and 
came at a cost. As such, it represented a clear moment of strategic choice for contract parties.
398
 
Generally, people certified private documents either in order to record new and valuable rights 
therein embodied or to strengthen their hand whenever they saw their privately recorded 
transactions in trouble. Thus, for instance, in P.Oxy. XII 1474 (Oxyrhynchos, 216) we find a 
creditor serving a notice of dēmosiōsis on a debtor who had taken out a seed-loan in December 
of 214 to be paid back six months later after the harvest in Epeiph of the same year (June-July, 
215). The creditor, however, waited until the following Mecheir, or the end of January 216, to 
register the cheirograph via dēmosiōsis as a preliminary step in initiating legal proceedings. We 
discover a similar situation in PSI XIII 1328 (Oxyrhynchos, 201). Here the creditor made a loan 
of two talents in Epeiph 194, with monthly interest payments beginning the next month (Mesore) 
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 Yiftach-Firanko 2003: 251-58. 
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and running until the following Mesore, or July-Aug. 195, when the principal was also due. The 
loan went into default and creditor‘s petition relates the sequence of his next steps: 
 
τ ς  ὲ  πο όσ ως  ὴ    ο υί ς ἐ   οσίω- 
σ  τὸ   [ ο ]   ο  χ  ρό ρ φο  ὑπο  ή  τ  τῶ   ( τ  ) Ἁθ ρ 
ὅπ ρ ὑπο<τέ>τ χ   τ[έ]ρῳ ὑπο  ή  τ  τῶ ἐ  στ῵τ   τ   Τῦβ , 
55 οὗ   ὶ   τί ρ( φο )   τ  όθ  τῶ  πο  ω    ῶ τῶ   ὶ Δ ο υσί- 
ῳ ἐ ωπίῳ   ’    ω ίου  ρχ     στ  ο ῦ ὑπ ρέτου   ο ο - 
θως τ  ς ο σ  ς ὑπὸ τὸ τ ς    οσ σ[ ω]ς ὑπο ρ φ  ς,   ὶ 
    ’ [οὕ]τ ως τ ς  πο όσ ως    ο υί  [ς, β]ο  ο    τὴ  πρᾶ- 
ξ      σ σθ   ... 
 
But since there had been no repayment, I published the stated cheirograph in a 
hypomnēma in Hathyr of Year 4 (Oct.-Nov. 195), which I appended to another 
hypomnēma in Tybi of this year (Dec. 199-Jan. 200), of which I also had a copy served 
personally to Apollonianos who (is) also (called) Dionysios [i.e., the debtor] through 
Ammonios the assistant to the archidikastēs, in accordance with the subscriptions on the 
(memorandum) of dēmosiōsis. And since there has thus [i.e., still] been no repayment, I 
wish to effect praxis ... 
 
The creditor in this case waited a full four months after the loan was due to publish the 
document, which he did for the explicit reason that there had been no repayment.
399
 He then 
waited a full four years before serving it. Perhaps the most fantastic such delay is P.Mich. XI 
614, in which we discover a debtor who waited over 30 years to register his cheirograph! A 
systematic study of the timing of dēmosiōsis might produce interesting results, but in the 
meantime it is clear that in this period extensive good faith efforts were often made to save the 
contract before proceeding even to the preliminaries of official enforcement.
400
 This effective 
―grace period‖ was no doubt in part the product of the cost of creating such a paper trail: there 
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 Cf. P.Oxy. XII 1474.23. 
400
 Sometimes, however, people proceeded with official enforcement prematurely in bad faith: see P.Oxy. XLIX 





was not only the registration fee associated with the dēmosiōsis itself, but the series of petitions 
to be written and delivered, the need for someone trustworthy to go to or be in Alexandria to 
submit the application, fees for the hypēretai who served the documents, etc. (cf. Demetrios‘s 
failure above in P.Mil.Vogl. I 25 to create a paper trail until the death of Geminos, pp. 183ff.).
401
 
Likely of equal weight, however, was the value of the business and personal relationships one 
would prefer to preserve, if possible, until they became too expensive.  
 To return to Taptheus and her sister-in-law: she published her husband‘s cheirograph 
(i.e., the engraphos asphaleia) because, by virtue of having paid her husband‘s debt, she had 
activated the conditional right set out in the document, and was thenceforth in the position of 
creditor vis-à-vis her husband‘s heir. There was, of course, little sense in publishing the 
document before this point: Tapetheus could very well have predeceased her husband, and so 
this would have been a case of being ―over-insured‖—needless enforcement protection, wasted 
money.
402
 Suggestive, however, is her immediate publication. As we have seen, there was often a 
significant lag when it came to dēmosiōsis, as creditors naturally hoped to extract payment 
without the cost, financial and personal, of official enforcement. Not so in this case: here we see 
a rush to fortify an inherently weak position by anticipating litigation and official enforcement.   
In addition to the immediate publication we also have the odd verbatim report of 
Tapetheus‘s wish for Helene to be eugnōmōn:  ἴ   ὲ  οὖ    τὴ    ο ο θως τ  ς ἡ   ο     ς 
  ὶ   το ρ τορ    ς    τάξ -   σ       ω [ο]       ὶ ἢ  πο  τ στ σ ί  ο  τ  
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 Cf. P.Oxy. XXXIV 2627 (Oxyrhynchos, II) and  III 533 (Oxyrhynchos, II-III). 
402
 More puzzling is why Limnaios‘s creditor (     στής) should have been content to wait until his death for 
repayment. The language does not suggest a legacy, but perhaps this was the manner in which the equivalent of a 





ὑπάρχο τ  ἢ τὸ  ρ  ρ ο     πο ῵   .403 Memoranda ordering payment (diastolika), as we 
saw above in the case of BGU II 614, were served either through the stratēgos‘s office, or 
occasionally by agents of the archidikastēs, who issued the order (e.g., PSI XIII 1328 above). 
We know this in large part because ancient petitioners took pains to be specific, including the 
manner in which their documents were served (in some cases we also have the subscriptions of 
the hypēretai themselves).404 There is no mention of the stratēgos or any hypēretēs here, but this 
is an unusual, not an unparalleled, omission: we can be sure that Tapetheus did not ―serve‖ the 
document herself.
405
 Instead, I take  έ [ου]σ  in line 23 to mean that Tapetheus is quoting 
either what she said to herself, or more likely a portion of her petition to the archidikastēs, which 
was served by some officer and to which Helene responded in her antirrhēsis. This quote does 
not merely resemble, but in fact has the same strategic function as the ultimatum Ptolemaios 
embedded in his diastolē to his brothers-in-law in BGU II 614. If, as Yiftach-Firanko suggests, 
the pledged property had been disposed in such a way as to keep Tapetheus from taking 
possession of it as per her asphaleia, and if we take her quote as reported accurately, then we 
should conclude that Tapetheus already knew the status of the property when she published her 
asphaleia. In other words, she published it even as she knew it to be a dead letter by virtue of 
Helene‘s actions. There is, after all, no reason why Tapetheus would not have had prior 
                                                 
403
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indications that getting her dowry back was going to be difficult even before her husband‘s 
death, for she had no doubt known Helene for years, if not for decades. Indeed, paying the 
prescribed debt, getting a receipt, and immediately registering the asphaleia after Limnaios‘s 
death suggests that Tapetheus was girding herself for bibliomachē.406 Like Ptolemaios, 
Tapetheus wanted to get ―out in front‖ of the case and establish an imposing legal position 
against Helene‘s formidable de facto position of ownership. She therefore fired all barrels at 
once, serving her sister-in-law with her published contractual claim while simultaneously 
insisting on her statutory claim to prōtopraxia. The confusion or simultaneity of claims is thus to 
be explained by the fact that Tapetheus knew Helene‘s gnōmē: Helene was not going to honor 
her obligation, and so Tapetheus wanted to overwhelm her with as many cogent legal claims as 




The appeal to eugnōmosynē here reflects the liminality of this particular point in the 
dispute. As noted, here the term is not restricted to repayment in the quasi-technical sense it 
acquired through this period, but encompasses the wider notions of honor and respect due certain 
obligations. The diastolikon Tapetheus issued was a last chance to get Helene to respect (a) her 
as her sister-in-law, (b) the wishes of her dead brother (as embodied in the asphaleia), (c) the 
legal document she had published, (d) the debt it recorded as paid and the property it recorded as 
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 On the confusion of some legal scholars as the nature of the legal claims, see Mitteis 1912: 272. Yiftach-
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time of marriage and prōtopraxia at issue at this point, but it does not explain the representation of the relationship 





owed, and (e) the authority of the Prefect and the rule of law—in short, almost every conceivable 
relationship constituting an obligation commanding respect. All these obligations could be met 
by following either the contract or the law, the choice was Helene‘s. If she did neither, then she 
was flagrantly agnōmōn, and the only recourse left to Tapetheus was to proceed via the 
authorities. Here, then, we are at the moment of no return, or so it is represented. Ptolemaios in 
BGU II 614 was anticipating or bluffing that this point had been reached; not so Tapetheus: this 
was the last chance for resolution before going forward with risky, costly, and unpleasant legal 
proceedings. As remarked above, agnōmosynē can, by definition, only be countered with the law, 
hence its appearance in petitions. Those who persist in it have ―forced‖ the petitioners to ―take 
refuge‖ in the law and the authorities, and the petitioners go to great lengths to demonstrate the 
extent to which they have attempted to resolve the matter on their own. Hence, the necessary 
counterpart to agnōmosynē: the ―boldness‖ and ―self-pleasing‖ attitude of those who prefer to go 
to law rather than to act as they should (cf. ἡ [ ]ὲ ἐτό -     σ     τ  ῵  ί  ο    τίρρ σ     ’ 
ἧς ἐ           τ    πρὸς τὴ    ί   ἐπ θυ ί  ). It is the progression from norms to law in 
enforcement and dispute resolution which we have seen in the last few documents that accounts 
for the overtly moral claims in ancient petitions about those who would use the law. Only the 
―bold‖ break their promises and pledges, betray trust, and defy the norms of respect and 






4.9 Positive Norms: Conclusion 
Before moving on the negative norms surrounding legal enforcement and litigation, we need to 
pause to sum up the preceding discussion, which has set out two positive norms of contracting in 
Graeco-Roman Egypt, namely trust and ―respect.‖ These norms are proper to contracting 
relationships as I have defined them (i.e., contracts as frameworks, not restricted to formalized, 
written contracts), and as such they constitute rules both prior to and coexistent with the laws of 
contracting. In other words, these norms help to determine both with whom and how one 
contracts before the decision is made to formalize the contract, as well as the behavior of parties 
during the life of the contract (i.e., in addition to whatever the parties understand to be their 
strictly legal rights and responsibilities).  
Trust was a personal quality of the contracting parties, but one based on experience rather 
than status. That is to say that while one was more likely to trust family, and while friends were 
by definition trusted people, one trusted them not because they were family and friends but 
because they had proven themselves worthy of trust. Indeed, the entire vocabulary of trust 
emphasizes this essentially empirical nature, showing it to be a quality based on constant and 
repeated testing: ancient trust was only as firm as the last demonstration of its existence. 
Moreover, in a world in which trust was a species of knowledge, actions necessarily mattered 
more than motivations. One could thus lose trust by failing to perform, regardless of reason or 
desire, for what this quality denoted above all was precisely the likelihood that a person would 
deliver. For similar reasons, one could not properly be said to ―trust‖ those one did not know; to 





There were, however, ways in which one could bridge trust gaps, and of these have seen 
a few examples in this chapter. Though such strategies need to be studied systematically, at this 
juncture it is fitting to note that most of them revolved around limiting exposure (including not 
engaging in a transaction, cf. Chapt. 2), putting up real security, or leaning on the pistis of an 
intermediary until trust could be established between the contracting parties themselves (e.g., PSI 
IV 377, pp. 148ff. above). Only the second strategy may be seen as replacing personal trust, and 
it remains an open question the extent to which people in Roman Egypt did in practice secure 
transactions on real security alone, absent any knowledge of the other party. The significance of 
real security in this context is that it suggests a willingness to rely on law and the state more than 
norms and personal relationships (unless we are to believe that only the powerful were able to 
extract security and enforce foreclosure). We will return to this theme and it implications for 
―impersonal contracting‖ (cf. Sec. 2.5) in Chapter 6. 
With respect to the law itself, it is true that pistis was a legally recognized standard in 
some of the legal transactions recorded in the papyri, akin to the standard of Roman fides, and 
furthermore that legal documents could be said themselves to have pistis (e.g., P.Oxy. I 70; see 
nError! Bookmark not defined.); yet it should not for those reasons be considered a component 
of law per se. Instead, when the law invokes or codifies trust, we should see it as relying on or 
incorporating a norm. Nor is this sort of interplay between norms and law surprising: as 
suggested above, in one light business law is nothing other than a state-sponsored device to 
bridge trust gaps, primarily by acting as a guarantee of fulfillment, with the result (if not the 





the first instance. This is, however, not the only way in which law or the state can—or did— act 
to widen the ambit of contract. 
Next, like trust, ―honoring‖ an obligation, or being eugnōmōn, also began as a personal 
quality. It properly and originally denoted one who had a ―right‖ relationship to another person, 
just as eusebia characterized a ―right‖ relationship with the divine. ―Right‖ in this context was 
articulated by a sense of duty or what one owed another person. The sources of obligation were 
manifold, ranging from familial or filial ―debts,‖ to those owed authority figures and, at the most 
rarefied, to those owed other people qua fellow humans. Promissory, contractual, and monetary 
obligations were initially all thus interpreted through this personal lens: to renege on a promise, 
to not honor a contract, to refuse to recognize a debt—these were all received as personal slights. 
Insofar, then, as eugnōmosynē was conceived of as a quality of character, revealed but not 
constituted by acts, it was different from pistis. Over time, however, the notion of eugnōmosynē 
became more abstract and objective: it was the obligation itself that increasingly (but never 
completely) became the object of respect as opposed to the person owed. Concomitant with this 
change was the rise of the use of the verb eugnōmonein to describe discrete acts of eugnōmosynē. 
By the late Roman period, the verb could—and often did—mean simply ―to repay,‖ without 
comment or reference to the regard in which the parties held each other (though, of course, it was 
always ―good‖ to repay what one owed). That said, well into the third century it is still found 
describing the act of honoring obligations of all sorts, including contracts. In other words, 
contractual obligations and parties with whom one entered into contractual relations were both 





Finally, the same factors that made trust and ―respect‖ so important to the decision to 
enter into contracting relationships also enabled them to play potentially significant roles in 
enforcing the terms of those relationships. Just as one contracted with those whom one trusted to 
perform, so one sought out those who had the right gnōmē with respect to their contracts and 
contracting partners. As we have seen, parties thus sought out reputational information about 
potential partners before entering contracts, and in one instance (P.Ross.Georg. III 1) we even 
find a party calibrating the level of contractual investment or reliance to the gnōmē of the 
potential partner. By the same token, once in a contractual relationship, we find ancient people 
threatening each other with reputational sanctions in the face of breach. We should not be quick 
to discount the effectiveness of such threats: losing one‘s reputation for pistis or becoming 
known for agnōmosynē was no trivial matter for anyone with an interest in future transactions—
after all, it was pistis and eugnōmosynē that controlled one‘s access to the world of contractual 
relations. After a manner of speaking, then, trust and the proper gnōmē (or one‘s reputation for 
each, if we side with Glaukon in Bk. 2 of Plato‘s Republic) acted as limiting reagents for 
complex transactions: contracting proceeded only as far as trust and respect for obligations ran, 
or could be extended to run by various devices, the law, or other institutions. 
Our petitions suggest that law took up where norms left off. Rhetorically, it is the 
repudiation of norms (agnōmosynē) that drives the petitioner to take refuge with the authorities. 
Rhetoric, however, is not reality. In reality, the controlling power of norms did not end abruptly 
at the boundary of the law. Indeed, this is apparent from the same petitions if we read them from 
the perspective of what the petitioners wanted from the state. From this perspective the state 





contracting. Thus, while it may have been the refusal of one party to act ―correctly‖ that 
―necessitated‖ a suit in a case of breach, the act of justice required of the state involved not the 
punishment of de jure illegal acts so much as the righting of moral wrongs. Of course, if one 
could also charge the breaching party with an actual ―crime,‖ so much the better, at least with 
respect to succeeding in getting the state involved. This was, for instance, Tapetheus‘s strategy 
(BGU III 970), who combined a statutory claim with her contractual claim in order to build the 
strongest, most imposing case she could against her sister-in-law: Helene had disregarded not 
only her brother‘s obligation, which she inherited, but the law as well. Far from constituting 
separate realms, norms and law, society and government, were related in a complicated and 
dynamic manner, and the authorities often understood and endorsed norms that kept contracts 
together and parties out of court.
408
 These are themes to which we will return in Chapter 6. 
The law and the state were every bit as much objects of the social imagination as any 
other human institution, loci around which and through which second-order values and norms 
developed. Breaking or litigating contract were therefore not merely legal acts, but ones 
interpreted and in part controlled by norms about how and when one should or should not breach 
a contract, and when one should or should not take the opposing party to court. Here we are 
dealing with Ellickson‘s ―controller-selecting‖ rules: why did people sometimes elect to proceed 
on the basis of norms and at other times on the basis of law? At what point and why did people 
seek third-party enforcement in Roman Egypt? As suggested above, one may see the traces of 
these norms and the calculus they forced adumbrated in the decision of the parties to formalize 
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their contracts in the first instance, since one important reason to do so was to facilitate access to 
official enforcement.
409
 The decision to press one‘s legal rights was, therefore, not one based 
purely on one‘s estimation of one‘s legal case, and to treat it as such is to misapprehend the 
possibilities, costs, and strategies of contract enforcement. A full understanding of the norms of 
contracting must embrace not only those norms that surrounded the establishment and 
maintenance of contracting relationships, but also those that informed their dissolution and 
litigation, and this in turn demands a study of the notion of ―breach.‖ 
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CHAPTER 5: BREACH AND THE MORALIZATION OF CONTRACT 
 
For the study of breach we will largely rely on a genre of document conspicuously missing in the 
preceding chapter: the contracts themselves. In this chapter, however, I am not particularly 
concerned with the legal effects of breach, but rather the language of breach, or the way in which 
it was conceived, how that conception changed over time, and what both can tell us about the 
kind of commitment a contract was. Although I will argue for a particular legal history with 
respect to the inscription of breach in papyrus contracts, most legal scholars will be surprised at 
the subject matter of the discussion: almost all of the words studied in this section have not been 
thought to have had a legal significance. Indeed, most scholars have dismissed the words we will 
investigate in this section as at best meaningless, and at worst ―superfluous,‖ ―mere fluff,‖ and 
―degenerate.‖410 And, seen from the light of the law, they would be correct. There was, for 
instance, in almost all cases was no legal distinction to be drawn between the primary words for 
breach, π ρ β ί     and π ρ συ  ρ φ   : both denote  ―breach.‖ Similarly, explicit 
prohibitions against practicing    οτ χ ί  (―fraud‖),     φ σβήτ σ ς (quarrelling, i.e., 
disputing the contract), or  ὑρ σ  ο ί  (―finding excuses‖) did not add anything legally to the 
contract: fraud was not permitted, regardless of how one drafted a contract; ―excuses‖ were not 
legal defenses; and no clause could legally bar the other party from disputing the terms of the 
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agreement. Yet these same words, if read in the light of wider cultural practice, will be shown to 
be socially and historically significant, revealing how ancient people thought about the contracts 
they wrote, the nature of the obligation embodied in them, and what it meant to break them. 
Finally, if we believe, as I have argued in Chapter 2, that contracts need to be read against the 
modalities and possibilities of enforcement, then the history in this chapter takes on a greater 
significance. For, in studying breach, we are in effect studying the negative of enforcement, and 
the history of breach will be shown to be one reflection of the evolutionary adaptation of written 
contracts to the enforcement regime.  
 Section 5.1 introduces the main verbs for breach, π ρ β ί     and π ρ συ  ρ φ   , 
and demonstrates that there was in Alexandria during the Augustan period a latent difference 
between them that could be actualized. This in turn suggests that they were not the simple 
synonyms most scholars have taken them for (e.g., Berger 1911). In fact, if one traces the history 
of their usage, one discovers that each exhibits a distinct chronological and generic distribution 
in the papyri. These distributions are the fossilized traces of the evolution of breach in both 
conception and drafting in Graeco-Roman Egypt, and by reading this record we can both explain 
the subtle differences we observe in usage and meaning between the two, as well as reconstruct 
something of the moral attitude towards breach.  
Section 5.2 returns to the prior history of both words in the literary and epigraphic 
sources of the classical and Hellenistic period. From the discussion of this evidence, we discover 
that although parabainein is used to mean ―breach of contract,‖ the association with private 
contract appears to be weaker than that with treaties, oaths, and public law. The fact that we have 





determined with regard to whether or not breach per se was inscribed in contracts with the verb 
parabainein, as opposed to specific injunctions or conditions that constituted breach (e.g., not 
repaying, not returning a ship at a certain time, etc.). We are on firmer ground with 
parasyngraphein. There is one literary attestation of the word in Dem. 56, Against 
Dionysodoros. I analyse this speech with respect to the rhetoric of breach, since it serves as a 
useful foil for trial transcripts from the Ptolemaic and Roman periods, and place 
parasyngraphein in the context of the speech as a whole. Parasyngraphein is shown to be an 
intransitive verb that expresses an attitude towards contractual obligation and one‘s contract 
partners. That is, one ―breaks a written contract‖ with respect to someone else, one does not 
―break‖ the contract itself, and as such is part of the rhetorical program of the speech, and not at 
all the technical legal word that it would come to be in Ptolemaic Egypt.  
 With Secs. 5.3-5.4 we return to Egypt and look at the first attestations of the words for 
―breach of contract.‖ The distribution is surprising. Parasyngraphein is revealed as the first, and 
for a long while, the only word for breach. It first appears in a petition from the last quarter of the 
third century BCE, and then progressively in contracts over the course of the second century. The 
evidence suggests that the inscription of breach per se begins in earnest sometime in the mid-
second century (in other words, after more than a century of written contracts), with the practice 
becoming wide-spread sometime in the final quarter. Parabainein, on the other hand, is attested 
only once to mean ―breach of contract‖ in the second century, but begins to supplant 
parasyngraphein as the regular word for breach over the course of the first, attaining a dominant 
position sometime around the time of the Roman conquest. Section 5.3 is dedicated to exploring 





ways, to describe either ―general breach‖ of any sort of contract or ―specific breach‖ in 
contractual quit-claims or cessions with disclaimers of right based on the Nichtangriffsklausel, a 
a declaration by a party that he or she will not sue over the rights waived in the document. 
 Sections 5.4-5.5 trace the development of these two strands of breach, the general and the 
specific. I argue that both uses can be seen in the Ptolemaic period, but collapse by the end of the 
first century BCE.  In the Ptolemaic period, the specific meaning of parasyngraphein in 
conjunction with a creative use of the Nichtangriffsklausel produced a certain sort of consensual 
contract, in which the transaction was the syngraphē itself. I discuss these contracts, which I call 
―transactional agreements,‖ in Sec. 5.4.2. By the turn of the millenium, however, 
parasyngraphein had effectively merged in meaning with parabainein, and was being 
progressively supplanted by it, with both denoting general breach. The Roman attestations of 
parasyngraphein are stereotyped and narrowly circumscribed in a particular set of transactions, 
frozen in a few formularies for cession and sale, retaining nothing but a conventional association 
with the Nichtangriff language. Parabainein thus continued the tradition of general breach, while 
the pattern of parasyngraphein in the Roman period traces the weakening momentum of the 
Ptolemaic tradition of specific breach.  
 Section 5.6 briefly discusses the pattern of parabainein in Roman contracts before 
concentrating on the use of parabainein before it was used to mean ―breach of contract.‖ In the 
early Ptolemaic period it was associated with public law and oath and promise, and I suggest that 
its ―transgressive‖ meaning or connotation was still present in its subsequent life in contracts. 
Sec. 5.7 argues that the shift from ―breach‖ (parasyngraphein) to ―transgression‖ (parabainein) 





―moralization of contract.‖ I thus connect this change in the language of breach to the appearance 
of other legally irrelevant, but morally significant contract vocabulary, which I adduced at the 
beginning of the chapter. Many of these words, like kakotechnia, have a long history in oaths 
that had often attended or covered contracts and treaties. Others without this specific history 
nonetheless share with kakotechnia a concern for the foundational commitment to contract, or 
the core morality of contract ―to abide,‖ and began to appear in the texts of contracts at about the 
same time. Intriguingly, this moralization of the text of contracts coincides with what appears to 
be a decreased use of juristic oaths. This and other formal changes in contracts over the 
Ptolemaic and early Roman period together suggest a displacement of the functionality and 





5.1 The Vocabulary of Breach 
There are two principal words for ―breach of contract‖ in the papyri, π ρ β ί     and 
π ρ συ  ρ φ   , the former being the most common in the Roman period.411 Both verbs 
appear in petitions concerning contracts and in the contracts themselves, where they usually form 
part of the protasis of a penalty clause (e.g., ―if X breaches, X will pay the following penalty‖).  
Before we proceed, however, there is one word that has been taken—wrongly—to signify 
breach of contract, π ρ χ  ρο ρ φ   . Paracheirographein is derived from the complex 
χ  ρο ρ φ   /χ  ρο ρ φί , and exists as a purely technical legal term in Roman-period 
papyri, without a single attestation in literary or epigraphic sources.
412
 Cheirographein signifies 
the drafting of a χ  ρο ρ φί , or affidavit, of which we have numerous attestations and 
examples spanning the third century BCE to the third century CE, often containing a written 
version of the royal or imperial oath. These affidavits, and the oaths which they contained or 
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 Cf. Berger 1911: 1-4. There are other words for ―breach‖ in Greek that do not appear in contracts. We have 
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236.17 [treaty with Philip, 338/337 BCE]). Like 
parabainein, π        ν can mean ―to transgress‖ with respect to the law (e.g., Din. 1.62, P.Oxy. VIII 1119; 
XXXIV 2705), though it is never used of breach of contract. The meaning originally was to play a false note 
―outside‖ the melody (see Chantraine 1968-80 and LSJ, s.v., and note that its opposite is ἐ    ής, cf. emmenein). 
Though there are attestations of this and other legal uses of plēmmelein and its cognates from the classical through 
the Byxzantine period, it seems to become more popular in the third century, the date of the two Oxyrhynchite 
papyri above. Chantraine notes (loc cit.) its continued life in modern Greek, esp. π        ο ί   ο  for ―tribunal 
correctionnel.‖ 
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 BGU V 1210 (Theadelphia, post 149), P.Mich. IV.224 (Karanis, post 173), P.Oxy. XVII 2112 (Arsinoite, late II), 
P.Fay. 42a (Theadelphia, late II-early III), and most recently O.Narm. 112 (Narmuthis, late II-early III). For a 
history of the word, see Palmer 1946: 75, 129 (he cites an attestation of paracheirographia from the first century, 
but this would seem to be an error). The fact that all attestations appear in documents from the Arsinoite is likely 
insignificant: the rules of the Gnomon (BGU V 1210)  applied to all of Egypt unless otherwise stated (e.g., §100), 





recorded, safeguarded a wide variety of declarations and promises, primarily those relating to 
taxation and other administrative or fiscal activities, but also those related to purely private 
matters.
413
 Significantly, the verb never means to draft a χ  ρό ρ φο , a nominally autographic 
contract, nor is a cheirographon ever called a cheirographia, or vice versa in this period.
414
 
Paracheirographein, a relative late-comer to legal vocabulary, thus naturally meant ―to submit a 




This otherwise straightforward picture is complicated by §§98-99 of the so-called 
―Gnomon of the Idios Logos‖ (BGU V 1210.218-20), a second-century copy of a loosely 
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Preisigke 1915, s.vv. χ  ρο ρ φέω and χ  ρο ρ φί ; Wörterbuch, s.vv.; Mayser 1970: III.1, 131; Palmer 1946: 
75, 127; cf. Seidl 1933: 132-34. In P.Mich. II 123 verso, col. iv loans are attested as     ο      , which the editors 
assume to be cheirographiai, but intrepret as ―contracts of loan.‖ The fact that repayment is promised ―under oath‖ 
( πό οσ ς   τ  ρ οῦ), however, suggests that we have here are promises to pay under oath, and not contracts (note 
also that these loans were not in the register (cf. p9), and see Sec. 5.6.2, esp. pp. 343ff.). There is little epigraphic 
evidence for either cheirographein or cheirographia. In Egypt, its meaning is the same as in the papyri, see, e.g., 
White and Oliver, Hibis 1 (the ―Edict of Capito‖ = OGIS 665, but without the readings of White and Oliver) and SB 
XVIII 13315. What evidence there is outside of Egypt does not suggest a connection to cheirographa (which are 
attested epigraphically). E.g., in ID III 1403 Bb col. 2.31 and 1442 A.82, second-cent. BCE temple inventories from 
Delos, the word describes a feature of a pinax, where I presume it refers to a vow made in the name of the deity, if 
we are to extrapolate from its use in Egypt. Lampe‘s article on χ  ρο ρ φέω suggests some slippage between 
cheirographiai and cheirographa in late antique and Byzantine patristic sources (1961, s.v.). If so, it is striking that  
more than 70 years after Seidl‘s monograph on the oath there are still no documentary examples prior to the middle 
of the third century in which we find evidence of this phenomenon. Moreover, late examples suggest to me that this 
―slippage‖ occurred because of a change in contract practice, and are not the product of simple linguistic confusion. 
P.Cair.Goodspeed 14 (Hermopolis, 343), for example, is a copy of a contract, which is indeed called a 
cheirographia; but it is also a contract secured by an oath to the Christian god. Compare other later documents that 
combine elements of affidavit and contract: P.Lips. I 57 (Hermopolis, 261), P.Oxy. XXII 2347 (Pela, 362; no doubt 
an example of what was to be sworn by a sailor in P.Oxy. IX 1223.15-16 [Oxyrhynchite, ca. 370], pace the 
interpretation of Woytek 1996: 240), P.Flor. I 43 (Hermopolis, 370), P.Lips. I 52 (Thebes, 372), and perhaps PSI 
Congr. XX 16.2-3 (Oxyrhynchos?, ca. 330?). There is no need to expand χ  on the verso of SB XXII 15286, a loan 
from the Arsinoite dated to 362, to χ (ρο ρ φί ) instead of χ (ρό ρ φο ), cf. the verso of P.Nag.Hamm. 63 
(Diospolis parva, 341). Cf. the discussion of Seidl 1933: 130-34; Berger 1911: 46; and Wolff 1978: 107n3 and 123. 
415





organized epitome of rules for use in the office of the Idios Logos, a bureau charged with a 
variety of fiscal and judicial functions.
416
 These provisions have long been connected with 
penalty clauses in papyrus contracts that contain the so-called Fiskalmult, or the penalty to be 
paid to the state in the event of breach (see P.Köln III 147 below for an example).
417
 The 
mistaken idea that cheirographein could refer to the drafting of cheirographa, and the 
putative connection of the Fiskalmult with the above-cited sections of the Gnomon, have 
resulted in a lingering misperception that paracheirographein means ―to breach a contract‖ 
(see, e.g., O.Narm. 112, published in 1993).
418
 But as even Meyer admitted, and Seidl found 
decisive, such a meaning is impossible for the second century, the period in which we find all 
five instances of the word. The question of the Fiskalmult and its relationship to the Gnomon 
touches directly on the role of the Roman state in contracting, since it was a device by which 
parties could harness the enforcement power of the state in defense of private obligations. 
Similarly, the relationship of oaths to contracts is an important topic, not only because oaths 
occupy something of the same ethical and normative (and linguistic) ambit as contracts 
insofar as they relate to the notion of obligation, but also because they had the power to turn 
private facts into public facts, as the oaths sworn were customarily made in the name of the 
King or Emperor. We will return to oaths in Secs. 5.6-7, but the relationship between the 
                                                 
416
 See Swarney 1970. 
417
 Uxkull-Gyllenband 1934: 99-101, cf. Meyer‘s comments in Jur.Pap., p. 340; rejected by Seidl 1933: 123-27. On 
the Fiskalmult, see Mitteis 1891: 523-36; Berger 1911; Schwartz 1920: 179-84; and Pierce 1972: 159-78. 
418
 This problem no doubt persists in part because Kiessling only revised Preisigke‘s Wörterbuch though ἐπ  όπτω, 
leaving the Wörterbuch with the wrong definition, ―Verstoss gegen die Abmachung‖ (citing the Gnomon), which 





Fiskalmult, oaths, and paracheirographia will have to await a separate study. In the 
meantime, however, we may state with confidence that this word did not mean ―breach of 
contract,‖ and so we may put it to the side and concentrate on parabainein and 
parasyngraphein. 
Parabainein means to ―step over‖ something, directly cognate with the English 
―transgress.‖ Used of contracts since classical times,419 it typically takes a direct object, usually a 
contractual provision or term, though it may also be used absolutely (see, e.g., the Herakleopolite 
documents in CPR I). Not infrequently the participle is used to denote the party in breach, thus 
designated   π ρ βάς or   π ρ β ί ω . Just as the breaching party ―oversteps‖ the 
boundaries established by the document, so the party abiding by the terms of the contract is said 
to ἐ  έ    , or to ―stay within‖ its bounds.420 Of course, parabainein was not restricted to 
contracts or even legal contexts, but was a word capable of expressing all manner of 
―transgressions,‖ physical and metaphorical, moral and religious.421 
Parasyngraphein was, like paracheirographein, a technical term, but one derived 
directly from the language of contracting, meaning to do anything ―against‖ or ―outside‖ a 
συ  ρ φή, in accord with the general metaphor of transgressing the boundaries of a 
contract.
422
 While in the Roman period this verb is used synonymously for parabainein, it 
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 E.g., Dem. 34.33; 35.21; 40.11; 48.46, 50; 56.10, 44, 48. The last speech also contains our sole literary attestation 
of parasyngraphein (see n422). Cf. Table 5.2 below. 
420
 This party may also be designated by the participle, i.e.,   ἐ  έ ω  (e.g., P.Mil.Vogl. I 23.19-21 [Tebtynis, 108]). 
421
 See LSJ and Preisigke, Wörterbuch, s.v. π ρ β ί ω, and Secs. 5.6-5.7 below. 
422
 Pollux 8.140: τὸ  ξω τ  πο  σ   τ῵  ἐ  τῇ συ  ρ φῇ συ β θέ τω , citing Dem. 56.28, 34, our only literary 





appears to take on a specific meaning in a handful of documents from early Roman 
Alexandria that contain two penalty clauses, the first set off by parabainein and the second by 
parasyngraphein.
423
 One such document is BGU IV 1120, an Alexandrian synchōrēsis dated 
to 5 BCE.
424
 This contract records the leasing of three tomb-gardens (kēpotaphiai) by a certain 
Diodorus to Hermias and his family for a five-year period. Bundled into this lease is a starter-
loan of 200 drachmai. The lease specifies: a rent schedule in both money and produce (lines 
8-19, cf. 38-40); alternative payment plans for the loan, seemingly within the discretion of the 
lessees (19-25); and the responsibilities of the lessees, namely to deliver the produce to a 
certain location (38-40) and to keep the garden and its physical plant in good working 
condition (29-34). In return, the lessees receive the aforementioned ―interest-free‖ (atokos) 
loan ―for the planting and care of the kēpotaphiai‖ (20) and ―the possession of existing and 
future crops during the period of the lease,‖ from which they ―shall retain the profits, paying 
                                                                                                                                                             
the contract carried a provision against breach:  ὴ ... ἄ  ο τ  π ρ  τὴ  συ  ρ φὴ  πο ήσῃς, cf. Sardis VII 1.ii.4 
(ca. 200 BCE): ἐ    ὲ  ὴ β β  σω    ἢ π ρ  τὴ  συ  ρ φὴ  π ρ β ί ω    τὴ     ρ   έ    ἐπὶ [the 
various provisions)]; and BGU VIII 1844.24-25 (Herakleopolite, 50-49 BCE):  ξ οῦ    ἐ   φ ί  τ     σ υ  τ ά ξ   
 ράψ     ράστω  φρουρά ρ [χ]ω  τ ὸ    ἐ    ο    ο< >   τ στ σ   ἐπὶ σέ, ὅπως ἐπ -        σ[θ]ῇ 
 πο  τ στ σ   ἡ    ἐ  π  ίο   [τὸ] | [π] ρ  τὴ  συ  ρ φὴ  β β  φορ  [έ] ο   έρος  τ . The verb is 
formally derived from συ  ράφ    (Mayser 1970: I.3, 138; Palmer 1946: 128; cf. paracheirographein, n414 
above), and can mean doing something outside or contrary to a syngraphē, as above, or be opposed to 
syngraphesthai, as often in Dem. 56. On this speech, see Sec. 5.2. 
423
 Cf. BGU IV 1116, 1117, 1119, 1120-22; P.Köln III 147 (all leases datable to the reign of Augustus and from 
Alexandria). Contrast to CPR I 2, 11, 6, 64, 89, 103, 123, 124, 130, 133, 141-44, 146, 148, 153, 203, 220; VI 73, 
P.Neph. 29; PSI XV 1546; SB XIV 11703, SPP XX 47, all third-century documents from the Herakleopolite nome 
which contain both verbs, but with no difference in meaning. On these latter documents, see pp. 310ff. in general, cf. 
App. III. 
424





the rental and the produce reserved‖ for the lessor (27-29).425 For his part Diodorus guarantees 
the lease for the duration of the term and assumes some responsibility for the irrigation of the 
gardens, or he will be liable to a penalty (46-50). The lessees are not allowed to terminate the 
contract early, and the contract gives detailed instructions for what is owed at the end of the 
term (37-38, cf. 21-27).  
At the end of the contract come the following penalty clauses: 
 
40 … ἐ]     έ τ  π ρ β[ ί]  ω σ  , ἐ τί      το ὺ ς ὃ ἐ   ἐ οφ   ής[ωσ ] τ ῵   
[φόρ]ω  [ τ   ὲ] 
τ ς τ ς χρήσ ως  ρ υρίου  ρ χ  ς     οσί ς τό ους    ράχ ους τ ς   ᾶς  
  [ τ      ] 
  ὶ τ  β άβ    ὶ   π  ή  τ    ὶ ἄ   ς  ρ υρίου  ρ χ  ς τ ρ   οσί ς,  
    ο έ  ς [τ ς] πρά ξ ως 
   τ  τ῵  τρ ῵           ω    ς   τ  σ     ὶ ἐξ   ὸς οὗ ἐ   [  ]τ ῵   
 ἱρ τ     ὶ ἐ  τ῵  ὑπ ρχό τω    το  ς π ά  τ ω    θάπ( ρ) 
44 ἐ   ί  ς,   ὶ  ὴ ἐπ φέ ρ    πίστ  ς [ἢ  ]  ρους  ἶ   , ἐξουσί ς ο σ ς τῶ  
   Δ ο  ρῳ, ἐ      τ    π ρ - 
 συ  ράψ ω σ   , ἐ βά        τοὺς ἐ  τ ς   σθ σ ως ἐ τὸς <τοῦ> χρό ου  
    ὶ  τέρο ς   τ   σθοῦ    ὶ πράσσ    τὸ ἐσό (  ο ) 
  φ  [ρ]  [  π] ρ  τὴ      ίσ[θω]σ  , πο ο  τω   ὲ   τ῵  ἕ  στ   
  ο ο θω ς   ὶ τὸ  Δ ό ωρο  β β  - 
 [οῦ    το ς τὴ ]  ί[σθωσ   ἐπὶ τὸ]  χρό ο    ὶ τὴ    τ ί   ἐ [   ]ρ    ὶ τὸ  
ὕ  ω ρ [       ]                     [τὴ ] 
48 ἐ  τῇ   τ ί  π  ὴ , τοὺς   ὲ     σθω έ ους χωρὶς πά τω  τ῵   
προ    έ ω   [ ] ό      τ       
 ἕ  στο  τὸ ἐπ  βά  ο               [       ]    ο υ    τ      σθω [ έ     ὶ    ὲ  τὸ   
   Δ ό ]ωρο  π  ρ    π έ σ θ   
 τ῵   π        π ρο    έ ω  [ἢ]   οχο   ἶ    τῶ ἴσῳ ἐπ τί ω , τ   ὲ   ίψ     
τ῵     τ    [     ]ω    ρπίω  
51a  τ  ὄ τ  ἐ τὸς    ῵( ) [           ]   σ   [     ]         ο υ θ           τ ου [  Δ ό] ωρο ς  
  ρο[ς        ]       χρό (ο ) συ ή   χ   
51 〚τοῦ ἐ  στ῵τος              〛         ὶ τ ῵  ἐω   έ ω        [     ] τοῦ Δ ο  ρου  
                                                 
425
 In this situation the interest was likely bundled into the loan, rather than the loan being truly interest free, as 
suggested by the ―penalty‖ of having to pay interest in the event of breach, lines 40-41, cf. Pestman 1971. The 





   〚   θ’ ἣ    χ   συ χ ρ σ  〛, ἐ   [ ὲ] 
52 οἱ     σθω έ ο  [ἐ ]β ί ωσ   \  τ  τ(ὸ ) χρό( ο )/ τ ς   σθ σ ως,       ἡ  
τ῵  \  ( ) /    ρπ῵  συ ά   ξ ς ἕως τοῦ 
 Μ χ ὶρ    ὸς τοῦ ἐσχάτου  τους οἷς ἐ   οἱ     σθω έ ο  συ    άξωσ . 
 
If [the lessees] transgress anything, they shall pay up whatever rent they owe and the 
loan of 200 silver dr. with interest at 2 dr. per mina per month. They shall also 
reimburse for damages and expenses and pay a penalty of 300 silver dr., and Diodoros 
shall have the right of exaction from all three as mutual sureties or from any one of 
them he chooses or from their properties as if by legal judgment; nor shall they plead 
pacts, and any pact shall be invalidated. Diodoros shall have the right, if they breach 
with respect to any (of these terms), to eject them from the lease within the term, to 
transfer the lease to others, and to exact from them any loss in so doing. But it they do 
all things accordingly (i.e., per the contract), Diodoros on his part shall guarantee their 
lease for the term and the irrigating ... and the water ... the cistern. The lessees shall 
pay each month, apart from all the items above mentioned, the imposed ... and give the 
leaseholds, and Diodoros shall omit nothing of the above mentioned ...  or he shall be 
liable to an equal penalty. Whatever waste material there is in the garden stuffs 
between months ... shall belong in part to Diodoros ... If the lessees give up the lease at 
the end of the term, the right of disposition of the crops shall remain until the month of 
Mecheir of the last year to whomsoever the lessees may contract. 
 
There are, as we see, two penalty clauses here, one governed by parabainein, the other by 
parasyngraphein, with the penalties of the former distinguished from the latter. The first 
clause considers damages arising from failing to comply with particular terms of the lease; the 
second establishes the lessor‘s damages from the perspective of the lease as a whole, 
specifically in the event that Diodoros needs to find another tenant. The parabainein-clause 
thus defines a breach that could in theory leave the contract intact. For example, the late 
payment of a month‘s rent could be seen as a ―transgression‖ triggering the specific penalties 





300 dr. penalty), without necessarily resulting in the termination of the lease itself.
426
 The 
parasyngraphein-clause, on the other hand, envisions a breach that gives the lessor the right to 
terminate the contract unilaterally (though note the lessor‘s guarantee in line 47), while 
reserving the right to demand that Hermias and his family cover any shortfall incurred by a 
new lease. An obvious problem is that it is left open what constitutes a parabasis versus an act 
of parasyngraphē (the object of both verbs is ―any (term)‖: τ  and    τ   , respectively), and 
how such a determination is to be made.
427
 That said, the result of the combination of the two 
clauses is clear, i.e., the creation of a virtual saving clause in the space between ―breach‖ and 
―material breach.‖428 In other words, the drafter used the more specific verb parasyngraphein 
in order to establish a class of act that could be determined as undermining the contract as a 
whole (what we would today call ―material breach‖), thereby giving the lessor the right to see 
the entire contract as abrogated, as opposed to mere ―transgressions‖ which violated certain 
terms, but did not therefore necessarily entail the cancellation of the contract.
429
   
                                                 
426
 Cf. the specificity of the parabainein-clause in a similar lease: BGU IV 1119.32-33 (Alexandria, 6/5 BCE): ἢ   θʼ 
ὃ ἐ     π ρ β ί ῃ, which follows a list of specific actions constituting breach. 
427
 See Secs. 5.2-5.3 on the transitivity of parasyngraphein. The first reliably dated occurrence of π ράβ σ ς or 
π ρ β σί  to denote the abstract idea of ―breach of contract‖ appears in the fifth century (P.Flor. III 313 
[Hermopolite, 449]). See Preisigke, Wörterbuch, s.v. cf. π ρ βάτ ς. Π ρ συ  ρ φή is attested only in Pollux 
(see n422).  
428
 We should count the ambiguity of the double breach-clause as working in the favor of the lessor, since the 
language suggests that he could exercise both clauses cumulatively (i.e., the same act could trigger both clauses). It 
is also worth noting that the right to recover the shortfall from re-leasing is in fact simply that of imposing another 
penalty: one would guess that the first penalty clause would almost certainly cover any shortfall (cf. Berger 1911: 
158-59). Compare, however, BGU IV 1121, a lease with a double breach clause and an express saving clause that 
would seem to work in the lessee‘s favor, i.e., should the lessor breach by disturbing or breaking the lease, the 
landlord will not only pay a penalty, but remain liable for the lease.  
429





To this document we may compare P.Köln III 147, another Alexandrian document 
(though not a synchōrēsis) datable to the same period as the documents from Abusir el-Melek 
in BGU IV. P.Köln III 147 appears to be a homologia for a long-term lease or lease-sale of a 
ship.
430
 The document is fragmentary, with only the end surviving: 
 
τὴ  συ ά   ξ   ἐ τὸς τοῦ χρό ου . [ . ] . . [ . . ] . [ca. 23 letters] 
4 σὺ  τοὶς σ    σ  ἐπ ὶ τω     τ[ ] ’Α  [ξ]   ρ [ί   ὅρ ω ]          ὶ   τ - 
 β β    έ   π ὴ  τρ β ς   ὶ σ{ }ήψ ως, π ὴ  ἐ    ή τ  βί  ο  ἐ  θ οῦ 
  [έ]  [τ]     τ  χ  ῵   ἢ πυρὸς  πὸ   ς πάθῃ το  π  ο   ο  ἢ ὑπὸ πο   ίω  
 ἢ  ῃστ῵  π ρ σπ σθῇ ὃ   ὶ συ φ     ς   τ στ   σ ω . ἐ    έ τ  το τω  
8 π ρ β ί ω, ἐ τ ίσω σο  τά τ  β άβ    ὶ ὃ ἐ   ὀφ  ήσω πρὸς τ  τ῵  
     ω   έρ  σὺ  ἡ  ο ί     ὶ ἄ   ς \ ὡς / ἴ  ο  χρέος  ρ υρίου  ρ χ  ς  
   π  τ  οσί [ς] 
  ὶ ἱ ρ ς Κ ίσ ρ   ρ χ  ς     οσί ς χωρὶς τοῦ  έ       ρ   τ   
   προ   ρ  ( έ  ), 
 τ ς πράξ ως σο  ο σ ς    τ  ἐ οῦ   ὶ ἐ  τ῵  ὑπ ρχό τω   ο  πά τω  
12   θάπ ρ ἐ   ί  ς    ρω  ο σ῵  ὧ  ἐ   ἐπ  έ  ω  πίστ ω  π σ῵  
   ὶ πάσ ς σ έπ ς. ἐ    έ τ  π ρ συ  ρ φ῵, ἐξέστω σο  ἐ βά  ο τά    
 ἐ  τ ς   σθ σ ως ἐ χρό ου ο σ ς  τέρῳ   τ   σθ῵σ     ὶ   σ- 
πράσσ    τὸ ἐσό   ο   φ  ρ    π ρ  τὴ  ἐξ    ίσθωσ   
16 υ  π   ρ ὧ    ὶ ἐ  ἡ έρ  ς χρ    τ  ζο σ  ς πέ τ   φ’ ἧς ἐά   ο  προ- 
 [ ίπῃς ca. 18 letters ] τ     σφ[ά ]       υπ ρθέτως. 
  
... the right created by contract (synallaxis) within the period ... [the ship] with its 
equipment to the harbors in Alexandria in no way damaged except for wear and tear, 
unless anything violent should come about from the god in a storm or the ship suffer 
from fire on land or be hijacked by enemies or pirates, which (circumstances) I will 
undertake to make clear (i.e., if any of these eventualities come to pass). But if I 
transgress any of these (provisions), I will pay you both the damages and whatever I 
owe for the share of the freight charges with hēmiolia and another 500 drachmai as a 
private debt and another 200 drachmai sacred to Caesar, without prejudice to the 
aforewritten terms, which remain valid; (and) you have the right of praxis both from 
me and all of my belongings as if by legal decision, with all such defenses as I may 
bring forward, as well as all protection, being invalid. But if I breach in any way, it 
will be in your power to expel me from the lease within its term, assign the lease to 
another, and collect the ensuing shortfall from the new lease, concerning which [I will 
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funish you] a security without delay within five business days from the time you make 
it known to me. 
 
Here we see the same technique of drafting a virtual saving clause: transgression exposes the 
lessee to liability for penalties, but does not ipso facto rise to material breach and cancellation 
of the contract, an event for which separate sanctions are prescribed. The same problem of 
interpretation remains as above (i.e., what constitutes parabasis versus parasyngraphē), but 
this was likely intentional: the point of this virtual saving clause was not to protect the lessee 
from losing the contract on the basis of a non-material breach, but to state explicitly that 
breach (parabainein) did not automatically release the lessee from the contract; and if he was 
released for material breach (parasyngraphein), that he was still responsible for the lease as a 
whole until the lessor covered with a new lessee.
431
  
From these documents we may conclude that parasyngraphein could, if necessary, 
denote breach of contract per se or in toto, as opposed to merely the breach of specific terms.  
The word syngraphē only came to mean ―contract‖ as such in Egypt in the Byzantine period; 
in the Ptolemaic and imperial periods it almost always referred to written contracts issued by 
                                                 
431
 This differentiated use of parabainein and parasyngraphein appears in several Alexandrian synchōrēsis leases 
(App. III, nos. 24, 26, 29-32; no. 27 is technically a labor contract, but for work in a vineyard, and it has therefore 
been assimilated to a lease). One can also distinguish a change in template in these documents: those from around 13 
BCE (nos. 24-28) tend to use the participle, while those from 6-3 BCE (nos. 29-32) conjugate the verb in a separate 
penalty clause as above, with the exception of no. 31, which uniquely uses the verb in a genitive absolute. The form 
of P.Köln III 147 may therefore point to its being closer to the turn of the millennium than to the beginning of 
Roman rule. Finally, to these synchōrēsis, one should also compare the very different double penalty clauses in 
P.Oxy. XVII 2134 (Oxyrhynchos, ca. 170), a petition to serve notice of intent to foreclose. Embedded in the petition 
is the original contract, in which parasyngraphein governs a second penalty clause calling for a penalty for ―any sort 
of breach‖ (ἐ    έ τ  το τω  π ρ συ  ρ φ῵, 26-28), while the first breach clause secures the right of 
foreclosure in the face of delinquency (ἐ    ὲ  ὴ [ πο] ῵   θ’ ἃ  έ[ ρ] πτ  , 21-26). Unlike the aforementioned 
Alexandrian synchōrēseis, parasyngraphein is not here being set against parabainein, and ―material breach‖ is 
clearly covered by the first penalty clause. That said, it is perhaps significant that the second clause is being used as 





the agoranomos or grapheion.
432
 Wolff reasonably suggested that this state of affairs was an 
artifact of Ptolemaic legal history: the syngraphē, the oldest contractual form in the Greek 
world,
433
 had come to be so firmly identified with official drafting and its products over the 
course of early Ptolemaic period in Egypt that the term did not expand to embrace 
cheirographa and other newer contractual forms until quite late.
434
 Yet, by the Roman period 
parasyngraphein was used to describe an act of breach in all parts of Egypt without regard to 
contractual form or public or private status, so long as the form routinely made provisions for 
breach, e.g., in synchōrēseis, syngraphai, and cheirographa.435 While the concept of the 
syngraphē thus retained something of its aboriginal specificity in Roman Egypt as a contract 
type and not a word for contract as such, the same was not apparently true of the idea of 
breach, which developed from its etymological basis.  
The fact that Alexandrian scribes could apparently activate or realize a latent 
difference between parabainein and parasyngraphein in the early Roman period suggests that 
they were not originally synonyms. This hypothesis will be borne out by the historical 
distribution and pattern of usage of each verb, which we will trace and interpret in Secs. 5.3-
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 See the introduction to Chapt. 3 for the lack of a word for ―contract‖ in Greek and the various names of 
contractual forms. 
433
 Kunkel 1932; cf. Cohen 1973: 129-36 and Wolff 1978: 57-63. 
434
 Wolff 1978: 137-39. 
435
 For instance, we see the word used above in BGU  IV 1120, an Alexandrian synchōrēsis from early in the 
imperial period, as well as in a copy of a mortgage rendered in cheirographic form and embedded in a petition 
relating to registration of the loan in P.Oxy. XVII 2134 (Oxyrhynchos, 170; see n431). It does not appear in 
hypomnēmata, but this rose to prominence as a contractual form in the Roman period (cf. Yiftach-Firanko 2007), 
and in any case did not typically carry penalty clauses. In fact, I have found only two that do: P.Kron. 38 (Tebtynis, 





5.6. Both of these words have a history that stretches back to the classical era, and therefore 
our analysis should begin with the Greek evidence of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. There 
is, in fact, only one literary attestation of parasyngraphein in the entire Greek corpus, and that 
appears in Dem. 56, Against Dionysodoros. This speech is illuminating not only for what it 
can tell us about parasyngraphein, but also for the sort of rhetorical arguments employed and 
social values implicated in what we might call a pure contract case in classical antiquity. A 
full discussion of it with respect to breach will therefore serve as a helpful basis of 





5.2 Breach and Demothenes’ Against Dionysodoros (Dem. 56) 
Dem. 56 is a forensic speech delivered in an Athenian dikē emporikē around 323-22 BCE.436 
The plaintiffs are, from all appearances, two metics, Darios (the speaker, whose name is 
known only from the hypothesis) and Pamphilos, who had loaned 3,000 drachmai to a pair of 
traders, Dionysodoros and Parmeniskos, for the grain trade between Athens and Egypt (§§ 6, 
9). Dionysodoros and Parmeniskos, however, never made it to Egypt, but stopped in Rhodes 
and sold the cargo, and now two years on the ship had still not returned to Athens (§ 45).
437
 
From Darios‘s argument we gather that the contract took into account only two contigencies: 
full repayment if ship ―returned safely‖ to Athens (σῴζ   /σῴζ σθ  , §§ 22-25, 32-37) or 
full remittance if it was ―lost‖ (   φθ ίρ σθ  , § 32-37).438 When Dionysodoros returned, 
however, he claimed that the ship had been ―damaged‖ (ῥή  υσθ  , § 23, 40-43), and was 
therefore willing to pay interest on the loan only for the portion of the trip completed to 
Rhodes (§§ 12-14).
439
 Darios confirms that he and his partner were approached with this 
compromise solution but rejected it, despite the fact that it was accepted by other creditors (§§ 
                                                 
436
 There is a good deal more going on in and behind this speech than will be covered here: see Carey and Reid 1985 
for text, date, and commentary; cf. Isager and Hansen 1975: 200-213; Cohen 1973: 97n4 (older literature); 1992: 
164-69; Usher 1999: 256-57 (rhetorical structure); and most recently Schuster 2005 (legal analysis). 
437
 Nor had, it seems, Parmeniskos: Carey and Reid 1985: 198.  
438
 Cf. Carey and Reid 1985: 215-17, 221-22.  
439
 Release from repayment if the ship was lost was a basic feature of these loans: Cohen 1973: 127-29; Isager and 
Hansen 1975: 79-81; Cohen 1992: 141-43. Other contingencies were, of course, not only possible, but also 
sometimes covered in maritime contracts, as shown by Dem. 35. Such provisions, however, were not necessarily 





12-30). Instead, he insisted on the full amount, with penalty, in accordance with the terms of 
their syngraphē.  
Though there are several complicating factors at work in the dispute which led to its 
being litigated,
440
 it seems reasonable to suppose that the traders did not fulfill the express 
terms of the contract; otherwise, Darios‘s case would be nonsense, resting as it does squarely 
on the contract. Indeed, Darios attempts to hitch the fortunes of contract as an institution to 
the successful defense of his particular syngraphē, making his case as much about contract in 
general as about his specific contract. To this end, Darios pursues two lines of argument: one 
from within Athenian contract law for the strict interpretation of the syngraphē; and one from 
without, in which he advocates for strict interpretation per se as the appropriate default rule 
for Athenian commercial law. Both lines of attack are approved by Aristotle in his discussion 
of contracts (synthēkai) as evidence in the Rhetoric (1376a-b, quoted in notes below). 
Darios‘s internal or legal argument relies on the Athenian homology law. As he says, 
creditors receive but the merest scraps of paper ( ρ    τ ί   ) in return for their cold, hard 
cash (§ 1), and so they must rely on the Athenian jurors and their laws if they are ever to see their 
money again:  
ἡ   ς  ’ ο  φ  ὲ    σ   ,    ’   θὺς τῶ      ζο έ ῳ  ί ο    τὸ  ρ  ρ ο . τῶ οὖ  
ποτὲ π στ  ο τ ς   ὶ τί   βό τ ς τὸ βέβ  ο  προϊέ  θ ; ὑ   , ὦ ἄ  ρ ς     στ ί, 
  ὶ το ς  ό ο ς το ς ὑ  τέρο ς, οἳ      ουσ  , ὅσ  ἄ  τ ς   ὼ  ἕτ ρος  τέρῳ 
  ο ο ήσῃ,   ρ    ἶ   . (§ 2) 
 
We, however, do not say we will give, but we give the money straight away to the 
borrower. In what, then, do we trust, what guarantee do we have when we issue payment? 
                                                 
440





Why, we trust in you, men of the jury, and in your laws, which command that whatever 




The law adduced here is the so-called ―homology law,‖ the foundation of Athenian contract law, 
which established that whatever obligation or liability one officially or publically recognized to 
another (homologein) was thereby constituted as the controlling or authoritative (kyrios) terms of 
the agreement admissable in court, somewhat similar to the parole evidence rule in the common 
law.
442
 The dikai emporikai were controlled by a set of jurisdictional rules, and most of the 
surviving speeches revolve around these rules (i.e., the paragraphē trials), with the parties 
arguing whether or the dispute should be heard in the special court.
443
 These rules, however, had 
nothing to do with contracting per se, and in fact this speech is the only one of the five emporic 
speeches that does not treat procedural issues of the dikē emporikē.444 Legally, Dem. 56 is a 
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 Cf. §§ 15-16, 26-27. 
442
 On the homology law, see Dem. 35.1342.12, 47.77, 48.54; Hyper. 3.13; Deinarch. 2.4; Isok. 18.24; cf. Pl. Symp. 
196c; Arist. Rhet. 1376a-b. The classic discussions are Pringsheim 1950: ch. 3 passim; 1955; Wolff 1957; Kussmaul 
1969; Von Soden 1973; Thür 1977; and now Cohen 2006 and Jakab 2006. On this meaning of kyrios, see Hässler 
1960: 19-23; cf. Vélissaropoulos-Karakostas 2001; Cohen 1992: 161-62; 2006. At the heart of the debate is Wolff‘s 
thesis of Zweckverfügung as a theoretical description of the basis of contractual liability in Athens. See Wolff 1957, 
cf. Todd 1993: 256-57, 261-68; Vélissaropoulos-Karakostas 2002; Cohen 2006; Jakab 2006; Carter 2007; and 
Carawan 2007. In my view, Cohen has misinterpreted the combined force of homologein and kyrios: it is not so 
much that any ―agreement‖ is ―valid‖ (i.e., a consensual contract) as any ―acknowledged obligation‖ is 
―authoritative.‖ A law controlling what terms are to be accepted by a court as the final and relevant terms of the 
contract has nothing to say whatsoever about the sort of agreement people came to. That is, one‘s homologia could 
be executory and consensual or partially performed and real: all this law determines is the status of the homologia as 
the final version of the deal. As we shall see in the case of Dem. 56, which relies almost entirely on the homologia 
law, the contract was real and partially performed (i.e., the plaintiff handed over the money immediately): what he 
was suing on was whether or not the express terms of the syngraphē should be the only point of consideration before 
the court (as opposed to ―equity‖ concerns). That this case, which is one of the purest ―contract‖ cases to survive 
from Athens, turning as it does on the homology-law, should be about a real contract and not an executory one, 
should give us pause in thinking that there were many consensual, executory contracts being drafted in classical 
Athens. Cf. Sec. 5.4.2 on the ―transactional agreement.‖ 
443
 Cf. Cohen 1973.  
444





contract case, pure and simple, though the written nature of the contract will play an important 
rhetorical role.
445
 The homology law, as Darios argued, constituted the syngraphē before the 
court as the only legitimate framework for measuring and justifying the actions of the parties 
with respect to their agreement,
446
 and Darios therefore spends a good deal of time parsing 
(    ξ  , § 31) the meaning of the terms in the contract, particularly σῴζ   /σῴζ σθ   and 
   φθ ίρ σθ  .  
                                                 
445
 There is, however, the matter of § 10:   τ φρο ήσ  τ ς  ὲ τ῵   ό ω  τ῵  ὑ  τέρω , οἳ      ουσ  τοὺς 
  υ  ήρους   ὶ τοὺς ἐπ βάτ ς π       ς ὅ τ  ἂ  συ θ῵ τ   ἐ πόρ ο ,     ὲ  ή, τ  ς    ίστ  ς ζ  ί  ς  ἶ    
ἐ όχους. If this refers to a specific law (otherwise unattested), it would merely constitute a special case of the 
general homology law (see n442; cf. the formulation of Isager and Hansen 1975: 142, 210, 212; Schuster 2005: 165-
66), and therefore a corollary of  main breach of contract claim. It is telling, however, that Darios nowhere seeks to 
hold Dionysodoros liable for the penalties mentioned above, and so perhaps we should wonder whether this is 
merely a highly tendentious phrasing of the general homology law meant to suggest that the traders had run afoul of 
the grain laws, without necessarily saying so (cf. the claims that that Athenians had been ―wronged‖ (adikein) by the 
traders in § 44, 47)? Darios invokes these laws directly with respect to his own loan (e.g., § 6), not the activities of 
Dionysodoros and Parmeniskos, presumably because as aliens they were not covered by them (though he comes 
closest to doing so in § 3; cf. Carey and Reid 1985: 197, 207). This would, after all, be consistent with the general 
rhetorical strategy of painting the traders as profiteers associated with Cleomenes and taking advantage of—if not 
causing—the recent grain shortages (§§ 7-10, on which, see Carey and Reid 1985: 204-5, 210-12; Isager and Hansen 
1975: 200-8, 212-13). 
446
 Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1376a33-76b1: π ρὶ  ὲ τ῵  συ θ  ῵  τοσ  τ  τ῵   ό ω  χρ σίς ἐστ   ὅσο    ξ    ἢ 
  θ  ρ   , ἢ π στ ς πο     ἢ  πίστους—ἐ    ὲ    τῶ ὑπάρχωσ , π στ ς   ὶ  υρί ς. As Isager and Hansen 
suggest (1975: 211-12), even if it was standard business practice to split the losses in the way in which 
Dionysodoros suggested, there is no reason to suspect that such practices had been received into the law as  legally 
recognized defaults . Indeed, the emphasis that Darios lays on the kyrios-quality of his contract shows that he was 
arguing against custom (and the actions of other creditors, §§ 26-31) as legally relevant. In light of the argument as a 
whole, and the repeated emphasis laid on syngraphai being kyria, I cannot agree with Isager and Hansen that 
Darios‘s syngraphē did not contain language as to the kyrios-quality of the document similar to what we find in 
Dem. 35.13. Moreover, in §§ 11-15 Darios admits that he was willing to entertain a compromise and ―take a haircut‖ 
(   ’ ἡ ο    ο    ί  ἐ  ττοῦσθ ί τ    ὶ συ χωρ   ) in order not to appear litigious (φ  ό   ος; cf. 42.12), but 
not at the price of annulling the contract (   ίρ σθ  ), which at this time was accomplished not by destroying it, but 
merely by noting that it was akyros, or no longer authoritative, in front of a banker (  ο ο ήσο    ἐ   τίο  τοῦ 
τρ π ζίτου ἄ υρο  πο     τὴ  συ  ρ φή , i.e., Darios would admit the existence of additional pacts, which had 
modified the original agreement, such that he could not pursue precisely the case he presents here; cf. Dem. 33.29). 
The reason he cites for not being willing to cancel the contract in its entirety was that he needed evidence that he had 
not broken the law himself by loaning money for grain export from Athens, cf. Dem. 33.35-38, n445 above, and 





This legal argument is supported by a rhetorical strategy that characterizes the parties 
according to their attitude towards law. Those who recognize the kyrios-quality of contracts tend 
also to recognize the authority of law generally (e.g., §§ 2, 11); while who refuse to abide by the 
terms of duly executed contracts thereby reveal a certain arrogance or boldness, even 
imperiousness: to disregard the rules one writes up with another is to show contempt not merely 
for that specific private ordering and the rules of contracting, but the rule of law writ large.
447
 It 
is, in Darios‘s phrase, to set oneself up as a law unto oneself (§ 12:   τὸς   υτῶ  ο οθ τ῵  
  ὶ ο χὶ το ς ἐ  τ ς συ  ρ φ ς     ίο ς π  θό   ος).  
This high-handedness is not just a moral vice, but a political one as well. More than once 
Dionysodoros is cast as a man given to issuing ―orders,‖ ―as if [his] order were more 
authoritative than a written contract‖ (ὥσπ ρ τὸ σὸ  πρόστ     τ ς συ  ρ φ ς  έο  
 υρ τ ρο     έσθ  , § 41).448 In this charge few in the jury would have failed to hear an echo 
of the  υρ τ ρο -clause, an example of which is preserved in the contract recorded in Dem. 
35.13 ( υρ τ ρο   ὲ π ρὶ το τω  ἄ  ο    ὲ   ἶ    τ ς συ  ρ φ ς)449—and even fewer the 
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 τό   : §§ 3, 19, 21, 41; ὕβρ ς: § 12;     σχυ τί : § 41;   τ φρό  σ ς: § 10. Cf. Isok. 20.7-8; Hypereides 
3.31; Andok. 4, which is a study in such character assassination. Again compare the rhetorical position with Arist. 
Rhet. 1376b7-11: ἡ   ρ συ θή    ό ος ἐστὶ  ἴ  ος   ὶ   τ   έρος,   ὶ  ἱ  ὲ  συ θ     ο  πο οῦσ  τὸ   ό ο  
  ρ ο , οἱ  ὲ  ό ο  τ ς   τ   ό ους συ θή  ς,   ὶ ὅ ως   τὸς    ό ος συ θή   τίς ἐστ  , ὥστ  ὅστ ς  π στ   
ἢ     ρ   συ θή    τοὺς  ό ους     ρ  . Cf. Kussmaul 1969: 30ff. 
448
 Cf. the use of ἐπ τάττ    in § 16, and contrast both to the speaker‘s assertion at § 26: ο  ’ ἐστὶ  ἡ    ο  ὲ  
 υρ τ ρο  τ ς συ  ρ φ ς. 
449
 Cf. § 39: ἡ  ὲ    ρ συ  ρ φὴ ο  ὲ   υρ τ ρο  ἐᾷ  ἶ    τ῵  ἐ    ρ   έ ω , ο  ὲ προσφέρ    ο τ  
 ό ο  ο τ  ψήφ σ   ο τ’ ἄ  ’ ο  ’  τ οῦ  πρὸς τὴ  συ  ρ φή ; and the public loans recorded by the polis of 
Arkesine in IG XII.7 68-70, cf. Ditt. Syll.
3 
955.41-46): τ ς  ὲ συ  ρ φ ς τ σ     [ὡ] ο ό  σ    ρ [ σ  ]  ς 
   ὲ   ἶ     υρ τ ρο ,  ήτ   ό ο   ήτ  ψή- | [φ] σ    ήτ   [ό  ]  [ ή]τ  στρ τ  ὸ   ήτ   ρχὴ  ἄ    
 ρί ου- | [σ]   ἢ τ  ἐ  τ [  συ  ]ρ φ      [ρ]   [έ  ]  ήτ  ἄ  ο   θὲ   ήτ  τέχ-        ήτ  π [ρ ]υρέσ   





echo of laws that reserved the ultimate authority for nomoi over psēphismata.450 Since in the 
democratic discourse of Athens the only entity capable of issuing authoritative ―orders‖ was the 
people through their legitimate organs,
451
 individuals who arrogated to themselves the right to 
issue ―orders‖ were guilty of a usurpation of sorts, betraying a dangerously oligarchic, perhaps 
even a treasonous or tyrannical, character.
452
 As Darios reminds this jury in his summation, the 
only people who should be ―legislating‖ ( ο οθ τ   ) are they themselves, the men of Athens (§ 
48). 
This legal argument for a strict interpretation is framed by a larger policy argument 
whose terms and justifications are properly external to contract law. Just as Darios opened 
with a warning that maritime credit rested ―on you and your laws‖ (§ 1 above), so he closes by 
recapitulating this theme (§§ 48-50): 
 
χωρὶς  ὲ το τω , ἄ  ρ ς  θ    ο ,  ὴ    ο  τ , ὅτ   υ ὶ  ί    ί       άζο τ ς 
 ο οθ τ  τ  ὑπὲρ ὅ ου τοῦ ἐ πορίου,   ὶ π ρ στᾶσ  πο  οὶ τ῵    τ  θά  ττ   
ἐρ άζ σθ   προ  ρου έ ω  ὑ ᾶς θ ωροῦ τ ς, π῵ς τὸ πρᾶ    τουτὶ  ρί  τ .    
 ὲ    ρ ὑ   ς τ ς συ  ρ φ ς   ὶ τ ς   ο ο ί ς τ ς πρὸς    ή ους     ο έ  ς 
 σχυρ ς οἴ σθ        ἶ      ὶ το ς π ρ β ί ουσ     τ ς      ί   συ        
ἕξ τ ,  το  ότ ρο  προήσο τ   τ    υτ῵  οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ     ίζ    ὄ τ ς, ἐ   ὲ 
το τω    ξ θήσ τ   ὑ    τὸ ἐ πόρ ο . (49)     έ το  ἐξέστ   το ς τω  
  ξ θήσ τ   ὑ    τὸ ἐ πόρ ο .     έ το  ἐξέστ   το ς   υ  ήρο ς, συ  ρ φὴ  
 ρ ψ  έ ο ς ἐφ’ ᾧ τ    τ π       ς  θή  ς,  π  τ    τά     τὴ    ῦ    ς ἕτ ρ  
ἐ πόρ  , φάσ ο τ ς ῥ         ὶ το   τ ς προφάσ  ς πορ ζο έ ους οἵ  σπ ρ   ὶ 
Δ ο υσό ωρος οὑτοσὶ χρ τ  ,   ὶ τοὺς τό ους   ρίζ    πρὸς τὸ  π οῦ  ὃ  ἂ  
φήσωσ   π π  υ έ   ,   ὶ  ὴ πρὸς τὴ  συ  ρ φή , ο  ὲ   ω  σ   ἅπ  τ  τ  
συ βό           σθ  . (50) τίς   ρ ἐθ  ήσ   τ    υτοῦ προέσθ  , ὅτ    ρᾷ τ ς 
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 E.g., Dem. 23.87, 218; 24.30. 
451
 Cf. the ―orders‖ of the polis and the law in other speeches in the Demosthenic corpus: προστάττ   : (e.g.) 24.53, 
43.59, cf. Arist. Nich. Eth. 1130b; ἐπ τάττ   : (e.g.) 24.53, 80, 92, and 39.7.  
452





 ὲ  συ  ρ φ ς    ρους,  σχ ο τ ς  ὲ τοὺς το ο τους  ό ους,   ὶ τ ς   τί ς 
τ῵  ἠ     ότω    προσθ   ο σ ς τοῦ     ίου;      ῵ς, ὦ ἄ  ρ ς     στ ί· 
ο τ    ρ τῶ π ήθ   τῶ ὑ  τέρῳ συ φέρ   τοῦτο ο τ  το ς ἐρ άζ σθ   
προῃρ  έ ο ς, οἵπ ρ χρ σ   τ τοί   σ     ὶ  ο  ῇ πᾶσ   ὑ      ὶ   ί  τῶ 
ἐ τυ χά ο τ .   όπ ρ     ὑ ᾶς   τ῵  ἐπ  έ      πο   σθ  . 
 
Besides this, men of Athens, you must not forget that, while you are today deciding 
one case alone, you are fixing a law for the whole port, and that many of those 
engaged in overseas trade are standing here and watching you to see how you decide 
this case. For if you hold that syngraphai and homologiai made between parties are to 
binding, and show no leniency towards those who transgress them, lenders will be 
more ready to risk their money, and the business of your port will be increased. But if 
shipowners, after dratfting a syngraphē to sail to Athens, are to be permitted to put 
their ships into other ports, giving out that they have been disabled, or advancing other 
pretexts such as these of which Dionysodoros has availed himself, and to reduce the 
interest in proportion to the length of the voyage which they say they have made 
instead of paying it according to the syngraphē, there will be nothing to prevent all 
contracts from falling apart. For who is going to be willing to risk his money when he 
sees that syngraphai are unenforceable, while arguments such as these prevail and the 
claims of wrongdoers take precedence over justice? Do not permit this, men of the 
jury, for it is advantageous neither to the mass of your people nor to those engaged in 
trade, who are men most useful to you publicly in general and privately as individuals 





Darios thus reminds the jury that in deciding this case they will be establishing a precedent 
likely to have a profound effect on the credit market in the Piraeus. If they opt to defend this 
contract they will thereby strengthen the efficacy ( σχυράς) of all contracts. If, however, they 
admit other considerations, i.e., do not treat the contracts as kyrioi, then they risk all contracts 
falling apart (ο  ὲ   ω  σ   ἅπ  τ  τ  συ βό           σθ  ).454 And the credit market 
will, according to Darios, rise and fall with the enforceability of contracts. Darios thus 
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 Trans. adapt. from Murray 1936. 
454
 Cf. the argument in the epilogue to Dem. 34 and Isok. 20, cf. Arist. Rhet. 1376b11-13:  τ   ὲ πράττ τ   τ  
πο    τ῵  συ       άτω    ὶ τ    ο σ     τ  συ θή  ς, ὥστ     ρω      ο έ ω      ρ  τ   ἡ πρὸς 





supported his legal argument with a rhetoric of political morality, but his call for strict justice 
according to the law ( ἱ   τί   τοῦ     ίου, § 50; cf. § 28 and τ  ἐ  τ ς συ  ρ φ ς  ί     
passim) with a clear and unabashed argument for self-interest rightly understood on multiple 
levels: creditors are good for business, and what is good for business is good not only for 
Athens as a whole, but also those members of the jury who in their own affairs ―just happen to 
have dealings with these most useful of men‖ (οἵπ ρ χρ σ   τ τοί   σ     ὶ  ο  ῇ πᾶσ   
ὑ      ὶ   ί  τῶ ἐ τυ χά ο τ ).455  
Of course, there might have been good reason for the jury to recognize what one might 
call ―the equity argument‖ in this case,456 particularly if the sort of compromise Dionysodoros 
proffered represented a customary business response to the intervention of unforeseen 
circumstances.
457
 Theoretically speaking, there is nothing necessarily destructive to credit 
markets in reaching such a decision and validating prevailing business practices: to the extent 
that courts consistently or expressly recognize standard business practices they thus become 
                                                 
455
 On ―usefulness‖ as a business and banking term in Athens, see Cohen 1992: 65-66, 72, 147-48, 154-55. Cohen 
1973: 93-95 plausibly suggests (with evidence from the sources) that the dikasts were men experienced in emporic 
affairs, which helps to explain this wink to the jurors at the end of the speech. Arguments from expediency are 
common in epilogues, as well as the combination of arguments from both justice and expediency: Usher 1999: 
passim. Cf. Dem 34 and Arist. Rhet. 1375a-b on contracts and 1360a on the need for the orator to recognize the 
usefulness (chrēsimos) of the commercial class, who work on the basis of synthēkai and symbolai in providing for 
the polis. On dikaia as ―claim-rights‖ emanating from contract, cf. Carter 2007, but without sufficient grounding in 
the relationship of dikaios to nomos generally and rhetorically in Greek thought (e.g., what happens to a ―claim 
right‖ based on positive law when juxtaposed to that which is dikaios according to natural law? Cf., e.g., Arist. Nich. 
Eth. 1134a39-32, 1137a31-38a2; Rhet. 1376b14-30). 
456
 Carey and Reid 1985: 200. 
457
 Cf. the provisions in the syngraphē preserved in Dem. 35, likely delivered before 340 BCE, on which see Isager 





established or received as a default rules that the parties can depend on or negotiate around.
458
 
That said, the fact that decisions of Athenian courts were not issued in written form meant that 
it would have been difficult for those legal spectators to whom Darios alludes to interpret the 
reasoning behind the decisions. In fact, this holds true for subsequent Athenian juries as well, 
thus weakening the power and value of precedent.
459
 Unless, of course, the jury upheld an 
already established law: to do so clearly was to strengthen the only written rules there were, 
the public laws of the state and the ―private laws‖ of individuals (Aristotle‘s phrase in the 
Rhetoric, n447 above).
460
 So, self-serving and rheorically-motivated as Darios‘s argument 
obviously was, the bright-line default of caveat stipulator he advocated was also likely to 
have been the clearest and most predictable default rule for fourth-century contracting, 
especially when it came to complicated emporic transactions: surely, in this of all courts, 
written contracts ought to be kyriai and ischyrai, not logoi.  
Darios uses the verb parasyngraphein twice in the speech, at §§ 28 and 34, and 
parabainein three times at §§ 10, 44, and 48. Parabainein was, as stated above, the usual 
word for transgressing the boundaries set by the law, an oath, or an agreement. The precise 
historical relationship between treaties, oaths, and private contracts in Classical Greece is not 
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 Cf. the arguments about predictability in Athenian contract law by Laani 2007. She notes that Athenian juries 
were not bound by precedent, but the question seems less one of being bound than that it was difficult to 
communicate, discover, and adhere to precedent, for Darios is clearly arguing for the advantage of setting precedent 
here. 
459
 Cf. Frier 1985: 227-31 on the effects of purely oral verdicts in Roman law of the late Republic. 
460





of immediate concern here;
461
 but we do need to establish the wider context of breach so as to 
be able to recover the differences between parabainein and parasyngraphein in Dem. 56.  
There are 52 instances of parabainein in the Demosthenic corpus where it means to 
―transgress‖ in a metaphorical sense (see Table 5.2).  
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 Oath and its relationship to contract are receiving renewed attention: see, e.g., Cohen 2006, Jakab 2006, and the 























NB. The total number of entries does not equal 52, since (a) some attestations took more than one object, 
requiring two entries, and (b) I have listed multiple attestations in the same paragraph only once. 
 
Aproximately half of the attestations refer to nomoi (20), while 12 refer to public treaties and 
another 10 to private contracts. The rest describe the violation of the boundaries set by oaths, 
Object Total Refs. 
τὸ   σ βές 2 9.16; 18.157 
τὸ  ί   ο  2 9.16; 25.17 
   
 ό ος 15 
20.89, 153; 21.30, 92, 147, 177; 23.71; 
42.4, 12; 46.27; 58.5, 24, 49, 50, 55 
το τω  τ  (of a law) 2 21.10; 24.18 
ψήφ σ   3 18.28; 58.49, 50 
   
 ό    1 26.13 
 ό     2 26.13; 59.117 
   
ὅρ ος (securing public treaty) 2 17.22; 19.318 
το τω  τ  (of the heliastic oath) 1 24.151 
ἅ  ς (private) 1 19.191 
σπο   ί (private) 1 19.191 
   
  ρή   5 6.2; 9.6, 17.2, 3, 8 
συ θ   ί (public) 3 17.26; 18.165, 181 
 ο   ὶ   ο ο ί   2 17. 21, 22 
τ  τ῵   ο  ῇ   ο ο  θέ τω  1 17.19 
 ο  ὶ πίστ  ς 1 18.164 
   
συ θ   ί (private) 3 48.38, 46, 50 
συ  ρ φ ί 2 46.28; 56.48 
τ  τ῵  ἐ  τῇ συ  ρ φῇ 3 34.33; 56.10, 44 
τ     ρ   έ   1 35.21 





abstract values (e.g., τὸ   σ βές), and custom. This pattern is generally mirorred in the other 
Athenian orators, except that it is very rarely used to describe the breach of private 
contracts.
462
 We should likely attribute this to the accident of the topics addressed in the 
speeches—there are simply more commercial cases in the Demosthenic corpus—since we 
find the language of private contractual transgression expressed clearly in Deinarchos‘s 
citation of the homology law (Against Philocles § 4:   ὶ    ὲ   ο  ὸς τ ς πό  ως  ό ος, ἐά  
τ ς ἐ   τίο  τ῵  πο  τ῵    ο ο ήσ ς τ  π ρ βῇ, τοῦτο    οχο   ἶ            τῶ 
       ) and playfully deployed by Plato (e.g., Crito 52e, 54c; Theat. 183d).463 
The earliest Greek texts which reliably and regularly use parabainein are fifth- and 
fourth-century Attic inscriptions of treaties and oaths, the earliest of which appears to be the 
Phaselis decree (IG I
3 
10, ca. 469-450 BCE): ἐ- | [    έ τ ς π ρ β] [ί]    τ  ἐψ - | 
[φ σ έ  , ὀφ] [ έτ]ω  υρί ς  [ρ]- | [ χ  ς ἱ ρ] ς τ    θ   ί   (19-22). In this case, there 
is a monetary penalty for breaching the decreed terms of the symbolaion, though it is the 
offending party, not the polis, that is liable for the fine in the case of ―breach.‖464 Internal 
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 Isokrates: 11 instances: horkos: 18.24, 25, 29; 14.44; synthēkē (public): 18.26, 29, 47; 14.10, 44; 16.43; nomos: 
7.41; 12.170 (the common law of Hellas); 20.7. Instead of parabainein, Isokrates uses luein of dissolving contracts 
and synthēkai: 18.24 (cf. Dem. 56.49 above). Andocides: 5 instances: psēphisma: 1.79 (but in the text of an 
embedded decree); synthēkē (public): 3.27; symbola (public): 4.18; τ     φέρο τ : 4.19 (LSJ III.3); nomos: 4.39; 
horkos: 4.39. Lysias: 5 instances: horkos: 9.15; 12.47; nomos: 1.26; dogmata: 6.43; absolute: 6.44. Isaeus: 3 
instances: τ    ο ο  θέ τ /ὡ ο ο   έ  : 2.40; 5.7; horkos: 2.40; a private, familiar injunction (ἐπ σ ήψσ  ς): 
9.36.  
463
 Aristotle uses the verb, but surprisingly never of private agreements, cf. the pseudo-Aristotelian Π ρὶ  ρ τ῵  
1251a37-b1; Prob. 950a. The closest Aristotle comes to discussing breach is Nich. Eth. V.8 (justice in business 
relations), cf. IV.7 (moral truthfulness vs. ethical business practice); and VII.13 (―useful‖ and ―legal‖ friendship, i.e, 
contractual relations).  
464
 Cf. IG I
3






decrees also sometimes carried similar penalty clauses, with fines for those who 
―transgressed‖ (e.g., IG I3 153, ca 440-425 BCE).465 Breach of a public treaty by the polis or its 
representatives was typically punished with a curse, as, for instance, in IG I
3 
9 (ca. 458), a 
treaty with the Delphic Amphictiony with an oath to abide (emmenein) by the symmachia and 
a curse for breaching (parabainein only partially survives, but is almost certainly to be 
restored). Similar are the inscribed loyalty oaths forced on others, like the Colophonians (IG I
3
 
37, 447/446 BCE). Such oaths themselves contained the terms, which, if ―transgressed,‖ 
activated a curse.
466
 In other words, in such treaties the treaty  was the oath (or vice versa), 
such that breaking one was tantamount to breaking the other.
467
 Indeed, treaties and the oaths 
that sealed them were so closely associated that they could be spoken of together as ―sworn‖ 
(e.g., IG II
2 
34, a treaty between Chios and Athens, 384/383 BCE),
468
 language echoed in 
Thucydides (e.g., 1.78 and 5.30).
469
  
 To return to Dem. 56, the third instance of parabainein comes in § 48 (quoted above, pp. 
253f.), and clearly conveys ―breach‖ in a generalizing sense, as   τάς obviously refers to 
syngraphai and homologiai. This instance should be contrasted with the first two, where Darios 
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appears to be paraphrasing the language from his contract. In § 10 Darios complains that 
Dionysodoros and Parmeniskos have ―despised the syngraphē ... and the penalties—which they 
had drafted against themselves, should they breach any (term)‖ (  τ φρο ήσ  τ ς  ὲ  τ ς 
συ  ρ φ ς ...   ὶ τ῵  ἐπ τ  ίω , ἃ συ   ράψ  το   τοὶ οὗτο    θ’  ὑτ῵ , ἐά  τ  
π ρ β ί ωσ  ). The subordinated protasis here sounds very much like a quote from the 
contract, especially since penalty/curse clauses in the treaties above, the extant contract in Dem. 
35, and indeed most extant contracts in Greek for the next century, were structured as similar 
―if/then‖ statements.470 Darios returns to precisely the same point in § 44, again seeming to quote 
the penalty clause of the contract and stressing the fact that it was the defendants who agreed to 
the penalty: ―For it would be a terrible thing were you (sc. the jury) to treat those who had 
written down a double penalty against themselves, should they breach any of the terms in the 
syngraphē, with comparative leniency, particularly when you have been wronged no less than 
us‖ (  ὶ   ρ ἂ      ὸ   ἴ ,   τοὺς  ὲ  το τους   π  σί     θ’  ὑτ῵  τὴ  ζ  ί   
 ράψ σθ  , ἐά  τ  π ρ β ί ωσ  τ῵  ἐ  τῇ συ  ρ φῇ, ὑ ᾶς  ’ ἠπ ωτέρως  χ    πρὸς 
  το ς,   ὶ τ ῦτ  ο χ ἧττο  ἡ ῵  συ       έ ους). From such statements we might 
conclude that the contract had expressly provided against ―transgression‖ per se.  
Section 38, however, suggests that parabainein was not the original language of the 
contract. At this point in the speech, Darios has the contract read out yet again and claims that it 
said the following:  
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   ’ ἐ    ὴ  πο ῶς τὸ  ά   ο    ὶ τοὺς τό ους ἢ  ὴ π ράσχῃς τ  ὑπο  ί     
ἐ φ      ὶ   έπ φ , ἢ ἄ  ο τ  π ρ  τὴ  συ  ρ φὴ  πο ήσῃς,  ποτί             σ  
  π άσ   τ  χρή  τ . 
 
But if you do not repay the loan and the interest or do not present the security publicly 
and untouched, or if you do anything against the syngraphē, it ordains that you pay 
double the money. 
 
The phrase ἄ  ο τ  π ρ  τὴ  συ  ρ φὴ  πο     is obviously an equivalent to the ἄ  ο τ  
π ρ β ί     in the other instances, but this extract appears to be an exact quote of the contract 
which is being read out. It is certainly presented as such, unlike the other two instances above. 
We cannot, of course, be sure, yet I am inclined to think that this reflects the drafting of the 
contract, even though nothing, unfortunately, allows us to recover the original language of the 
contract with certainty, and both formulations above (i.e., parabainein and poiein allo ti para tēn 
syngraphēn) are found in later contracts.  
 From the preceding disucssion, it is abundantly clear that parabainein conveyed ―breach‖ 
of contract in classical Athens, if not in Greece more widely, both generally and with a view to 
specific contractual provisions. It was also used to describe breach in allied institutions, like law, 
oaths, treaties, and agreements, all of which were conceived as a set of legitimate boundaries. In 
commercial cases that revolved around written contracts, the verb stood in for periphrases like τ  
π ρ  τὴ  συ  ρ φὴ  πο     or πο     τ   ξω τ῵  ἐ  τῇ συ  ρ φῇ    ρ   έ ω  (Dem. 
34.3, cf. 34.33). It may even have been written into contracts themselves, though, as we just saw, 
there is no direct evidence of this (a point to which we shall return shortly). What need, then, was 
there for parasyngraphein? 
 Darios uses parasyngraphein twice, §§ 28 and 34. In the first instance, Darios is in the 





was irrelevant to the case at hand, which depended entirely on the interpretation of the 
syngraphē. He thus challenged the defense to show ―either that the contract was not kyria or that 
it was somehow unjust (ο   ί   ος) for him to fulfill all of its terms.‖ He then says:  
  
    έ τ   ς  φ ί  σί  τί σο    ὶ συ   χωρή  σ   τοὺς   ς Ῥό ο  τό ους  τῳ ήποτ  
τρόπῳ π  σθέ τ ς,     τ ῦτ  ο  ὲ        ς ἡ ᾶς, ο ς π ρ συ    ράφ   ς   ς 
Ῥό ο    τ    ὼ  τὴ    ῦ ;  
 
If certain men have remitted anything to you and have accepted the interest to Rhodes, 
after having been persuaded in some manner, do you therefore in no way wrong us, with 
whom you have broken your written agreement by putting your ship in at Rhodes? 
 
 
The point of this section, as indeed most of the speech, is to stress the sanctity and controlling 
authority of the written document. Darios repeatedly emphasizes the volitional element of the 
contract (i.e., after all it was ―they themselves‖ who agreed to these terms), especially the fact 
that it was the defendants who had allowed these penalties to be drafted into a written document. 
They had, accordingly to Darios, thus opted into two sets of rules: not only had they agreed to 
the specific terms of the contract, but they also agreed to have it be under the jurisdiction of the 
emporic court, where the syngraphē was the only pistis that mattered (or so he claimed; boldly, if 
not provocatively, he calls no witnesses and offers no depositions in support of his account of the 
defendants‘s actions). Darios (or the speech-writer) therefore reaches for a more specific word 
than parabainein to describe the particularity of the defendant‘s act of malfeasance, i.e., their 
having violated a written contract. In this connection, it is worth noting that the verb is 





other verbs that take external accusatives of persons affected, like    ρ  τ   ,    ουρ    , 
       , υβρίζ   ,  ο οῦ  (cf.  ὖ/   ῵ς/   ῵ς πο    ).471 
 A few moments later in § 34, Darios asks the jury to compare the actions of the two 
parties in a highly tendentious manner: 
 
σ οπ  τ   έ, ὦ ἄ  ρ ς  θ    ο , πότ ρο  ἡ   ς το ς ἐ  τ ς συ  ρ φ ς     ίο ς 
χρ   θ  ἢ οὗτο , οἳ ο τ    ς τὸ συ   ί   ο  ἐ πόρ ο  π π     σ  ,    ’   ς Ῥό ο  
  ὶ Αἴ υπτο , σωθ ίσ ς τ  τ ς   ὼς   ὶ ο     φθ ρ έ  ς ἄφ σ   οἴο τ        
 ὑρίσ  σθ   τ῵  τό ω  π ρ συ    ρ φ  ότ ς ... 
 
But look and see, men of Athens, whether it is we who are availing ourselves of the rights 
of the syngraphē or these men, who sailed not to the agreed-upon port, but to Rhodes and 
Egypt, who with the ship safe and sound think it fit to seek an interest abatement, 
although they broke the contract ... 
 
Here the verb is used without an express object. It may be that it is being used absolutely (as 
parabainein sometimes is); but it is more likely that we are intended to hear the plaintiffs as the 
implied object, as they are in § 28. Here the participle follows as a damning comment or 
qualification of the defendents‘ asking for an abatement. Strictly speaking, the legal point has 
already been made with the preceding genitive absolute, since it contained the terms of the 
contract (σωθ ίσ ς      φθ ρ έ  ς) which the defendants ignored. Π ρ συ    ρ φ  ότ ς, 
on the other hand, points up the personal relations in the actions of the parties, as if to say: ―they 
have the nerve to come looking for an abatement from us, even though its with us that they broke 
the contract?‖ 
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 By this time, the word syngraphē had largely come to mean a written contract in 
Athens,
472
 and it would seem obvious that we are meant to hear an echo of the syngraphē in the 
verb parasyngraphein. As we have seen, the writtenness of a contract was, depending on the 
case, a point to be scored in the Athenian courts, and it was a bell Darios made sure to ring 
several times in his presentation.
473
 Carey and Reid have noted that syngraphē and 
syngraphesthai appear 105 times in the emporic speeches, with 48 of those instances occurring 
in this speech alone.
474
 This verb thus echoes the primary emphasis on the position and role of 
the syngraphē and syngraphesthai in this speech, expressing a violation of the highest standard 
of contractual dealings, the violation of a written contract with another party, who are the object 
of the act, not the contract itself. Put more concretely: one ―transgressed‖ (parabainein) or did 
something ―against‖ or ―beyond‖ or ―outside‖ the terms or boundaries of a contract, but ―broke 
contract‖ (parasyngraphein) with the opposing party. On the one hand, parasyngraphein was an 
ethical word, negatively charged on analogy with other π ρ -compounds (e.g., 
π ρά ο ος/π ρ  ο    ), used in order amplify the specific moral and ideological matrix in 
which it was embedded (i.e., the rhetoric of anti-social, tyrannical lawlessness). On the other, it 
was a technical word, invented and used by those for whom written contracts and business ethics 
were the stuff of life, a commercial species of parabasis. Aristotle understood business ethics 
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and ―friendship‖ to be a subject or ―virtue‖ of its own in the Nichomachean Ethics.475 While he, 
of course, had a particular intellectual and philosophical agenda, it does perhaps reflect a 
growing recognition of a new way of relating to others, the beginnings of a merchant code or 
business ethics. And this is what Darios is giving voice to here, helping to create a new 
vocabulary for a commercial vice. Crucially, it does not seem to be a legal term for breach of 
contract, as it would become in Ptolemaic Egypt. 
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5.3 Parasyngraphein and Early Ptolemaic Contracts 
There are 81 attestations of parasyngraphein in the papyri, all but five of which appear in the 
texts of contracts, with the rest in petitions concerning contracts (see App. III; a probable 
exception is the last attestation, which is dubious on several grounds: see below, n556). Their 
distribution is intriguing with respect to chronology, contractual form, and transaction type. 
To begin with the chronology, more than 500 contracts are recorded in the HGV for the period 
spanning the beginning of Ptolemaic rule down to the year 100 BCE. Parasyngraphein appears 
in the text of only 8 of those contracts. Of these, only three can be securely dated to before 
150 BCE (we have approximately 340 contracts dated to before 150). Even more surprising is 
the fact that parabainein, the routine word for breach in contractual and similar settings in 
classical and Hellenistic times and in papyrus contracts of the Roman period, appears in 
precisely one contract before the year 100 BCE.
476
 If there were contracts—and we have scores 
of them—then surely there was a way of describing breach: what was it? 
One finds in this initial period that breach was most commonly described not by a verb 
denoting the abstract idea of breach, but rather by a verb describing a specific action. Thus, a 
lease or a loan might read, e.g.,     ὴ  πο ῶ τὸ  σ το  or     ὴ  πο ῶ   τ  τ  
   ρ   έ   (see, e.g., BGU X passim), followed by a penalty.477 For the first two centuries 
of Ptolemaic rule contracts therefore rarely provided for ―breach‖ expressis verbis, but instead 
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stipulated for specific actions or failures to act which activated a penalty.
478
 This is true of 
demotic contracts as well: there was no word in them that meant ―breach of contract.‖ Instead 
they were drafted with objective descriptions of breach with respect to the transaction, e.g., 
P.Dion. 4.20-22: ―Si je ne les [sc. cows] livre pas | conformément à ce qui est écrit ci-dessus, 
je te donnerai 1500 (deben) d‘argent ... au moins  |  en question, forcément es sans tarder‖ 
(Akoris, 108 BCE). They also typically rehearsed a series of procedural claims with respect to 
what constituted performance, but these should be considered periphrastic expressions of 
specific breach, e.g., ―I shall not be able to say, ‗I have performed for you in accordance with 
everything which is (specified) above,‘ while the instrument which is above is in your hand‖ 
(Pierce 1972: 17 [Saqqara, 108 BCE]); or P.Dion. 5. 22-23: ―Je ne pourrai pas dire: ‗C‘est un 
contrat de location qui se prolonge  |  un an,‘ tant que tu détiens une parole à ma charge‖ 
(Akoris, 106 BCE). There was, then, no language describing breach inscribed in the contracts 
of the early Ptolemaic period, nor, interestingly enough, were there any provisions for general 
breach. By ―general breach‖ I mean a provision that treats the contract from the perspective of 
the transaction as a whole, and thus works to include or imply terms which the parties had not 
reduced to writing, but likely would have, had they considered the particular circumstances 
now threatening the contract. General breach thus conceives of breach with respect to the 
transaction or the contract as a whole, whereas ―specific breach‖ is a narrow contruction of 
particular actions that constitute breach as set out in a particular contract, as in the loan 
examples set out above. 
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As we have seen in the previous section, some incohate notion of general breach could 
have been inherited from classical and early Hellenistic contract experience, if not in drafting 
practice. The syngraphē in Dem. 35.10-13, our only preserved emporic syngraphē, contains a 
number of ―if/then‖ contingency clauses, but no language of breach or a general breach 
clause. The evidence from Dem. 56 indicates that the disputed syngraphē may have carried 
some sort of general breach clause, but the most direct reference in § 38 suggests that the 
original text read something along the lines of ἐ    ’ ἄ  ο τ  π ρ  τὴ  συ  ρ φὴ  
πο ήσωσ .479 Thus the syngraphē most likely did not use the language of breach per se, 
although it appears to have employed a very close periphrasis for it, and more importantly, 
clearly provided for general, as opposed to specific, breach. It is telling, however, Darios did 
not rely on this general clause, if it existed, but instead argued from specific violations. The 
general breach clause was adduced only to point up the volitional element of the ―self-
imposed‖ penalty, while the argument for a general ―faithlessness‖ was pressed with the 
charge of parasyngraphē (cf. n427). 
Occassionally, we find in early Ptolemaic contracts a blanket clause of the following 
sort: ἐ    ὲ  ὴ οἱ       πο ῵σ     τ  τ     ρ   έ   (or   θ  συ   ράψ  το) or even 
simply     ὲ  ή.480 This phraseology is usually employed when a contract has numerous 
specific obligations, and so represents merely a summary term for the explicit provisions set 
out in the contract. That said, it is, perhaps, more open to interpretation than the specific 
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conditionals, and to that extent closer in effect to a general breach clause.
481
 However, it 
differs significantly from a general breach clause precisely in that it does not suggest that 
there are undefined (i.e., unwritten) actions that will constitute breach if they threaten or 
undermine the underlying transaction. Though there are contracts and petitions that claim that 
certain actions are π ρ  τὴ  συ  ρ φή  (P.Dryton 11 [Pathyris, 164 BCE], BGU VIII 1844 
[Herakleopolite, 50-49 BCE], and perhaps SB XXII 15545 [Theadelphia, 146 BCE]), I know of 
no example in the papyri of a periphrastic breach clause of the sort apparently written into the 
contract in Dem. 56. By the time breach was drafted as such in Egypt, it was conceptualized 
in terms of parasyngraphein or parabainein. As I shall argue below, the inclusion of terms for 
breach and provisions for general breach point to a greater sense of the contract as a distinct 
thing, a framework whose totality was more important that the specific provisions it included; 
or, put another way, as a set of interpersonal relations legitimated not by form but by the 
underlying reason for its coming into existence.  
Not coincidentally, our first papyrological attestation of parasyngraphein comes from 
a case in which general breach is precisely the claim. The word first appears on papyrus in a 
petition of 222 BCE from Magdola in the Fayyum (P.Enteux. 59; App. III, no. 1). In this 
petition three lessees complain that their landlord Demetrios is ignoring their good-faith 
efforts to demonstrate their inability to fulfill the terms of their lease with respect to an 
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arbitration procedure set out in their syngraphē, and that his avoidance therefore betrayed ―a 
desire to break the contract‖ (βου ό   ος π ρ συ  ρ φ   ): 
 
β σ     Πτο    ίω  χ ίρ    Θ ό οτος, Γ     ος,   ί ς.     ο   θ  ὑπὸ  
Δ   τρίου τ  ός.   σθ - 
σ ς   ρ ἡ     τὸ  Ν  ίου    ρο    ὶ  σ   π ά ου (τρ   ο τ ρο ρω ) ο ς  
 χουσ   π ρὶ       ρ   έ   τ ς Θ  ίσ- 
του   ρί ος,   ς ( τ ) β , ἐφʼ ὧ  ἄρξ  [ . ἄρξ  ] τ ς   σθ σ ως   σπόρος   ἐ   
τ῵     [l.    ] ( τ  )   ς τὸ ϛ  [ .   ϛ ] ( τος), ἐ φορίου τὴ  (ἄρουρ  )  
  άσ- 
4 τ   (πυρ῵ ) ( ρτ β῵ )   , τὸ    τ ρο  ( τος) (πυρ῵ ) ( ρτ β῵ )   𐅵´,   ὶ  
τ ς συ  ρ φ ς τ ς   σθ σ ως     ορ υο σ ς   ί  υ ο  
 π ὴ   βρόχου   ὶ   τ βρόχου, ἡ  υ  τὴ σπ ρ     ἕως  οί χ   , τὴ   ὲ  ὴ  
 υ  τὴ  σπ ρ     ἕως   
τοῦ  οί χ, π ρ   βό τ <ς> Δ  ήτρ ο    ὶ ἄ  ους  ο  οὺς ἄ  ρ ς   ·  
ἡ    (l. ἡ ῵ )  ὲ π ρ    β  ό τω  
Δ  ήτρ ο  ὅπως π ρ   ίξω      τ῵  τὴ   ὴ  υ  τὴ  σπ ρ    , ο   
προσέσχ     ἡ ῵ , βου ό- 
8    ος π ρ συ  ρ φ   , τ   ὲ ὅρ   ἡ     ἃ π ρέ   ξ   ἐφʼ οἷς    
συ   {  } ρά   θ  ο  β β  ο .  έο  θά σου, 
β σ   ῦ, προστάξ   Δ οφά    τ῵  στρ τ  ῵   ράψ   Μ   ά ρ  [l.  
Μ   ά ρω ] τ῵  ἐπ στ<άτ>       ς Βουβάστου  ποσ- 
 τ      τὸ  Δ  ήτρ ο  ἐπὶ Δ [ο]φά    τὸ  στρ τ  ὸ    ί, ἐ   ἐ    ξ   θ   
τ      τ ς ἐ τ  ξ - 
ως ὄ τ     θ , ἐπ     άσ     τὸ  τὸ  ί   ο  ἡ     ὑποσχ   . το του  ὲ  
   ο έ ου, 
12 ἐσό  θ  τοῦ     ίου τ τ υχότ ς.   τ χ  . 
 
To King Ptolemy from Thedotos, Gaddaios, and Phanias, greetings.  
   We are being wronged by a certain Demetrios. He let us the klēros of Nikias and 
Asklepiades, the 30-arourai holders in the village of Herakleia in the Themistos 
division, for two years, on the condition that the lease begin with the sowing of the 
25
th
 year for (harvesting in) the 26
th
, with the rent being 3 artabai of wheat for each 
aroura, and 3.5 artabai of wheat for the second year. And the syngraphē of misthōsis 
states: ―guaranteed against risk, apart from drought or flood—the part which can be 
sown before the 10
th
 of Choiak—(they will inspect?) whatever part cannot be sown 
before the 10
th
 of Choiak, after having called in Demetrios and three mutually 
acceptible men.‖ Although we are trying to call in Demetrios to show him that it 
cannot be sown, he has paid us no mind, wishing to break the contract; and he does not 
guarantee the boundaries which he showed us on the terms for which we contracted. 
We beg you, King, to order Diophanes the stratēgos to write to Meleager the epistatēs 





if we are vindicated as to the truth of the allegations in this petition, to force him to 
uphold our right. If this comes about, we will have obtained justice. Farewell. 
 
 
According to their syngraphē, if the lessees were unable to sow before the 10th of Choiak 
because of a poor inundation they were to have the evidence of this condition certified by 
Demetrios and three mutually acceptible witnesses. In this connection, it is important to note 
that lessees in this period generally appear to have assumed inundation risk by default.
482
 This 
explains why the lessees made sure to quote the part of their contract in which the risk had 
been explicitly assumed by Demetrios. The risk, however, had been imperfectly transferred, 
for the drafting of the verification process left the lessees with the responsibility of bringing 
the evidence of force majeure to Demetrios‘s attention (6: π ρ   βό τ <ς>). Demetrios, 
however, had every reason not to verify the level of the innundation, since this left the tenants 
responsible for the full rent. Poorly matched to his incentives, then, was the apparent lack of 
any positive responsibility on his part to make sure that the verification took place. In other 
words, careless drafting opened up a loophole for Demetrios, and in the event he seemed to be 
trying to slip through it ... by doing nothing. Indeed, all he had to do was to make himself 
scarce for a relatively short while. The 10
th
 of Choiak, or Jan. 25, represented what the parties 
evidently saw as the last possible sowing date for a full harvest, coming as it did at the end of 
the sowing season.
483
 The petition is dated to Jan. 28, or three days after the date set for 
sowing or modification, and soon the evidence of a poor inundation would quite literally 
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evaporate as the flood progressively subsided, leaving the leasees at a disadvantage in any 
subsequent arbitration or litigation.  
Once we recall that almost all contracts in this period defined breach in terms of 
specific actions, the legal problem before the lessees comes into sharper relief. Given the way 
early Ptolemaic (not to mention fourth-century) contracts were drafted, breach claims were 
necessarily more likely to revolve around concrete questions of terms and facts than intentions 
(cf. the strategy in Dem. 56 in Sec. 5.2). All a judge or jury need ask was: is a certain action or 
forbearance stipulated in the contract? And if so, did the defendant do or not do that action? If 
this contract, like others in this era, carried no general breach clause, Demetrios could 
plausibly claim that he was required merely to perform or forbear from only those actions 
specified in the contract, with no residual obligation to abide by the spirit of the contract as 
such. He could thus interpret the lease as saying that he had no positive responsibilities in the 
verification process as it was written. (Of course, he would no doubt have put it rather 
differently, e.g., that the defendants failed to inform him in a timely manner.)  
Telling in this regard is the lessees‘ second claim, that Demetrios had failed to 
guarantee the boundaries of the klēros (8: τ   ὲ ὅρ   ἡ     ἃ π ρέ   ξ   ἐφʼ οἷς 
συ   {  } ρά   θ  ο  β β  ο ). The lease, it seems, like many or most Ptolemaic leases 
included a bebaiōsis-clause, to which the plaintiffs hoped to hold Demetrios accountable.484 
Why not simply rely on this claim? It may have been dubious, or hard to prove, but I suspect 
that the real reason was that it was simply not  a compelling counter-claim to an accusation of 
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manifest failure to sow. Indeed, one rather suspects that this second claim was tacked on 
precisely because it was a defined violation of the contract, whereas ―breach‖ was not.485 In 
the end, however, it seems that the lessees and their scribe thought Demetrios better charged 
with the real offense of malicious avoidance, even if it was not explicitly covered in the 
contract. This, then, was the legal problem facing the plaintiffs: Demetrios‘s act of breach 
was, strictly speaking, no act at all within the world of the syngraphē.  
This dilemma is reflected in the rhetoric and strategy of the lessees‘ petition, as they 
accuse Demetrios of ―wishing to breach the contract‖ (βου ο   ος π ρ συ  ρ φ   ). This 
charge is balanced by their presentation of the contract as still in force: having done nothing 
yet, Demetrios cannot properly be said to have breached; similarly, they themselves are even 
now still trying to get Demetrios to participate in the validation mechanism (note the conative 
present participle in the genitive absolute).
486
 Significantly, it is the legal inadequacy of the 
contract as a framework for the transaction that forces the plaintiffs to argue in terms of 
breach per se. The plaintiffs opted for parasyngraphein over a word like parabainein for the 
obvious reason that parabainein conceptually and grammatically took as its object one of the 
terms of the contract, and this is precisely what they cannot claim: Demetrios is ―breaking the 
contract,‖ not ―transgressing one of its ennumerated boundaries.‖ Instead, the want to hold 
him accountable for his attitude towards the contract as a written instrument and themselves 
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effect not ―guaranteeing‖ the land by not participating in the verification and modification procedure. 
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 Cf. the note by Guéraud, P.Enteux. 59, note to line 6, p. 143. Compare the insensitivty ofTcherikover and Fuks to 





as contract partners. The arguments for general breach and imminent breach (i.e., the 
importance of intention) collapse in the intransitive and totalizing verb parasyngraphein. One 
can easily see how it was this sort of distinction that eventually allowed the word to come to 
mean ―material breach‖ as opposed to ―breach‖ in the Alexandrian synchōrēseis (Sec. 5.1). 
The first attested contract to include the term is P.Petr. II 47 (Arsinoite, 210/209 BCE; 
App. III, no. 2). The contents are rather murky due to the condition of the papyrus, but the 
document appears to represent a settlement over a loan that had already been litigated in some 
fashion.
487
 The settlement agreement ends: 
 
20            ...[  ὶ  ὴ ἐξ       
Δο ο άζ    ή   Ἱστ  ίω  π ρὶ τ῵  χρ[  άτω     ή ο ς]  
ἐπ  θ   , ἐπ ό τ  [ ὲ -ca.?- ἐ    έ τ ς  
π ρ συ  ρ φήσ     ὶ  ὴ ἐ   ί    τ[     ο ο ί   
24 ἥ τ   φο ος   τ῵  ἄ υρος  στω   ὶ προσ[ ποτ σάτω 
   ἐπ πορ υ[ό   ος -ca.?- ] ...  
 
... [and it is not permitted] to Donomazis (i.e., the debtor) or to Istiaios (i.e., the 
creditor) to sue [each other] over the money ... [but if anyone (i.e. either)] 
breaches or does not abide by [the agreement], let his suit be invalid and let the 
one initiating the suit pay an additional fine ... 
 
The principal transaction of this syngraphē was one of mutual forebearance: the parties agree 
not to litigate over the disputed loan. Parasyngraphein, in other words, is not communicating 
general breach as in the previous instance, but instead constitutes a specific action, for in this 
contract there was nothing to ―do‖ beyond abiding (emmenein) by the agreement recorded in 
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the syngraphē. After a fashion, then, the syngraphē was the transaction.488 Though different in 
scope, this ―specific‖ use of the verb here shares with the first case the facts that: (a) in neither 
instance does it govern a direct object, but is used either absolutely or with the opposite party 
as the indirect object; and (b) both emphasize, though in different ways, the syngraphē as a 
totality.  
 The next use of the verb comes in P.Mich. III 182 (App. III, no. 3).
489
 This document 
performs two legal functions, a fact reflected in its broken-backed construction.
490
 The 
contract is drafted as a homologia between three lessees of a woman named Eirene and her 
creditor Nikandros. Specifically, the lessees acknowledge that they are obliged to pay the rent 
owed to Eirene to Nikandros or his agents, at his discretion, on the rent schedule of the 
underlying leases, which is reiterated for confirmation. Then follows a penalty clause, in 
which the lessees must either pay the rent ―according to what has been written,‖ or pay 
whatever they owe immediately with hēmiolion. The remainder of the contract is given over 
to obligations established between Nikandros and Eirene. First, if the lessees ―in no way break 
the contract‖ (32-33:   θὲ   ὲ π ρ συ  ρ φο  τω    - | τ῵ ), Nikandros is to receive the 
rent as payment on Eirene‘s loan. Second, if any portion of the rent cannot be paid by the 
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 Cf. Secs. 5.4.1-5.4.2. 
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 This document belongs to an archive that has been re-assigned to the lessees Leontiskos and his associates by the 
editors of Trismegistos, having previously been seen as having belonged to the lessor Eirene (Seidl 1962, following 
Westermann, Keyes, and Liebesney, the editors of P.Col. IV). The best discussion of the larger context for this 
contract and Eirene‘s financial arrangements is still to be found in P.Col. IV, pp. 194-202, cf. n332 above on P.Col. 
IV 121. 
490
 Formally, it is a ―Homologie in Syngrapheform, ohne Zeugen‖ (Rupprecht 1967: 65n6; on homologiai and 
syngraphai and objectivity vs. subjectivity of style, see Mitteis 1912: 72-75; Von Soden 1973: 3-7). There are some 





lessees due to certain specified circumstances, like crop failure, Eirene is to pay the difference 
and Nikandros will cancel the mortgage. Finally, if Nikandros receives the payments but does 
not credit them or cancel the mortgage, he must pay a penalty to Eirene.  
Although it is a bit jarring to move from a series of infinitives dependent on 
homologein to a series of independent conditionals concerning parties who are not the subjects 
of the head verb, there is no break in the homologia formally: many early notarial homologiai 
exhibit the same grammatical structure (e.g., BGU VI 1262 [Oxyrhynchos, 216/215 BCE]; 
P.Tebt. 105, App. III, no. 11). Substantively, however, the first legal transaction ends with the 
first penalty clause. That is to say, it would be odd for the lessees to acknowledge new 
obligations constituted between Nikandros and Eirene over the recording and crediting of 
payments towards a mortgage in which they had no interest, and in fact they do not do so. 
Rather, the second half of the contract is, as described above, in effect a homology between 
Nikandros and Eirene, which erects a set of rules to safeguard Eirene‘s interests in the 
payment scheme. Under this arrangement, Nikandros has no legal obligation to the lessees, 
but is obliged under penalty to credit the payments towards Eirene‘s loan (44-52). This second 
transaction between Eirene and Nikandros could have been recorded in a separate document, 
but the parties economized on paperwork by having the new, three-way deal embodied in one 
contract.
491
 This contract thus aims to connect and in part supersede two sets of prior 
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 For the legal problems associated with substitution or assignment of obligations in the papyri, see Wenger 1906: 
esp. 186-209, 237-59; Weber 1932:  46-60, 63-70, 75-93. P.Mich. III 182 is positively schizophrenic when 
compared to the more unified examples discussed in the works above, cf. the example of P.Oxy. IV 728 below 
(n504). Wolff 1957: 59n77 suggests that there was a separate agreement between Nikandros and Eirene (i.e., besides 






contracts, a series of lease syngraphai issued by Eirene to the lessees (19-22) and her loan 
agreement with Nikandros (9, 13). The convenience of the arrangement is clear, but there are 
legal problems to solve: (a) establishing Nikandros‘s legal claim against the lessees; (b) 
establishing Eirene‘s claim against Nikandros with respect to his responsibilities under the 
rent-transfer scheme; and (c) extinguishing certain of Eirene‘s claims against the lessees under 
the old leases.  
Technically speaking, there was no need to solve the first problem legally: Eirene 
could have simply told her lessees to pay Nikandros. We may compare in this connection 
P.Tebt. II 593 (Arsinoite, 115/116), which contains a letter ordering a tenant to pay a third 
party. In this case, the order no doubt sufficed: the landlord merely told his geōrgos to pay his 
brothers, and likely this arrangement was never legally formalized.
492
 Eirene could also have 
asked her lessees to be party to a homology directed to her to the same effect if she wanted to 
hold them legally responsible for getting the payments to Nikandros. Nikandros, however, 
wanted a direct legal connection to the lessees: they were to understand that they were 
obligated to follow his directions when it came to payment. This was, in fact, a typical move 
made by loan assignees.
493
 In this case, however, there was not even the fiction of a loan to 
rely on, and therefore no question of establishing an obligation on a real basis: the land and 
the leases were still Eirene‘s. Nikandros therefore had them execute a homologia. Though 
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 Orders assumed in Digest. 
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conceptually very different, the homologia was, like the Roman stipulatio, well suited to the 
recording of idiosyncratic, unilateral obligations.
494
  
Given the decision to formalize the new arrangement as a homologia between 
Nikandros and the lessees, Eirene‘s order was transformed into an endorsement. This we have 
in P.Mich. III 183, dated to the next day: a simple cheirographic statement of consent 
(synchōrein) and a promise not to sue the lessees—in effect a waiver of the right to sue on the 
strict terms of the original leases.
495
 This was necessary not only because P.Mich. III 182 
affected a contract to which she was party (i.e., the leases, hence the consent), but also 
because the lessees needed to be released from the responsibilities and liabilities which had 
now been transferred to Nikandros (hence the waiver, satisfying the third legal problem). 
Otherwise, one can imagine that the lessees could legally be held liable to two penalties for 
the same default. 
Like most assignments, Nikandros had not only the debt (i.e., the rent payments) 
transferred from the original contract to himself, but the benefits of breach as well (i.e., the 
first penalty clause).
496
 There are, as we recall, two mentions of breach in P.Mich. III 182. In 
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 Only one assigned loan of the Ptolemaic period was drafted as a homologia: P.Adler 4 (Ptolemais, 109 BCE). Yet 
―[i]n unseren Urkunden [i.e., loans] wurde das Gewicht mehr auf den Akt der Auszahlung als auf die Erklärung der 
Schuldners empfangen zu haben oder zu schulden gelegt‖ (Rupprecht 1967: 136); hence most ―novated‖ or 
―delegated‖ loans in the Ptolemaic periods were accordingly drafted as ―real‖ loans typically were, i.e., as protocols. 
There was, however, no typical form for the redirection of rent, and since Nikandros was not taking over the lease 
(see below), this left the homologia as the most appropriate form. 
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 Cf. Wolff 1978: 164-66, who notes that this is our earliest example of a ―hypographic cheirographon.‖ The 
addition of the waiver, however, strikes me as going beyond the function of a subscription. Cf. Secs. 5.4.1-2. 
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 This was not merely a matter of establishing a legal obligation: the penalty could have been left to Eirene to 
collect in the case of default. Penalties were real sources of revenue in antiquity, as indeed they are to contemporary 
banks, credit card companies, and cell phone providers. We know of abuses in the attempts to increase revenue from 





the first instance, breach is defined as a failure to pay ―according to what has been written ...‖ 
(29: ἐ    ὲ  ὴ  πο ῵σ    θʼ ἃ  έ ρ πτ    τ .). If we compare contemporary leases, e.g., 
those found in BGU VI, we find that (a) breach by the lessee was typically defined precisely 
by the phrase found in this contract, i.e., in terms of payment of rent, which was balanced by 
the lessor‘s obligation to confirm (bebaioun) the lease or pay a penalty;497 and (b) that these 
leases nevertheless often included multiple terms beyond payment of rent and guarantees of 
tenancy.
498
 Occasionally, the terms of lessee-breach are more attentive to the specific terms of 
the lease (e.g., BGU VI 1266 [Takona, 203/202 BCE], line 26: ἐ    ὲ  ὴ  πο όσ  ἢ  ὴ 
  τ στήσωσ     θ’ ὃ    έ ρ πτ    τ .; and the strikingly specific P.Ryl. IV 583 
[Philadelphia, 170 BCE], with a breach clause to match, line 19: [ἐ    ὲ  ὴ π ρ]   ίξ   ἢ  ὴ 
ἐπ τ [ ]   ἕ  στ  τ[῵]   ρ[ ω ]   τ     ρὸ  ἢ  ίπ   τὴ   ίσθωσ    τ .); but, more often 
than not, the only verb defining breach before the middle of the second century BCE, 
regardless of the content of the contract, was apodidōmi. By all indications, then, Nikandros 
had the breach clause of the original lease syngraphē transferred to this new agreement more 
or less verbatim, along with the only terms that were specifically relevant to his homologia, 
i.e., the rent schedule, so as to give particular force to the penalty clause phraseology. 
                                                                                                                                                             
creditors refusing to accept repayment in order to collect penalties or extort a portion of them from debtors. 
(Balanced against this, however, was the cost of malicious prosecution by debtors, cf. another decree of Mamertinus, 
reiterated by Valerius Eudaimon (142-143) in P.Oxy. II 237 viii.7-18). We should therefore see the assigning of the 
penalty to Nikandros as part of the price of the mortgage. 
497
 Cf. Berger 1911: 149-65; Hermann 1958b: 145-48. 
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The second breach clause comes in the condition attached to Nikandros‘s obligation to 
Eirene: if lessees do not ―breach in any way‖ (  θὲ  π ρ συ  ρ φο  τω    τ῵ ), he will 
credit the payments against Eirene‘s loan or pay her a penalty. But why parasyngraphein? 
And, does this genitive absolute refer to the terms of the underlying lease, or the obligations 
embodied in the present homologia?   
We might first wish to ask whether or not it was copied from the underlying leases, as 
the penalty clause appears to have been. In a handful of subsequent Ptolemaic leases from the 
second-century Arsinoite (App. III, nos. 5, 11, and 12) parasyngraphein is added as a general 
breach clause, very like what may have stood the contract at issue in Dem. 56: ἐ   ... ἢ ἄ  ο 
τ  π ρ συ  ρ φῇ vel sim. In these Ptolemaic documents it always appears as a covering 
term additional to the lessee‘s payment requirement and/or the lessor‘s guarantee requirement 
(SB III 7188.35-36; P.Tebt. I 105.34, 43; 106.29; cf. SB XIV 11969.13 [App. III, no. 4]). We 
also find the phrase    ὲ /  θὲ  π ρ συ  ρ φ    vel sim. in SB III 7188.32 (where it 
seems to refer to both parties mutually) and SB XIV 11969.23, as well as several subsequent 
documents (though not all leases: App. III, nos. 17, 18, 23, 37, 38, 42, 53, 54, 57, and 63).
499
 
In PSI X 1098 (no. 23: an Arsinoite lease from 51 BCE), the phrase even appears in a genitive 
absolute before a penalty clause (cf. no. 31). From these examples is it obvious that the verb 
was simply added to the normal template of specific breach. Unfortunately, we have strikingly 
few leases from the first century BCE with which to determine the relative frequency of its 
appearance or the precise date or place of its introduction. On the other hand, BGU XIV 2389 
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(Herakleopolite, 72 BCE) and SB XII 10942 (Oxyrhynchos, 4 BCE) show that the custom of 
drafting leases without provisions against general breach continued until the turn of the 
millennium and beyond.
500
 On balance, then, the early date of P.Mich. III 182 suggests that 
whereas a version of the first penalty clause with apodidōmi stood in the underlying lease, the 
parasyngrapein did not, the first attestation in a lease being some thirty years later in no. 5 
(154 BCE). 
If the verb was not simply imported from the underlying documents, we might 
reasonably wonder whether it was used here not for general breach, as it would be used in 
leases, but with specific force, as it appears to have been in P.Petr. II 47 above. In fact,  there 
are a series of circumstantial clues that together point in this direction. First,   θʼ ἃ 
 έ ρ πτ   in the first penalty clause is (obviously) plural. This could be interpreted either as 
reflecting the plurality of the underlying leases (19-20), or as including the leases and the 
present homologia, a reading supported by Eirene‘s subsequent endorsement, P.Mich. III 
183.7-8: [ὑ ῵ ] πο σά τω  (sic)   τ    τ  τ ς συ  ρ φάς. Eirene explicitly agrees to the 
new terms of the homologia and makes her waiver conditional on the lessee ―acting in 
accordance with the syngraphai,‖ which, given the contents of her endorsement, obviously 
includes P.Mich. III 182 (styled a syngraphē in line 52). Moreover, πο  σά τω  τ    τ  
τ ς συ  ρ φάς is the positive formulation and the functional equivalent of   θὲ  
π ρ συ  ρ φο  τω    τ῵  in P.Mich. III 182.501 Second, we have seen that the verb 
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could used to mean a ―breach against the contract as such‖ (P.Enteux. 59), but was first 
inscribed in the text of a contract denoting a specific act of breach (P.Petr. II 47). In neither 
case did it govern an express direct object (cf. Dem. 56), as it would later when it was 
assimilated to parabainein. Nor does it do so here in P.Mich. III 182 (I take   θέ  here, and 
originally, as an adverbial accusative, i.e., ―in no way, at all‖; later   θέ  is clearly conceived 
of as the direct object as the verb increasingly came to be thought of as transitive, e.g., App. 
III, nos. 37, 38, 42, and esp. 52 and 53). Third, while the penalty clause as a whole serves 
Eirene‘s interests, it is itself conditional: Nikandros‘s obligation to act is predicated on the 
lessees‘ fulfilling their obligations. It is hard to see what interest he had in their doing 
anything but paying him rent: everything else was Eirene‘s concern. Nor would she want his 
recording the payments based on their fulfilling all the other requirements of her lease. The 
genitive absolute, then, is Nikandros‘s condition, and it therefore makes most sense to see 
parasyngraphein as referring to those terms in which he had the most interest, which were not 
those of the underlying leases, but of the present homologia.  
Wolff understood this document not to be a ―contract in the strictest sense,‖ but rather 
―the confirmation of an arrangment agreed to by the three parties, dressed up in a quasi-
sollemnized form.‖502 His judgment was based on two grounds. First, although called a 
syngraphē (line 52), and so almost certainly drafted by the agoranomos, this document is 
nevertheless missing several elements characteristic of contemporary agoranomic instruments, 
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including the long dating formula, the concluding signalments of the parties, and the 
registration marks. Second, and more important still for him, was the absence of the praxis-
clause, or the clause by which liability to execution was understood to attach.
503
 Missing this 
clause, Wolff understood this contract to have no teeth: without the right to proceed to praxis, 
there was no collecting the prescribed penalties. Liability thus remained attached to the 
underlying contracts, and failure to perform by the lessee would set off a chain-reaction of 
reliance on previously established liability. In other words, Nikandros could claim the penalty 
pursuant to breach of this contract, but would be unable to collect personally. Instead, he 
would have to declare Eirene in default and rely on his praxis-clause against her to threaten 
foreclosure in order to pressure her to threaten to exercise her praxis-clause against the lessees 
when she dunned them for the penalty.  
Wolff‘s is a characteristically trenchant analysis, and one which is superior to those 
that have seen it a contractus in favorem tertii.
504
 Wolff is no doubt correct in the essentials of 
his interpretation, but there is an irony in his reconstruction: in the act of denying it the status 
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 Cf. Wolff 1941: 429-32 on contracts missing praxis-clauses (where he does not discuss this document).  
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 E.g., Taubenschlag 1955: 401, with previous literature. The main comparandum usually adduced is P.Oxy. IV 
728 (Thosbis, 142). This document is a private protocol drafted by two lessees who sell part of their future crop to a 
buyer on the condition that he pay the purchase money to the landlord as the lessee-sellers‘ rent. The landlord gets 
the express right to both a penalty and praxis over the buyer if he fails to pay. Certainly, the impression is that it was 
the landlord who arranged the sale in the first place, since the lessees retain no right against the purchaser and the 
receipt that is appended to contract is made out directly to the purchaser by the landlord (cf. Berger 1911: 147n4 on 
internal confusion of the nature of the transaction). Nevertheless, this is a contract still written from the perspective 
of the assignors for the benefit of the assignee, who is not party to the contract, while P.Mich. III 182 is drafted from 
the perspective of the assignee, for the benefit of the assignor, who is not formally party to the contract—even 
though it is an assignment! In the end, however, the comparison fails largely because of the underlying assumption 
that Hellenistic contracts observed the same rules of privity as Roman (or modern) contracts. Praxis was routinely 
assigned to third parties (Wolff 1941), and on this score P.Oxy. IV 728 is not exceptional (except perhaps in the 





a true contract, he demonstrates precisely how it worked. True, Nikandros might not have 
been able to pursue the lessees in P.Mich. III 182 on the strength of this document alone; but 
then, he did not have to: the homologia superseded the underlying contracts, but only in part, 
as was intended. Indeed, those underlying contracts were the necessary foundations on which 
this one was built. Legally inelegant and slip-shod, perhaps, but eminently workable, or it so 
seems from events. As it turned out, the lessees did default, as we know from P.Col. IV 121 
and 122 (Krokodilopolis, Jan. and Feb. 181 BCE, resp.), both threats of arrest by a govenment 
official for non-payment of taxes owed by the lessees as required by their lease, though 
unrelated to payment scheme in P.Mich. III 182.
505
 Regarding the loan, Eirene‘s accounts 
show that a year later she paid ten talents     [σ] τὴ  ὑποθή    Ν  ά  ρω  (P.Mich. III 
200r.30)—no doubt part or all of the balance she agreed to pay according to the second 
condition set out in P.Mich. III 182.37-43. No word about any penalties assessed, 
unfortunately, but then if the failure was due to one of the three stipulated conditions in this 
rule, there would have been no penalties levied.  
P.Mich. III 182 may not have been a stand-alone contract, but it was not designed to 
be; rather, it was designed to be a viable and enforceable framework to get something done. 
There are, in fact, several ―arrangements‖ in the papyri, each missing a key component of 
what might make for legal enforceability, like praxis-clauses.
506
 This does not mean that they 
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were conceived of as unenforceable, actually or legally (though they might have been). Such 
contracts are, as a rule, understudied, but in some ways represent the cutting edge of contract 
as an institution, demonstrating a confidence in contractual frameworks as a social technology 
capable of ordering a variety of social and economic transactions.
507
  
In this section, we have interpreted the first three instances of parasyngraphein, these 
being the first three recorded instances of the concept of breach of contract per se. The first 
(P.Enteux. 59) was fairly close to its use in Dem. 56, in that it was intransitive and a charge 
leveled at the party in breach. Even so, it seems to have acquired a quasi-technical coloring, 
constituting a charge in and of itself (one might imagine parabainein being used in a similar 
context a century earlier in Athens). Significantly, we see it used precisely because the 
defendant is alleged to engage in acts that are intended to undercut the purpose for which the 
contract was drafted, but which do not therefore contravene its express terms. Subsequent 
contracts added parasyngraphein as a covering term for general breach in an effort to capture 
and define such actions as breach. P.Enteux. 59, then, stands at the head of the major tradition 
of the inscription of general breach in the contracts of Greco-Roman Egypt.  
The other two instances, P.Petr. II 47 and P.Mich. III 182, use parasyngraphein to 
denote a form or specific breach. In these cases, the contracts have no underlying material 
component (as in a lease or a loan, where property is handed over), but dispose of rights in a 
form of mutual cession wherein the transaction is the contract itself. In P.Petr. II 47, the 
transaction was the mutual forbearance from litigation, and in P.Mich. III 183, it was the 
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mutual agreement of three parties to abide by an ―arrangement.‖ These documents thus stand 
at the other head of the breach tradition, representing the specific use of parasyngraphein. 
Unlike general breach, this branch does not survive much beyond the reign of Augustus. 
Though one is general and the other specific, both uses of parasyngraphein recognize, and in 
a sense depend on, a notion of the totality of contract or contract per se. In fact, one might 
hypothesize that the abstract notion of contract as such, as something larger than merely the 
sum of its clauses or terms, was first grasped in the experience of an unanticipated breach, and 





5.4 Parasyngraphein and Later Ptolemaic and Roman Contracts 
A brief glance at Appendix III suggests that a change in drafting practice with respect to the 
inscription of breach took place around the turn of the second century BCE. In contrast to the 
three or four attestations in contracts from the turn of the third century down to the last quarter 
of the second, we count 16 or 17 instances in contracts (or oaths attached to contracts) 
between the last quarter of the second century and the end of Ptolemaic rule, primarily in 
Herakleopolite and Oxyrhynchite cessions, but also in a handful of miscellaneous contracts 
from the Delta, the Arsinoite, and Memphis. This is a significant trend, since the HGV records 
more contracts for the second century than the first in absolute terms, even as the number of 
total documents climbs in the first (i.e., a relative decline in the frequency of contracts as a 
percentage of the corpus as a whole, suggesting that we have an higher frequency of 
parasyngraphein in what is effectively a smaller sample).
508
  
Thus far we have seen two uses of parasyngraphein in the papyri, both different 
modes of the same concept. In the third and early second century BCE, the verb denoted either 
a breach of syngraphē in a general sense (P.Enteux. 59) or a specific act of breach in contracts 
where the transaction was the promise to abide by the rules embodied in the syngraphē 
(P.Petr. II 47). Over the course of the second century the general use grows in popularity as 
the verb came to be added to the specific obligations set out in leases as a covering term (App. 
III, nos. 4, 5, 11, 12, and 23; and we should recall that our very first attestation [no. 1] refers 
to a lease). To these instances we may also adduce at least one non-lease example: SB VI 8974 
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(no. 14). One of the clearest instances of this trend comes in no. 13, a loan in the form of a 
six-witness protocol from Memphis in which breach is described in traditionally specific 
terms (18-19: ἐ    ὲ  ὴ  πο ῵    θό(τ )    έ ρ πτ  ), but the Fiskalmult is characterized, 
uniquely for the Ptolemaic period, as a ―fine for breach paid to the royal (treasurey)‖ (24: τοῦ 
π ρ συ  ρ φ      ς τὸ β σ    ὸ  ἐπίτ  ο ).509  
Over this same period one may continue to see instances of the specific use of the 
verb. Indeed, I will argue that the idea and practice of inscribing breach fostered of new type 
of consensual contract in Greco-Roman Egypt, one which was based on the idea of mutual 
cession and articulated by the specific use of parasyngraphein. I will call these contracts 
―transactional agreements,‖ since the agreement, or more properly the syngraphē which 
recorded it, was seen as the transaction, hence the appropriateness of proscribing 
parasyngraphē (5.4.2). These contracts were not the product of theory, but practice, being 
nothing more than an ingenious adaptation of a pre-existing document type (the 
Abstandsurkunde with the Nichtangriffsklausel) to a new and more sophisticated purpose 
(5.4.1). This early association of parasyngraphein and the Nichtangriffsklausel becomes a 
standard feature of sales and cession contracts, and it is this association and its ossification in 
scribal models that accounts for the majority of the attestations of parasyngraphein between 
100 BCE-100 CE.  
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explore the relationship between breach and the Fiskalmult in another place, since it needs to be explained in light of 





The history of the verb from the early second century to the end of the Ptolemaic era 
goes some way to explaining the Alexandrian practice of using parasyngraphein in contra-
distinction to parabainein when drafting clauses for ―material breach‖ (pp. 240ff.). 
Parasyngraphein was both the original word for breach and the most specific, relating to the 
syngraphē as such. It was therefore available for the meaning of ―material breach,‖ or more 
properly ―breach of the whole contract‖ or ―breach of the contract itself.‖ As time wore on, 
however, parasyngraphein not only lost its original and distinctive significance, but was 
supplanted even in its more general meaning by parabainein. By the early first century CE, it 
appeared only in certain types of contracts based on older, Ptolemaic models.  
In order to explain the pattern of fossilization in the later Ptolamaic and Roman 
periods, we need to explore the specific us of parasyngraphein, since the tradition of general 
breach was clearly taken over by parabainein. When not used as a covering verb, 
parasyngraphein appears in two closely related sub-catagories of the specific use: (i) 
instances in which the verb appears in connection with the so-called Nichtangriffsklausel;
510
 
and (ii) those in which it relates to the breach of a transactional agreement. The two are close 
cousins, since the transactional agreement represents an outgrowth or new application of the 
Nichtangriffsklausel.  
The Nichtangriffsklausel is in essence a declaration or promise of one party (usually a 
seller or creditor) that he or she will not take legal action against the other party (usually a 
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buyer or the debtor) with the words  ὴ ἐπ  θ    or  ὴ ἐ        or both.511 It was followed by 
the assertion that any  φο ος was ἄ υρος and that the party in breach would be liable to an 
additional fine (προσ ποτί    ), which usually consisted of a penalty and the Fiskalmult.512 
The clause appears in all manner of cessions, quit-claims, and receipts, almost all drafted as 
homologies. There is a clear connection between the legal renunciation embodied in the Greek 
Nichtangriffsklausel and the demotic cession document sh n wj (known in Greek as a 
συ  ρ φὴ  ποστ σίου, whence the German Abstandsurkunde), but the relationship is not 
one of mechanical adoption or translation, as Schwartz has shown.
513
 One of the principal 
differences is that from the very outset the Nichtangriffsklausel characteristic of the Greek 
syngraphē apostasiou was recorded as a homologia, whereas the demotic Abstandsurkunde 
was in the protocol format. There is a long and deep juristic discussion about the legal nature 
and history of these documents and their relationship to each other, for which the present 
discussion has a certain significance. My present interest, however, is to explain the pattern of 
usage and likely meaning of parasyngraphein so that we may recover something of the moral 
valence of breach. With that in mind, we begin with the observation that there is a strong 
connection between documents that carry the Nichtangriffsklausel, the homologia format, and 
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the verb parasyngraphein (see App. III). Since the basis of the transactional agreement is the 






5.4.1 Parasyngraphein and the Nichtangriffsklausel 
 
The earliest witness to the association between parasyngraphein and the Nichtangriffsklausel 
is P.Petr. II 47 (see pp 275f. above). This document at once a receipt (cf.  πέχ    in line 7) 
and something more than a receipt, since it clearly goes beyond the usual acknowledgement of 
money and the penalty is, atypically for receipts, bilateral. The next relevant document is 
P.Köln IX 366 (App. III, no. 6), a late second-century homology recording the receipt of a 
loan. After confirming receipt (3:  πέχ   ), the document continues with the 
Nichtangriffsklausel, as is typical of all receipts.
514
 Then follows a penalty clause, which 
begins ἐ    ὲ Δ  ήτρ ος π ρ[ ]- | συ  ρ φ῵  ἐπέ θῃ ἐπ   [  ῵]  [  τῶ] π  ρὶ [τ῵ ]   
προ   ρ   έ ω  ἢ ἄ  [ ος] τ  ς [τ῵ ] π  ρ ʼ  [  τοῦ] (14-16). No other Ptolemaic receipt 
after this date uses parasyngraphein.
515
 Instead, those Ptolemaic receipts with penality clauses 
(less than half: Rupprecht 1971: 19) characterize breach with the specific verbs of the 
Nichtangriffsklausel, either eperchesthai or epikalein or both, e.g., BGU XIV 2394 (Tholthis, 
216/215 BCE), P.Dion. 28-31, 35 (Hermopolite, 111-103 BCE), P.Würzb. 6 (Theadelphia, 102 
BCE), and P.Ryl. IV 588 (Krokodilopolis, 78 BCE). Similarly, in P.Köln IX 366 the main verb 
is the specific verb of the Nichtagriffsklausel, ἐπέ θῃ, which has been characterized by the 
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 On receipts, see, generally, Rupprecht 1971, and now the recent discussion in P.Heid. VII 399 and VIII 414. 
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 The next instance in a receipt is no. 25 from 14 BCE, or what appears to be a receipt for nursing wages in the form 
of an Alexandrian synchōrēsis. The receipt is complicated by the presence of a third party (cf. discussion in 
C.Pap.Gr. I, p. 56), and this may explain the presence of the verb in addition to the more usual parabainein (i.e., this 
was a receipt which was more of an agreement than most receipts, like P.Petr. II  47). Sadly, it is not complete, 
hampering any real analysis on this score. See BGU IV 1148 (Alexandria, 13 BCE) for a very close comparandum 





addition of the participle. Parasyngraphein thus adds nothing particular to the clause other 
than the coloring of eperchesthai as constituting ―breach of contract.‖  
This participial use of parasyngraphein is quite prominent and appears to be the 
manner in which it was first introduced, calqued onto older templates using specific verbs. In 
the oldest documents it qualifies, as we have just seen, eperchesthai vel sim. as breach (nos. 
15, 16, 25, 52), while in some Roman documents it modifies a phrase like ἐ    ὴ πο ῇ   θ  
 έ ρ πτ   (no. 39 and likely no. 40). These later documents demonstrate both the loss of 
specificity of the verb (for qualifying such a phrase is tautological), as well as the extent to 
which it had become normal to write breach expressly into contracts: as we saw above (p. 
267f.), earlier Ptolemaic contracts had drafted penalty clauses in similarly broad language as a 
summary term without such qualification. In other early documents, the participle is used 
proleptically to define the party in breach, designating him or her as   π ρ συ  ρ φ῵  vel 
sim (nos. 7-9, 10, 24, 26, 27, 31). Significantly, in the earliest examples (7-9, 10) the party in 
breach is specifically seen to be so in light of having broken the terms of the 
Nichtangriffsklausel, whereas in the later documents this specific association is often missing: 
  π ρ συ  ρ φ῵  is simply ―the party in breach.‖ In sum, it appears as if in all of the early 
examples the participle was added to the existing template as a way of writing breach into the 
contract, a counterpart to the addition of the covering term in leases, but here with specific 
attachment to the Nichtangriffsklausel.  
As stated at the beginning of this section, there is a connection between the 
Nichtangriffsklausel and the homologia form (again, see App. III). In the Ptolemaic period 





objects regularly complemented the protocols which recorded the sales proper. Such 
homologies included the Nichtangriffsklausel, fortified with a penalty.
516
 Similarly, most 
receipts of loans show the same pattern of protocol and homology, protocol for the loan and 
homology for the receipt. This general relationship between homology and protocol in the 
Ptolemaic period was elucidated by Schwartz in 1913, who concluded that the homologia was 
a form effectively restricted to certain kinds of transactions. Von Soden (1973) weakened the 
strong version of the thesis by showing that no such restriction existed with respect to the 
homology, i.e., it could be used for transactions Schwartz had thought the preserve of 
protocols (no one challenges the restriction of the protocol). The tight connection between the 
Nichtangriffsklausel and the homology, however, was confirmed.
517
 Also, as was clear in 
1913 and remains so today, the homology overtook the protocol over the course of the 
Ptolemaic period to become the dominant contractual form by the mid-first century CE.
518
 In 
other words, all kinds of transactions, with a very few exceptions, were increasingly drafted as 
declarations by one or both parties. In connection with this trend, we should that 
parasyngraphein is used as a word for general breach in the early Ptolemaic period 
exclusively in protocols (nos. 4, 5, 13, 14 and 23, perhaps no. 1?), whereas it is used as a verb 
of specific breach in homologies.  
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We may now hazard a guess as to why parasyngraphein first appears in leases 
describing general breach: these were contracts that (a) dealt with a real (material) transaction, 
and so were recorded as protocols (whereas transfers of rights were recorded as homologiai); 
and (b), they the most potential for unanticipated breach in that they were truly relational in a 
way that other transactions recorded in protocols, e.g., loans and sales, were not. The import 
of the second fact is that leases were contracts more prone to the loop-hole problem seen in 
P.Enteux. 59 than leases or sales, hence the need for the inscription of a general breach clause. 
The connection of the Nichtangriffsklausel with parasyngraphein and the homology, 
coupled with the historical success of the homology, explains the bulk of the attestations of 
parasyngraphein. The Nichtangriffsklausel was carried by the homology, which progressively 
became the preferred contractual form, and with the Nichtangriffsklausel came 
parasyngraphein. A full half (40) of the instances in Appendix III come in land cessions or 
sales. These documents are the descendants of templates for earlier homologies wherein the 
verb was associated with the Nichtangriffsklausel. With respect to cessions, our earliest 
examples are nos. 15 and 16, cession homologies from the early to mid-first century BCE 
Herakleopolite. The text of the penalty-clause at the end of the homology is by now familiar: 
ἐ    ὲ ί ω  ἢ ρ[ ]   ί  ς ἢ ἄ  ο ς ὑπ[ὲρ   τ῵ ]   π ρ συ  ρ  φ οῦ τ ς ἐπέ  θ ω σ  
ἐπὶ Δ ο  σ ο  ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς π ρʼ   τ[ο]ῦ ἐ    ῵    τῶ π ρ[ὶ τ]ο τω     θʼ ἃ   
  έ ρ πτ  ,  τ . (e.g., no. 16, BGU VIII 1733.17-19). Precisely as with P.Köln IX 366 
above, we here have parasyngraphein as a participle modifying the specific verb 
eperchesthai, as well as the equivalent verb, engkalein, following as a second qualifying 





significant exceptions in Sec. 5.7). The general case for sales is much the same: 
parasyngraphein appears right where we have come to expect it, in the breach formulation of 
the penalty clause after the Nichtangriff language, from our very first sale (no. 35) to our very 
last with the language in the fourth century (no. 80). These are all vestiges of time when this 
word was associated with independent homologiai carrying the Nichtangriffsklausel, a 





5.4.2 Parasyngraphein and the Transactional Agreement 
 
There are some contracts in which the Nichtangriffsklausel appears to have been put to greater 
work than the run-of-the-mill receipts and Abstandsurkunde cited above. These are what I 
have called ―transactional agreements.‖ The transactional agreement is neither an ancient nor 
a modern jursitic category, but my own term for a miscellany of highly particular or 
ideosyncratic arrangements (cf. P.Mich. III 182 above, pp. 276ff.), which nevertheless share 
one essential feature: the agreement itself is in a real sense both causa and solutio. 
Transactional agreements have typically been distributed by legal scholars into various sub-
categories or types. Berger (1911), for example, classes the documents discussed in this 
section and other like them variously as Quittungen, Teilungsverträge, 
Auseinanderseztungsurkunde, Zessionsurkunde and liberatorische Verträge. I have no quarrel 
with these sorts classifications for the purpose of modern analysis—and indeed some of them 
were the truly salient categories for ancients who used these contracts. That said, classification 
of this sort also tends obscure the similarities which existed between them at the level of 
contract (which Berger recognizes, e.g., 1911: 181, 188-89).
519
 As I will argue below, the 
transactional agreement represents an innovation on a basic set of contractual tools, turning a 
form of cession into a type of bilateral consensual contract. The bulk of transactional 
agreements are either Berger‘s Auseinanderseztungen, which are by nature heterogenous, or 
property divisions (    ρήσ  ς, Teilungsverträge), which form a coherent group. The latter 
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group is defined by a traditional ―transaction‖ which was re-inscribed as a transactional 
agreement, creating a ―type‖ of contract (see below, pp. 312ff.).  
The transactional agreement, which we first see in P.Petr. II 47 above (pp. 275f.), is a 
bilateral agreement to follow a roadmap embodied in a written contract, given legal force by 
the Nichtangriffsklausel cum penalty. Breach in these contracts was described by 
parasyngraphein, for these were contracts for which the charge of parasyngraphē was 
specifically relevant: it was the most appropriate verb for breach of the ―transaction,‖ which 
was the syngraphē. Indeed, just as the apodidonai reflected the core obligation stemming from 
an initial giving (didonai) in a contract for loan, so forbearance from parasyngraphein 
fulfilled the core obligation established by drafting a written accord (syngraphesthai).
520
  
Moreover, they are, as I will show, in essence consensual contracts, but not therefore 
executory contracts. By ―executory,‖ lawyers mean contracts in which binding promises have 
been exchanged, but part or all of the performance still lies in the future. For example, I may 
contract to buy your car for a set price a month from now, but if I rescind my offer next week, 
I would be liable (in a common law system) for damages on the theory that you relied (or 
should have been able to rely) on my promise, regardless of whether or not any property 
changed hands. A contract like P.Petr. II 47, or any other like it wherein the ―transaction‖ was 
the syngraphē, was not executory because it was in fact executed, as reflected by both the 
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agreement and the Nichtangriffsklausel. Both elements were effective from the moment the 
syngraphē was ratified, even as the obligations extended into the future. Or, put another way, 
performance began with ratification; there was no other defined moment or act of fulfillment, 
as one has in the example of the car sale.
521
  
I have already argued for just such an interpretation of P.Petr. II 47 and P.Mich. III 
182, that each represents a form of transactional agreement, fortified by the 
Nichtangriffsklausel. The next example is P.Tor.Amen. 5, a document drafted in 119 BCE 
which we can reasonably reconstruct on the basis of the legal documents used in its litigation 
(App. III, nos. 7-9, cf. App. II). The contract is called a  ο  ὴ   ο ο ί  by the parties 
(P.Tor.Amen 6.89; 7.7), who are two paraschistai, or embalmers.
522
 In this agreement, the 
embalmers divide up a territory as a shared monopoly.
523
 The contract is reprised at length in 
P.Tor.Amen. 8, where we are fortunate to find something very close to the precise wording of 
the original contract: 
 
... ἐ  έ      ὲ 
  φοτέρους ἐ  το ς πρὸς   υτοὺς   ω ο ο   έ ο ς   ὶ  ὴ ἐξ      
                                                 
521
 Cf. Rupprecht 1971: 97 and n21. 
522
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ἡ    π ρ  συ  ρ φ    τ  τ῵  προ   ρ   έ ω ,     ὲ  ὴ, τὴ  
  φ ο  ο  ἄ υρο   ἶ      ὶ προσ ποτ [ ]σ   τὸ  π ρ συ   ρ φοῦ τ  
τ῵  ἐ  έ ο τ ,   θʼ ὃ ἂ   έρος ἢ  ἶ ος π ρ συ  ρ φήσ  ,  τ . (31-35) 
 
[We agree] that both of us abide by the terms which we agreed upon with each other 
and that it is not permitted for us to breach anything of the aforementioned (terms), but 
if we do not (abide), the attack is invalid and the breaching party will pay to the one 
abiding, with respect to whatever part or term he breaches, the additional penalty of ... 
 
Important here is not only the connection to the Nichtangriffsklausel, but also the equivalence 
of parasyngraphein to emmenein (cf. P.Petr. II 47). One of the positive obligations was 
precisely to abide by the agreement, which strictly speaking was an ―obligation‖ of all 
contracts. Here, however, it is an express, specific obligation, and parasyngraphein is not 
added as a mere qualification, as in the participial instances we saw in the previous sub-
section (e.g., no. 6), but acts rather to reinforce the notion that one is obliged to abide by the 
whole syngraphē. 
Significantly, the contract is conceived of as a mutual cession, a traditional form of 
homology ( φίστ σθ  , P.Tor.Amen. 8.7, 15).524 Yet, attached to this cession are ―additional 
acknowledgements‖ (  φότ ρο   ὲ προσο ο ο οῦ   , 8.21), which are none other than the 
precise terms of the agreed-upon division of territory and clientele, without which the cession 
would not have served its purpose (and even so, it was litigated, as parties disputed the rights 
they had under it, cf. P.Tor.Amen. 6.13ff.). The verbs attached to prosomologein are in the 
future (θ ρ π  σ   ,  ο   σ   ) or dependent on ἐξ     . In fact, ἐ  έ     (in the portion 
                                                 
524





quoted above) is not present, but future (i.e., ἐ       ). If we parse the entire sentence, we 






1.   φότ ρο   ὲ προσο ο ο οῦ    
a.  ὴ θ ρ π  σ    τοὺς ἐ  τ῵     ή ω   πο    στ   έ ω  [ ]ω ῵  
   ὲ τοὺς    β ί ο τ ς   ὶ ἐρ  ζο έ ους ἐ  τ  ς   άστ [ο]υ      ς  
b.    ὲ  ο   σ     ήτ  ὄσπρ ο   ήτ  οἶ ο     ʼ ἄ  ο   θὲ    θʼ 
  τ  οῦ  τρόπο , 
c.    ὲ  ὴ    οίως θ ρ π  σ       ὲ  ο   σ    το ὺ ς   το  οῦ τ ς ἐ  
τ  ς    ή ω[ ]       ς  πὸ τοῦ   ( τους)  έχ ρ  τ οῦ   ς τ  ς   ί ς 
  τ῵    το   σθ     
i.    ὲ ἐ οὶ ἐξ      <θ ρ π     > τ    τ φ ρό     ἐ  Πο  π  ως 
  ς Π    τ ς Λ β  ς τοῦ Κ ο π τ ίτο υ σ   τ      τὸ  ὴ ὑ πάρχ    
ἐ  τ   σ     ο έ            [  ]ρί[  ] 
ii.   οίως  ὲ    ὲ τ῵       θ   ἐξ      θ ρ π      τ  ἐ  τ ς 
Ποο π  ως  ποθ ήσ ο τ  σ   τ  
d. ἐ         ὲ   φοτέρους ἐ  το ς πρὸς   υτοὺς   ω ο ο   έ ο ς  
i.   ὶ  ὴ ἐξ      ἡ    π ρ  συ  ρ φ    τ  τ῵  προ   ρ   έ ω  
 
As the schema above shows, the futures appear in clauses dealing with the bilateral or mutual 
obligations and are directly dependant on prosomologein: (a) the injunction against giving 
care in ―each other‘s‖ villages; (b) the injunction against the charging of fees; (c) both 
followed by a combined term restating the injuction in terms of classes of client. These 





but particular (ἐ οὶ, τ῵       θ  ), in form rather like a parenthetical id est explaining the 
import of the injunctions. Finally, (d) there is a return—signaled by  ὲ—to the initial structure 
of future verbs describing mutual obligations (  φοτέρους, πρὸς   υτοὺς), but this time a 
positive obligation of the promise to abide by what they have agreed upon, which is then 
rewritten, as were the prior clauses, as an ἐξ      statement (d.i). 
Here we see something of the path-dependance of legal evolution. The way to solve 
the problem of legalizing a purely consensual contract was to leverage the 
Nichtangriffsklausel of the homologies regularly used to confirm sales and cessions.
525
 By 
origin and general usage, the homologia was backward-looking, a sollemnized recognition of 
an act, an obligation, or a state of affairs, in anticipation of a possible suit (i.e., a sort of ―pre-
confession,‖ should a dispute arise as the to nature of the legal relationship).526 For example, 
most of the homologiai in the previous section functioned as declarations of completed loans, 
cessions, sales, etc.  Just so here we have the recognition of a bilateral cession (aphistasthai). 
The Nichtangriffsklausel served as a way of penalizing litigation or legal contestation on the 
grounds that the transaction had already been acknowledged (homologein) as completed. One 
was in effect being penalized for a form of perjury when one sued on a debt or contract 
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 The precise nature of contractual liability in Greco-Roman Egypt is debated, but it is clear that there was no 
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extinguished by a homologia. The homologia of a transactional agreement, on the other hand, 
testified to no real (material), prior, completed act or a condition resultant upon such an act 
(e.g., as in a receipt, apechein), unless one counts the act of agreement or the drafting of the 
syngraphē itself. This is to say that though the homologia was formally retrospective, the 
transactional agreement was functionally prospective, with but a sleight of hand to gloss over 
this tension.
527
 This is, in fact, perfectly illustrated here: ἐ         ὲ   φοτέρους ἐ  το ς 
πρὸς   υτοὺς   ω ο ο   έ ο ς (31-32). The embalmers acknowledge that they had come to 
a mutual agreement and promise to abide by their agreement. Such an arrangement was given 
legal force by piggy-backing on the Nichtsangriffklausel, which, as we have seen in the case 
of P.Petr. II 47, could itself constitute a legally recognized obligation (recall that in this case it 
was also bilateral), and was by nature prospective. One final interesting note is the extent to 
which the consensual element is emphasized both in this contract and confirmed by the judges 
presiding over case (   ο οῦ τ ς πρὸς   υτοὺς συ  χωρήσ    , P.Tor.Amen. 8.38, cf. 
6.18), another indication that there was no material element to the transaction.
528
  
The next clear example comes in no. 22 (Oxyrhynchos, 63/62 BCE), a homology 
drafted by three uncles in which they promise not to proceed against their nephew Moschion, 
who had loaned their mother (his grandmother) an unspecified amount via a syngraphē, 
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 Von Soden can account for the acknowledgement of the cession here (and all cessions) as the acknowledgement 
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because he agreed to ―renew‖ it ἐ  πίσ [τ  ]     τὴ  προ   ρ   έ         ότ [τ] .529 The 
document is a difficult one for its use of the word pistis. Schmitz reviews the interpretations 
advanced of this contract and dismisses the suggestion of Grenfell and Hunt that pistis in this 
case means ―pledge‖ or ―security,‖ preferring to follow Schwartz instead in seeing this as an 
instance in which it refers to a fiduciary commitment (Vertrauensverhältnis).
530
   
The substance of the contract is in effect the Nichtangriffsklausel: the uncles 
  ο ο οῦσ   ...   θὲ  ἐ        ...    ’ ἐ    έσ       ’ ἐπ    σ σθ   Moschion or his 
representatives about the earlier loan because of his ―renewal,‖ subject to a penalty. The 
penalty runs thus: [ἐ]    έ τ ς ἡ  ῵  π ρ  τ  προ  - |  ρ  [ ]έ   π ρ συ  ρ φ[ῇ] ἢ 
ἐπέ θ ῃ τ [῵ ] Μοσχίω  , χωρὶς | τοῦ τὴ   φο ο  ἄ υρο[ ]  ἶ      ὶ π[ρο]σ ποτ  σάτω 
|   ἐπ[  ]θὼ  ἢ   ὑπὲ[ρ   τ]οῦ ἐπ   υσ[ό ]  [ο]ς Μοσχίω    | ἢ [ὧ]  ἐ [ ]  ἐπέ θῃ τ῵[  
π] ρʼ   τοῦ ἐπί[τ  ]ο   τ . (21-25). In this clause we should note the following features: 
First, parasyngraphein comes first, as it did in P.Petr. II 47. In P.Tor.Amen. 5 it came second, 
but importantly it was but the negative of the positive obligation to abide, which was a proper 
object of homologein. In all these cases the prominence of parasyngraphein is an indication of 
its being the principle act of breach, or of its specific use, which should be distinguished from 
its subordination to other specific verbs other contracts, like the leases, where it is acting 
merely an umbrella term for general breach. Second, we see here that it is equated to the 
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 Lines 18-21: ἕ     τοῦ τὸ  Μοσχίω     ά τ   ς   τί ς τὸ         ο χ ωρ σ ὸ  τ ς προ  ρ  έ  ς  ρ [υ]ρ   ς 
συ    άξ ως     ς τὴ   ρσ  ό   ἐ  πίσ [τ  ]     τὴ  προ   ρ   έ         ότ [τ]  π πο  σθ   (the uncles will 
not sue Moschion ―because Moschion for various reasons has effected the renewal of the above-mentioned money-
agreement with Arsinoe [sc. his grandmother] (relying) on trust on account of the previously-stated kinship‖).  
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 1964: 65-69. I will leave it to others to speculate as to the τ   ς   τί   (besides    ότ ς) that persuaded Moschion 





central element of the Nichtangriffsklausel, eperchesthai. In P.Petr. II 47 and P.Tor.Amen. 5 
parasngraphein was equated to emmenein, and then followed by the saving clause 
characteristic of the Nichtangriffsklausel. Here, on the other hand, the verb is tied much more 
tightly and explicitly to the Nichtangriff language. It is fruitless to speculate what this 
difference might mean precisely. This is one of those cases in which it is difficult to tell 
whether it is the transactional nature of the agreement or the Nichtangriffsklausel which 
explains the use of the verb. That said, the prominence of the verb, its (increasingly archaic) 
intransitive use, and the careful crafting of the language (we have no precise parallel for this 
penalty clause), coupled with the idiosyncratic nature of the agreement all suggest that it is 
being used here with specific force. 
There is, however, a difference between this contract and the previous ones, namely 
that the homology here is not perfectly bilateral. Instead, we seem to have an unbalanced 
exchange of two different types of obligation. Moschion gratuitously novates his debt in a 
way that obviously puts him at a legal disadvantage, which he only agrees to do given the 
trust (pistis) he has that this disadvantage will not be exploited by his uncles. His uncles in 
return promise not to pursue any claims they may now have as a consequence of the novation 
and expose themselves to a heavy penalty if they do. On the one side, then, there has already 
been performance, as Moschion has novated the debt, whereas on the other the performance is 
open-ended, a present and continuing obligation to forbear into the future. Moschion‘s partial 
performance is the causa of the homologia, which makes this document more like a typical 
retrospective homologic quit-claim than a transactional agreement. Then again, the uncles are 





claims. In this sense, then, the agreement to novate (and so renounce certain claims on the old 
debt) is matched by the uncles‘ renunciation of claims on the new notes of debt, and the 
imbalance is explained by the respective starting legal positions of the parties. Although this 
was essentially a mutual cession, it required a particular sequence of sessions rather than the 
simultaneous cession typical of the transactional agreement. The specific use of 
parasyngraphein points the underlying mutual nature of the cessions, even though the drafting 
necessarily reflects only one half of the transactional agreement. 
The last document we will discuss in this category is no. 28, a synchōrēsis from 
Alexandria dated to 13 BCE. This document is an agreement between two recipients of a loan, 
Pompeios and Ptolemaios, and their joint surety, Tryphon son of Tryphon. The document 
states that a loan of 600 dr. was made by a party whose name is now lost (only his patronymic 
survives) via a syngraphē and a bank diagraphē to all three. It then reveals that Pompeios had 
spent 520 dr. and Ptolemaios 80 dr., meaning Tryphon, though legally party to the loan, had 
not received any of the funds. He was thus a surety in fact, but a debtor by law. The rest of the 
contract runs thus: 
 
... συ χωρο ῦ  [  ] 
ἐπὶ το σ    πο οῦ    ἕ  στο  τὸ ἐ   \ τῶ/ (l.   υτῶ)   φά   ο  τ   
τ῵           ( ) 
σὺ  το ς τό ο ς ἐ  τ῵    τ  τὴ  συ  ρ φὴ  σ     ο (έ ῳ) 
12 χρό ω    ὶ π ρέξ σθ[  ]   φότ ρο   ὲ  τὸ  Τρ φω     - 
 ὲ  πρ σσό   ο  τοῦ     ίου χάρ  ,   άτ ρος  ὲ τὸ  
ἕτ ρο  οὗ   τ  έχρ τ     φ   ίου,   ὶ ἐ τ ίσ    ὃ ἐ   π ρ  - 
χ θ ῇ ἢ πράσ σ  τ     ἕτ ρος χάρ   το τω    ὶ τό ους   ὶ 
16 τ  β άβ    ὶ   π  ή  τ , τ ς πράξ ως     ο έ  ς ἐ  τοῦ π  - 
ρ συ  ρ φοῦ τος531   ὶ ἐ  τ῵  ὑπ ρχό τω    τῶ πά τω   τ . 
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We (therefore) agree on the following: that each will repay whatever capital lies to his 
account ... with interest in the period indicated in the syngraphē; and that both will 
render Tryphon immune to praxis with respect to the loan, while each (will render) the 
other (liable to praxis) for the capital he has spent; and that (each) will repay whatever 
has been exacted or will be exacted from the other with respect to these matters, as 
well as interest, damages, and expenses; with the right of praxis over the one who 
breaks the syngraphē and all of his goods, etc. 
 
Pompeios and Ptolemaios thus agree to take full responsibility for the loan by making each 
other full sureties for the other, thereby extinguishing Tryphon‘s obligation to repay under the 
terms of the underlying syngraphē. This was likely done without the creditor‘s knowledge, or 
if he did know, he does not appear to have legally consented, at least within the four corners 
of this contract. This is, then, a side deal between the debtors, in no way affecting the legal 
rights of the creditor (contrast the involvement of Eirene in P.Mich. III 182 above, pp. 276ff.).  
We should also note that there are no penalty clauses here. The three went in on the 
loan, with Tryphon doing the other two a favor by being party to it as a condition of its being 
extended. The creditor likely needed extra security in the form of a third person in order to 
make the loan, and he clearly included penalties (τ  β άβ    ὶ   π  ή  τ ) for which 
Pompeios and Ptolemaios now take full responsibility. Tryphon, on the other hand, seems to 
have felt secure enough in his relationship with Pompeios and Ptolemaios not only to agree to 
put himself in the position of a debtor, but also to dispense with the incentive of a penalty to 
make sure that the other two released him as promised. That said, he did not feel so secure as 
to dispense with a written agreement.  
We can only speculate what value this contract would have had in a court of law. 





and 1056) give the creditor the right of praxis equally over all debtors equally.
532
 If the 
creditor approached these three for repayment and obtained easy satisfaction from Pompeios 
and Ptolemaios, it is hard to see why he would refuse this in order to exercise his right of 
praxis over Tryphon. But if he did not get his money, then surely his right over Tryphon 
trumped Tryphon‘s over Pompeios and Ptolemaios, with this document serving only to 
indemnify Tryphon after the fact, if he were forced to repay the loan.  
But why parasygraphein? First, we should note that there is no hint of the 
Nichtangriffsklausel here.
533
 On the contrary, the detailed provisions for mutual praxis suggest 
that the entire purpose in drafting this document was to establish where each party stood if 
and when litigation became necessary, not its renunciation. Second, this is the only instance in 
the Alexandrian synchōrēseis where the verb appears on its own without parabainein. There 
are ten instances of parasyngraphein in the Alexandrian synchōrēseis:  
 seven are leases which use the verb to create a virtual saving clause;  
 one is a labor contract (no. 27) which has been assimilated to a lease and uses 
the verb to the same effect;  
 one is a receipt for wages for a wetnurse (no. 25), wherein there is a third party, 
perhaps explaining the use of the verb instead of the more usual parabainein 
(n515);  
 and then we have the present document.  
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 Cf. Rupprecht 1967: 17-18; cf. Mitteis 1912: 113-15. 
533
 The clause does appear in synchōrēseis that act as receipts, e.g., BGU IV 1148, though usually with parabainein. 





We should compare these ten instances to the 49 instances of parabainein in the synchōrēseis 
from the same period. The latter was thus clearly the more normal word for ―breach,‖ as 
demonstrated by the nine attestations of parasyngraphein above which coincide with the 49 
instances of parabainein. The eight lease/labor contracts reveal parasyngraphein as a way of  
expressing ―material breach‖ (cf. pp. 240ff.); and no. 25 is a receipt in which the verb is 
clearly added as a participle to the standard template, which we know from other documents 
typically uses only parabainein (cf. n515). This contract, then, is the only Alexandrian 
synchōrēsis to use the verb on its own. It could be that parasyngraphein is being used merely 
as a synonym for parabainein, but in the context of the general Alexandrian pattern it would 
seem reasonable first to see it‘s solitary use as somehow intentional, and second to interpret 
its meaning here as something like ―total breach‖ or ―breach of the syngraphē as such.‖  
Taking these observations together with the substance of the contract, 
parasyngraphein refers to the present document, not the underlying loan, though there is a 
point of overlap where breach of one will constitute breach of the other. The synchōrēsis is 
activated only in the event of breach of the loan contract, and again it‘s purpose is to order the 
consequences of that initial breach. It does so in two ways, first by distributing the liability of 
initial or underlying breach, and second by establishing mutual rights and obligations over 
each other consequent on that liability. From the creditor‘s perspective, breach by one is 
tantamount to breach by all: they are all equally liable. From the perspective of this 
agreement, on the other hand, Pompeios and Ptolemaios may severally be in breach if one 
pays and the other doesn‘t (lines 10-12). In this respect, then, breach of the loan collapses with 





both to repay Tryphon, for example, is in breach only of this synchōrēsis. Either event, failure 
to repay or failure to indemnify will result in giving the injured party praxis over   
π ρ συ  ρ φ῵  and all his possessions. This contract differs from the other transactional 
agreements in that it is not cessionary in nature, yet it shares with them this mutual ordering of 
idiosyncratic future rights embodied in a syngraphē, which in Alexandrian, with its tradition 
of using parasyngraphein to mean ―breach of the whole syngraphē‖ suggested this verb for 
―breach‖ to the scribe rather than the regular parabainein. 
The final group of contracts to consider under this heading are the divisions or 
diairēseis.534 In this category are App. III, nos. 10, 44, 45-46, and 47. The last three were 
drafted in Tebtynis between 46 and 48 (nos. 45 and 46 are copies of each other), while the 
first is from late second-century BCE Pathyris. The three from Tebtynis take the form of a 
mutual homology:   ο ο οῦσ      ή ο ς ...   ῃρ σθ   πρὸς   υτοὺς ἐξ    ο ο  τω  
    ρέσ   ἐπὶ τοῦ π ρό τος  πὸ τ ς ἐ  στ σ ς ἡ έρ ς ἐπὶ τὸ  ἅπ  τ  χρό ο  τ ς 
ὑπ ρχο σ ς   το ς (object X).535 Then come the precise terms of the division, which 
comprises the body of the document, followed by a reprise of the opening statement of 
division and a penalty clause (e.g., no. 47: P.Mich. V 326.ii.55-58): 
 
 ρ τ    οὖ    ὶ   σπόζ    ἕ  στο  τ῵    ο ο ο  τω    ὶ τοὺς π ρʼ   τ῵    ὶ 
τοὺς   τ    ψο έ ους ὧ      ήρω τ     - 
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 In general, see Berger 1911: 179-85; Mitteis 1912: 270-71; Kreller 1919: 77-93; Montevecchi 1988: 208-9.  
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 Cf. Mitteis 1912: 270-71; Montevecchi 1988: 208-9. No. 44 is a variation on the theme: a unilateral release of 
claims (ἐξίστ σθ  ; cf. Schwartz 1920: 219-21) by one sister to another for an unstated reason. In lines 15-16, the 
party making the cession declares that she is satisfied (  π θ ; cf. Schwartz 1920: 98n3), echoing the demotic 





ρ῵   πὸ τ ς ἐ  στ σ ς ἡ έρ ς ἐπὶ τὸ  ἅπ  τ  χρό ο      φ  έ τως,   ὶ  ὴ 
ἐπ    σ σθ     άτ ρο    τ῵  [ἐφʼ] ἃ   ἕτ ρο(ς) 
  τ῵       ρ῵τ   τρόπω       ί· ὅ τ   ʼ ἂ  τ῵  προ   ρ   έ ω  
π ρ συ  ρ φῇ τ ς τ῵    ο ο ο  τω   ποτ [ σά]τω    
 ὴ ἐ  έ ω  τ῵  ἐ  έ ο τ   τ . 
 
They (agree that) each of the contracting parties and their assigns and heirs shall 
therefore own and control the shares which have been allotted to them from the 
present day forever, without question, and that one shall not proceed against the share 
which the other has received in any manner. If any of the aforesaid contracting parties 
breaches with respect to any of the above terms, the party not abiding shall pay to the 
party abiding by it etc. 
 
One finds divisions of property serving much the same purpose in demotic papyri, 
with at least some examples having clauses at the end which approximate the substance of 
Abstandsurkunde and the Nichtangriffsklausel.
536
 As with the demotic Abstandsurkunde and 
the syngraphai apostasiou, so here too there are important differences which suggest that the 
Greek diairēsis is not a mere translation of an originally Egyptian instrument. For instance, 
our demotic divisions are unilateral declarations, while our later Greek ones are typically 
multilateral, as above.
537
 Sadly, it is hard to trace the evolution of this contract type since very 
few Ptolemaic divisions in Greek survive. One of our earliest, though, is suggestive. P.Ashm. I 
22 (Aueris, 106 BCE), is a συ  ρ φὴ   ο ο ί ς drafted between two brothers who thereby 
confirm some demotic documents previously executed concerning possessions and offices left 
to them by their father (Fr. A.11-13:   ο ο οῦσ      ή ο ς ... |...  έ      υρί ς ἃς 
τέθ   [ τ]   πρὸς  ὑτοὺς συ  ρ φ ς Α  υπτ ί [ ς]   [π] ρ[ὶ τ῵         ]     τ    [ φθέ τω ] 
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 E.g., P. BM Andrews 15 and 21, P.Hawara dem. 16 and 17; cf. Depauw 1997: 144-45; Berger 1911: 181-83. 
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   τ ο  ς ὑπὸ τοῦ προ   ρ   έ ου   τ῵  π τρὸς [Λέο] τος ὑπ ρχό τω    ὶ   ρ῵ . 
Significantly, it is already at this date in the mutual homology format of our imperial 
examples. The demotic documents confirmed here no doubt adhered to the traditional 




Closer to the demotic in some ways is one of our other early divisions, P.Lond. III 880 
(no. 10). This is a unilateral homology by a father dividing his property amongst his children. 
The document ends with a penalty clause, impossibly still dependent on the father‘s initial 
  ο ο   . Berger suggests that we understand   ὶ  ὴ ἐξέστω, which makes sense of the 
nominative ἕτ ρος as well:539   ο ο    Τοτο ς Π   ίου ...     ρ σθ   (l.   ῃρ σθ  ) τ  
ὑπάρχο τ  [  ]τ῵  ...   ὶ  ὴ <ἐξέστω> ἐπ    σ σθ   ἕτ ρος ἐπὶ τὸ  ἕτ ρο  π ρὶ τ῵  | 
π ρ   χωρ  έ ω    άστω    ρί ω ,     ὲ  ὴ, ἡ τʼ  φο ος τ῵  |ἐπ πορ υο έ ῳ 
ἄ \υ ρ(ος)  στω   ὶ προσ ποτ  σάτω   π ρ συ  ρ (φ῵ )  τ . (10-11, 28-30).540 This 
is more obviously a form of will, unlike the subsequent divisions, but it is not like later ―living 
wills‖ that we find from the imperial era.541 Instead, the division in this document had 
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 Pace Hombert and Préaux 1938: 148, who believe that the language of the demotic documents suggested the 
mutual homology. As Wolff rightly notes (2002: 71n1, 81n42) this is an entirely Greek document, and importantly 
such a document was not needed to give the underlying demotic documents force (cf. P.Hawara dem. 16 and 17, 
unilateral divisions (mesiteiai) with Greek dockets from Aueris, 92 BCE). Wolff instead sees this contract as an 
expression of the cultural and legal freedom of the late Ptolemaic period. 
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 1911: 185; cf. Schwartz 1961 [1913]: 194n52, 213. 
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 Cf. P.Stras. II 85 (Pathyris, 113 BCE) is a virtually identical contract, complete with this phrase, but without 
parasyngraphein, replacing it with   ὶ προσ ποτ  σάτω    ὴ ἐ  έ ω  τ῵  ἐ  έ ο τ . 
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immediate effect, as we know from P.Lond. III 1204, which shows that one of the children 
(the daughter) alienated her portion with the father‘s consent and participation less than a year 
after this division. Indicative of this being a mutual cession rather than a pure will is the fact 
that breach is defined not between the father and the children (cf. P.Mich. V 321), but between 
the children themselves, who are technically passive in this document: it is the father who 
makes and acknowledges the division, through which the children somehow acquire rights 
and responsibilities vis-à-vis each other. One possible signal of the inherent mutuality of this 
agreement in the text itself comes in the phrase   ό τ ς συ   ράψ  το with which the 
contract begins, belying the formally unilateral nature of the declaration. Finally, the very 
presence of parasyngraphein, as we have come to see, further suggests that this is a 
transactional agreement, an interpretation born out by the daughter‘s subsequent action: 
everyone needed to be ―on board,‖ since sales or alienations were contemplated as at least 
possible, if not anticipated in the near future (indeed, one wonders if it wasn‘t the need to sell 
that drove the division).  
Schwartz‘s interest in this document was in what it illuminated of the evolution of the 
self-standing cession homology.
542
 He argued that as a gift, there could be no protocol for a 
such a unilateral cession (i.e., the father received no price or other consideration in return for 
the division). And yet, both the parties and the state had good reason to ratify and record these 
important transfers of property in legal instruments. So, parties drew up the second half, as it 
were, of a sale, which was the Abstandsurkunde. The fact the homology attested to no 
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material transaction, no causa, was signalled in late second-century Pathyris with that curious 
phrase,   ό τ ς συ   ράψ  το,―bei diesen besteht, da die Urkunde keine causa angibt, 
welche die Verfügung motivieren würde, in besonderem Mass das Bedürfnis das Gewolltsein 
der Erklärung zu betonen‖ (1913 [1961]: 193-94). In other words, these were transactional 
agreements. The evidence of parasyngraphein in general supports Schwartz‘s grand theory, it 
being another piece of evidence for the development of the basic contractual tool-kit of the 






5.4.3 Addendum: Athetein 
 
There is one word in the papyri that was used in a manner that approximates ―breach of 
contract,‖ though it is relatively rare. Athetein in non-loan contracts means ―to ignore‖ a 
provision or ―to treat it as cancelled,‖ ―to set it at nought.‖543 As with parabainein, it also has a 
history in the language of treaties and oaths, e.g., Polyb. 8.36.5, 11.29.3, 15.1.7-9, 15.17.3, 
23.8.7, 29.2.2, 31.10.1, 36.9.14-17. In contracts (and treaties and oaths) it therefore represents a 
different metaphor than either parasyngraphein or parabainein, but is closer to the latter. Like 
parabainein it is conceptually more attuned to the parties‘ relationship to the particular rules of 
the contract, rather than to the contract as a whole, and it is the act of disregarding a rule that 
allows one to transgress it. In usage, however, it has more in common with parasyngraphein (see 
Tab. 5.4.3). 
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 For  θέτ σ ς (cancellation) in loans and receipts, see Rupprecht 1971: 12-15, 75-81, 86-92. The noun is by far 





Table 5.4.3 Attestations of athetein in non-loan contracts and wills 
   
Date Prov. Doc. Form Trans. A B 
P.Ashm. I 22 106 Aueris contract homologia division Y  
SB VI 8974 100-76 Busiris contract 6-witness 
syngraphē 
marriage Y ? 
P.Oxy. XLIX 3482 73 Oxyrhynchos contract homologia cession Y Y 
BGU IV 1123 30-14 
BCE 


















P.Mich. III 186 72 Bakchias contract homologia division  Y 
P.Mich. III 187 75 Bakchias contract homologia division  Y 
P.Oxy. III 493 50-99 Oxyrhynchos will NA will   
P.Oxy. III 492 130 Oxyrhynchos will NA will  Y 
P.Oslo II 31 138-161? unknown contract homologia division  ? 
 
A = parasyngraphein in the same document 
B = parabainein in the same document 
 
 
Three patterns jump out immediately from the table above. First, athetein very rarely appears on 
its own. Second, it is associated in succession first with parasyngraphein, and then with 
parabainein. Third, it is limited to transactional agreements, with the exception of SB VI 8974 
(App. III, no.14), an idiosyncratic marriage contract from the perspective both of the complicated 
arrangements and its drafting.
544
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The word is clearly an older word for breach than parabainein in the documents (cf. 
Sec. 5.6), but failed to catch on. Three possible reasons recommend themselves. First, the fact 
that it could mean ―to cancel completely‖ could lead to confusion, since cancellation is 
obviously different from breach. We indeed see the verb used this way, especially, but not 
exclusively, with respect to loans (e.g., P.Oxf. 14 [unknown, II] and P.Dura 31 [Ossa, 204]; 
cf. n543). Second, it was slightly more difficult to add to the specific verbs than 
parasyngraphein, which could be expressed clearly in a participle without an object (cf. Sec. 
5.4.1), whereas athetein would always have to have an object in order to distinguish between 
the unilateral exercise of a ―line-item veto‖ and actual cancellation. Third, although the idea of 
ignoring a provision was clearly an act of arrogance and negatively charged
545
 and the verb 
could be used to describe dealing faithlessly with someone,
546
 transgression rather than 
lawlessness seems generally to have been the more deeply embedded notion when it came to 
breach.
547
 These same qualities, however, recommended it for use in transactional agreements, 
which consisted of newly erected rules and boundaries. That is, an alternative to thinking of a 
transactional agreement in toto (hence the contravention of which was parasyngraphein) was 
to conceptualize it as a series of new rules vulnerable to being ignored, a mode of 
conceptualization which may have recommended the verb to wills later in the Roman period.  
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 E.g., BGU IV 1123.11-12:      ὶ ἡ[ ]῵  ἐξό τος  θ τ    τ῵  ὡ ο ο   έ ω     ὲ  [τ῵ ]    τ  τὴ  
  τοχὴ     ʼ ἄ  ο    ὲ  ἐπ τ      ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ  τέρου     ί  τρόπῳ      ὶ ἢ   [ -ca.?- ] | [ -ca.?- ] ἐ  τ[  ]σ   
τὸ  π ρ β σό   ο  [τ῵  ἐ ]  έ  ο  [τ ]  τ .; cf. P.Erasm. I 1 (see n225) and P.Oxy. VIII 1120 (Oxyrhynchos, 
early III). 
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 Cf. LSJ s.v.  θ τέω I.3, cf.  θέτ    and  θέτ σ ς III. This use is not attested in the papyri. 
547
 Lawlessness was, however, a second-order association, as we have seen in the rhetoric of Dem. 56 (Sec. 5.2) and 





5.5 The Fall of Parasyngraphein 
The transition to the more regular inscription of breach in papyrus contracts should be dated 
roughly to the third quarter of the second century BCE, when we begin to see it used with 
increasing frequency as a covering term in leases and in association with the 
Nichtangriffsklausel. It is impossible to determine from the evidence which was the ―original‖ 
mode of parasyngraphein, the specific or the general, and indeed it may be that both emerged 
simultaneously. The very first attestation (P.Enteux. 59) seems closest in all regards to the 
forensic use we saw in Dem. 56, and one can easily imagine how either use, the general and 
the specific, might have developed from the personal (i.e., intransitive) charge of 
parasyngraphē embodied in that petition. 
By the middle of the first century BCE, however, the use of parasyngraphein was 
already in decline, even as the inscription of breach was gathering steam. As opposed to the 
80 attestations of parasyngraphein (I discount the last: see n556), there are 208 attestations of 
parabainein, of which 163 appear in contracts (cf. Tab. 5.6a below). The first documentary 
attestation is in P.Stras. II 115 (Philadelphia), a contract of indeterminate nature dated to 
either 148 or 137 BCE. It contains the Nichtangriff language, and therefore is some sort of 
receipt, division, or transactional agreement.
548
 After that, we must wait until 73 BCE for the 
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 In the ed. pr. of SB III 7188 (Krokodilopolis, 154 BCE; see Wolff 1939: 104-17), Wolff restored parabainein in 
lines 28-29: [  ὶ τ   ρ   πά τ , ὅσ]  [ ]  θ[ή]  [  ]   ὶ πά τ  τ      ορ υ  έ   συ τ τ   σ[ έ ]    ὶ   θὲ  
β ά[πτο τ ς    ὲ π ρ β ί ο τ ς -  . - ]   [ -  . - ]     [   ]  ἕ [  ]στ  τ῵  ἐ  τῇ   τῇ σ[υ ] ρ  φῇ 
ἐ    ρ   [ έ ω . This is a contract that definitely contains parasyngraphein (App. III, no. 5). Given the early date, 
the fact that parasyngraphein appears (cf. next section), and that I can find no parallel for the phraseology of line 28, 





next contract to bear the word: P.Oxy. XLIX 3482, an Oxyrhynchite cession. From the mid-
first century BCE on, parabainein steadily gains ground as the preferred word for general 
breach in our contracts. 
Nor is this merely a matter of raw numbers: the pattern is path-dependant and speaks 
to an evolution in the conception and drafting of breach. Once we subtract imperial cessions, 
sales, and divisions, parassyngraphein appears only in Oxyrhynchite documents, with all but 
one dealing with loans of one sort of another (nos. 34, 40, 55, 59, and 64). Furthermore, the 
last three instances show a distinctive penalty clause: ἐ    έ τ  το τω  π ρ συ  ρ φ῵, 
ἄ υρο   στω   ὶ προσ ποτ ίσω   θʼ ὃ ἐ   π ρ συ  ρ φ῵  ἶ ος τό τ  β άβος   ὶ 
ἐπίτ  ο   τ . vel sim. Significantly, this clause is first attested in an Oxyrhynchite cession 
from the first quarter of the first century (no. 37), and consistently thereafter in subsequent 
Oxyrhynchite cessions through the second century (e.g., nos. 42, 54, 56-57, 63). The 
impression, then, is of a migration of an old formula, originally used in cessions and sales, to 
other types of contracts, a consequence of the verb losing its distinctive flavor.
549
  
Other indications point in the same direction. For instance, we find parasyngraphein 
used interchangeably for parabainein, stripped of all syngraphic specificity, in C.Pap.Gr. I 
14.25-26: ἐ    ὲ | π ρ συ  ρ φοῦ τ ς  ὴ πο ῇ   θ   έ ρ πτ   (App. III, no. 39), to 
which we may compare similar tautologies in PSI X 1120 (no. 34), SB XVI 13042 (no. 40), 
and P.Oxy.  XIV 1641 (no. 49). And this process is not confined to the Oxyrhynchite. No. 62, 
for instance, a division from Ptolemais Euergetis from 108 reads ὅ τ   ʼ ἂ  τ῵  
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προ   ρ   έ ω  π ρ συ  ράφωσ  οἱ   ο ο οῦ τ ς,  πο[τ σάτω]   [  π ]ρ β ς τῶ 
ἐ  έ ο τ  [π] ρ[ ]χρ    τ  β άβ   τ . (28-29). No other example of this clause pairs 
parasyngraphein and parabainein in this way, but, if qualifiying the party in breach as such, 
does so by labelling him    ὴ ἐ    ῵  (e.g., nos. 45/46, 47). The last attested qualification of 
a party in breach with the participle of parasyngraphein came nearly 30 years earlier in no. 
53.
550
 Centuries earlier one would have reached for   π ρ συ  ρ φ῵  (e.g., nos. 7-8, 10), 
but by the second century the natural opposite to emmenein in contracts was parabainein.551  
We find yet another potential indicator of the verb‘s slide into obsolesence in a pair of 
linguistic solecisms. In at least two instances, nos. 30 [Alexandria] and 36 [Oxyrhynchos]), 
the aorist subjunctive is conjugated as if it were a regular thematic verb (i.e., < 
*π ρ συ  ράφω, *π ρ συ έ ρ ψ ). The collapse of contract verbs is not uncommon in 
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 Nos. 52 and 53 show an awkwardness of construction, perhaps evidence of the formula no longer being properly 
understood. Take, e.g., no. 52, lines 17-19:    ὲ  τὴ   [ ]ο ο [ο]ῦσ   ... ἐ           ὲ ἐ    έσ      [ὲ] | 
[  φ σ]β τήσ    [  ὲ] ἐπ    σ σθ [  τρό]πῳ      ὶ. [ὅ,] τ [   ’] ἂ  τ῵  προ   ρ   έ ω  π ρ συ  ρ φ῵ , 
ἐ    ὲ   [ ὴ β β  σῃ    ὲ π ρ]έχ τ  , προσ π[οτ σ]άτω  τ . Litinas (2002: 75-76) rightly corrects the 
original readings of    [ ]     to  [ὅ,] τ [   ’] ἂ  and π ρά]σ χ τ    to  π ρ]έχ τ   on the basis of apposite parallels 
and autopsy. The editors of the ed. pr. had corrected π ρ συ  ρ φ῵  to  π ρ συ  ρ φοῦ τ ς, since they 
construed the participle with the previous clause. This was, however, the wrong correction, as Thases (the principal) 
is consistently the only declarant (  ο ο   ,   ο ο οῦσ , cf. the singular of the breach verbs and penalty verbs 
that follow). Instead of number we should correct the gender, i.e., π ρ συ  ρ φοῦσ  (we might also prefer 
β β  ο  to β β  σῃ, since no. 52 appears to be drafted on the same model as no. 53, even down to the mistake of 
gender; cf. no 40). I also do not understand Litinas‘s assertion that the case should be accusative instead of 
nominative after his improvement of the text. While it is true that I can find no other instance of a participle 
appearing with ἂ  in a relative clause, it still seems most natural to understand this as an awkward adverbial 
participial phrase modifying the subject of β β  σῃ and π ρέχ τ  , particularly in light of the history of 
participial use of parasyngraphein (cf. Sec. 5.4.1). Finally, CPR I 220 (no. 35), which Litinas also discusses, reads 
[π ρ ]συ  ρ φήσ  (i.e., fut.), and does not need to be corrected to the subjunctive. Though rare, this use of the 
future is a known phenomenon, cf. no. 60 and Mandalaras 1973, §§ 408-10. 
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imperial Greek, but generally only in forms derived from the first principal part.
552
 Likewise, 
although later Greek evinced a preference for sigmatic aorists or second aorists, consistently 
replacing the latter with the former, the aorist forms of contract verbs were strikingly 
regular.
553
 These two examples come from different places and record different transactions 
with different formulae: this is not, therefore, a matter of the replication of a scribal mistake in 
a model. Moreover, the only people who ever had occassion to write this word, particularly by 
the Roman period, were scribes. To my mind, the most likely explanation is that it had simply 
ceased to sound or look incorrect to write π ρ συ  ράψῃ or π ρ συ  ράψωσ  , even to 
those for whom the word was part of their professional vocabulary.554 
Finally, there is the mass of Herakleopolite sales and cessions from the third century 
(nos. 61, 65-80). After the Abstands/Nichtangriff language, they all contain the following 
formula: ἐ έχ σθ   τὸ        π ρ βά τ  (vel sim.) τῶ ὡρ σ έ ῳ   τ  τ῵  
π ρ συ  ρ φο  τω  ἐπ τί ῳ  τ . Although we have many documents from the 
Herakleopolite, at present I know of no securely dated sale or cession from this nome between 
the third-century documents in CPR I and late Ptolemaic documents in BGU VIII. I also see 
no reason to trust the second-century dates assigned to many of the documents in CPR I, and 
in many cases the Hearkleopolite origin cannot be confirmed. In fact, given the evidence, one 
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 Gignac 1977-81: II, 363-68 (note that most examples remain contract verbs in other tenses); cf. Mandalaras 1973: 
§§ 299-300. 
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 Cf. Gignac 1977-81: II, 290-96. 
554
 Of course, there are numerous homologous forms between regular and contract verbs, which can only be 
distinguished by accent (e.g., the nom., m., sing., act. participle). How many other attestations of *π ρ συ  ράφω 





should probably consider it a definitive sign of Herakleopolite drafting if the contract carries 
this set phrase, perhaps stretching back to Ptolemaic times, cf. no. 13 (cf. p. 289 above).
555
 
Significantly, in this model the only modified verb is the participle of parabainein, while the 
form of parasyngraphein is frozen in place. These are the last attestations of the verb, and so 
it ended its days as a Ptolemaic left-over in a Roman legal refrigerator.
556
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 Cf. the comments of Kramer and Shelton on P.Neph. 29, p. 106. 
556
 Cf. the mistake of one scribe in no. 79: π ρ  τ῵    τ συ  ρ φο  τω . The very last attestation (no. 81) is in 
a sadly garbled passage in a papyrus now lost (P.Sakaon, p. 105). Besides the Herakleopolite documents, there is not 
a single attestation in the third century before no. 81. This is, however, a petition that deals with a land dispute, and 
it is just possible that parasyngraphein appears by virtue of a reference to a sale document like those from the 
Herakleopolite. Sadly, the papyrus is now missing in the Cairo Museum, and given Jonguet‘s comments in the ed. 
pr. (Melanges Cagnat [1912, Leroux: Paris], pp. 414-15), it seems more reasonable to assume that π ρ συ  ρ φ  





5.6 Parabainein and Contract 
Parabainein in the Roman period became the word for breach in contracts, in all nomes and 
regardless of transaction. In this section, I will first discuss the determinants governing the 
choice of verb for breach in contracts during the period of the final transition, and then the 
pattern of use of parabainein before it became the regular word for breach in contracts. With 
respect to the pattern, we will see that it was used in the early Ptolemaic period almost 
exclusively in connection with public law and oaths and promises. Since ―breach of contract‖ 
is clearly shown to be a subsequent development, we need to consider what semantic 
connotations were carried over into ―breach of contract‖ from the original uses of 
parabainein. I therefore explore the relationship of parabainein to law in Sec. 5.6.1, and its 
connection to promise and oath in Sec. 5.6.2, demonstrating that the verb was part of a 
foundational moral vocabulary, unlike parasyngraphein. I conclude by suggesting that we see 
the transgressive connotation of parabainein retained in its contractual use. I explore in Sec. 
5.7 what it might have meant for ―breach‖ to be replaced with ―transgression,‖ and argue that 
this evolution was institutionally significant.  
The three determinants governing the use of parabainein in contracts of the Roman 
period appear (in no scientific order) to be: (i) the conservatism of local style or formulae for 
certain transactions (e.g., whether or not the style called for parasyngraphein, as in 
Oxyrhynchite cessions); (ii) the dictates of the particular contractual form (i.e., whether or not 





contract. Before discussing each briefly in turn, it will help to see the pattern of usage visually 











NB. By ―active,‖ I mean instances where the attestation is of a living word. This applies only to parasyngraphein: all of the third 
century examples, which appear only in Herakleopolite cessions and sales, are fossils (see previous section). I do not include the 
Alexandrian synchōrēseis in the moving averages, since they represent an anomaly in the data set, but instead mark them as data 





Table. 5.6.a Active uses of breach verbs in papyrus contracts 300 BCE – 300 CE   
 parasyngraphein parabainein 
250-225  0 0 
224-200 2 0 
199-175 1 0 
174-150 2 0 
149-125 1 1 
124-100 4 0 
99-75 2 0 
74-50 7 1 
49-25 2 2 
24-0 10 48 
1-24 CE 2 6 
25-49 10 8 
50-74 4 4 
75-99 7 7 
100-124 3 12 
125-149 2 11 
150-174 1 7 
175-199 1 9 
200-224 0 18 
225-249 0 14 
250-274 0 5 
275-300 0 8 











Reviewing the data above, I expect some to be surprised that there are so few 
attestations of parabainein in the contractual record. According to admittedly rough 
calculations for the number of contracts attested in the HGV, approximately 4% of contracts 
used the word over the course of the first three centuries. To any papyrologist, this likely runs 
counter to his or her experience with the texts: parabainein strikes one as a very common 
word in imperial contracts. Even after accounting for the inherently unreliable method of 
counting contracts in the HGV and the observation that many of our contracts are fragmentary 
or merely subscriptions or summaries (and so often give no indication of how breach was 
written into the contract)—even then, there is nothing unreliable about the 39 attestations 
from the whole of the second century. When set against the HGV‘s approximately 1,000 
entries for contract from the second century, this seems a very low number indeed.  
We also get a sense of just how dependent our data is on the variables of local style 
and document survival from the spike of attestations in the late first century BCE, all but two 
of which come from the Abusir el-Melek cache of synchōrēseis.557 The HGV lists 93 contracts 
from Alexandria in this period, giving us a ratio of just over 50% carrying the word 
parabainein, far above the general average of 4%. In fact, the word occurs more often in these 
documents than in the whole of the second century! Moreover, the fact that Alexandrian data 
points sit so far above the trend lines suggests just how low our ―average‖ is. In this 
connection, we must also remember that breach was originally described by specific verbs, 
and this tradition continued throughout the Roman era. While it is certain that the overall 
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inscription of breach rose from the Ptolemaic period, it nevertheless remained but one of 
several ways to describe breach. A full study of breach will therefore require a detailed study 
of contract styles over the course of the Roman period in order to relate the inscription of 
breach per se to specific or implicit breach. 
That said, the moving averages do tell a story, one of the decline of parasyngraphein 
and the rise of parabainein. One factor shaping of this trend relates to style. As we saw in the 
last section, some models called for parasyngraphein, and they were surprisingly long-lived. 
In Oxyrhynchos the penalty-clauses of these models became detached sometime in the second 
half of the first century and were incorporated into models for other transaction types, 
allowing the verb a brief and limited second lease on life (cf. p. 321). Significantly, outside of 
Augustan Alexandria and the third-century Herakleopolite (which are both special cases of 
different sorts), only one document shows both verbs, no. 62 (cf. p. 321). The real rate of 
incidence of breach verbs for most of the nomes in the Roman period is thus the combined 
total for parasyngraphein and parabainein.  
Form is another important variable. Hypomnēmata, for example, came to prominence 
over the course of the Roman period.
558
 These were originally memos, and then applications, 
and increasingly used as contractual forms. Over time they acquired more and more of the 
usual elements of contracts, like praxis- and kyria-clauses.
559
 However, only two from before 
the fourth century have penalty clauses: P.Kron. 38 (Tebtynis, 137) and P.Mil.Vogl. III 143 
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 Wolff 1978: 116-22; cf. Yiftach-Firanko 2007. 
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(Tebtynis, 170/171). This is not the place to revisit Arangio-Ruiz‘s theory of social change 
and the rise of the hypomnēma, or what effect the subservient and unilateral form of the 
hypomnēma may have had on legal relations. Considered the perspective of the inscription of 
breach, the rise of this form depressed the incidence of parabainein.
560
  
Third—and unstudied—are contract forms that could and routinely did carry penalties, 
but did not (cf. BGU IV 1144 [App. III, no. 28] above, pp. 308ff.). As Berger rightly noted a 
century ago, parties in Graeco-Roman Egypt were free to incorporate penalties, theoretically 
at will.
561
 And indeed, we have many contracts without penalties. The study of these as a 
group will have to await another time; here we note only that those contracts which did not 
assign penalties very rarely inscribed breach per se, creating another pool of documents 
without either verb. Third-century contracts which explicitly forbid breach but fail to include 
penalties constitute an important exception to this rule. Compare, e.g., P.Oxy. XLI 2977 
(239/240) and XXXI 2586 (264): both are apprenticeship contracts from Oxyrhynchos, both 
drafted as private protocols, both expressly prohibit breach with parabainein; the main 
difference between them is that XXXI 2586 carries no penalty-clause. We could potentially 
explain this difference as a function of familiarity or community, since XLI 2977 concerns the 
training of a slave, while XXXI 2586 is made between two Oxyrhynchite weavers, who we 
know as a community made a practice of placing their sons with each other in apprenticeships 
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 Arangio-Ruiz 1961; cf. Wolff 1978: 119-22. 
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 1911: 34, 44. I say ―theoretically‖ because actual practice no doubt depended on the relative social and economic 





(note, however, that XLI 2977 does not include the Fiskalmult).
562
 Alternatively, we might see 
in XXXI 2586 evidence of a trend towards the inscription of breach without penalties (cf., 
e.g., P.Oxy. VI 908 [Oxyrhynchos, 199], PSI III 218 [Oxyrhynchos, 250], and P.Cair.Isid. 80-
81 [Karanis, 296 and 297, resp.]). Whether one should interpret such contracts as pointing to a 
decline in the use of penalties, or conversely as indicating the importance of inscribing breach 
regardless of penalties, is an open question. 
What is truly surprising, perhaps even shocking, in this data is the comparatively late 
date at which we find a documentary use of parabainein in contracts, the second half of the 
second century BCE. As we saw in Sec. 5.2, the verb had been used since the fifth century to 
describe the violation of treaties and oaths—and often both together or metonymically one for 
the other. The language of transgression was clearly percolating through all manner of law-
like arrangements at every level of Greek society in the fourth century, from priestly 
organizations and tribes using (or perhaps re-appropriating) the forms and language of law,
563
 
down to individuals and their private orderings, and it continued to be part of the language of 
treaty, oath, and contract throughout the Hellenistic era.
564
 Unfortunately, we have no 
unambiguous evidence for the use of either parasyngraphein or parabainein in the text of a 
fourth-century contract (cf. pp. 260f. and 269). The first private contract I know of to use the 
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 See Ratzan forthcoming a. Some first- and second-century weaving apprenticeship contracts did carry penalties: 
e.g., P.Oxy. IV 725 (183). 
563
 Cf., e.g., IG II-III
2 
1328.11-13 (a decree of the oregōnes ca. 183/182 BCE: [ἐ ]  [ ]ὲ π ρ  τ ῦ-   τ  πο   , 
  ρ ο  ἕ[σ]τωσ   οἱ ορ  ῵  ς ζ   οῦ τ [ς τὴ]  [π] [ρ] β ί ουσά[ ]   τ  τ῵     ρ   έ ω   τ .); cf. 1275 
(an early third-cent. BCE law (nomon) of some thiasōtēs that uses the kyriōteron language, but not parabainein). 
564
 Cf., e.g., Staatsverträge 481, an agreement and oath between Eumenes and some mercenaries between 263-241 





word is Sard.VII 1, a cheirographic (or at least subjectively drafted) mortgage (parakatathēkē) 
between a certain Mnesimachos and the temple of Artemis ca. 200 BCE, in which it appears as 
a covering term: ἐ    ὲ  ὴ β β  σω    ἢ π ρ  τὴ  συ  ρ φὴ  π ρ β ί ω    τὴ  
   ρ   έ    ἐπὶ [the various provisions]. Before that, such epigraphic contracts as we have 
(mostly public, for obvious reasons) denote breach in specific terms (e.g., the Arkesine loans 
in IG XII.7 68-70, cf. Ditt. Syll.
3
 955; see text in n449). Fittingly, perhaps, our very first 
papyrological attestation of parabainein with the meaning ―breach‖ does not appear in a 
document at all, but the paraliterary UPZ I 144 (pp. 195ff.), where the word for contract is 
also the (by then) literary word for contract, synthēkē (27:  ὴ π ρ β ί     τ    τ  [τ ς] 
συ θή  ς).565 
The best way to determine what it might have meant to have started to incorporate 
―transgression‖ into the text of contracts themselves is to study the verb‘s pattern of usage 
(see Tab. 5.6.b). 
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 If we take Plutarch as an example of literary koinē (who is admittedly late for this purpose, but there is no 
Hellenistic author who covers as wide a range of material as he does), we find that he uses synthēkē when speaking 
of ―contract‖ in a neutral sense, and homologia to mean an ―(oral) agreement‖ (Mor. 742e). Syngraphē appears just 
once in his oeuvre, and precisely because it reeks of the quotidian world of business. At Mor. 1044a he lambasts 
Chrysippos‘s advice to teachers on when to ask for payment, either up front, which is safer, or later, which is 
    ω ο έστ ρο  (Chrysippos‘s word):   ὶ π῵ς ἢ χρ  άτω    τ φρο  τὴς   σοφός, ὑπὸ συ  ρ φὴ  ἐπ’ 
 ρ υρίῳ τὴ   ρ τὴ  π ρ    ο ς,  ἂ   ὴ π ρ  ῶ τὸ   σθάρ ο    σπράττω  ὡς π πο   ὼς τ  π ρ’  ὑτό , ἢ 
β άβ ς  ρ ίττω , φυ  ττό   ος  ὴ      θῇ π ρὶ τὸ   σθάρ ο ; (―And how is the sage either disdainful of 
wealth, if he hands over [with a pun on ―betraying‖] virtue for money under contract—and even if he does not hand 
it over, nevertheless extracting his pittance as having done what he could—or superior to injury, if he is taking pains 
to guard against being wronged with respect to his pittance?‖ (cf. the discussion of hyposyngraphos in App. I). That 
said, it is not a purely literary word: synthēkē appears in documents with the meaning of contract (e.g., P.Oxy. III  





Table 5.6.b Objects of parabainein in documentary papyri from 300 BCE – 300 CE   
 physical "pass by" law judgment oath promise contract will ? Total 
275-250 1         1 
249-225   1       1 
224-200     1     1 
199-175   1       1 
174-150     1 1   1 4 
149-125   1 1 2  1   6 
124-100   1    1  1 3 
99-75   1      1 2 
74-50       3   3 
49-25     1  3   4 
24-0       48   48 
1-24 CE       6   6 
25-49       8   8 
50-74       4 1  5 
75-99       8   8 
100-124   1   1 13 2 1 18 
125-149   2    11 4  17 
150-174   1    7 2  10 
175-199  1 1    9 1  12 
200-224       18   18 
225-249       14  1 15 
250-274 1      5   6 
275-300   1    8 1  10 
TOTAL 2 1 11 1 5 2 167 11 5 205 
 
The rise of parabainein in contracts and wills is impressive, particularly as we note that in 
nearly all other categories the incidence remains low and fairly consistent, with one exception: 
oaths. For the remainder of this section, I will explore the way in which parabainein was used 






5.6.1 Parabainein and Law 
 
In the Ptolemaic period the majority of the references to legal transgression come in petitions 
about official abuses with respect to royal prostagmata.
566
 The one exception is SB I 5675 
(unknown, 183 BCE), in which the king warns his agents against transgressing his orders. This 
was language that the Prefects adopted in their time.
567
 Somewhat oddly, petitioners in the 
Roman period did not accuse Roman officials, or anyone else for that matter, with having 
―transgressed‖ the law.568  
Two instances bear closer inspection. First, P.Hib. II 205 (Heliopolite or Memphite, 
246/245 BCE) contains a heavily edited official report. In it, the writer complains about certain 
powerful people ( σχ ο τ ς) who have submitted a petition disputing the amount they owe in 
taxes, while the rest, some with ―rather poor‖ (  τ   έστ ρο ) vineyards, have already paid:  
 
οὗτο   ὲ  [ό ]ο 〚τὴ    τ υξ  〛\πρὸς τ ς προ σ [ό]  ο[υς]   
 [π ρ]  β ί ουσ    〚[ἐ β] β ή  σ  〛  υσ τ   [σ]τάτους   π  ῵  [ς]   
〚[     ἐ] τ  έ ο  〛 \ χο τ ς  ... (22-24) 
 
―These alone have submitted a petition have transgressed with respect to the revenues, 
despite being possessed of holding the most profitable vineyards ... 
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 E.g., P.Tebt. III.1 786 (Oxyrhyncha, 138 BCE), P.Tor.Choach. 4 and 5 (Thebes, 111 BCE), and UPZ I 108 
(Memphis, 99 BCE). This word is not discussed by Di Bitonto 1967; 1968; or 1976. 
567
 E.g., M.Chr. 188 (Oxyrhynchos, 127), P.Prag. II 122 (unknown, 191), P.Cair.Isid. 1 (Karanis, 297). Cf. n411 on 
the increasing use of plēmmelein to mean legal transgression. 
568
 While parabainein does not figure in petitions, paranomein/paranomos occasionally does (see Preisigke, 






As Turner, the editor, noted, ―the correction of this phrase ... is revealing for official 
psychology‖ (p. 121).569 What it reveals in particular is the decision to characterize one side‘s 
attempt to dispute via a recognized procedure as ―transgressive‖ or criminal, reminiscent of 
the early dynamics of agnōmosynē in the private sphere (cf. pp. 175ff.). 
The second instance comes in the form of a petition to the stratēgos by a certain 
Berenike, a citizen of the polis of Ptolemaïs, ca. 149-137 BCE (P.Merton I 5). In it, she claims 
to have been wronged (    ου έ  ) by her neighbor Andronikos, who is alleged to have first 
encroached on her land (6-7: [ἐ    ο  ἐπ β ]-   β  έ    ἐπὶ  έρος τ ς ἐ  ς   ς), and then to 
have played fast and loose with both the boundary markers and official procedure in the hopes 
of changing the facts on the ground permanently to his advantage. Although Berenike had 
apparently won an initial verdict before the epistatēs on the merits of her case, the decision 
seems not to have been enforced, as Andronikos ignored the order to restore the land and a 
certain Tychon, perhaps the village scribe who was charged with enforcement, failed to carry 
out his brief. This gave Adronikos an opening, so that he, ―transgressing the judgment given 
in my favor as aforesaid, and removing the boundaries of the royal land [i.e., the land in 
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 A few lines later, and of piece with the tone of the correction, the writer accuses the rich of ―conspiring‖ 
(ἐπ συ ίστ  τ  ) at the instigation of Achoapios the nomarch. Episynistasthai occurs just once more in the papyri 
(a fragmentary petition in the Zenon archive: P.Cair.Zen. IV 56623 [unknown, 253 BCE]), but is well attested 





dispute], paid to the god Soter the customary first-fruits in violation of my contract of sale 
deposited in the public record office.‖570  
Without putting too fine a literary point on what is, after all, a petition (and one not 
without significant grammatical problems, e.g., the anacolouthon in the lines quoted above), 
we here see how an act of physical and legal transgression is translated into an act of moral 
transgression. Andronikos first physically ―trespassed‖ on Berenike‘s land, and here the term 
used is the technical, legal one for encroachment, epibainein.
571
 Yet it was only after his 
acting in demonstrably bad faith, ignoring legal decisions and moving boundary markers, that 
Andronikos was manifestly guilty of ―transgression.‖ At one point Berenike says that 
Andronikos ―bent around‖ his responsibility to abide by the decision and willingly re-
establish the boundaries (14-15: π ρ  ά  [ψ  τος  ὲ]   τοῦ   τ  ί ου τοῦ   ουσίως τὸ  
 φορ σ ὸ  [πο   σθ  .]). Perikamptein is a hapax in the papyri, and therefore something of a 
risky restoration, but not unreasonably so given the traces and dearth of possibilities. If 
correct, the meaning accords well with the core complaint in this petition, namely that 
Andronikos has not overstepped, but violated the boundaries of the legal decision she 
obtained before the epistatēs (π ρ β ί ο τος τὴ     ο έ    [ ο   ρίσ  ]),572 and is 
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 Lines 25-9: … το του οὖ ] | π ρ β ί ο τος τὴ     ο έ    [ ο   ρίσ   ὡς  ἴρ τ  ] |   ὶ π ρορίζω  τὴ  
β σ    ὴ    [  ἐτάξ το τ῵  θ ῵ ] | Σωτ ρ  τὴ  ἐξ  θους  π ρχὴ  π[ ρ  τὴ  π ρ τ θ  έ   ] |  ἐ  τ῵  
   οσίω  ὠ ή   ου. Translation adapted from ed. pr. On the anacolouthon, see ed. pr. note to line 25f. 
571
 Cf. Wörterbuch IV (Kiesling), s.v. ἐπ β ί ω. 
572
 Cf. the use of parabainein with respect to a judicial decision in the contemporaneous UPZ 144 above (pp. 
186ff.).  Similarly, emmenein appears in connection with ―abiding‖ by official orders or judgments: P.Polit. Iud. 3 
(Herakleopolis, 140 BCE?), P.Oxy. I 38 (Oxyrhynchos, post 49), P.Mert. III 104 (Oxyrhynchite, early Roman), 





therefore now not encroaching on, but consciously violating the boundaries of her land 
(π ρορίζω  τὴ  β σ    ὴ    [ ]),573 as well as those of her registered contract with Panas, 
from whom she bought the land (π[ ρ  τὴ  π ρ τ θ  έ   ]   ἐ  τ῵     οσίω  ὠ ή   ου). 
The substitution of the preposition para for epi in the action itself (i.e., ἐπ β ί      
π ρ β ί    ) and the accretion of π ρ - at the end of this petition both aim to cement 
Andronikos‘s actions as morally wrong and wantonly illegal, conflating the authority and 
legal status of her boundary markers and her duly deposited contract with those of the legal 
decision she received from the state.  
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5.6.2 Parabainein and oath and promise 
 
As with law, there is nothing surprising about finding parabainein associated with oaths in the 
papyri, yet the nature and history of its association with oaths has important implications for 
its subsequent association with contract. We will begin, however, with promise, since it stands 
at the foundation of oath, which is in essence a solemnized or sacralized promise. 
A late third-century letter jokingly remonstrates with a friend (P.Oxy. LV 3812.2-5 
[Oxyrhynchos]) who had ―disregarded the earnestness of word in deed,‖ that although he was 
to be ―forgiven‖ for his ―lack of leisure‖ ( σχο ί ), this was no excuse for not keeping a 
promise, for promises were ―serious business‖ (σπου   ο ).574 Promises in our sources were 
serious business indeed. We have already come across promise as a basis for thinking of 
people in terms of their gnōmē: those who kept them were eugnōmōn while those who did not 
were considered agnōmōn (pp. 173). The study of promises in the papyri requires a separate 
treatment, but here we will note that many are implicated in contractual relations (unlike the 
letter above), of which I will give two examples.
575
  
First, consider the letter of Protarchos to Zenon,  in which the Protarchos asks Zenon 
to fulfill a promise he had made to supply natron: 
      
... π  ρ  τό σ  ἐπ    ί  σθ    ποστ      ἡ    
〚                   〛 τ  χξ [             ]υ τ [       ]τ  [-   .   -]  σ      τ      [   ]    [       ]   
                                                 
574
 2-5: τὸ σπου   ο  τ῵   ό ω   ρ ῳ π ρ    ς. ἡ   ς  ὲ τῇ   σῇ  σχο [[ ]]ί  συ     σ ο   ,      χρή 
σ[[  ]]\        -   σθ   ὧ  ὑπέσχου   ὶ σπου άζ    ἃ ἐπ  ’  ί ω (l. ἐπ    ί ω)  πο ήσ   . 
575





    ω ὴ  ο    τ π  ψά  θ ·  [ ]ὸ συ βέβ    ,    έτ  ὑπάρχο τος ἐ  τ῵   
4  ο ῵ , π ρ πορ υό   ο  χρ   υό   θ  ἐξ ἄ  ω   ο ῵ , ὅπως  ὴ ἡ ἕψ σ ς  
   - 
πέσ  .  τ  οὖ    ὶ  ῦ     ῵ς ποήσ  ς,     ὴ  πέστ    ς ἐπʼ   τό,  ῦ     
  π [οσ]τ  ί  ς   ὶ ἡ    ἐπ [ στ]ο ὴ  [ ]ρ ά ψ [ ς        ]     [      ]  έ  ω  ς, ὅπως  
φρο - 
τίσο      ὶ  ὴ οἱ     ψοὶ  ρ ῵σ   ο    χο τ ς  ίτρο    ς τὴ  ἕψ σ  . (1-7) 
 
... Because you promised to send us ...[nitron] ... we have not received delivery. Since 
there is no longer any in the nome, it has come to pass that we are going around and 
borrowing it from other nomes so that the boiling does not stop. Still even now you 
will do well—if you have not already sent it all together(?)576—to send it right now 
and write a letter to us ...  [in which?] you have determined how we might best take 




This is a classic case of contractual reliance, even though there is no mention of a contract, 
and indeed the entire tenor of the letter runs counter to seeing any formal contract here, at 
least for the provision of natron.
577
 What the larger relationship between these two is difficult 
to say from this document alone, though there very well might be a contract at the basis of it, 
for example a lease.
578
 In this connection, we could compare it to C.Pap.Iud. I 13 
(Philadelphia, mid III BCE), in which the tenants Alexander and Ismaelos complain to Zenon  
that the land they farm had gone dry ―because you have not provided for us according to the 
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 For ἐπὶ τὸ   τό? 
577
 Contrast P.Lond. VII 2054 (unknown, mid III BCE), where the ―promise‖ to supply gravel to Zenon is in fact a 
tender, cf. epidechesthai (pp. 165ff.). Cf. a Roman example in P.Herm. 12 (unknown, late II-early III), a letter from 
a father to his son concerning the use of ―Cretan earth‖ in fulling: τὴ   πὸ σοῦ     σο έ    πρὸς ἡ ᾶς   
σπου ὴ    ρ β῵ς ᾔ       ὶ π ρʼ -     ο  ρου    οίως ἐπυθό      ὶ  -   πὸ τ῵  σ῵   ρ   άτω , ο ἷς 
π στ  -     σ ς   ὶ τῇ τοῦ τ χ ίτου(*) ἐπ     ί-  |    Κρ τ  ὴ  ὑ πο   βά ω ἐσχ  έ    ... (3-8: ‖I knew 
exactly the enthusiasm which you would display towards us, and I learnt of it alike from Heliodoros and from your 
letter. Trusting in this and the promise made by the craftsmen, I assume that you have received the ‗Cretan 
earth‘...‖). 
578





contract‖ (5-6: π ρ  τὸ  ή σ  χορ      ἡ      τ    \τ   τὴ  συ  ρ φή ). They therefore 
request that ―you do as you promised, and extend us a loan‖ (6-7: σ  πο     |   θά π ρ 
ἐπ    ί ου, ὥστ    ὶ προ   ίζ    ἡ   ). The ―promise‖ of the loan was clearly not part of 
the syngraphē. It may have been suggested or offered by Zenon as a possibility under certain 
conditions when the lease was executed, but more likely it is a remedy put forward by the 
tenants, meant to take the place of the chorēgia that Zenon had purportedly failed to provide. 
In pressing their case, they remind him that both sides have an interest in the land‘s 
productivity,
579
 and so propose a modification that keeps the core contractual ―promise‖ in 
place, even if by means not   τ  τὴ  συ  ρ φή .580  
Another good example, this time from the imperial era, does not use parabainein but a 
periphrasis for it to express the transgression of a informal contractual promise. P.Dubl. 15 is 
a second- or third-century letter from the Oxyrhynchite nome, in which the author accuses the 
recipient of engaging in ―hold up‖ behavior (cf. pp. 41ff.), or renegotiating  halfway through 
so as to extract greater value from the bargain than originally agreed to (―moving the goal 
posts‖): 
 
[     ]θ ω  [π]  ρ    ο έ ου Πρ ά- 
[ ]ο υ   π ό  υσο    τὸ ,  οὺς   - 
[τ]ῶ τ  ὄ τ  π ρ  σοὶ πρόβ τ  
4 [ ] , σοῦ  πο   βά ο τος  ρ - 
[χ]  ς    τὸ  τ σσ ρά ο τ  
  θʼ ἃς    β ς π ρʼ ἐ οῦ ἐπὶ π ρό - 
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 8-10:   τὸς   ρ ἐπίστῃ ὅτ  ο θὲ   έ      έ ο      π ρ  τὸ τὴ    υ ρί      έσθ     ὶ   ς τὸ  ἐπ ρ- | 
χό   ο  χρό ο  π πό     . 
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τ   ου (l.  ο )  ρ χ  ς τ σσ ρά ο τ  
8   ὶ π ρ  Πρ ά ου ὀ  οή ο τ  , 
ὡ ς  ἶ    ἐπὶ τὸ   τὸ  ρ χ  ς 
    οσί ς  ξή ο τ  .      σ- 
      έ σ  θέ ω ὅτ  π ρ    ξ    
12 ἐχρ ήσω. ἐ οῦ   ρ π ρό τος ὑπέ - 
σ χ ο υ τὸ   ά [ρ]ο υρο  τοῦ χόρ το υ 
 ρ χ ῵     τὸ  βρωθ    . 
ὕστ ρο   ὲ ἐ  ί  σ ς ἡ ᾶς σὺ  
16 τῇ τ   ῇ τοῦ    ὸς  ρ χ  ς τρ[ ]- 
ά ο τ     ὲ π ήρ  ὄ τω  
τ῵  πέ τ   ρουρ῵ ,    ὼς 
ὅτ  ο      ότρ ο ς προ ρχό    
20   [ ]   ὴ ἐ  υτοῦ.   ὶ  ῦ  οὖ , 
[φί] τ τ ,      ί < >   τοχὴ  
[πο]  ήσῃ        θέως  πό υσο  
  τ ὸ    ὶ Μ   ρτ   ο , ὑπ ρ τ[ή]- 
24 σ ς   τοὺ ς πρὸς τὴ     τ  . 
   ῵ς  ὲ  πρ ξ ς  ὴ    - 
β ς πρὸς τὴ    ορτὴ .     ῦ  
ἄ    θ             τὸ  φί ο .  ρρωσο. 
 
... when Priam arrives, release him [a third person, C] and give him the 14 sheep 
that are with you, you yourself taking one hundred and forty drachmai, in 
addition to the forty drachmai you got from me when I was present, and the 
eighty from Priam, making altogether two hundred and sixty drachmai. I want 
you to know that you behaved contrary to your pledge. For I was there when you 
promised that the two arourai of grass would be grazed for one hundred 
drachmai. Later on, you made a new demand for thirty drachmai along with the 
price of a goat, with the five arourai not even being paid, since you knew that I 
would not come out, by god, against my own interests.
581
 So do not now put any 
bond on him [C], my friend, but release him [C] immediately, and Mamerteinos, 
putting them up for the night. You made a mistake in not coming up for the 
festival. But come up now on behalf of ... your friend. Farewell. 
                                                 
581
 The ed. pr. translates: ―...because you knew that I would not proceed in a hostile fashion but only in my own 
interest(?).‖ The general interpretation is correct, but the editor misconstrues certain key words. Proerchesthai in 
this context means little more than ―to proceed, go forward,‖ and allotrios should be taken with the genitive 
ἐ  υτοῦ, as usual, meaning merely ―alien, someone else‘s,‖ not ―hostile‖ or ―aggressive‖ (cf. Kiessling, 
Wörterbuch, s.v. and pp. 467f.). Cf. P.Oxy. VI 963 (Oxyrhynchos, II-III), a letter in which a daughter tells her 
mother that she is acting in character: ο      ότρ ο [    ρ] τοῦ ἤθους πο   ς. Instead of the intrusive and 






The writer and the recipient (B) are clearly implicated in a web of dealings, which include the 
buying and selling of livestock and land (16-17), as well as a set of common acquaintances 
(25-27). Unlike the example from the Zenon archive, we should see these two as from the 
same socio-economic milleiu, which accounts for the stronger tone. The writer, whom 
Grenfell and Hunt identified as Agathodaemon (P.Dubl., p. 83), appears to have purchased 14 
sheep from B, making a down-payment at the time of 40 drachmai and agreeing to pay 100 
drachmai for their pasturage. When the time came to collect, he sent an agent, whose name is 
now lost (C), but B demanded an additional 30 drachmai and ―the price of a goat.‖ Now, there 
may be something more to this (the addition of the goat sounds suspicious: did C some how 
cause the loss of a goat?), but Agathodaemon casts it as a simple hold up: B has his 40 
drachmai, the sheep, and one of his men, and knows full well that Agathodaemon was not 
about to throw it all away by acting as if his property was none of his concern (   ὼς   ὅτ  
ο      ότρ ο ς προ ρχό    |   [ ]   ὴ ἐ  υτοῦ). In other words, B holds all the cards and he 
knows it. All Agathodaemon has in his hand is the recipient‘s broken dexia (cf. 208ff.). B has, 
in Agathodaemon‘s words, π ρ    ξ    ἐχρ ήσω (we should likely understand an implied 
dative, probably  ο ), a verbal echo of parabainein. Note also that he stresses that this was a 
promise made to his face, not to an agent (ἐ οῦ   ρ π ρό τος). True to form and keeping 
his eye on his interests, Agathodaemon has now sent down another agent with the balance of 
the payment (whether the 260 represents the original or the new price is impossible to say). 
Interestingly, the letter does not end with reputational threats, as we saw in P.Bad. II 35 and 





the point of retaliation. However, Agathodaemon is letting his associate ―know the score‖ in 
the informal balance of accounts he is keeping, telling him that a black mark has gone down 
in his book against him.
582
  
We have two examples of broken promises described explicitly as ―transgressed.‖ For 
reasons that will become apparent in a moment, I will begin with the later one. In one short 
letter from second-century Oxyrhynchos, P.Oxy. III 526, we find the word used in connection 
with a purely personal commitment: 
 
χ ίρο ς Κ  ό   ρ , 
 Κ ρ   ός σ  προσ  ο- 
 ρ  ω. ο   ἤ     π - 
4 θὴς   ό ως σ    τ - 
   ίπ  , ο   άρ τ ς    - 
 βά ω  τοῦ Τῦβ  τὸ  
 τό ο      π  ο [ῦ ]   - 
8 φά   ο   ο  ίζ[  .     ] 
    βέ ω (l.    β ί ω) σὺ  [τῶ ὀρ]- 
 χ στῇ·      ὶ  ὴ  [ έ]- 
 β    ἐ ὼ τὸ   ό ο  
12  ου ο  π ρέβ  ο . 
   τ χ  . 
 
Greetings Kalokairos, I, Kyrillos, address you. I was not so unfeeling as to leave you 
without reason. For though a man gets his interest in Tybi tenfold, he does not recover 
his capital. I am going up with the dancer; even if he were not going up, I for one 




Besides the interesting insight we get into the psychology of credit and risk in this letter (i.e., 
that no rate of interest or penalties compensates for the risk to the principal), we also gain a 
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 Cf. Ellickson 1991: 55-56 on the ―mental accounting of interneighbor debts.‖ 
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sense of the ethical implications of keeping promises. There is no question of Kyrillos being 
in any way formally bound to go up the Nile; instead, he had merely given his word.
584
 Nor 
did his word rise to the level of even an informal contract, like B‘s dexia to Agathodaemon or 
Johanna‘s ―agreement‖ (syntagē) with Epagathos (pp. 158ff.). We are instead firmly within 
the zone of first-person ethical commitment (cf. Fig. 3.3). Kyrillos felt this promise to have 
obligated him morally, and that in order to keep from ―transgressing‖ it, he was willing to  
risk insulting his friend. The basic thrust of the letter, in fact, is to show that both the needs of 
business and this promise were sufficient reasons for his leaving Kalokairos, who would 
otherwise be justified in seeing his action as ―without reason‖ and ―heartless.‖  
We cannot, sadly, recover anything of the context, and so most of the letter‘s point is 
lost. (For example, why so gnomic about the loan? And why so emphatic about the keeping of 
this promise to the dancer: at whom was the pronoun ἐ   in line 11 directed?) Yet this does 
not negate the letter‘s value as one of those rare authentic expressions of ethical commitment 
in the papyri, as well as of the norm of keeping one‘s word. One was expected to keep 
within—and not ―transgress‖—the bounds one declared to others,585 and Kyrillos knew 
Kalokairos would agree. In its way, this is precisely the kind of conventional doxa that served 
as grist for Plato‘s and Aristotle‘s ethical mill, as they pondered the seeming paradoxes of 
―self-control‖ and whether one could one be unjust to one‘s self, since it is, in a real sense, 
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 Cf. P.Lips. I 107 (n316 above) 
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impossible to ―transgress‖ one‘s own word.586 Such boundaries are the products of will, and 
as such they are incapable of exercising more authority than the ethical agent who erects them 
for his own sake. Indeed, the only other time we find parabainein governing the word logos is 
in the more normal situation: the violation of a boundary by another (i.e., it takes two to 
transgress). In SB IV 7354 (unknown, early II) a certain Sempronios upbraids his son Gaios 
after learning that he was persuaded by a friend not to enroll in the navy as Sempronios had 
wanted: ―In the future, then, see to it that you are not persuaded, and (if you are) you will no 
longer be my son ... Do not cross my words ( ὴ οὖ   ου τοὺ[ς]   [ ]ό ους π ρ βῇς) ...‖587 
The fact that Kyrillos can speak in terms of ―transgressing‖ his own logos reveals the extent to 
which a promise could be thought of as having status independent of its author: one was 
obliged to respect one‘s own word, not merely because others relied on it (and Kyrillos does 
not make this justification), but because it was, in a Kantian way, conceived of as a form of 
law. 
UPZ 1 24 (Memphis, 162 BCE) contains our other instance of someone describing the 
breaking of a promise as a transgression. It is a petition from Ptolemaios, the detainee at the 
Sarapeion, to the hypodioikētēs Sarapion.588 Sarapion had apparently promised (8: 
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 E.g., Pl. Rep. 430e-31a: Ο  οῦ  τὸ  ὲ   ρ ίττω  ὑτοῦ    ο ο ;     ρ   υτοῦ  ρ ίττω    ὶ ἥττω   ήπου 
ἂ   ὑτοῦ  ἴ    ὶ   ἥττω   ρ ίττω ·     τὸς   ρ ἐ  ἅπ σ   το το ς προσ  ορ   τ   (―Isn‘t the expression 
―master of himself‖ ridiculous? For he who is master of himself would of course be subject to himself and vice 
versa. For the same person is addressed in all these expressions.‖). 
587
 5-11:  ο πὸ  οὖ  β έπ ,  ὴ π σθῇς,   ὶ ο  -    έτ   σ  ( .  σ  )  ου υἱός. οἶ  ς, ὅτ  πᾶ  ῥᾴ-   [  ο]     ς τ [οὺς 
 ]   φο ς σου     φορ [ ]   [ ]χ  ς   ὶ ὑπ ροχή .  ὖ ο   ( . οὖ ) πο ήσ ς      ς    ὴ  στρ τί   στρ τ ῦσ  ( . -
  )  ἕ      [ ]ὴ          [       ]              ὴ οὖ   ου τοὺ[ς]   [ ]ό ους π ρ βῇς   ὶ ἕξ ς    σ     ς ἃ   [   ]; trans. slightly 
adapted from Winter, CP 22 [1927]: 246). Cf. P.Mich. VIII 485, pp. 128ff. 
588





ἐπ    ί ω  ο ) to execute an order on a petition already recognized by the king on behalf of 
the twins, but Sarapion‘s order got hung up in the bureaucracy. Ptolemaios therefore asked 
that he speed up the process so that the twins got their due. In characterizing Sarapion‘s 
motivation for subscribing the request, Ptolemaios appealed to his sense of reverence: σὺ  ὲ 
〚ὢ 〛 πρὸς τὸ θ  ο   σίως      ί   ος   ὶ ο  βου ό- |    ος π ρ β   ί τ  τ῵  ἐ  τ῵  
ἱ ρ῵  ἐπ      έ ω  ... (11-12: ―But you being religiously disposed and not wishing to 
transgress anything promised in a temple ...‖).589 This is a warning swaddled in praise: 
Sarapion was to be commended for having taken his promise seriously, as evident from his 
forwarding the request on to the scribe with a favorable subscription (13-14); but he had to see 
that his promise remained unfulfilled, for he had not promised to subscribe, but to have what 
was owed paid out to the twins. Ptolemaios thus carefully frames the Sarapion‘s actions in 
order to support his interpretation of the ―promise,‖ and quotes Sarapion‘s own subscription 
as evidence of his intent (14: ἐπ σ  ψά   ο  τ    θή [ο ]τʼ  πο οῦ   ). We, of course, 
have no idea what Sarapion thought he had promised, if anything, and he no doubt recieved 
dozens of requests when he visited the Sarapeion.
590
 Perhaps in a recognition that his case was 
weak  (the scribe had in fact acted on the subscription, but had latched onto ἐπ σ  ψά   ο  
instead of  πο οῦ   ), Ptolmaios suggests that Sarapion would not (of course) want to 
transgress ―a promise he had made in a temple.‖ Though Ptolemaios speaks of ―promises,‖ he 
is insinuating vows or oaths. Both the qualification of the promise as ―in the temple‖ and the 
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 Cf. Thompson 1988: 244. 
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use of parabainein suggest oaths: these were the promises most often made in temples and the 
most common objects of transgression after law.
591
  
The first instance of parabainein to describe the breaking of an oath comes in 
P.Enteux. 26 (Magdola, 221 BCE). In this petition Ctesicles claims that he has been wronged 
by his daughter Nike and a certain Dionysios, a comedian, who has ―corrupted‖ her (11: τοῦ 
φθ [ί]ρ  τος [  ]τὴ      [ί] [ου). Ctesicles had previously prosecuted his daughter for 
ingratitude in Alexandria, at which time Nike swore out an affidavit with the royal oath (a 
cheirographia), promising to give her father 20 drachmai per month from her own labor as a 
pension. This promissory oath was accompanied by a penalty: ἐ    ὲ  ὴ πο    ἢ 
π [ρ] β ί  [ ] τ  τ[῵    τ  τὴ ] χ  ρο ρ φί   |   π[οτ  σ ]ί  ο    τὴ  ( ρ χ  ς) φ ἢ 
τ῵  ὅρ ω    οχο   ἶ    (7-8). As it turned out, she did not perform in accordance with her 
oath (9: ο  π [ο   ]  ο  τ῵    τ  τὴ  χ  ρο ρ φ[ί]   ο  [ὲ ]), and so Ctesicles now asks 
for the two of them to be summoned to a hearing so that Dionysios may be dealt with and 
Nike forced to recognize his ―rights‖ (dikaia).  
As the editor notes, we are dealing with an oath taken in a purely private affair, not 
one pursuant to some state interest (a common function of the royal oath). Here it is seemingly 
taken by Nike as a condition of Ctesicles dropping his suit. The oath, however, does not 
establish the obligation: this pre-exists, as P.Enteux. 25, another case of filial ingratitude, 
shows. In this second case, the son has agreed, perhaps before a magistrate, to pay his father a 
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 Cf. UPZ I 71 (Memphis, 152 BCE). 10-14:   ὶ  ῦ   ὲ   ...   π ρ βέβ    , \τοὺς ὅρ ους 〚το〛 , ο ς 
συ θέ   ο  πρὸς     υτοὺς ὀ ω ό         τ  τ῵  ρ    ίω      ὶ το ς ἄ  ο ς ἱ ρο ς. On oaths in Egypt, see the 





pension (6: [ο]  ʼ ὥς  ο   έ ω    ο θὲ  τ῵  συ χωρ θέ τω ; cf. Ptolemaic synchōrēseis 
before chrēmatistai, e.g., P.Mert. II 59 [Krokodilopolis, 154 or 143 BCE] , which is executed 
with a cheirographia [line 17]), but is now reneging and acting abusively. In a series of notes 
appended to the petition, the son Strouthos is recorded as having been summoned by the 
authorities, whereupon he promised to support his father Pappos to the tune of two bronze 
drachmai per month, all with his father‘s consent  (verso 1-1:   τ στ ς Στρουθὸς  φ  
  σ    Πάππω  τ῵  π τρὶ   τοῦ     ς τροφὴ    τ῵  τὸ       χ   οῦ ( ρ χ  ς) β . 
π ρὼ   ὲ   ὶ Πάππος    ο    ἐπὶ το το ς). The last line has defied comprehension, but 
seems to mention a penalty for recalcitrance.
592
 From both examples, it is clear that there is a 
pre-existing, non-contractual obligation to care for one‘s parents, which could serve as the 
basis of a legal claim (cf. the charge of agnōmosynē for not observing filial obligations, pp. 
171f.). Such obligations were sometimes reinscribed in contracts, but this was merely to cloak 
one form of obligation in another.
593
 Nike‘s oath and Strouthos‘s forensic promise, on the 
other hand, were additive in that they attached a new liability with definite penalties to the 
old. We should also note the form: the penalty clause in P.Enteux. 26 looks for all the world 
like the later breach clauses of contracts, though note that the penalty is not a Fiskalmult or a 
religious dedication, but a penalty to be paid to the father in the case of perjury.  
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 Verso 3:   ὶ ἐ   ἐ   υτό   ο    τ  τήσῃ      ἐπ  ράψ      τὸ  ἐπὶ τὸ ἱ ρὸ  τοῦ   τοῦ  έρους 
593
 Demotic Verpflichtungsurkunden (Depauw 1997: 148), cf. P.Enteux., p. 67 and the living wills of the imperial 
period in which parents received pensions in return for ceding effective control of their property (n541). This 
arrangement is not the sole invention of the Egyptians: Friedman 1965: 36-38 describes intergenerational ―support 
contracts‖ in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Wisconsin which work much the same way, inscribing a moral 





The next document is UPZ I 71 (Memphis, 152 BCE),  a fairly elusive letter from 
Apollonios the epistatēs to his friend Ptolemaios, complaining about the bad behavior of 
Ptolemaios‘s brother, also called Apollonios. In lines 10-14 the epistatēs says that Apollonios 
has broken his oath:   ὶ  ῦ   ὲ   ...   π ρ βέβ    , \τοὺς ὅρ ους 〚το〛 , ο ς συ θέ   ο  
πρὸς     υτο<ὺ>ς ὀ ω ό         τ  τ῵  ρ    ίω      ὶ το ς ἄ  ο ς ἱ ρο ς. He then asks 
for Ptolemaios to mediate between them. Wilcken (UPZ I, p. 339) and Seidl (1929: 82) concur 
that we are here dealing with another oath in a purely private matter (cf. the example of 
W.Chr. 110a [Thebes, 110 BCE]).  
The third, P.Amh. II 35 (Soknopaiou Nesos, 132 BCE), is a petition by the priests of 
Soknopaios to Apollonios, the stratēgos and superintendent of revenues, concerning a dispute 
with Petesouchos, the lesōnis or chief priest.594 Four days earlier, Petesouchos had allegedly 
collected 225 artabai of wheat under false pretenses from the priests‘ tenants. The priests 
protested and Apollonios confiscated the grain. The aim of this petition, which was written 
just hours after the priests had lodged the intial complaint, was to: (i) file formal charges 
against Petesouchos; (ii) ensure that the wheat remain safely in escrow; and (iii) to request a 
trial date before the epistatēs. The priests make two criminal complaints against Petesouchos, 
accusing him of bia and perjury.
595
 In recapitulating the stratēgos‘s actions earlier in the day, 
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they characterize his confiscation as motivated by, or somehow connected to, the oath-
breaking:   
 
ὑπὲρ ὧ    χ  ρο ράφ     τὸ  β σ - 
   ὸ  ὅρ ο  Π τ σοῦχος     σ῵  ς ὑπὲρ τοῦ 
 ὴ ἐφάψ σθ   τ῵  ἐ φορίω  τ ς   ς 
28   τ     έ   τρόπο  ἐ  τ      ο υί  
ἡ ῵  πρὸς   τὸ  συ    άξ   τ ς 
  σω  ί ς τοῦ    ( τους)   ὶ π ρ β β - 
 ότος τ  τ ς χ  ρο ρ φί ς. 
  
Because of what Petesouchos the lesōnis had sworn to in an affidavit of the royal oath, 
(namely) that he would not lay hands on the revenues of the land in any way in the 
agreement we came to with him for the lesōneia of the 38th year; and he has 




Several aspects of this document are fascinating, but here we are interested in just two. First, 
we discover that the chief priest holds his position by virtue of some sort of synallaxis. 
Second, he is being prosecuted not for breach of contract, but perjury.
597
  
The precise nature of a synallaxis in this period is unclear. On the one hand, it was 
clearly distinguished from a syngraphē when it came to land tenure, although it nonetheless 
represented some sort of recognized contractual relationship. Royal land, for instance, was 
never held on the basis of syngraphē, but synallaxis. Yet, when the land was considered 
marginal, it could be let on an entirely ad hoc basis ἄ  υ συ    άξ ως for a reduced rent.598 
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Wenger (1902: 170) understands the synallaxis in the case above to be a full contract, and 
Petesouchos‘s oath taken to strengthen the obligation. Wilcken, on the other hand, believes 
that Petesouchos had fallen afoul of an Amtseid, in which he promised not to steal revenues 
dedicated to the god (the priests insist that the grain under embargo belongs to Soknopaios, 
lines 23-24, 43-44; cf. AfP III [1906]: 518-19, cf. Seidl 1929: 91). While Wenger‘s 
interpretation of the synallaxis is manifestly based on later usage and is therefore untenable 
for this period, the parallels Wilcken and Seidl cite seem too regular and formulaic for the 
particular case here. The priests stress that the oath was taken in conjunction with the 
particular synallaxis which they themselves had arranged. If the cheirographia was an 
Amtseid, it would seem to have been one designed specifically by them for the 38
th
 lesōneia, 
and hardly one issued at the instance of the state or to protect its interests (Petesouchos may, 
of course, have taken another oath to the crown for that purpose). The priests may have 
extracted a cheirographia from Petesouchos precisely because the traditional arrangement 
they had with him was contractual (synallaxis) but not reduced to a written contract 
(syngraphē), or one that would not be recognized for some other reason. The cheirographia, 
however, would not only bind him before the state, but had the further advantage of being a 
form of written evidence. In any case, it is noteworthy that on the basis of a dispute over a 
contractual agreement the priests choose to indict for bia and perjury, but not breach per se. 
The fourth and final instance in this section is P.Polit.Iud. 9 (Herakleopolis, 132 BCE). 
In this petition, Berenike, a Jew from Aphroditopolis (which one is not certain), appeals to the 
archontes of the Jewish politeuma of Herakleopolis, claiming that another Jew, Demetrios son 





the slave‘s nursing wages for the child for the period between the sale and transfer of 
possession.
599
 Intriguingly, she says that Demetrios ―issued me a letter of ancestral oath, 
which oath acknowledged‖ the terms of the agreement (7-8: π ροή  τό   ο  ἐπ στο ὴ  ὅρ ου 
| π τρίου   ο ο ο ο    ος), which she then reproduces. One of the terms was the standard 
double penalty cum Fiskalmult, with breach evidently framed with a specific verb (12: ἐ    ὲ 
 ὴ   π ο  ῵ ). After this introduction, she complains that Demetrios has paid neither the 
purchase price nor the wage as set out in his ―letter of oath‖: 
  
τ  [ῦ]τ   ὲ   ὶ ἄ    τ ς ἐπ σ τ ο  ς 
π  ρ  χο σ ς   ὶ τοῦ    του 
    θέ   ο   πο    ω ότ[ο]ς   έχρ  
28 το [ῦ]   ῦ ,      π  [ρ ]β β  ότος τ ὸ  
πά τ ρ ο   ό ο ,   ὸ ἠ      σ [ ]έ   
ξ   τ ί ς π  ρ       βά        ὶ 
 π  ρ     ο   υ   πρὸς ὑ ᾶς ἄ [ ]- 
32    [  τ῵]  ἐ   φρο ίτ ς πό    Ἰου  ίω  
π  ρ ὶ το  τ [ου] ἐ π  στο ὴ   ξ ῵ 
ἐ   φ  ί  τ   σ [υ τ]ά ξ   τ ῵  ὑπ ρέτ   
π  ρ π έ[ ]ψ   τ ὸ  Δ  ήτρ  ο    ὶ     - 
36     σ  έ ους   τ ὸ  ἐπ     [ά]σ [ ]  
π ρ χρ     πο  οῦ       ὶ   π ο τ   σ   
σ ὺ  ἡ  ο ί   (τά   τ )  β    ὶ τ   [   ]-   .  - Β φ 
   ὶ τὸ  πό ρ ο    ὶ τἆ      ο ο θ ω ς 
40 τ῵  ὅρ ω , π ρὶ   ὲ [τ]οῦ   ς τ ὸ β σ    ὸ  ἐπ τί ου 
   τ  τοῦ π ρ β β   ό τ ο ς       β      σοπ ο ή ρ ω ς . 
 Date and traces. 
 
Since the letter contains these (terms) among others and Philotas [a mistake for 
Demetrios] has paid nothing up till now, but has transgressed the ancestral law; and 
since I am forced to hazard a journey from home and have brought before you a 
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 letter (of oath) from the Jews of Aphroditopolis concerning the defendant; I 
request, if it seems right, (i) that you order your attendant to send for this Demetrios; 
and, after having summoned him, (ii) that you force him to pay immediately, including 
the additional fine with the double penalty, being 12 talents, as well as ... the 2,500 
drachmai and the income [for the wage] and the rest according to his oath; and (iii) 





We have three elements here, law, oath, and contract: how do they relate, and which have 
been ―transgressed‖?  
Demetrios gave Berenike a ―letter of oath,‖ but the text of this oath reads like a Greek 
contract (cf.   ο ο ο ο    ος). This ―letter of oath‖ appears in another document from the 
politeuma (P.Polit.Iud. 12), which concerns a promise to pay rent in arrears for land that had 
been leased three years earlier. The ―ancestral oath‖ also appears once more in P.Polit.Iud. 3, 
a suit over a dowry. In this last instance there is a contract, a syngraphē synoikesiou, but little 
can be made of the case as a whole since the papyrus is fragmentary and difficult to interpret. 
In all three P.Polit.Iud. ―letter of oath‖ cases there were underlying contracts, and what unites 
them was the need to establish a more immediate sense of liability than that established by the 
contracts.  
For example, in the document before us we have a sale on credit. Berenike has agreed 
to sell the slaves to Demetrios for a set price to be paid on a set day, but to retain possession 
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 Cf. Kiessling s.v. ἄ  ος 4. Berenike is apologizing for bringing a matter before the court which may properly lie 
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until the price is paid. In the meantime, Demetrios as the new owner is responsible for their 
upkeep (i.e., the nursing wages). Sales were only actionable if the price had been paid; and 
sales on credit were typically accomplished by arranging a fictitious loan.
602
 In this case, 
however, we have no peg on which to hang legal liability, as this was a pure promise: there is 
no transfer of property, no arrha, no fictive loan, only a consensual sale, which was not 
recognized in Ptolemaic Egypt (hence the recourse to the legal fiction). Berenike therefore 
demanded ―a letter of oath‖ as a sort of formal contract like a stipulatio: it could be the basis 
of a suit if the sale was never completed because it did not depend on traditio for liability to 
attach. P.Polit.Iud. 12 presents a different version of the same problem. In this case the 
defendant had leased land owned by the plaintiff‘s father and then fell into arrears. Sometime 
later the tenant swore out a ―letter of oath‖ on the debt to the plaintiff, the lessor‘s son, not the 
lessor himself. Here, then, we must have some form of novation or assignment, as the debt is 
passed to the son, who was not party to the original lease.
603
 In both cases the oath established 
formal liability with respect to transactions that did not involve the transfer of money, either 
because the traditio had not yet taken place (P.Polit.Iud. 9) or because it had already taken 
place, but between two other parties (P.Polit.Iud. 12). 
In her complaint Berenike accuses Demetrios first of transgressing the ―ancestral law.‖ 
As the editors point out, she must be referring to the oath.
604
 What particular part of the 
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―ancestral law‖ she is citing is not clear, but there is both Old Testament authority on the 
swearing of oaths
605
 and contemporary evidence for the practice.
606
 The editors further 
comment that Berenike does not seem to ask for any particular punishment for perjury, and 
tentatively cite Philo‘s testimony at De Spec. Leg. 2.28 that perjury was punished by death or 
public beatings. Perhaps if condemned Demetrios could expect such punishments at the hands 
of the archontes, but we should note that Berenike does in fact recommend a punishment for 
perjury: π ρὶ   ὲ [τ]οῦ   ς τ ὸ β σ    ὸ  ἐπ τί ου     τ  τοῦ π ρ β β   ό τ ο ς       β    
  σοπ ο ή ρ ω ς .  
In other contract cases from this period, plaintiffs ask for all the penalties in their 
contracts in the event of breach. If we look to P.Tor.Amen. 8, for instance, there is a call for 
the party in breach to pay both penalties, the contract penalty and the Fiskalmult, in an 
undifferentiated manner, simply τ  ἐπίτ    (87; cf. 300f. and App. II below). In an earlier 
phase of the same dispute, one of the embalmers voluntarily waives ―the fine‖ (P.Tor.Amen. 
7.26: π ρὶ  ὲ τοῦ ἐπ τί ου  π   άσσω), by which he seems to mean both the contract 
penalty and the Fiskalmult (cf. lines 13-15), asking only for his ―rights‖ (to dikaion). While it 
appears that parties could waive penalties (only fitting as they were free to insert them), 
Berenike‘s request suggests that it lay within the archontes‘ discretion to apply the fine or not, 
that they, in other words, could decide to condemn Demetrios to pay her the purchase price 
with the contract fine (the hēmioloia), but not the Fiskalmult to the king. This sheds an 
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interesting light on the assessment of penalties, and one cannot help but wonder whether all 
judges had similar discretion with respect to the Fiskalmult, or whether this severability was 
somehow particular to the archontes of the politeuma or other such courts, and if the latter, 
whether or not the status of the ―letter of oath‖ was a factor 607  
Given the current state of the evidence, it is fruitless to speculate on such questions, 
but we might also pause for a moment to consider Berenike‘s description of the Fiskalmult as 
τὸ ἐπίτ  ο    τ  τοῦ π ρ β β  ότος. Besides the Gnomon, we have no evidence 
connecting the Fiskalmult to oaths per se before the Byzantine period (if indeed the 
Fiskalmult is relevant to the Gnomon, cf. above, pp. 237ff.).
608
 We have cheirographiai which 
include penalty clauses, e.g., P.Enteux. 26 above (pp. 348f.), but the evidence for the 
Fisklamult in Egypt points to its being used as a sanction against breach of contract, not oath 
(cf. UPZ I 125 [App. III, no. 13], line 24: τοῦ π ρ συ  ρ φ      ς τὸ β σ    ὸ  ἐπίτ  ο ). 
Moreover, we may be sure that Berenike is using parabainein here to mean ―transgression‖ 
and not ―breach of contract.‖ She already stated that Demetrios has ―transgressed the ancestral 
laws.‖ The phrase οἱ πάτρ ο   ό ο  was the standard way to refer to Torah law in the 
Septuagint, just as parabainein was the standard Septuginal word for ―sin‖ and 
―transgression.‖609 By suggesting to this Jewish court as they deliberated over a case of Jewish 
                                                 
607
 Cf. Seidl 1933: 122-23. 
608
 The best discussion remains Seidl 1929: 101-8; 1933: 123-27. Byzantine association: Berger 1911: 46; cf. Seidl 
1933: 114-19. 
609
 See Hatch and Redpath 1998, s.v. π ρ β ί    . I would like to thank Prof. S. Schwartz for recommending the 






law that the Fiskalmult was ―a penalty for those who have transgressed,‖610 Berenike was 
attempting to dress up a civil remedy for breach of contract in the language of legal and 
religious transgression, just as she dressed up her (non-binding) contract of sale as a written 
Jewish oath.
611
   
What is striking about the use of parabainein in connection with oaths is that many of 
the oaths were themselves connected to contracts. The orthodoxy on oaths in Graeco-Roman 
Egypt was articulated eighty years ago by Erwin Seidl (1929, 1933).
612
 Despite cataloging a 
fairly suggestive collection of instances in which oaths were used in private business, 
including contractual settings (1929: 81-86), Seidl concluded that the use of oaths in private 
legal transactions had diminished from a regular occurrence in the Saite and Persian periods to 
a comparative infrequency in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods, only to grow again in the 
Byzantine era. He attributed the waning of oath in private legal affairs to the intersection of a 
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 If I am correct in my interpretation of the use of the ―letters of oath‖ as formal end-runs around legal liability 
problems, it seems that the archontes were amenable to this use of this Jewish institution (or at least they attracted 
petitioners who thought so), but might they have had a problem with the Fiskalmult in the ―letter of oath‖? The 
Fiskalmult was in origin a Greek religious practice (Latte 1920; Pierce 1972: 159-78), and it is more than possible 
that the archontes were aware of this, since the phraseology of some of the Greek and demotic versions of the 
penalty which speak in terms of money for ―the burnt offerings and libations of the kings‖ or money ―consecrated 
(hieros) to the kings,‖ who were, after all, gods with temples in Egypt. Jews had good relations with the Ptolemies, 
though it is perhaps conceivable that some purists or extremists regarded the Fiskalmult as a form of idolatry. The 
range of Jewish attitudes towards such institutions in classical antiquity ran the gamut, from the Essenes to the 
Babatha, who appears content to swear by the tychē of the emperor (P.Yadin I 16). Though the Fiskalmult in private 
instruments stretches back to the late third century, the evidence suggests that it become more popular in the mid 
second century, and may have therefore represented something of a novelty in ―letters of oath‖ in 132 BCE. One 
could imagine that it might possibly seem an odd punishment for one who ―transgressed‖ the ―ancestral law‖ to be 
condemned to pay a fine ―consecrated‖ to the king, hence the question of whether or not the archontes would 
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declining religiosity and rising faith in the state in the Graeco-Roman period (1933: 114). It 
would be more difficult to maintain the first element of this proposition today, partly because 
more evidence connecting oath and contract has emerged since 1933.
613
 Also, our view of the 
Ptolemaic state has changed sufficiently that some of the examples he characterizes as 
supporting state interests would not necessarily be taken as such today.
614
  
Yet it is not merely a question of evidence, but also of object. Seidl‘s consideration of 
the relationship between oath and contract is a narrowly legal one. He thus discounted the 
evidence he found for ―oath-like assertions of no juristic value.‖615 His object was the study of 
oaths that were recognized by the state, a self-evidently legitimate and valuable project. It 
should not, however, be confused with a study of the role of oaths in business (as Seidl 
recognized, collecting a few examples of non-juristic oaths: 1933: 118-19).
616
 If we start with 
the premise that there is a deep conceptual connection between law, oath, and contract, we 
might wonder what happened to the complex of ideas such that oaths could fall out from 
private legal business so completely. In other words, how might the associations between 
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these three institutions be affected by such a change both within themselves and vis-à-vis each 
other? The advantage of Seidl‘s work is its clear and tenacious hold on the official oath, but 
this focus shuts out concomitant shifts in allied institutions, like contract. We should therefore 
ask ourselves what it might mean to have a morally-charged word like parabainein—which 
was otherwise reserved for the transgression of law, oath, and promise, and thus equated with 
crime, sacrilege, and faithlessness—to appear in contracts, replacing the comparatively 
antiseptic and legal parasyngraphein? And how might this be connected to the displacement 
of oaths from legal transactions? The suggestion of the final section is that the substitution of 
parabainein for parasyngraphein is part of a larger phenomenon, whereby contracts were 





5.7 The moralization of breach  
Though parabainein appears in one second-century BCE contract (P.Stras. II 115), and is 
clearly used to mean breach of contract in the trial proceedings and petitions of P.Tor.Amen. 
6-8 (to which we will return in App. II), the next contracts in which it appears are Ptolemaic 
cessions from the first century BCE. These contracts are all homologies attended by oaths, and 
all use parasyngraphein to describe breach (cf. App. III, nos. 15-21).
617
 It has now been 
demonstrated that parasyngraphein was the older verb for breach, and that its use in cessions 
is to be connected to its association with the Nichtangriffsklausel, which association extends 
back to the third century BCE (Sec. 5.3-5.4). We should therefore assume that the appearance 
of parabainein in these documents represents an innovation. The oaths, which were legally 
required, have been little studied in their own right since the publication of the Herakleopolite 
documents, and the interest at that time was predominantly in their relationship to the moment 
of legal transfer (i.e., had the cession been perfected before the oath was taken or was the oath 
necessary to execute the cession).
618
 Our interest is in the language of breach and how the two 
verbs relate to each part of the document, the homology and the oath. As we shall see, these 
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documents preserve archaeological traces of the shift from parasyngraphein (breach) to 
parabainein (transgression).  
The Herakleopolite cession homologies are written from the perspective of the person 
ceding the property, who acknowledges that he or she consents (eudokein) to the 
administrative transfer of title (metepigraphē), followed by a description of the property, a 
guarantee of title (bebaiōsis), and then a penalty clause, which is the Nichtangriffsklausel.619 
Parabainein is never attested in the text of the homology, only parasyngraphein. Cession 
documents from Oxyrhychos are by and large similar, but with the important difference that 
the homologies never use parasyngraphein in the participle, but always conjugate the verb, 
and draft the clause in such a way as to supplant eperchesthai altogether. There is thus is no 
explicit connection between the verb and any language of the Nichtangriffsklausel. Instead, 
the Oxyrhynchite declarant agrees: (i) to hand over the ceded property, guaranteed and free of 
encumbrances; (ii) not to interfere with the new owners; and (iii) not to act fraudulently with 
respect to the cession (e.g., P.Oxy. XLIX 3482. 13-14:    ὲ    οτ χ ήσ    π ρὶ τὴ  
π ρ χ ρ σ   π ρ υρέσ     [   ]    ᾶ  ).620 The form of the cession was remarkably stable in 
Oxyrhynchos, for almost the same formulae appear two centuries later in no. 63, long after the 
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act of cession had any meaningful distinction from sale, and indeed long after it was usual to 
have any form of parasyngraphein in a contract.
621
   
The Herakleopolite oaths covering the cessions are promissory oaths, cast in the 
future, to abide (ἐ       ) by the homology, which is often referred to as a syngraphē tou 
homologou. I reproduce BGU VIII 1738
622
 as an example of an oath without the introductory 
dating formula (all of the restorations are guaranteed by the other examplars): 
 
   ρή ω  ρ    ί ου Μ    ὼ  τ῵    τοί[ ω  ἱππέω ] 
12   ὶ   υἱὸς ρ    ί  ς Μ    ὼ  [ ] ά [οχος τοῦ π τρ  οῦ] 
  ήρου πο  ω ίῳ Ε βο  [ου Μ    ό   τ῵    τοί ω ] 
ἱππέω  ἐ          ὶ πο ήσ[    σοί τ    ὶ το ς π ρ  σοῦ] 
πά τ  τ    τ  τὴ  τοῦ    ο  ο  ί [ου συ  ρ φὴ  ἣ  τ θ ί]- 
16   θά σο      τοῦ   τοῦ   ορ[ ] ο[ ίου ἅ   τ   χ  ρο ρ φί  ] 
τ  τ      φ  ρ [ο έ]   ,   θʼ ἣ[    ω ο ο ή  θ     ὲ ] 
ἡ ῵     ρή ω[  τ]ο ῦ ὑ π ά ρ χ [ο τος   τ῵  π ρὶ                  ] 
 στ θ οῦ τό πω[                ο     τῇ   τ π  ρ φῇ], 
20 τὸ   ὲ ἕτ ρο  συ  υ [ ]ο     [τ   π ρ χωρήσ     ὶ πᾶσ   ἃ] 
   οῦ τ       τ ς συ  ρ φ[ ς,   ὶ    ὲ π ρ συ  ρ ]- 
φήσ       ὲ    οτ χ [ήσ]    τ[  τ῵      τ ς συ  ρ ]- 
φ ς ἢ τ῵  ἐ  τῇ χ  ρο ρ φί  τ  τῃ [   ρ   έ ω ] 
24  ήτ   ρίσ      ὲ  ί       έ [  ἡ ῵   ράφ σ]- 
θ ί σο     ὲ το ς π ρ  σοῦ ἐπὶ    [   ὸ]ς ἄρ[χ]ο το[ς] 
   ʼ ἐπὶ  ρ τ ρίου π ρί τ  ος ἁπ ῵ς τ῵    τ  τοὺς 
τόπους. ἐ    έ τ  π ρ β ί ω    τ῵      τ ς συ  ρ φ ς 
28 ἢ τ῵  ἐ  τ   χ  ρο ρ φί  τ  τῃ    ρ   έ ω , ἡ  ὲ  
π [ρ ]χ ρ σ ς  υρί   στω   ὶ ἡ πρᾶξ ς  στω σοί τ    ὶ 
το ς π ρ  σοῦ τ῵    θʼ ἡ ῵  ἐπ τ ί ω    [ο]  ο - 
θως τ   συ  ρ φ  ,   τοὶ  ʼ   οχο   ἴ     τῶ ὅ ρ [ ῳ] 
32  π  ί ʼ ἂ   ὖ συ θ῵   .623 
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 Cf. P.Oxy. XLIX 3482, introduction. 
622
 Pace the editor‘s assignment, I see no way to connect the recently published P.Bingen 53 to lines 22-23 of this 
document. 
623
 There has been much discussion of this final phrase, particularly in light of the legal effect of the oath vis-à-vis 
the cession. The evidence has not been compared, so far as I know, to oaths appended to the Cretan treaties, e.g., 






We, Chairemon son of Herakleides, Macedonian of the katoikic cavalry, and his son 
Herakleides, Macedonian heir of his [father‘s] klēros, (swear by the king and queen) to 
Apolllonios son of Euboulos, [Macedonian of the katoikic cavalry], that we will abide 
and do for you and your assigns everything according to the syngraphē tou homologou 
which we have drafted for you through the same agoranomos at the same time as this 
cheirographia, according to which we [have declared] that (i) of us Chairemon 
[consented to the metepigraphē] of the stathmos belonging to [him], while the other 
[i.e., Herakleides] likewise consented [to the cession and everything which] is declared 
through the syngraphē; and (ii) that we will neither breach nor deal fraudulently with 
anything written in the syngraphē or this cheirographia; (iii) nor will either of us 
initiate proceedings against or indict you or your assigns on any charge in front of any 
officer or any tribunal for any reason whatsoever concerning these places. But if we 
transgress anything written in the syngraphē or this cheirographia, let the cession be 
valid and praxis be yours and your assigns‘ for the penalties against us according to 
the syngraphē, and may we ourselves be held liable to this oath as soon as it has been 
duly executed. 
 
The oath serves to make one‘s foundational commitment to abide by the contract explicit. One 
thus promises not to parasyngraphein or kakotechnein with respect to the contract. The word 
for breach in the oaths is always parabainein, as here, while in the homologies it is always 
parasyngraphein (cf. App. III, nos. 15-16).
624
 The oaths from Oxyrhynchos were similar in 
that they swore the following: ἐ        ἐ  ἅπ σ  το ς   τ  τὴ  συ  ρ φή  τ ς |  
  ο ο ί ς ... | ...   ὶ    ὲ    οτ χ ή[σ]    Στράτω   | π ρὶ τὴ  π ρ χωρ σ   τ ς   ς 
   ὲ π ρὶ    ὸ |   [  ]ὲ  τ῵      τ  [ς  ] ο ο ί ς    π φω   έ ω  |    [ ὲ π ρὶ τὸ  
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 P.Oxy. XLIX 3482 has parabainein in a penalty clause, but not in the cession. There are in fact two homologies 
in this document: a cession (lines 1-16, where the breach verb is athetein, cf. Sec. 5.4.3) and a division (16-27), and 
the parabainein is used in the division. Sadly, we have very few Oxyrhynchite comparanda before the third century, 
but it is nevertheless interesting that Oxyrhynchite divisions should use parabainein in the first half of the first cent. 





ὅρ ο]  τ οῦτο  π ρ υρέσ         ᾶ  (e.g., P.Oxy. LV 3777).625 The earliest extant oath also 
includes parasyngraphein, like the Herakleopolite examples (P.Oxy. XLIX 3482.35). 
By this time, however, the distinction between the contract and the oath had begun to 
break down, and mutual influence can be detected. Thus, even though no homology uses the 
word parabainein to set off its penalty clause, one can speak of ―transgressing‖ a contract in 
an oath about a contract, e.g., BGU VIII 1737.15, where it appears that the usual 
π ρ συ  ρ φήσ    (cf. lines 21-22 in the oath above) has been replaced with 
π ρ βήσ[ σθ  ]. By the same token, kakotechnia, which is properly a word that belongs in 
an oath about a contract (as we shall see next), appears in BGU VIII 1731.15 and in the text of 
all three Ptolemaic cession homologies from Oxyrhynchos.
626
 Indeed, this assimilation of 
contract to oath, or the bundling of oath elements into the contract, explains why 
parasyngraphein is, anomalously, not directly associated with the Nichtangriff language in the 
Oxyrhynchite cessions.  
In Oxyrhynchite cessions, as described above, it is kakotechnein that is associated with 
the substance of the Nichtangriff language, and the promise is not to press a claim or deal 
fraudulently:  ὴ ἐ π ο ήσ σθ   Θέω      ʼ ἄ  ο  ὑπὲρ   τοῦ |  [ὧ  π] ρ   χ ρ     
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 Cf. P.Oxy. XLIX 3482.35-37:   ὶ   θὲ  π ρ συ  ρ φήσ       ὲ | [   οτ χ ήσ    π ρὶ τὴ  τ ς   ο ο ί ς 
συ  ρ ]φ ὴ     ὲ π ρὶ   θὲ  τ῵    ʼ   τ ς    π φω   έ ω     ὲ | [π ρὶ τὸ  ὅρ ο  τοῦτο  π ρ υρέσ   
   ]   ᾶ · I would in general consider emending P.Oxy. XLIX 3482 to be more in line with P.Oxy. LV 3777, e.g., 
line 31: [ ... ἐ        ἐ]  ἅπ σ   τ . instead of [ ...    ο   ]  ἅπ σ   τ .  
626
 BGU VIII 1731.14-18: ἐ    ὲ Θέρσ   ρος   ὶ ρ     ί  ἢ [ἄ  ος ὑπὲρ   τ῵ ] ... συ   χω[ρ  έ     ὶ]   
   οτ χ ῵σ    θʼ ἃ  έ ρ πτ  , [τ   ὲ    ω ο ο]   έ      [ρ  ]   σ [τω, ἡ  ʼ ἐσο]  έ    φο ος ἄ [ υρος  στω] 
    ὶ προ σ  π ο τ  σάτωσ   Θέρσ  [ ρος   ὶ]  ρ  [   ί   ] ὶ   ὑπὲρ   τ[῵ ] ἐ π  [ θὼ ] ...  | 
π ρ συ  ρ φ῵σ  ἐπίτ  ο  χ    ο ῦ  ο [ ί]σ  [ τος τά ]  τ  π  [ τή ο τ  ...      ὶ    ὲ  ἧ[σσ]ο  ἡ 





  θότ  πρό   τ      ὲ  έρους    ὲ    οτ χ ήσ    π ρὶ τὴ  π ρ χ ρ σ   π ρ υρέσ       
[   ]    ᾶ  (P.Oxy. XLIX 3482.12-14). Kakotechnein also appears in connection with the 
Nichtangriff language in Arsinoite cessions from the imperial period,
627
 an apparent addition 
since earlier Ptolemaic cessions from the Arsinoite show merely the Nichtangriffsklausel (e.g., 
P.Tebt. III.1 820 [201 BCE]).
628
 Given (a) the use of the Nichtangriffsklausel in quit-claims 
generally, and in cessions specifically (Sec. 5.4); (b) the association of both kakotechnein and 
parasyngraphein with the Nichtangriff language; and (c) the homogenization of the cession 
contract with the accompanying oath such that certain elements originally in oaths ended up in 
the contract, specifically kakotechnein; it therefore seems reasonable to hypothesize that in the 
case of the Oxyrhynchite documents the specific language of the Nichtangriffsklausel fell out, 
in some sense replaced by kakotechein, while retaining the tell-tale parasyngraphein.  
All the above, however, is predicated on there being an original relationship between 
kakotechnia and oath, and only a secondary association with contract. Is this the case? 
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 SB VI 9109 [Tebtynis, 31]; P.Coll.Youtie I 19 [Ptolemais Euergetis, 44]; and BGU XI 2051 [Arsinoite, II]. E.g., 
SB VI 9109.7-8: ὅ τ   ʼ ἂ  τ῵  προ   ρ   έ ω  π ρ συ  ρ φῇ Κρο ίω , ἣ   ὲ  ἐ   πυήσ τ   ( . 
πο ήσ τ  ) τοῦ π ρʼ  ο τοῦ ( .   τοῦ) π ρὶ το τω   φο ο    [ἢ]      σ   ἢ ἐ π  σ   (l. ἐ ποί σ  ) ἢ 
   υσ   ἢ    οτέχ  σ     τ  πᾶ   έρος ἄ υρος  στω   ὶ προσ ποτ σάτω   τ . 
628
 But not all cessions have the clause, e.g., CPR XVIII 4 (Theognis, 231 BCE). This is, however, a rather odd 
cession (see CPR XVIII, p. 50). I know of only three extant Arsinoite land cession cheirographiai: BGU II 543 
(Aueris, 27 BCE), W.Chr. 111 (Soknopaiou Nesos, 6), and P.Tebt. II 382 (Tebtynis, early Augustan). None contain 
the relevant language, though we should note that W.Chr. 111, the most official-sounding, is incomplete, and the 
other two look as if they were sworn on the insistence of the parties, not for the sake of legal execution (cf. Seidl 
1933: 117; Oates 2004: 174). There is thus no telling if the standard Ptolemaic oaths from the Arsinoite contained a 
promise concerning kakotechnia. But compare instances of kakotechnia from Arsinoite documents, where is it 
associated with both the Nichtangriffsklausel and/or parasyngraphein, e.g., App. III, no. 47; P.Mich. V 350, a 






Kakotechnia and its cognates are very old words, stretching back to the beginning of 
Greek literature (e.g., Hom. Il. 15.14), and the meaning, as may be divined from its roots, is 
not merely to do, but to devise something ―bad‖ or ―evil,‖ with emphasis on the intentionality 
of the bad act.
629
 In classical times, the word as it was used in legal contexts signified either 
malicious plotting or deception in general (e.g., Antiphon 1.22 (cf. Löbl 1997: 147-48), Dem. 
43.2), or in a more limited and technical meaning, the suborning of perjury ( ί   
   οτ χ  ίου).630 We perhaps see something of an intermediate stage between the general 
and technical meanings in attestations in which kakotechnia implies a sort of conspiracy to 
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 Cf. the schol. ad Hom. Il. 15.14; Hesychius (Latte), s.v.  ο ο  τ  and   σ  τ ς; Löbl 1997: 14-15. Metopos of 
Metapontion is explicit: Π ρὶ  ρ τ ς, frag. 1 Thesleff (p. 118): ἁ  ὲ  ὦ     ί  τ῵  ο  στ  ῵  έρ ος τᾶς ψυχᾶς 
ἐ τὶ ο    οτέρ · ποτέο      ρ ἁ  ὲ  φρό  σ ς τᾷ τέχ  , ἁ  ὲ    ί  τᾷ    οτ χ ί · ἕξ     χ  άσ ος   ρ ποθὲ  
 ὑρίσ    τὸ ἄ   ο · . . . ἁ  ὲ    ρ π  ο  ξί   πὸ    ί ς, ἁ  ὲ    ί   πὸ τ῵  ο  στ  ῵  έρ ος τᾶς ψυχᾶς. See 
also, e.g., Gorgias, Fr. 11a; Aesop, Fab. 36 (Hausrath and Hunger), Hdt. 6.74; Men. Dys. 301-24, 3Macc. 7:9, 
Lucian, Calumniae 10, 12, Alex. 4; Libanius, Or. 4.27, 18.184 (a forensic setting), Declam. 1.108. It is a common 
word in Christian authors for the devil‘s work. The other meaning of kakotechnein is to ―practice badly,‖ as in to 
apply one‘s technē poorly (often referring to poor application of rhetorical or medical technique; see LSJ s.v. for 
examples). This meaning activates a different aspect of technē and is therefore irrelevant in this context. It is also, to 
my knowledge, never so used in the papyri, cf. the examples in Preisigke, Wörterbuch, s.v. The two meanings can, 
of course, converge in discussions of the relationship between virtue, art, and knowledge, e.g., commonly in Philo, 
De congressu 141, De mutatione 150, De Somniis 1.107, De Spec. Leg. 3.101, 4.48; cf. Quint. Inst. 2.15.1-2, Plut. 
Mor. 706d7, Strabo 7.3.7 (note the connection with pleonexia, cf. Metopos above), Lucian, De Parasito 27. A 
wonderful example comes in the Prefect Tiberius Julius Alexander‘s edict of 68 (cf. Sec. 6.2), when he condemns 
the kakotechnia of assessments based on an average rise of the Nile, saying that ―indeed nothing is more just than 
the truth,‖ ([  ίτο ] τ ς    θ ί ς   τ ς ο  ὲ   ο         ότ ρο   ἶ   , OGIS 699.55f-58). Extrapolation, in other 
words, is malpractice in the service of dishonesty.  
Kakotechnia/kakotechnein is distinct from kakourgia/kakourgein until the later third century. Kakourgia is a 
general word for criminality, though often related to theft, e.g., P.Enteux. 84 (Ghoran, 285-221 BCE), P.Oxy. XXXVI 
2754 (Oxyrhynchos, 111), SB XX 14662 (Arsinoite, 154), and P.Oxy. XII 1408 (Oxyrhynchos, 212-214); cf. 
Gagarin 2003. Any relationship to contracting is incidental. E.g., in M.Chr. 52 (Soknopaiou Nesos, 150-154), a man 
accuses a number of assailants of kakourgia because they violently forced him to issue a cheirograph of sale (cf. 
P.Mil.Vogl.I 25). The also word appears in shipping contracts, but with a specialized meaning (see Meyer-Teermer 
1978: 11-12, 119-20, but cf. P.Oxy. LXVI 4526 [Oxyrhynchos, 69/70]). Kakotechnein thus relates to deviousness 
with respect to one‘s obligations under contract, whereas kakourgia is less specific. In the later third century, there 
was something of a convergence of the two, e.g. PSI XIII 1337 (unknown, 250-260: both words appear in 
conjunction), P.Oxy. XII 1468 (Oxyrhynchos, 256-258), W.Chr. 228 (Hermopolite, 298: oath on a property 
declaration), P.Oxy. I 71 (Oxyrhynchos, 303), but it was still used for common criminals, e.g., P.Abinn. passim. 
 
630
 Pollux 8.37 (citing Lysias), cf. Dem. 47.1-2, 49.56; Harpocration (Keaney), s.v.    οτ χ  ῵ . See Pauly-









The first association we have with the word in the realm of contract comes in fifth-
century BCE treaties. E. H. Wheeler first described what he called ―anti-deceit‖ clauses in 
treaty oaths, the earliest version of which were provisions in the oath to promise to uphold the 
treaty ο  ὲ τ χ ῇ ο  ὲ   χ  ῇ ο     ᾷ or   ό ῳ.632 Wheeler‘s particular theory about the 
rise of anti-deceit clauses in the fifth-century and concerns about the ―sophistic interpretation‖ 
of treaties is immaterial to this discussion. What is important, however, is the general idea that 
treaties were accompanied by oaths to abide by them (cf. pp. 259f.), and that some oaths were 
more specific than others in spelling out what the parties meant by ―abiding‖ by the treaty 
(i.e., an attempt to rule out sophistic interpretation). Kakotechnein (and the earlier ο  ὲ τ χ ῇ 
 τ .) appear in these oaths as variations of the ―anti-deceit‖ clause. All oaths, however, aimed 
at strengthening the foundational commitment to the treaty; the anti-deceit clause was merely 
an attempt to write a better, more tightly binding oath. In the world of the treaty, on the other 
hand, this foundational commitment is presumed: it merely spells out the terms of the 
relationship.  
A nice example of this version of the ―anti-deceit‖ clause can be found in 
Staatsverträge 492, a treaty between Smyrna and Magnesia-on-Sipylos after the Third Syrian 
War (ca. 243 BCE) in which both sides agreee to swear oaths to abide (emmenein) and to 
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 E.g., Dem. 29.11; 33.38; cf. Pl. Laws 936d and the quasi-legal Aesop, Fab. 67 (Hausrath and Hunger).  
632





uphold or display other foundational values, like eunoia. They further promise: ο θὲ  | 
π ρ βήσο    τ῵    τ  τὴ    ο ο ί   ο  ὲ   τ θήσω ἐπὶ τὸ χ  ρο  τ     ρ   έ   
ἐ    τ   ο τ  τρόπω  ο τ    χ     ου    ᾶ  (63-64, cf. 72-73).633 Closer to a contractual 
setting is Staatsverträge 481 (=OGIS 266, 263-241 BCE), an agreement between Eumenes and 
his mercenaries. The ―contract‖ is styled both as a request (1: axiōmata) and an agreement 
(16: homologia). The oath sworn by the mercenaries rehearses their foundational commitment 
to the relationship (based in eunoia), but also contains a good deal of what one might consider 
contractual provisions (e.g., the obligation to return items that belong to the king [36-40]; 
what to do about communication with others [40-45]). The oath concludes with an anti-deceit 
clause, the conditions of release from the oath, and the consequences of perjury: ο  ὲ 
   οτ χ ήσω π ρὶ τὸ  ὅρ ο  τοῦτο  ο θὲ    ο τ  τέχ    ο  τ  π ρ υρέσ   ο     ᾶ . 
π ρ  ύω  ὲ   ὶ Ε  έ   τὸ[ ]     ττά ου τοῦ ὅρ ου   ὶ τοὺς   θ’   τοῦ ὀ ω ο [ό]τ ς 
συ τ   σθέ  -   τω  τ῵  ὡ ο ο   έ ω .   ορ οῦ τ   έ   ο    ὶ ἐ   έ ο τ  ἐ  τ     πρὸς 
Ε  έ   τὸ     τ ίρου    οί    ὖ  ἴ    ὶ   τ῵     ὶ το ς ἐ ο ς,        ’ ἐφ ορ οί     ὶ 
π ρ β ί ο  ί τ  τ῵  ὡ ο ο   έ ω , [ἐ]ξώ  ς  [ἴ  ]      ὶ   τὸς   ὶ  έ ος τὸ  π’ ἐ οῦ 
(45-51: ―And I shall not deal fraudulently regarding this oath by any means or pretext 
whatsoever. And I release Eumenes the son of Attalus from the oath, and also those who 
swore with him, when the matters agreed upon have been carried out. And may it be well for 
me and mine if I keep my oath and remain in good-will towards Eumenes son of Philetairos, 
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but if I should break the oath or transgress any of the agreements, may I and my line be 
accursed.‖ [Bagnall and Derow 2004, no. 23, p. 47]).634 
The first epigraphic example I know of in which kakotechnia appears is not in an oath 
at all. Kleonymos‘s tribute decree of 426/425 BCE (IG I3 68=M-L 68) contains a second decree 
which concerns the implementation and efficiency of the first. This second decree provides: 
ἐ    ὲ τ ς    οτ χ    [ όπος  ὲ   ρ ο   στ ]     τὸ φσέφ σ   τὸ το φόρο    όπος  ὲ 
 π χθέσ τ-]       ο φόρος θέ  ζ  ... (―But if anyone connives to the effect of invalidating 
the decree about the tribute, or to the effect that the tribute is not returned to Athens ...‖). 
Though not in an oath, the allies were bound by treaty and oath to obey Athens‘s psēphismata, 
and so the verb may appear because of the oblique link to treaty.  
The earliest uses of ο  ὲ τ χ ῇ ο  ὲ   χ  ῇ ο     ᾷ date back to the mid-fifth 
century,
635
 but the phrase also appears in the inscribed Arkesine loans from the turn of the 
fourth century in the kyriōteron-section (IG XII.7 68-70, text in n449). As with the Egyptian 
contracts over the last century of Ptolemaic rule, so here one can see the lines between 
contract and oath blur. The blurring in this case, however, is (from a legal point of view) 
somewhat more appropriate. The kyriōteron-clause establishes the status of the contract vis-à-
vis other legally controlling entities, institutions, and contracts. Deciding how to resolve 
conflicting authorities belongs to the world of the contract insofar as it is setting ―controller-
selecting‖ rules. In other words, one may establish the relationship of one framework to 




 972 (=IG VIII 3073, Boeotia, before 172 BCE); and Chaniotis 1996, no. 74 (= IC III iii 5 [Crete, 2
nd
 cent. 
BCE], perhaps no. 60 (111/110 BCE, copies in Athens and Rhodes). 
635





another without in any way calling into question or invoking the core notion of foundational 
obligation. Yet the kyriōteron-clause of the Arkesine contracts goes beyond merely 
establishing the jurisdictional status of the contract in that it anticipates a duplicitous or bad-
faith attempt to argue that the contract is not the controlling authority the parties had 
originally intended it to be. A contamination of contract by oath, but indirectly via the 
question of legal priority.  
The word only begins to be associated with private contracts in the course of the fourth 
century, a development just visible in Dem. 35 (Against Lakritos), dated approximately to ca. 
351 BCE.
636
 The specifics of the speech are not relevant here, but only the plaintiff‘s strategy, 
which consisted largely of proving that the bottomry contract underlying the dispute was 
never fulfilled, and that this was the result of kakotechnia (§§ 27, 56), with the defendants 
characterized as having regarded their syngraphē as mere ὕθ ος and φ  υρί  (§ 25). The use 
of kakotechnein here mirrors that of the other non-technical uses in the Demosthenic corpus in 
that it denotes a conspiracy to defraud, and so is in this sense unexceptional (note that it is not 
inscribed in the contract itself, §§ 10-13). The emphasis, however, laid on the moral 
imperative to follow a written contract and the assumption of its clarity (e.g., §§ 21, 25, 27, 
37, 39) go beyond the need to establish the requirement that there be a written document in 
order to proceed with a dikē emporikē.637 Indeed, the rhetorical strategy plays the uprightness 
of the written contract off the tricky, sophistic words of the defendant, who was a student of 
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 See MacDowell 2004: 131-33.  
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Isokrates (cf. §§ 2, 15, 22, 35-43, 56) and therefore trained in deceptive  ό ο  (§§ 30, 40).638 
The argument in this speech as to the clarity of a written contract and the depravity of one 
who ignores it becomes a presumption inscribed in papyrus contracts from the second century 
BCE onwards, namely that to do something against or beyond the provisions agreed upon in 




 Of the forty attestations of kakotechnia in the papyri, all but five come from contracts 
or oaths supporting cession contracts. Our first attestation comes in P.Eleph. 1 (Elephantine, 
310 BCE), the very first documentary contract to survive from Egypt. This famous marriage 
contract contains the following breach clauses:      (l. ἐ  )  έ τ     οτ χ οῦσ  ἁ ίσ  τ   
〚ἁ ίσ  τ  〛 ἐπὶ   σχ     τοῦ    ρὸς ρ    ί ου Δ   τρί  ... (6) and  ὴ ἐξέστω  ὲ 
 ρ    ί     υ      ἄ     ἐπ  σά  σθ   ἐφ’ ὕβρ       τρί ς    ὲ   τ   οπο   σθ   ἐξ 
ἄ   ς  υ    ὸς    ὲ    οτ χ        ὲ  π ρ υρέσ         ᾶ  ρ    ί      ς Δ   τρί   
(8-9). Here, much like the first attestations of parasyngraphein, the word is added as an 
intransitive participial modifier of the specific verb of breach.
640
 The next three attestations, 
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 Cf. the conclusion (§56), where the plaintiff requests that the jury ―help him against those who wrong him, and 
punish those who engage in fraud and sophistries‖ (βο θ    ἡ    το ς     ου έ ο ς,   ὶ  ο άζ    τοὺς 
   οτ χ οῦ τ ς   ὶ σοφ ζο έ ους). In a way, the body of the speech may be read as neatly divided between these 
two elements: the fraud perpetrated on the contract (§§ 18-27) and the defendant‘s sophistic attempts to cover it up 
after the fact (§§ 28-46). 
639
 Cf. the Nichtangriff language in P.Mich. V 350 (Tebtynis, 37): ἣ   ʼ ἂ  ποήσ τ   ( . πο ήσ τ  ) [ ] τ  τ ῦτ  
ἡ  ρσ  ό  ἢ ἄ  ους (l. ἄ  ο ) ὑπὲρ   τ ς ἐπὶ τοὺς προ   ρ   έ ους ρ    ί (  )     ὶ Πτο έ    ἢ ἐπὶ 
τοὺς   τ῵     ρο ό ους  φο ο  ἢ      σ   ἢ     φ σβήτ σ   ἢ ἐ πο<ί >σ   | ἢ    υσ   ἢ    οτέ χ  σ   
ἄ υρο    ὶ  πρόσ    το   ἶ      τῇ τ   ρσ  όῃ   ὶ π  τὶ τῶ ὑπὲρ     τ ς ἐπ   υσο έ ῳ.  
640





all late third-century BCE petitions concerning broken contracts, exhibit the same pattern: a 
participle used absolutely to qualify the party in breach as intentionally so (W.Chr. 337; 
P.Enteux. 85; P.Enteux. 4, all between 221-218 from the Arsinoite). The next example is 
C.Ord.Ptol. 43 (Tebtynis, 135/134 BCE), a list of ordinances in which the kings forbid 
kakotechnia, though sadly the frame of reference has been lost (18: προστ τάχ σ   ὲ   θέ   
   οτ χ     [...]).  
With the exception of the last example, these attestations suggest that kakotechnia was 
an early contender with parasyngraphein for breach. Both were used in contractual settings; 
both were at this time ethical words that related directly to the intent of the other party (cf. 
P.Enteux. 26, pp. 348ff.); both addressed, though in different manners, the foundational 
commitment to the contract. In the event, parasyngraphein won the battle but lost the war. In 
the course of its evolution, or the evolution of the drafting of breach, parasyngraphein came 
to be transitive and to relate directly to the contract, and therefore spoke only indirectly to the 
intentions or attitude of the party behind the act of breach. In other words, it lost some of its 
moral color, and this created an opening for kakotechnia—not seen in a contract in Egypt 
since the late fourth century—at the turn of the first century BCE: P.Dion. 16, 17, 20, 25, 33 
(Akoris, ca. 110-100 BCE). All are six-witness syngraphai recording loans, except for the final 
document, which is a cheirograph. All of them use the specific breach verb apodidōmi, and 





Some of the P.Dion. loans do not inscribe kakotechnia, but  ὑρ σ ο ο ί  instead 
(P.Dion. 14-15).
641
 This is clearly a matter of model or choice, for it appears in the same 
position as kakotechnia and in some cases the same scribe is responsible for both formulae 
(e.g., Ptolemaios, who wrote 14-17; see P.Dion., p. 180). If we trace the usage of 
heurēsiologia, we find 43 attestations, 39 of which are in contracts,  the vast majority being 
loans of one sort or another from all parts of Egypt.
642
 As with kakotechnia, so heurēsiologia 
appears in the last quarter of the second century BCE and then persists. Again, in a similar 
fashion,     φ σβ τ    is first attested in the second century BCE  in petitions and reports on 
disputes (e.g., P.Tebt. III.1 771, P.Lond. VII 2188), but the appears in the text of a contract for 
the first time in the early first century, a sale in which it is associated with the 
Nichtangriffsklausel (P.Hamb. III 218 [Oxyrhyncha, 29/30]). Thereafter is it a fairly common 
word embedded in sales and cessions from the Arsinoite.
643
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 Prominent demoticists, among them Sethe, Seidl, and Pierce, have all debated the 
extent to which these words should be understood as translations of the demotic n ḥtr (n) ỉwty 
mn.
644
 Pierce has argued that the most direct translation of this phrase is the Greek 
ἐπά    ο , ―necessarily, with compulsion,‖ but it is generally agreed that there are several 
Greek variations, including the formulations with kakotechnia and heurēsiologia in the 
P.Dion. documents, on what is essentially an execution clause, equivalent to   θάπ ρ ἐ  
 ί  ς. Partsch, for one, found these phrases ―nur als überflüssige Floskel des Urkundenstiles‖ 
(1920: 544), and Mitteis agreed (1912: 120), with much ink having been spilled over what 
legal effect such clauses have, if indeed any at all. Wolff, on the other hand, saw the irruption 
of such phrases into Greek contracts as evidence of a mixing of Greek and demotic legal 
styles, the product of a maturing and more mixed Ptolemaic society. Both lines of 
interpretation are valid so far as they go, but neither answers the question why such moralizing 
language was thought appropriate or necessary in contracts at this time.
 
True, they may not be 
legal words, but is legal superfluity the same thing as social irrelevance? Again, there may be 
a mixing of styles, but why so many and such pointedly moralizing ―translations‖ for an 
execution clause? Neither line of interpretation takes into account the historical uses of these 
particular Greek words and their prior relationship to contract via institutions like oath, nor 
has anyone yet seen that the very word for breach participated in this same moral revolution, 
as breach (parasyngraphein) was recast as transgression (parabainein). 
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This new moralizing contract vocabulary represents the inscription of values that touch 
on the core commitment to abide by a contract in the contract itself. The metaphysical 
relationship of the parties to the contract is, properly speaking, foreign to the contract itself, as 
the contract is but a set of rules. Oath was the proper sphere for the normative discourse about 
contract, a way of tying contract to bedrock values and powers, human morality and the divine 
order that guaranteed justice. The history of kakotechnia parallels that of parabainein: we find 
both originally used in oaths about treaties and contracts, then in complaints about breach of 
contract (i.e., still outside the contract), and finally in the contracts themselves. It is no 
accident that the point of entry for this moral vocabulary was the older Nichtangriff language, 
for this too touched on the commitment to abide by the contract. The language of legal 
renunciation was reinterpreted by the moral imagination as a test of ethical committment. 
 We have, then, a series of broad and coincident trends that make for a very suggestive 
circumstantial case for the broad moralization of contract over this period.  
1. There is the movement from protocol to homology, which is a movement from an 
objective description of a transaction to a subjective one. Even in so-called objective 
homologies (i.e.,           ο ο   ), the act is one of personal declaration (cf. Wolff 
1946: 76-77 and point 4 below) 
2. At the same time the cheirograph is also becoming more popular. This was a truly 
subjective format, regardless of the verbs used to record the transaction.  
3. Autograph subscriptions to demotic contracts continue the trend toward subjectivity 





4. Breach as such begins to be inscribed with increasing regularity. This is, inevitably, a 
recognition of the potential deviousness of the other party (cf. Williamson‘s dictum 
about the ever-present threat of opportunism, cf. Secs. 2.1-2.2), as the early use of 
parasyngraphein and kakotechnein in petitions show. 
5. The use of oaths appears to drop off in legal acts, though not in society at large. 
Tellingly, some homologies contain elements or traces of oath. For example, P.Corn. 4 
(Pathyris, 111 BCE) is a short contract recorded by the agoranomos in which a 
carpenter makes his declaration with embedded, almost involuntary, oath:   ο ο    
Π τ ς | Π  τίου τέ τω  | Ὥρω  Ν χο του ... |  ἶ  ὴ    τ σ  ῦσ   | ζυ ὸ  
ἁ  ξ  ὸ  |   ὶ  όφ  ο  ἄρ σ- | τ  ἕως Τῦβ    | τοῦ ζ ( τους) (―Petes son of 
Peatius, carpenter, acknowledges to Horos son of Nechoutes ... that he will (god 
willing) make a wagon yoke and basket before 3 Tybi of Year 7.‖).645  
6. As the notion of general breach or breach per se grows in popularity, it is 
progressively replaced by the culturally more salient notion of breach, which is 
transgression or parabainein.  
7.  A host of words either associated with oaths about contracts or treaties, or similarly 
value-laden with respect to the core morality of contract, begin to be inscribed in the 
texts of the contracts themselves at the same time as the more morally-charged word 
for breach gains ground. 
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Such is the outline for the circumstantial case for the moralization of contract, of 
which the inscription and then transformation of breach is but one element. The concomitant 
shifts listed above together point to the wider ethical and normative ambit in which 
contractual relations operated in Graeco-Roman Egypt, and the effect the social arena had on 
what purports to be a strictly ―legal‖ discourse. Of course, it is impossible to say whether 
these changes in written contracts reflected a change in actual norms or attitudes towards 
contracting or merely a tendency to inscribe a fairly consistent set of norms into the contracts 
themselves. However much we should like to know the answer to this question, it is in one 
sense immaterial: although we cannot be sure that our evidence tell us much about changes in 
attitudes versus changes in drafting practice, it would be perverse to suggest that the attitudes 





CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS 
6.1 Conclusion 
I began this work by arguing that contract has not been studied in its own right as an 
economic institution in the Roman empire, even though ancient documentary contracts, 
Roman contract law, and the economy of the Roman world have all been central topics of 
scholarly concern for more than a century. This paradox is largely the product of the profound 
differences in training and intellectual and professional milieux of those who have devoted 
themselves to these areas. In the early part of the twentieth century, the divide was, if 
anything, less pronounced than it was to become, but history and law were still distinct 
pursuits, in large part because Roman law formed the basis of professional legal education in 
Europe. As papyri began to be published at the end of the nineteeth century, their potential to 
serve as a counterpart to Roman legal texts was recognized immediately by Romanists and 
legal historians, and so it was they who most naturally and energetically engaged with the 
evidence of legal practice preserved from Egypt.
646
 As papyrology matured, however, one of 
the major advances was the growing appreciation for the complex relationship between the 
two legal traditions, the Greco-Egyptian and the Roman, which made the papyrological 
evidence, on the whole, less relevant to the study of Roman law per se. This recognition at 
once helped to correct the constant and forced analogies to Roman law one routinely finds in 
scholarship from the first half of the twentieth century, but it also led Romanists to quit the 
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field  in order to concentrate on Roman legal history proper, leaving legal papyri largely to 
scholars interested in ―Greek‖ law and papyrologists, many of whom were increasingly not 
trained in law.
647
 And so, where there had been two academic silos, there now stood three—
ancient history, juristic studies, and papyrology—a state of affairs with far-reaching 
consequences for the study of what appears on its face to have been a ubiquitous and fairly 
uniform economic institution across the Roman world (cf. Sec. 1.4). 
One of consequences of the tradition of juristic study and its explicitly narrow focus 
on the law and the role of the state has been to confuse the legal institution of contract with 
contracting itself, thus obscuring or ignoring its vital extra-legal dimensions. As discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, the economic institution of contracting is wider or larger than the legal 
institution of contract, precisely because the state is neither the only source of rules nor the 
only entity capable of administering meaningful sanctions. In order to study contract as an 
economic institution one must therefore broaden the scope to include all salient rules and 
agencies of effective enforcement. Personal ethics and social norms represent the other two 
basic sets of rules guiding contracting in addition to the law. By the same token, one finds 
contract partners and the community imposing significant penalties—along with or instead of 
the state—on those who broke the rules, if not the law.648 Together with the law and the state, 
these extra-legal second- and third-party rules and sanctions significantly affected the 
calculations of parties as they negotiated, drafted, and enforced their contracts, often in ways 
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perceptible in our sources.
649
 The necessary consequence of recognizing contract as a complex 
institution, or as a nexus of different sets of rules bound together by corresponding sets of 
controllers (cf. Tab. 3.3. and Fig. 3.3), is the contextualization of the law, state enforcement, 
and the legal strategies of the parties in what was the primary field for ancient contracting, or 
the interpersonal and social arenas. This, however, has been done only too rarely by those 
who have worked most closely with the legal evidence for practice (i.e., the lawyers), as their 
aim has most often been to explain, ―How did the law work?‖, not ―How did people use the 
law to accomplish their economic goals?‖650 
Ancient historians, on the other hand, have been alive precisely to the social and 
economic contexts of ancient contracting, but this has often led them to discount the 
significance of contract as an institution in one of two ways. As discussed in Chapter 1, some 
have seen ancient contracting as a sham, an epiphenomenal legal institution superimposed on 
the deeper and truly salient structures ordering ancient economic life, namely status, gender, 
patronage, family, custom, and raw personal power.
651
 While this is perhaps an extreme view, 
it is nevertheless generally true that the economic historiography of the Roman world has until 
quite recently given  fairly short shrift to the role of private law, despite the wide-spread 
recognition of the ―achievement‖ of Roman private law and the avowedly ―legal culture‖ of 
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the late Republic and early Empire.
652
 Seen in this light, the provocative pronouncements of a 
Finley or a MacMullen strike one as merely giving voice to the silent communis opinio (quid 
exspectas auctoritatem loquentium, quorum voluntatem tacitorum perspicis?) Yet, even as it 
is indisputable that various non-legal social structures and ideologies came together in 
molding ancient economic behavior and activity, it is untenable—at least in the face of the 
considerable Egyptian evidence—to assert that the law and the state were mere reflections or 
amplications of these social structures, or otherwise irrelevant because of the state‘s 
incapacity and lack of concern. Were either proposition true on its face, centuries of personal, 
social, and governmental investment in law and state enforcement would be inexplicable: if 
without any practical result, why bother drafting, witnessing, recording, registering, 
petitioning, and litigating contracts? In other words, we should see Alice Sindzingre‘s 
criterion of credibility (Sec. 3.2) as an Occam‘s razor that cuts in either direction: while she 
deploys it in order to stress the salience of non-legal (―informal‖) rules, we may turn it around 
and ask what else besides some basic credibility is demonstrated by the formal legal actions of 
hundreds of thousands from all but perhaps the lowest socio-economic strata with respect to 
their contracts over the course of antiquity?  
Other historians have recognized the reality and importance of contracting in the 
ancient world, but have done little to differentiate contract as an institution from the market, 
or to understand its particular relationship to hierarchical economic organizations.
653
 Yet, as 
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demonstrated in Chapter 2, there are very good theoretical grounds for attempting to do just 
this and to distinguish ―contract‖ as a governance structure from both the ―market‖ (or 
―marketing‖), on the one hand, and ―hierarchies‖ or ―firms,‖ on the other. Reading our 
evidence for ancient contract as merely passive indicia for market behavior in the ancient 
world is reasonable, insofar as contracts are clearly related to market activity, but it is 
analytically imprecise with respect to the study of the organization of economic transactions. 
On yet another, perhaps more important level, it hardly does justice to contract as an ancient 
institution of obvious importance in its own right, apart from or alongside the historical 
development of markets. This is a study, moreoever, that will repay the effort: the institutional 
nature of contract, with its dense implication of the individual, the community, and the state, 
holds the promise of illuminating not only certain aspects of the ancient economy, but also of 
shedding light on important questions touching on the fundamental relationships and 
dynamics between ancient actors, specifically the nature and scope of personal freedom and 
the relationship between the individual and the ancient state.  
These observations suggest that the institutional study of ancient contract must 
proceed along three axes (cf. Sec. 2.6). First, we must relate legal contracts to the larger 
process of contracting, contextualizing contract laws and state enforcement by placing them in 
a system or spectrum of rules and enforcers which broadly follows the schema set out by 
Ellickson (Sec. 3.3). In practice, this amounts to a more systematic synthesis of the legal and 
historical strands of scholarship on contract. For example, I submit that there is no true 
understanding of the role of contract in secured loans without a model that embraces both the 





219ff) , the timing of the various steps of foreclosure on secured loans drafted as private 
documents, from dēmosiōsis through to the final transfer of property to the creditor‘s onoma, 
cannot be explained by the legal rules alone. In other words, routine gaps of months or years 
are neither predictable nor intelligible merely in light of the costs associated with legal 
enforcement (e.g., availability of notarial services, tax implications of foreclosure, drafting 
and filing fees, etc.). Rather, the pace of formal foreclosure procedures appears to reflect the 
impact of additional transaction costs imposed by extra-legal rules (e.g., the consideration of 
potential effects on reputation or future transactions, the ability of the opposite party to 
monitor performance or impose self-help sanctions, etc.). Nor is a one-dimensional notion of 
self-help as Eigenmacht particularly helpful in these cases (cf. Sec. 2.3), since it is the 
creditor, typically the more powerful party, who delays. The timing thus reflects the 
integration of the legal and extra-legal in practice, which we need to recover in theory.  
The second axis is the systematic and analytic study of contract as a governance 
structure (cf. Sec. 2.2), with particular attention paid to the boundaries or phase shifts between 
governance structures. Specifically, this will mean research into the internal mechanics of 
transactions as they were organized via different governance structures, as well as broader, 
synoptic studies dedicated to exploring the boundaries and transitions between structures as 
conditions changed either synchronically (e.g., the decision to buy or lease within an 
organization, like a large imperial estate) or diachronically (e.g., the apparent shift from lease 
to employment contract in the case of vineyard management over the course of the Roman 
period in Egypt; cf. Rowlandson 1996: 228-36; and n89 supra). The larger aim will be to 





one governance structure over another, as well as to delineate more precisely the extent to 
which the various fundamental aspects of transactions (e.g., asset specificity) may have 
accounted for changes in their organization or frequency over time.  
The third and final axis consists of the ―Northian‖ questions about the history of 
contract that we must pose alongside our ―Williamsonian‖ questions about the relations bet-
ween governance structures. As North and others have suggested, the key driver in this history 
is the state. When, how, and why ancient states first took it upon themselves to enforce private 
contracts are indeed historical questions of the first order.
654
 By the turn of the millennium, 
however, there was a long tradition of state enforcement established more or less throughout 
the Mediterranean, and so our historical questions for the Roman period are not the same as 
those which touch upon origins in classical Greece or Republican Rome. They instead relate 
to basic characterization of state involvement and its historical development. This is a 
pressing task precisely because the Roman state tends to be caricatured (unintentionally) by 
economic historians operating in the NIE tradition whose expertise typically lies in much later 
periods (cf. Secs. 2.5-2.6) 
In line with the theoretical project sketched in the first three chapters, Chapters 4 and 5 
commence with the work of reconstructing the larger institution of contract in Roman Egypt 
by proceeding along the first of the axes described above, tracing and defining some of the 
extra-legal norms associated with contracting. Chapter 4 dealt with two moral qualities, 
namely pistis (Secs. 4.1-4.4, 4.8) and eugnōmosynē (Secs 4.5-4.8). The latter concept 
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translates roughly to the idea of ―respect‖ and has to my knowledge never been studied except 
by a handful of lexicographers. ―Trust‖ or ―faith‖ in the wider Greek and Hellenistic worlds, 
on the other hand, does have a scholarly literature attached to it, though a surprisingly thin and 
disorganized one with regard to the place of pistis in ethical and commercial life (cf. Sec. 4.1).  
I began with pistis because it is a fundamental value for contracting, historically and 
theoretically. ―Trust‖ represents a foundational moral value for contracting as a governance 
structure in any age, since sequential exchange necessarily entails some degree of reliance—
indeed, contracting is in essence nothing more than a series of rules designed to bolster or 
encourage reliance or trust. Historically, we see an early implication of the discourse of pistis 
in the world of business and law (as opposed to the discourse of philia, which remains more 
firmly in the social orbit, cf. pp. 126f.). Although pistis was first and foremost a moral quality, 
articulated by normative rules controlling its establishment, extent, and expectations (i.e., 
what sort of behavior was expected of people between whom there existed a relationship of 
trust), it had over time been received into the formal language of legal contracts, extended or 
transferred first to the notion of real ―security,‖ and then subsequently raised to the level of a 
legal standard of fiduciary ―trust,‖ later assimilated to fides in Roman Egypt. It is, in fact, only 
this secondary phenomenon, or the legal formalization of pistis, which has been studied in 
detail (e.g., Schmitz 1964; cf. Wolff 2002: 198-200), with no discussion at all in the literature 
of the primary social dynamics of pistis, or how trust operated in business and contracting 
relations.  
The study of pistis in Chapter 4 revealed it as an interpersonal value, conceived of as 





decisive in the ascription of pistis was the recognition of the trusted person‘s capacity to 
perform reliably, regardless of intention. The force or extent of pistis was therefore only as 
strong or as deep as its last demonstration. Although one was more likely to trust family and 
close friends, this seems in large part to be the natural result of their having the greater 
opportunity to prove their trustworthiness through continuous acts of reliability. Contractual 
relations based on pistis likewise proceeded on the basis of an explicitly empirical relationship 
of performance and counter-performance between ―tested‖ partners, with little or no element 
of what we might characterize as ―faith.‖ Such unfounded trust could be characterized, if not 
ridiculed, as naïve propistis (cf. pp. 151ff.). It is also important to point out in this connection 
that the objects of trust were overwhelmingly people. In fact, I found no single instance in 
which pistis or its derivatives were used to describe one‘s trust in institutions, organizations, 
the state, or its agents.
655
 The only inanimate objects that are regularly referred to as ―trusted‖ 
or ―trustworthy‖ besides real security are the legal documents themselves, yet this comes 
comparatively late and may reflect the technical rhetorical or forensic meaning of pistis as 
―proof.‖656 
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While pistis thus corresponded to an assessment of objective performance, 
eugnōmosynē represented a subjective interpretation of the gnōmē behind the performance. 
Being eugnōmōn meant having the ―right‖ or requisite respect for another person, just as 
eusebia characterized a proper reverence for the divine (pp. 170f.). ―Respect‖ is a derivative 
value, a measure of how well one has followed the social norms that control personal 
interactions. Accordingly, eugnōmosynē originally communicated the degree to which one 
was seen as treating another in line with the duties established by particular institutions, 
specifically the family, rank, and most interestingly for our purposes, obligations stemming 
from promises, loans, and contracts. All these institutions created ―debts‖ of one sort of 
another, and so represented opportunities for people to reveal their gnōmai, either by living up 
to their obligations and paying their ―debts‖ (eugnōmōn), or by repudiating them, thus 
revealing their contempt or lack of respect for the ―creditor‖ (agnōmōn). Here, then, we have a 
natural counterpart to pistis in contracting norms: eugnōmosynē represented a moral inference 
drawn from the same experience, but directed to the intentions of the agent. Significantly, this 
notion of ―respect‖ progressively lost its subjective frame of reference (i.e., ―Are you 
honoring me because of what you owe me as your mother, your social superior, your creditor, 
etc.?), being recast as an objective quality describing another‘s attitude towards monetary 
debts (i.e., ―Are you credit-worthy? Do you repay your debts?‖).  
Pistis and eugnōmosynē were the core values guiding the primary norms of contract 
formation and enforcement in Greco-Roman Egypt, and I will treat each process in order, 
though we should bear in mind that they are in reality dynamically interconnected (i.e., 





formation, both are revealed as prerequisites for contractual relations, though in slightly 
different ways. This basic assertion is validated by the fact that unwritten contracts, informal 
arrangements, and promises or pledges were framed in the first instance as moral obligations 
based on personal trust and respect. Thus the banker in P.Yale I 79 (pp. 145ff.) was thought of 
as owing a duty to the writer and his partner by virtue of his being an anthrōpos 
pisteuomenos. Though the banker was legally responsible for passing bad coin, the writer‘s 
solution suggests that he was at least as interested in testing the value of the relationship to the 
banker, which was based on trust, as he was in the value of the five staters, the recovery of 
which the law was unable to effect in any case. In a similar fashion, Johanna in P.Bad. II 35 
(pp. 158ff.) remonstrates in purely moral terms with Epagathos for his having ―gone back on 
his word.‖ Although the precise nature of the obligation is, sadly, less than clear, Johanna 
obviously had no documentary proof of the loan, which was not even made in her name. 
Instead, this contract was drafted according to the norms of pistis alone and she thus depended 
on his eugnōmosynē. Again, we may recall P.Fay. 124 (pp. 208ff.), in which the writer 
threatens a son with possible legal action for the ―insanity‖ of having abandoned the terms of 
his dexia to his mother. The point of the letter is to let the son know that although his mother 
was content to have relied on trust in the first instance, even to the extent of not recording the 
terms of the dexia in writing, she was nevertheless ready, willing, and able to pursue her claim 
by law if he did not ―honor his commitments‖ (ἐά π ρ  ὴ   -   [ ] ω ο ῵ς (l. 
 υ  ω ο ῇς) τ  πρὸς τὴ    - | τέρ ). Finally, P.Dubl. 15 (pp. 341ff.) describes a 





framed as a legal contract, but instead proceeded on the basis of personal pledge (dexia) and 
promise (hypischnesthai).  
In all these cases, there was no attempt to formalize the transaction as a written 
contract; instead, the parties organized their transactions along the lines established by the 
norms of trust and respect, usually backed by an express promise or pledge. This is not to say 
that the aggrieved parties in these or similar cases therefore necessarily forwent access to the 
courts: the mother in P.Fay. 124, for instance, likely had the makings of a successful case, 
given what we know about Ptolemaic and Roman courts recognizing the obligation of 
children to support parents (cf. pp. 171f. and 348f.). Yet the law and the courts nevertheless 
appear to have been very far from the parties‘ mind when they had arranged these contractual 
relationships, illuminating a process of contract formation that lay almost entirely outside the 
shadow of the law, proceeding instead according to the norms of trust and respect.  
Significantly, these same norms can be seen at work in the formation of contracts 
which anticipate the possibility of legal enforcement from the outset. The writer of PSI IV 377 
(pp. 148ff.), for example, submitted an offer to lease a flock. Though we do not have the 
contract itself, if indeed the undertaking was reduced to a separate contract, the language of 
the offer is itself formal and legal. Yet the question of entering into a legal contract in this 
case was secondary to the establishment of pistis—and we should recall before proceeding 
that the potential lessor was a man related to Apollonios‘ dōreia, and so in a position to 
command the considerable resources of the Ptolemaic state in the event of breach. In 
addressing the problem of trust, this document reveals the specific logic of pistis as it was 





instead attempted first to limit the exposure (and so the need for pistis), and then to bridge the 
evident lack of personal experience via a series of measures intended to leverage pre-existing 
pistis (i.e., the intermediation of a ―tested‖ person on whom the lessor already relied to 
monitor performance) and to build new pistis (i.e., the payment schedule, which increased the 
number of testing opportunities within the lease). In a similar, albeit more indirect fashion we 
see Ptollas in SB XIV 12172 (pp. 155ff.) telling his debtor that he had only made him the loan 
in the first place because he had ―known‖ him to be pistos. Ptollas was now prepared to use 
the loan document he had, but he preferred to keep the contract within the zone of personal 
pistis where it had originated and outside the realm of the state and its rules.  
In each of these cases, then, the parties made sure to position their contracts within the 
sphere of possible legal protection (cf. Fig. 3.3), even as their attitudes and the contracts 
themselves reveal the priority of the normative rules of pistis. In other words, the first step in 
legal contract formation was the measurement, or, if necessary, the establishment of the 
requisite degree of pistis. We may think of these social norms as establishing a threshold to 
contractual relations per se. One effect of this threshold function was that the norms of trust 
became the first set of rules controlling the mitigation of transaction costs. In order to cross 
the threshold, in other words, many of our transactions had to adapt to the extra-legal rules of 
pistis rather than to legal ones of law. Again, we see exactly this phenomenon in the case of 
PSI IV 377, in which the duration, payment schedule, and monitoring requirements of the 
lease were all modifications made (and costs borne) in order to get the parties across the 
threshold to contract. Presumably, a trusted person (as the writer obviously hoped he would be 





cases above—and I suggest most cases in antiquity—the protection offered by the state for 
private bargains was neither conceived of nor used as a replacement for pistis; instead, it 
served as a secondary support to a necessary pre-existing minimum level of trust. Failing this 
minimum, there were three general solutions: abandon the transaction; employ extra-legal 
strategies that addressed the core problem of interpersonal trust; or adjust the governance 
structure. 
The threshold to contract was thus a double threshold. As above, one way of framing 
the decision was to consider the contract as the transaction itself, such that it was all or 
nothing, e.g., ―Shall I lease or not?‖ Faced with such a decision, one might turn to some of the 
strategies seen in PSI IV 377 in order to meet the threshold for contract. Sometimes, however, 
the decision was more of a Williamsonian one, in that the party deliberated as to what sort of 
contract he wanted. This second threshold operated at the level of the governance structure, as 
the party considered how best to organize the transaction. Our clearest view of this type of 
threshold calculation comes in P.Ross.Georg. III 1 (pp. 202ff.). In this letter, Markos writes to 
his mother with some advice about an offer for lease she is about to get from a character 
named Apollonios the Blind. Specifically, he advises her to organize the transaction according 
to her judgment of Apollonios‘s gnōmē, i.e., whether or not he has shown himself to be 
eugnōmōn in past. If he is eugnōmōn, Markos advises her to lease him the land; if he is not, 
she should try and sell him the crop. In other words, another response to a basic trust deficit 
was to attempt to change the nature of the transaction to one which required inherently less 
pistis. Instead of a lease, which presented multiple sources of risk (e.g., of lessee 





management and consequent degradation of the land or irrigation canals, etc.), the mother 
could promise to sell the crop, a far less risky proposition. ―Selling him the grain‖ could be 
accomplished via two different routes: one could draft a formal advance sale, wherein 
Apollonios paid the purchase price immediately for delivery later;
657
 or there could be an 
informal agreement as to the future sale, with or without the price being set (cf. P.Dubl. 15, 
pp. 341ff). Of course, in the latter case Apollonios could always refuse to purchase at the time 
of sale, and so the mother would lose at least a certain buyer, and possibly whatever price he 
had promised, with no hope of any sort of legal recovery. But when compared to the risks of 
leasing, this was to assume practically no risk at all: there was always a market for grain, and 
his promise was unlikely to be the decisive factor in her cultivating the land, which she would 
normally do in any case. There was, then, little reliance involved in ―selling him the grain,‖ 
with such a contract in reality little more than the option to buy now or to buy first when the 
harvest came. Markos‘s advice thus lays out the thinking behind the extension of two different 
types of contracts, one located at the center of contract as a governance structure (lease) and 
the other at the very border of ―marketing,‖ approximating in all essential aspects a cash sale. 
So much for how pistis and eugnōmosynē informed contract formation; how did they 
control enforcement? As stated in Chapter 2, contracts by their very nature anticipate 
enforcement. Not necessarily legal enforcement, and not necessarily accurately, but even 
poorly conceived, informal contracts are intended to be enforceable. The first line of defense, 
of course, was not to enter into a contract at all, with the second being to modify the nature of 
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the transaction so that it was inherently less risky, as we just saw. Once one decided to 
proceed, however, there were a series of self-help strategies that one could use in order to 
enforce a contract. Self-help in contract enforcement is unintelligible if not set against the 
backdrop of official enforcement and ―crime‖: in the first case, most strategies depended on 
the law indirectly, with nearly all actions taken in view of what one considered to be within 
one‘s ―rights‖;658 and in the second case, the boundary between justified self-help and what 
the state might be persuaded to regard as unlawful aggression was a particularly contested 
one, as one might imagine (cf. Sec. 2.3). A full discussion of self-help, then, must await a 
systematic reappraisal of the role of the state in contract enforcement (cf. Sec. 6.2), while here 
we must be content to review some of the basic strategies based primarily on the norms of 
pistis and eugnōmosynē.   
As discussed in Sec. 2.3, most scholars of ancient law have explicitly or implicitly 
understood self-help as Eigenmacht, or private, unilateral acts of lawless or unlawful violence 
of a Hobbsian sort. I neither deny that Eigenmacht as such existed in the ancient world, nor 
that it was a serious problem; but I also submit that it was not the only economically or legally 
relevant form of self-help.
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 For example, as I show in a forthcoming study (Ratzan 
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 By the same token, scholars today tend to overestimate the power of the contemporary state, though perhaps less 
so than they used to. No doubt a current ancient historian would think twice before asserting that ―even the weakest 
plaintiff can sue even the strongest defendant without giving a thought to the physical, social, politicial or economic 
disparity between them‖ (Kelly 1966: 5). For Kelly, the only time modern conditions approximate the ancient are in 
times of war (1966: 5n1), which is to say that he is not so far from the sort of thinking embodied in MacMullen‘s 





forthcoming a), the right to retrieve persons in power from those with whom they had been 
placed (e.g., for apprenticing or wet nursing) was a recognized self-help right (i.e., one did not 
need official permission to proceed, and the authorities defended its lawful exercise). 
Although some direct testimony survives as to this right (e.g., P.Oxy. I 37, a trial transcript in 
which a particular exercise of this right is contested), we find a wider, indirect record of it in 
our surviving contracts—above all in the Oxyrhynchite weavers‘ apprenticeship contracts—
wherein this right is the object of negotiation. Although inherent in any self-help act is the 
potential for violence, the evidence suggests that violence was used only rarely to enforce this 
right of repossession; indeed, it appears to have been generally accepted that the owner or 
guardian was entitled to terminate such a contract unilaterally for any reason, provided that he 
had not traded this right away, in which case he owed a monetary penalty and not specific 
performance (i.e., the restoration of the person for the duration of the original term). 
Many, of course, might not see unilateral cancelation as ―self-help,‖ but not only is it 
recognized as such by modern lawyers, but more importantly it can also be shown to have had 
an effect on contract negotiation and formation.
660
 It was, to return to a prior theme, a credible 
rule, even though it was one based in custom. In this light, we may note that the modified 
terms of PSI IV 377 not only leveraged or built trust as described above, but they also allowed 
the lessor to terminate early and unilaterally should either the initial ―test‖ payment or the 
monitored performance prove unsatisfactory. Increasing access to monitoring and the 
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frequency of payment improve the other party‘s ability to exercise self-help in a timely 
fashion, whatever form it takes, since such measures increase both the flow of relevant 
information about performance to the other party, as well as the number of milestones or 
benchmarks in the contract, which represent clear opportunities for cancellation. 
On another level, there is evidence, primarily in letters, for parties taking defensive 
self-help actions during a contractual relationship, primarily the taking of hostages (cf. Sec. 
2.4). We saw one example of this in P.Dubl. 15, in which writer accuses his partner of holding 
him up for a better price. This, however, represents (at least from the writer‘s perspective) an 
unjust use of self-help because the partner had apparently agreed to different terms and now 
was going back on his promise (cf. P.Fam.Tebt. 37 below, pp. 432f.). Altogether different, I 
would say, is the case of a creditor temporarily seizing goods as collateral until the debt is 
paid and a sort of balance restored to the relationship. We see just such a case in P.Oxy. XLI 
2983 (Oxyrhynchos, II-III), a letter in which Harpalos assures Heras that Herakleides owes 
nothing on the ―Great Oasis account,‖ and so ―there was no need to hold the camel‖ (23:   ὶ 
ο   ἐχρ   τὸ   ά   ο    τ σχ   ). Harpalos blames his own inaction for the detention of 
the camel (24-26: ἐ ὼ   ρ     ο    ος ἐ  τὸ   έχρ  | το του ο  ὲ   πρ ξ ,   ὶ  έχρ  
το του   ἤτω), since he had failed to let his associate (who was in one of the Oases) know 
that Herakleides had paid the debt incurred in the oasis in the Oxyrhynchite nome. The letter 
thus reveals a web of business and financial transactions between the Valley and the Oases, 
with payments made in multiple locations, perhaps by transfers (cf. note ad line 18). The 
relationships and the tone of the letter leave no doubt that this was no legal detention of the 





of the Great Oasis account, a hold which Harpalos regrets and is therefore eager to have 
explained to Herakleides (cf. ll. 31-32:    ῇ οὖ    τ  χο  τὸ   ά   ο .   πά τ  
  τ   σ  ς   τῶ [sc. ρ    ί ῳ]). Nothing in this letter suggests a use of self-help that 
ran to Eigenmacht, but instead a standard strategy for maintaining a relational equilibrium 
between partners, a temporary suspension of business during which personal pistis was 
momentarily converted into a physical pistis of real security until trust has been proven once 
more. 
The most important extra-legal sanction stemming from pistis and eugnōmosynē was 
reputational. Managing ―reputation risk‖ is now a field of study in its own right, as 
corporations seek to avoid the costly effects of reputational sanctions in an age when 
destructive rumors and incomplete information can be disseminated to millions of people 
within seconds, driving down share prices and drying up sales.
661
 The vulnerability to 
reputation risk may be greater in the information age, but its existence is hardly new; and, if 
anything, the risk was more potentially catastrophic in antiquity since there was nothing like 
the same ability to repair one‘s reputation. Ancient historians have been alive to the 
importance of reputation, but relatively few have attempted to trace the ways in which ancient 
reputations were made, managed, communicated, and undone. They have also tended to 
downplay its power when compared to that of the law, often seeing such extra-legal, self-help 
sanctions as merely filling in the gaps left by in the law.
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 There is, of course, truth in this, 
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but we should not let the evolutionary model of the state blind us to the possibility that such 
sanctions were also in many cases cheaper, easier, and more effective than legal enforcement. 
Not only or always residual weapon of the weak, but also and often the first tools of choice.  
We have already seen many examples in the preceding chapters when parties threaten 
to use reputational sanctions to enforce contracts, whether it was Ptollas letting Isas know that 
his pistis was at stake, or Johanna warning Epagathos that his refusal to recognize his 
obligation was a σ       ο οσ   ς, the idea being that were his actions to come to light, 
they would constitute a ―sign‖ that others would be able to read as well as she (cf. P.Oxy. XLI 
2996, pp. 205ff.). Indeed, the entire discourse of pistis and eugnōmosynē has little other 
reason for being other than the communication of reputation, and papyrus letters are full of the 
sort of gossip that informed people‘s contract threshold calculations.  
For instance, we have the following first-century letter of unknown provenance in SB 
XIV 12084: 
Ζωί ος   ου έ    τ   
    φ   π   στ  χ ίρ    
  ὶ ὑ    ί    .   ί ωσ   (l.  ί  ωσ  ) 
4 Π ουτᾶ  ὡς ἐ   άχ    ο  
   β β  έ      ὶ ἠρ ότ  
 ου  ρ υράφ ο .  ο πὸ  
οὖ    θὲ    τῶ    π σ- 
8 τ  σῃς    ὲ  ὴ    τὸ  
ἐπ   έξ  . ἐ    έ τ  πο- 
ήσῃς π ρʼ ἅ συ (l. σο )  ράφω  (l.  ράφω) σὺ   - 
τὴ    ί ς ἕξ ς (l. ἕζ  ς). π ρὶ  ὲ 
12 τ῵    ρ ίω   ὴ   έ   (l.   έ   ) 
 υτ῵ . π ρ  ά   (l. π ρ  ά   )  ὲ Ἰσᾶ  τὸ  
[         ] βο  ἵ   [         ] ἐ τὸς 
 






Zoilos to Philoumene, his sister, most hearty greetings and good health. Know that 
Ploutas came up in a fighting mood and went off with some silver of mine. Do you 
therefore now put no faith in him, and don‘t receive him in any circumstances. If you 
do anything contrary to what I write you, you yourself will have unpleasantness from 
it. And about the weavers, don‘t neglect them. And ask Isas the ...663 
 
Here we understand that Zoilas, Philoumene, and Ploutas are all acquaintances, but what are 
we to make of Ploutas‘s ―lifting a little silver‖ from Zoilas? Αἴρ    is most often a neutral 
word for the taking and removing of objects, but it can also be used in the context of theft or 
unauthorized removal (cf., e.g., P.Ryl. II 127, 128 [discussed in App. I], 129, 136, 142, all 
mid-first century Euhermia). Now, it may be that Zoilos is accusing Ploutas of petty theft, or 
of being a bad house-guest, but the fact that he saw that Ploutas had ―come up river ready for 
battle‖ suggests that he saw the ―lifting‖ as retaliatory, even if unjustifiable. The origin of the 
dispute is unrecoverable, and it need not have been contract per se (though it could have 
been), but the sanction is contractual. Significantly, Zoilas does not go to authorities, or even 
intimate that such a move is to be contemplated. No doubt this is in part because the amount 
was small ( ρ υράφ ο ; see n6 in ed. pr.) and in part because this was not a run-of-the-mill 
―theft,‖ a word he never uses.664 Instead, Zoilas recognizes it for what it was intended to be: 
an ―unpleasant‖ self-help act by a friend, acquaintance, or partner—perhaps even family 
member—in an on-going dispute, which, for the time being, all parties are content to hash out 
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 Zoilos, therefore, retailates in kind, immediately drafting a letter to his 
sister in which he advises her neither to trust Ploutas nor to receive him. The latter is both a 
defensive precaution against any other retaliatory action he may be planning, as well as a 
potential signal to Ploutas that his behavior has consequences (cf. the language of ―signs‖ in 
P.Bad. II 35 and P.Oxy. XLI 2996, pp. 205ff.). For all intents and purposes, his business with 
Zoilas and Philoumene was over, and he likely soon discovered that a good portion of his 
network had been rendered inactive (and vice versa for Zoilas and Philoumene) until amends 
were made and the dispute resolved.  
The linguistic histories of both pistis and eugnōmosynē are interesting, but for very 
different reasons. We get little sense of the internal evolution of pistis—at least in its social, 
secular meaning (cf. Lindsay 1993 for its religious history)—but instead see the effects of 
external pressure from fides starting in the second century.
666
 With eugnōmosynē, on the other 
hand, we may trace what appears to be an internal development driven largely by its use to 
communicate reputation. Briefly, there were three broad trends: verbalization, objectification, 
and constriction of meaning. All three appear to be linked, though we must remember that 
changes such as these took place within the larger evolution of the language, and therefore we 
do not want to over-interpret them. That said, the most compelling explanation for the 
objectification and restriction of meaning resides in its use in the discourse of reputation. 
Through repeated inferences from subjective judgments of eugnōmosynē in contractual 
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relations (cf. P.Ross.Georg. III 1), the concept increasingly came to express another person‘s 
objective relationship to contract or debt per se, and not necessarily or primarily his regard for 
the person owed. From here, it was but a small step to eugnōmonein‘s coming to mean merely 
―to repay‖ by the late third or early fourth century (cf. Sec. 4.8).  
Such were the primary roles that pistis and eugnōmosynē played in contract formation 
and enforcement. Chapter 5 turned from what we might call ―positive‖ values articulating 
contract norms, to a ―negative‖ one, the moral valence associated with ―breaching‖ a contract. 
The concept of breach would seem to be of key importance to understanding the way in which 
a contract was enforced, and yet, as with the core values investigated in Chapter 4, there has 
been to date no investigation of breach per se. This total lack of scholarly literature required 
that the history of breach be built from the ground up, beginning with the very vocabulary of 
breach itself. Though this approach produced a lengthy discussion, it is one that nevertheless 
speaks directly to the central questions of this project, since it reveals the moral dimension at 
the heart of the legal institution of contract. Here I will merely reprise the principal findings of 
that discussion before synthesizing them with those of Chapter 4. 
Although ―breach of contract‖ was a concept in classical Athens (see Sec. 5.2), it was 
not regularly inscribed as a term in the documentary contracts which survive from Egypt until 
the second century BCE.
667
 Instead, breach was defined by the specific action of the principal 
verb of the transaction (Sec. 5.3). Over the course of the second century BCE, however, it 
became increasingly common to include a form of the verb parasyngraphein in contracts for 
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one of two ends: to function either as a specific verb in what I have called ―transactional 
agreements,‖ wherein the contract itself is the transaction (i.e., the embodied agreement is the 
transaction, without any ―real,‖ or material element, see Secs. 5.3-5.4.2) or as a verb denoting 
general or comprehensive breach. In the first case, parasyngraphein is itself a specific verb 
addressing the core obligation of a transactional agreement (syngraphesthai) embodied in a 
syngraphē, just as apodidonai represents the core obligation in a contract for loan, which is 
based on an initial transfer (didonai) of money or goods. In the second case, parasyngraphein 
represents an additional covering term in an attempt to expand the contract to include 
unspecified or unforeseen actions or inactions by the other party as constituting breach (cf. 
P.Enteux. 59, pp. 270ff.).  
Around the same time that breach per se becomes more common in contracts, the 
vocabulary of breach also begins to shift (Secs. 5.5-5.6). Instead of parasyngraphein, one 
increasingly finds the word parabainein. The general scholarly consensus was that these verbs 
were mere synonyms. The history of use, however, suggests that one verb progressively 
replaced the other, with the persistence of parasyngraphein in the Roman period a function of 
its fossilization in certain formulae and models. Furthermore, one discovers that a latent 
distinction can still be activated in early Roman Alexandria, as synchōrēseis for lease 
routinely use parasyngraphein to mean ―material breach‖ (i.e.,. from the view of the 
syngraphē as a whole), as opposed to the ―breach‖ (parabainein) of one of its terms (Sec. 5.1, 
cf. the discussion of BGU IV 1144, pp. 308ff.). This change in vocabulary also coincided with 





was a unified notion of breach as general ―transgression‖ against the terms of any kind of 
contract.  
This history—again interesting in itself—is relevant to the investigation at hand 
precisely because it can be shown to be part of a larger ―moralization‖ of contract. 
Parasyngraphein was a neologism born of the increasing use of written contracts in classical 
Athens and the wider Greek world, and while certainly it carried a moral charge in the one 
classical speech in which it is attested (Dem. 56), where it properly denotes an act of (written) 
contractual faithlessness (see Sec. 5.2), it nevertheless was a word restricted to the courts and 
the world of legal, written contracts. This remained the case in Egypt: we have no non-legal, 
non-contractual attestation of this word (cf. App. III). Not so parabainein. This was a word 
with a heavy and persistent ethical valence throughout antiquity in both literary and 
documentary Greek with respect to all manner of boundaries, physical, metaphorical, legal, 
and moral. The two great shifts in breach in the late Ptolemaic and early Roman periods, then, 
were the generalization of the concept, as parasyngraphein ceased to refer to the specific act 
of contravening either a written contract or a transactional agreement; and its moralization, or 
the shift from a technical legal term for breach to an overtly moral one with a wider cultural 
resonance. We may in turn fit this moralization of breach into a larger history of the 
moralization of contract, which is adumbrated at the end of Chapter 5 (Secs. 5.6.2-5.7).  
Parabainein was not a chance substitution for parasyngraphein, but a natural choice: 
it not only shared a deep conceptual affinity for the idea of the ―boundaries‖ imposed by a 
contract (cf. the use of emmenein with both treaties and contracts from the fifth century on, 





5.2, 5.6.2). The relationship of oath to contract is a contested one in the debate over the origin 
and nature of contractual liability in fifth-century Athens (see n442). In the study of Ptolemaic 
and Roman Egypt, however, this topic has generated comparatively little interest and less 
controversy. To be sure, there has been work on oaths, but primarily from a legal point of 
view, particularly the role they played in certain state processes, like registration and 
declaration (e.g., the census). With respect to their use in reinforcing obligations, the 
communis opinio still follows the line established by Seidl, namely that the use of oaths 
became less frequent after the Saite and Persian periods (cf. pp. 358f.). Presuming this decline 
to be real (and it may be that a re-examination of the evidence is in order eight decades later), 
how should we interpret it? Does it mean, as Seidl suggested (1933: 114), that parties no 
longer needed to invoke a sense of moral and religious obligation, but could instead rely on 
the power of the state to enforce their contracts? Perhaps. But this is to presume that the use of 
oaths declined, and not just the evidence for use.  
My suggestion in Chapter 5 is that we concentrate on the function and mechanics, and 
not the form of oaths covering private contracts in Egypt. If we do so, we discover that the 
change in practice documented by Seidl in fact conceals a sublimation of the moral mechanics 
of oath in the contracts themselves, and further that this represents a conservation of the oath‘s 
primary enforcement function. This interpretation depends on the identification of 
parabainein as an originally and enduring part of the moral vocabulary. Historically, this is 
unassailable: the moral dimension of parabainein is well attested in classical literature, and 
while instances of parabainein in the papyri are thin, they are in the first century and a half of 





contracts. Also suggestive is the evidence of the oaths covering mid-first century BCE cession 
contracts (sec. 5.7). Strikingly, in these contract-oath dyads parasyngraphein always and only 
refers to breach of contract, while parabainein always refers to breach of the oath, and 
occasionally to breach of contract. In other words, we see evidence here of the original 
linguistic domains of each word (parasyngraphein and contract, parabainein and oath), as 
well as of the encroachment of parabainein onto the world of contract. Finally, there is no 
mistaking the moral valence of parabainein and its derivatives throughout the Roman period 
and into Late Antiquity, it being a standard word for sin and transgression. The slow but 
inexorable replacement of parabainein for parasyngraphein is therefore best characterized as 
an infiltration of an explicitly moral discourse into the legal discourse of contracts, perhaps 
from the oaths that used to cover them. 
As we might suspect, this infiltration was not restricted merely to this one substitution; 
rather it is but one vestige of a larger, systemic re-equilibration of the moral and legal 
conception of obligation. To see this, we must step back and survey the entire history of 
contract over this period, and the traces of this general realignment are visible nearly 
everywhere we look. For instance, it was not just parabainein that was imported, but other 
moralizing vocabulary as well, some of which can also be shown to have originated in the 
world of oaths, or the discourse of the foundational moral commitment surrounding treaties 
and contracts. In this category we gave pride of place to kakotechnia (Sec. 5.7, esp. pp. 
367ff.). Other words, such as heurēsiologia, have less of a connection to oaths per se, but 
clearly participated in the same general moralizing trend in contract language (pp. 374ff.)—





cf. the limited but useful study of Düwel 1969). To this linguistic infiltration one may also 
match structural changes in the format of contracts. The most important of these is the turn 
towards subjectivity, reflected in the growing preference for the confessional form of the 
homologia and the personal declaration of the cheirograph and subscription, each recalling or 
perhaps replicating the subjectivity of oaths (cf. esp. P.Corn. 4, p. 377). All in all, the 
impression is of a decline in the use of oaths, but a conservation of their moral content and 
force as contracts slowly acquired some of their characteristics.  
The questions before us, then, are why and to what effect?  
The history of breach does not suggest that these changes were driven by the state. The 
inscription of breach per se in contracts has the obvious advantage of encouraging parties and 
courts to focus on the purpose of a contract (i.e., the transaction) rather its drafting (cf. the 
cautionary example of P.Enteux. 59, pp. 270ff.). This surely represented the initiative of 
imaginative individuals and competent scribes. By the same token, it is difficult to imagine 
the Ptolemaic or Roman state establishing formal requirements in contracts at the level of 
vocabulary. We do know of instances when the state appears to have either required or 
encouraged formal changes. For instance, in 146 BCE Ptolemy VI promulgated a decree 
requiring the Greek registration of demotic instruments, and this appears to have had an 
obvious and immediate effect upon registration practice.
668
 Centuries later, the rather sudden 
and wide-spread appearance of so-called ―stipulation-clause‖ (e.g., ἐπ ρωτ θ ὶς ὡ ο ό  σ  
vel sim.) also suggests the agency of the state, though perhaps indirect and inadvertent, if we 
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accept Wolff‘s theory (i.e., the promiscuous use of this clause is best explained as an 
abundance of caution fueled by a misinterpretation of an adverse court decision concerning a 
stipulation after the Constitutio Antoniniana).
669
 The Roman administration similarly evinced 
a clear preference for written documentation, even if it did not make the reduction to writing a 
formal requirement of contracts (cf. Sec. 6.2). In each of these examples a clear point of 
administrative policy, law, or procedural convenience explains the state‘s intervention, none 
of which goals are advanced by the substitution or inclusion of moralizing vocabulary. 
Moreover, as the survival of parasyngraphein suggests (Sec. 5.5), its decline and the rise of 
parabainein represented an organic change from the bottom up, driven by those who drafted 
contracts, not by those who adjudicated or registered them.  
In one sense, it may seem odd or ironic that the language of legal instruments like 
written contracts should reflect or respond to popular morality as much as—if not more 
than—legal doctrine, statutory requirement, or the rules of procedure. The demonstrable fact 
that they did, however, should serve as yet another indication that the ancient parties who 
went to grapheia to draft a contract had more than the state and its laws in mind when they 
did so. As pointed out in various places in the discussion of preceding chapters (e.g., n409 and 
pp. 331ff.), we have examples of contracts without penalties or enforcement clauses, and in 
some instances even legally unenforceable contracts (cf. BGU IV 1144, pp. 308ff). The fact 
that such contracts were reduced to writing indicates that the parties understood them as 
serious commitments worth the cost of memorialization; on the other hand, the fact that they 
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failed to include incentives to perform or provisions for execution and recovery—or 
sometimes drafted with utter disregard to the law (e.g., the fictive deposits hiding the dowries 
of soliders, M.Chr. 372.i.5-13)—is more good, if oblique, evidence of the operation of extra-
legal modalities of enforcement in the contracting process. Indeed, they suggest that we 
should not look at writing necessarily as only or always related to official enforcement, but 
rather as an aid to extra-legal enforcement as well.
670
  
The moralization of contract is, I submit, one of these modalities, an attempt to 
leverage ethics (i.e., first-party enforcement) and vicarious self-help (i.e., the third-party 
enforcement of norms) through the language of the instrument. One may easily imagine that 
contracts were seen as resting on a more solid foundation if they were fortified by the express 
moral commitment of the opposite party (hence the original role of oaths). What better way to 
sharpen or quicken this sense of commitment than by having the party formally declare or 
acknowledge, propria persona vel enim propria vox, the obligations that he or she now 
undertook to perform, while agreeing not ―transgress‖ the private law established by the 
document? At the same time, the field of ―transgression‖ expanded in tandem with the 
progress of parabainein, as parties were enjoined from an increasing number of ―immoral‖ 
acts (cf. Sec. 5.7). The fact that so much of the innovation we see in the texts of contracts is 
moral and not legal points up the perceived value of (or need for) such language. Though 
legally irrelevant, these were enforcement clauses all the same, drawing their meaning and 
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power from normative views of what constituted the proper attitude and behavior of one who 
was contractually obligated. In the end, it may be as Seidl hypothesized, that the bureaucratic 
controls and official justice provided by the Ptolemies, and then the Romans, allowed average 
Egyptians to do away with the juristic oath. But oaths persisted in this society (cf. P.Yale I 79 
above), and it is not altogether unsurprising that the need to invest one‘s contract partners with 
a heightened sense of moral investment remained, albeit sublimated, ultimately finding re-
expression in the contracts themselves.  
A different question is how successful this sort of enforcement was and at what cost it 
was purchased. All systems have a ―downside,‖ or the costs associated with them, and the use 
of ethical norms to enforce contracts is no exception. It might seem that the costs of extra-
legal, normative enforcement are quite low, and certainly lower than those of using the law: 
norms are widely known, easily discovered, generally uncomplicated, and require no 
professionals or administration to enforce. Of course, it is some of these same characteristics 
that generate the transaction costs associated with using them: norms are also generally 
incapable of nuance, may be contradictory (since not codified), and can be flouted by 
powerful individuals or groups, etc. These costs can be so high as to forestall transactions 
altogether, hence the need for a credible third-party enforcer, like the state (cf. Ch. 2). One 
particular cost is worthy of note here: since norms guide interpersonal relations, in contracting 
they tend to focus attention on the parties themselves instead of the transaction (cf. the early 
history eugnōmosynē in Sec. 4.5). In other words, unlike the insertion of general breach 
clauses, they draw attention away from the economic purpose of contract to the social 





interpretation of litigation as an ―attack‖ (e.g., ephodos; cf. the use of eperchesthai in the 
Nichtangriffsklausel).
671
 Resorting to litigation was one‘s legal right, but could for this very 
reason also be cast as an outright rejection of the moral codes of trust, respect, and obligation 
(cf. Sec. 4.9 and P.Yale I 79 above). The moral enforcement of contracts thus involved a 
distinct trade-off: on the one hand, it represented a firm lever for the parties as they engaged in 
self-help; on the other hand, the use of this lever almost certainly helped to personalize 
disputes and stigmatize the use of the courts (which, of course, was the point). To the extent 
such side-effects discouraged mutually beneficial solutions to contractual problems and 
disputes, contracting was obviously thereby rendered less efficient. 
The work of recovering the normative rules of contracting has just begun; this 
dissertation makes no claim to completeness (cf. Secs. 3.4-3.5). Though it is a tired and 
somewhat craven caveat, it is nonetheless true that the preceding chapters represent a starting 
point: while there is a useful literature on the economic and legal norms of classical Athenians 
and Roman elites,
 
there is, for all intents and purposes, no comparable literature based on the 
study of Egyptian papyri—which is to say that there is no study of norms on the basis of our 
best evidence for commercial and legal practice in the ancient world. Chapters 4 and 5 thus 
represent the first steps in working out the rules, history, and implications of this vital—some 
might even say obvious—yet still obscure side of contracting. While there is much more work 
to be done on norms, one glaring omission in this dissertation deserves a particular mention 
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here: there is no formal discussion of the role of social status. This gap is partly the product of 
an inherent defect in the discourse of the norms chosen for this study: pistis as a measure of 
personal reliance is a value associated with social equals, and true to form, the discourse of 
trust in the papyri is largely restricted to use within, and not between, social strata. This is less 
true of eugnōmosynē, as one of the lenses for respect was hierarchy (cf. Sec. 4.5). 
Significantly, however, it was not by this lens that eugnōmosynē in contracting was measured, 
but rather by the lenses of debt and promise, as its evolution demonstrates. Whereas the claim 
of agnōmosynē against a debtor in the mouth of an early Ptolemaic elite like Zenon 
necessarily carried with it the sting of personal ―disrespect‖ (e.g., P.Cair.Zen. III 59355 and 
59516, pp. 176ff.), the history of the word shows that it was precisely this subjective 
dimension that was progressively muted in favor of a more objective conception of a person‘s 
relationship to the obligation itself. This is not to say that the subjective element in contract 
relations disappeared or that status and hierarchy no longer mattered; quite the contrary, we 
have every indication that status, hierarchy, and dependence were very much alive, and 
perhaps stronger, in late antique Egypt than under the participate.
672
 
Therefore, it is not the existence or impact of such social norms on contracting that is 
in doubt, but rather the best way to track the presence and influence of social inequality in 
contracts. The main difficulty is that such differences were rarely advertised in contracts since 
they ran counter to the core logic of the institution, the essence of which was the personal 
binding of a notionally free agent (cf. pp. 94ff; Sec. 3.4; App. I and II). We saw an example of 
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both the ideological tension between status and contract, as well as of the methodological 
problem in treating status in contracts, in P.Mil.Vogl. I 25 (pp. 183ff.). In this trial transcript it 
is revealed that Geminos, a particularly wealthy and eminent person, appears to have 
persuaded his freedman and one-time phrontistēs Demetrios to deposit a substantial amount of 
money with him in the name of Demetrios‘s friend Deios, most likely because Geminos 
considered it undignified for a man of his stature to be subject to the praxis of a freedman, and 
one who had worked for him to boot. Since a written document was considered reliable proof 
of a transaction, the defense was forced into casting doubt on Demetrios‘s relationship to the 
document (there was, apparently, no case to be made for its being a forgery). The advocate 
thus ruthlessly played the ―status card‖ to this end, suggesting that Demetrios‘s ―poverty‖ 
(which he pointedly contrasted with Geminos‘s position as a   σχ  ο έστ τος ἄ θρωπος) 
gave him both motive and opportunity to steal the note. Specifically, he asserted that it was all 
but impossible that Demetrios should have been able to scrape together the 2,000 dr. from his 
wages, while his ―need‖ induced to steal the document from Geminos‘s house, to which he 
had convenient access because of his position. 
Everything we know about ancient law suggests that such status differences mattered 
not just socially or rhetorically, but legally, and indeed we have other trial transcripts in which 
status figures prominently, in the rulings as well as the arguments (cf., e.g., M.Chr. 80 
[=P.Flor. I 61; unknown, 85] and 81 [=P.Oxy. IV 706; Alexandria, late I-early II]).
673
 Over 
the course of the third century, one finds evidence of status creeping into contracts, both with 
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the rise of the hypomnēma (cf. n672 above), which was remarkably unilateral in form, and the 
inclusion of status designations in the body of the contract itself (e.g., P.Flor. I 16.20, 28 
[Euhermeria, 239]; perhaps significantly, also a hypomnēma).674 Before that, however, the 
relative positions of parties as such were largely hidden from view, even though they can 
often be plausibly reconstructed on the basis of the parties‘ personal designations (e.g., 
Alexandrian or citizen of Antinoopolis, former office-holder, or ―Persian of the Epigone‖675), 
the nature of the transaction, the terms, and occasionally information gleaned from other 
documents. The surviving examples of contemporary deposit contracts permit us to say with 
near certainty that the cheirograph of deposit which Demetrios executed between Geminos 
and Deios did not communicate the status difference between the two.
676
 Indeed, had either 
the cheirograph between the Deios and Geminos or the note between Demetrios and Deios 
survived, but not P.Mil.Vogl. I 25, we would have been hard-pressed to reconstruct the social 
dynamics behind the contracts, a cautionary example for assumptions about such differences 
on the basis of contracts alone.  
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The question of the effect of social inequality on contracting, then, will have to be 
pursued via a different method, but in doing so we should not be too quick to assume that 
contracts between unequals were always either the products of coercion or unenforceable. 
Indeed, one of the remarkable things revealed by P.Mil.Vogl. I 25 was the flexibility of 
contract, or its ability in this instance to accomodate both the demands of rank and the needs 
of enforcement. These two possibilities, coercion and unenforceability, in fact represent two 
different tests of contract with respect to social status. The first is whether or not stronger 
parties could strong-arm weaker parties into disadvantageous contracts. There is no doubt that 
this happened in antiquity (and still happens today, so called ―contracts of adhesion‖); the 
question is whether the state recognized this use of social power as inimical to contract (or 
justice, which are not necessarily the same; cf. below), and what steps, if any, it took to 
remedy the use of social and economic power.
677
 The second test is how such differences 
played out on the ground and in court when the weaker party was the plaintiff (i.e., when the 
weaker party had the better end of the deal). Both questions implicate the state in contracting, 
viz. how it policed the default rules of negotiation; and how it enforced executed contracts. 
Hence it is to the state that we turn next. 
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The state‘s role in the institutional development of contract has been central, proving to be the 
entity most capable of remedying the defects of contracting in a state of nature.
678
 There is no 
need to argue that Egypt under the Ptolemies and the Romans was no state of nature; but what 
precisely did the state do vis-à-vis contracting? If the main thrust of this dissertation has been 
that scholars have paid too little attention to the normative rules of contract, the central 
critique of the next part of the project is that they have also generally been too dismissive of 
the role which the Roman state played in supporting and promoting the institution of contract 
(cf. Sec. 1.2). This view is the product of the last generation‘s attempt to shrink the ancient 
state down to its true historical dimensions, correcting what they saw as anachronistically 
modernist interpretations and assumptions by drawing attention to its ideology and 
limitations.
679
 In so doing, however, they have left us with a Roman state that at times 
approaches the majestic indifference of an Epicurean god, while at others appears narrowly 
and ruthlessly bent on serving the interests of the great and the good at the expense of the bulk 
of the population.  
To be sure, this is a gross generalization, and there has been significant work since the 
1980s that has tended in the other direction. A now classic example is Frier‘s discussion of the 
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jurists‘ successful push for a conception of ―autonomous law‖ at the end of the Republic, or 
the attempt to establish clear rules of law independent of politics.
680
 More recently, some 
ancient historians have been keen to stress what they see as the market-oriented philosophy of 
Roman administration and justice, which in some formulations rises nearly to the level of an 
economic philosophy.
681
 According to this view, the state can be seen as attempting to hew to 
certain principles and not merely to certain social classes. In the main, however, the view of a 
laissez-faire state with an often ad hoc or ―corrupt‖ justice system heavily tilted in favor of the 
rich and powerful abides, and the papyri have often been used to enliven this characterization 
with the authenticity and immediacy only they can provide (cf. p.11).  
It would be bootless, of course, to argue that the Roman administration was as 
effective or involved in contracting as a modern state, for it wasn‘t. Moreover, as stated in the 
previous section, status and privilege were not only real, but also deeply embedded in the 
social and legal institutions of the Roman world, such that it would be wrong to discount their 
effects. That said, there has been too much emphasis on the state‘s spectacular failures of 
justice (cf. the essentially negative assessment of Lewis 1983: Ch. 9), and too little 
appreciation for its equally impressive, if less conspicuous, record of routine success when it 
came to contract. This is in part because the view of contract has been far too narrow: 
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although what happened in court was clearly important, most written contracts were not 
litigated, and we must count this in itself as a form of success (cf. Chapts. 2 and 3). We would 
do well, then, to understand what roll, if any, the state played in it. By the same token, while 
status and privilege were very real, so were certain basic political considerations of imperial 
rule and deeply-held non-economic ideological principles, both of which motivated Roman 
officials and which sometimes ran counter to the bald enforcement of status and privilege. 
These principles, which I would sum up as an ethic and ideology of ―good government,‖ did 
not rise to an economic or market philosophy, but nonetheless often served as an effective 
proxy for such. In short, my contention is that the Roman state did more than most scholars 
suspect with respect to the enforcement of private contracts for a variety of reasons, and that 
the proper appreciation of their administration of Egypt in this respect should factor into 
discussions of their economic policy and administration of the empire more widely, 
particularly as these same administrators took their understanding of imperial interests, 
administrative experience, and sense of mission with them wherever they went. To follow this 
contention is to proceed along the third axis of investigation outlined above (p. Error! 
Bookmark not defined.), and the central questions we need to ask are: what did the state do, 
why did it do it, and what effect did it have on contracting? By way of conclusion, I would 
like to give a brief prospectus of my answers to these three questions, which I intend to argue 
in detail in the near future. 
The actions of the state and the motivations of its officers are, for obvious reasons, 
bound up together intimately. Though axiomatic, this observation is the proper place to start, 





overstate the case, for there were some laws that pertained directly to contracts. Thus, for 
example, there was a law laid down about fines in synchōrēseis.682 Similarly, there was a 
 ό ος τ῵  π ρ θ  ῵ , which called for a double penalty for failure to return a deposit.683 
The evidence points to both as being Roman in date, the first likely connected to the Augustan 
reorganization of the Alexandrian katalogeion, the second perhaps datable to the reign of 
either Gaius or Claudius. With respect to leases, it has been suggested that the decline of the 
bebaiōsis-clause in Roman contracts might also be connected to a statute, one which made 
such guarantees implicit, thus rendering the phrase obsolete.
684
 If we turn to the miscellany of 
the Gnomon of the Idios Logos, we find that it contains a raft of rules pertaining directly or 
indirectly to contracts: §§ 1-2 (concerning the alienability of tombs), 65-67 (penalties 
connected to the improper sale or export of slaves), 70 (restrictions on dealings between 
public officials and the state, cf. §§ 109-11), 73 (prohibition on second mortgages from temple 
funds), 78 (priestly offices alienable only by sale, not auction), 100-101 (registration 
requirements), 103 (outlawing loans on ―liquids‖), 104 (prohibition on future sales), and 105 
(statutory limit on interest rates).
685
 And there are those ―laws‖ which we infer from practice. 
Thus we saw in P.Mil.Vogl. I 25 above that writing played an important and particular 
evidentiary role at trial: the document was considered prima facie proof of an obligation, 
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leaving the defense either to claim that it was an outright forgery or to attack the plaintiff‘s 
connection to the document. Though unwritten contracts were actionable,
686
 this rule of 
evidence clearly counted as one of the more important ―laws‖ affecting contract practice.  
Finally, there were restrictions on the freedom of contract made for policy reasons, 
such as we saw above in the case of the Gnomon. We have one papyrus in which we get to see 
precisely such a policy restriction being weighed and applied, a vivd and telling legal drama 
pitting status against contract. P.Oxy. IV 706 (Oxyrhynchos, 73 or perhaps 113-117) contains 
a fragmentary account of a trial between a freedman Damarion and his patron Herakleides 
before the Prefect in Alexandria.
687
 It seems that Damarion had attempted to buy his way out 
of any residual obligations he might have owed \ his former owner (the Alexandrian version 
of operae), in return for a cheirograph from Herakleides asserting that he would not longer 
have anything to do with him, no doubt an innovation on the receipt or the Abstandsurkunde 
(2-5: τὸ   ὲ ρ [ ]  ί      [            π    ]φέ    π ρʼ   τοῦ  ρ  ρ ο    ὶ    ρ - | 
[φέ    χ  ρό ρ] φο  π ρὶ τοῦ    ὲ  ἕξ    πρᾶ     [πρὸς   τό  ]). Herakleides, however, 
appears to have reneged, and so Damarion sued. The Prefect had the cheirograph read out in 
court and then consulted his consistory on what Egyptian law had to say about such a contract. 
In the event, he found that there was nothing in the law that conferred on freedmen the power 
to dispose of their residual responsibilities via contract (7-9: [ἐ   ὲ  το ς τ῵ ] Α  υπτίω  
 ό ο ς ο  ὲ  π ρὶ τ ς| [- ca.10 -   ὶ τ]  ς ἐξουσί ς τ῵   π   υθ ρωσά τω  | [...] ). And 
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so, on the basis of the astikoi nomoi, he reinstated the freedman-patron relationship and added 
that if he found Herakleides in court again with a complaint against Damarion, he would have 
the freedman beaten. There is no mention of the money that Damarion paid (and Herakleides 
accepted), and given the Prefect‘s sentence and the considerable leverage he thereby conferred 
on Herakleides, it seems all but certain that it was part of the price Damarion paid for his 
insolence.  
Most of the discussion of this papyrus has centered on what these astikoi nomoi were, 
the ius civile or the laws of Alexandria, a question that has not been resolved, and likely won‘t 
be unless further evidence appears.
688
 On the other hand, this trial tells us a good deal about 
the limits of contract as an institution in the eyes of the authorities. There was nothing wrong 
with Damarion‘s contract per se; the question before the Prefect was merely whether this 
transaction could be the object of a legal contract. Significantly, he first checked with local 
law, but when this was silent, he made a revealing policy decision to curtail the freedom of 
contract in order to shore up the institution of slavery and status.
689
 One could not use contract 
to rewrite this status. 
One could easily add other ―laws‖ to the list above, but even this small selection 
confirms the statement that there was no contract law per se. Instead, we see a multiplicity of 
rules, some relating to contractual form (e.g., synchōrēseis), some to transactions (e.g., 
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deposits), some Egyptian, some civic or imperial, some related indirectly to fiscal concerns 
(e.g., many of those included in the Gnomon, esp. § 101), while others driven by policy 
decisions. There appears to have been no codification of these rules and no legal doctrine—or 
even definition—of contract, and relatively few cases turned on points of ―contract law‖ as 
such (cf. App. II). When points of law did arise, the Prefect and other high officers could call 
on experts who were prepared to issue opinions (e.g., the Prefect‘s philoi in P.Oxy. IV 706; cf. 
Thomas 1982: 132 for the analogous experts attending the epistratēgos), and their opinions 
were often presented as definitive (e.g., P.Oxy. IV 706.7-9 above). These lawyers appear to 
have played a role similar to that of the Roman jurists, as we may surmise from the meager 
first-hand evidence we have for their activities, and their services were sometimes available 
even to judges at the lower levels (e.g., the opinion of the nomikos Ulpianus Dionysodoros to 
Salvistius Africanus, a soldier who was hearing a case, P.Oxy. II 237.viii.2-7).
690
 When it 
came to adjudicating contracts, this cadre of trained legal professionals no doubt produced a 
greater cohesion in the law and rendered the courts more predictable, though we should 
remember that we know little if anything of their training or even the bases for their opinions 
(Dionysodoros, for example, cites nothing to back his opinion, though he mentions that are 
―also‖ helpful precedents for the case in point).691 
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Whatever one may believe about the motive forces behind the development of Roman 
contract law,
692
 it seems clear that rules that had the most impact on contract in Roman Egypt 
were those that supported contracting rather than controlled contract directly. There were 
experts, but they played an interpretive and stabilizing role; the creative force in the system 
resided with the Prefect and his officers, and so the institution reflected a certain vision of 
empire rather than some internal legal logic. Therefore, while we can (and should) attempt to 
sketch out the shape of ―contract law‖ according to basic doctrinal contours (e.g., consent, 
capacity, duress, etc.), to do so exclusively would be to miss an entire set of rules, which 
while not directly related to contract as such, were nevertheless the credible rules by which the 
institution operated. Hence the importance of understanding the aims and ideology of Roman 
rule.  
The Romans, of course, did not rule out of beneficence. Revenue extraction was the 
prime directive in their administration of Egypt. Tempering this predictable and self-interested 
motivation, however, was an ethic and an ideology of good government. One can find 
expressions of this in any letter, decree, or order emanating from the Roman imperial 
machinery (and we will see examples below), but why should we take such pronouncements 
seriously? Much of the time we need not: they are just so much window-dressing. There are 
occasions, however, when we can measure the effect of the principle of good government, or 
see it animating Roman administrators and in such a way as to support contracting. 
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Here I will give but two examples. First, Tiberius Julius Alexander in his Edict of 68 
(Smallwood 1967, no. 391) addresses a host of problems brought to his attention by 
Alexandrian euschēmonestatoi and land-holders from the chōra (5-6). The first three articles 
of this important document are of immediate relevance. The first deals with forced leasing and 
tax farming, which Alexander forbids on the grounds that he has been ―convinced‖ 
(πέπ  σ   ) that such forced service is of no ultimate advantage to the state, which does better 
when the powerful engage with it willingly and enthusiastically (12-13). The second article 
treats the practice of officials‘ buying up debts and enforcing them with the power of the state 
by virtue of their position (i.e., as if the debts were public).
693
 Alexander forbids officials from 
buying such debt in the first place (though they may make their own loans), and confirms 
Augustus‘s grant of cessio bonorum in the case of private debts (public debts, however, could 
still land one in jail).  
The third article touches on a very different problem created by the confusion of 
public and private contracts. Apparently, the right of prior lien (prōtopraxia) against people 
who had responsibilities to the state was having the unintended effect of disrupting their 
private affairs: fear, real or pretended, of being in the position of a creditor or buyer behind 
the state was inducing people to call in loans and cancel contracts with those who appeared to 
be liable to the fiscus. The language of the decree begins with an affirmation of the desire that 
private business be conducted ―unburdened‖ by the state, which had a protective concern for 
―public credit,‖ or  ο  ὴ πίστ ς, by which I presume is meant the general confidence that 
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legally conducted business will be respected and effective (18-19: ἵ   〈 〉ὲ    { }〈 〉  όθ    
β ρ     τ 〈ς〉 πρὸ〈ς〉    ή ου〈ς  σ〉υ       ς τὸ τ῵     οσίω  ὄ ο     〈 〉ὲ συ έχωσ  
τὴ   ο  ὴ  πίστ     οἱ τ   πρωτοπρ ξί  πρὸς ἃ  ὴ       τ χρ    ο ).694 Alexander 
institutes the following solution to preserve the state‘s right to prōtopraxia while mitigating 
the risk it introduces in private affairs: he increases the amount and quality of information 
about the extent of exposure. Whomever an imperial procurator or oikonomos ―suspected‖ 
(i.e., of being over-leveraged or insolvent) was either to have a his account annotated or 
publically posted, ―so that no one may deal with him‖ (  [     ]〈 〉ὶς τ῵  το ο τω  
συ βά    ), or to have a portion of his estate sequestrated in order to cover his potential 
liability. Although the edict specifically says that these actions are only to be taken in those 
cases in which an official suspected that there might be a problem (22: ὑποπτό  τ     χ   ἐ  
τοὶς    οσίο ς πρά   σ  ὄ τω ), the fact that Alexander barred from legal action anyone 
who dealt with those were were liable to prōtopraxia and who had not participated in either of 
these sunshine measures meant that they were effectively going to be requirements for 
virtually everyone who had a state obligation. This solution was therefore not only 
economically smart, it was also politically savvy, since it resolved the rights problem while 
appearing to avoid the heavy-handed imposition of potentially embarassing declarations or 
onerous sequestrations: those who were uninterested in conducting private business need not 
worry.  
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This edict thus advertises a general concern with personal freedom and private 
business, at least of the propertied classes, and freely represents it as the product of core 
values and unvarnished expediency: ideally and practically, the government should not 
interfere unduly or unnecessarily with private contracts, but should rather promote and protect 
the koinē pistis. Should we take Alexander at his word? We might note that it took even less 
imagination than in the case of the first article to see that if the liability to the state was not 
made transparent, the state was going to have a difficult time getting the elite and landed 
classes it depended upon to deal with it. Be that as it may, one should not discount the impact 
of their own propaganda on the kind of solutions Roman officials (even ones born in the East) 
found to such problems. At the very least it reinforced their tendency to think in terms of 
property rights, even if the exercise was how to order them to their advantage. This 
represented a public good all in itself. Alexander‘s solution is a case in point, as it shows both 
an understanding for the way property rights, markets, and contracting function together, as 
well as a facility with the levers at the state‘s disposal to restore them to equilibrium. We may 
contrast this approach with that of the Ptolemaic state, which, when presented with similar 
problems, tended to protect particular classes of persons important to their revenues, like royal 
farmers, whom they effectively insulated from foreclosure (e.g., P.Tebt. I 5.221-47=M.Chr. 
36a; Tebtynis, post 118 BCE).  
The second profile in administration is a Roman Prefect under Domitian, M. Mettius 
Rufus. His activities represent a version of the ideology of good government that is, if 
anything, ―purer‖ that the previous example. P.Fam.Tebt. 15 (Arsinoite, 114/115) contains 





legal and financial responsibility for the documents in the bibliothēkē at Ptolemais Euergetis. 
The disordered state of the archive was only revealed accidentally when Mettius interrupted 
the proceedings of a case before him at the conventus to inquire why a document had no 
beginning (76-78: Μ ττίου Ῥο φου τοῦ ἡ   ο   -   σ  τος     ο  ζο έ ου τοῦ  ο οῦ 
  ὶ ἐπ    χθέ τος   τ῵  ἐ  τ ς β β  οθή  ς β β ίου   άρχου,   ἐπ ζ τήσ  τος  ὲ τὴ  
  τί     ʼ ἣ  ἄ  ρχό  ἐστ  ). Upon finding that this was not an isolated example, but 
indicative of the condition of a good deal of the contents in the archive, Mettius ordered that 
the archive be fully restored, touching off 35 years of on-again, off-again litigation over who 
would bear the cost of replacing the documents. Indeed, Mettius appears to have had 
something of a reformer‘s zeal when it came to archives and administration, for we know that 
he also issued a decree (preserved in P.Oxy. 237.viii.27-43) calling for a general registration 
of property because neither public nor private business was not being properly managed in the 
Oxyrhynchite due to long neglect of record-keeping (28-29:  ήτ  τ   [  ]ωτ     [ήτ  τ  
   ]ό σ     πρά   τ  τὴ    θή ουσ      βά       οί  σ  ).  
Of course, as with Tiberius Julius Alexander, Mettius‘s interest in such matters was 
motivated in large part by the recognition that the Empire ran on records, for what good was 
the right of prōtopraxia if no one knew who owned how much of what?695 In P.Fam.Tebt. 15, 
however, we get an important glimpse behind the chancery curtain to see the Prefect in action. 
What the original case was when the partial record was handed up to him we do not know, 
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though it likely was a garden-variety monetary or property dispute. Also, the damage to the 
―beginning‖ of the document must been more or less inconsequential, perhaps missing the 
date or the name of the first party—whatever it was, the document was clearly still useful at 
trial, for the parties brought it along and submitted it into evidence—no doubt in better 
condition than what many a papyrologist has wrung sense out of centuries later. Again, 
Mettius seems to have had the eye (or more likely the ear) of a practiced administrator, such 
that when the clerk read out the document, beginning in media res, he had a premonition of 
what that missing opening portended for the state of record-keeping in the Arsinoite. Overall, 
however, the impression one gets is that this was a man who prized thoroughness not merely 
because it was necessary for the fiscalité impériale or the smooth workings of private 
business, but for its own sake, because ―that‘s how things were done.‖  
Speculations about Mettius‘s personal work ethic aside, we have no reason to suspect 
the genuineness of his interest in the proper management of τά    ωτ  ά. He goes beyond 
what would be necessary for tracking property rights for fiscal purposes by ordering that 
rights within family settlements receive proper attention (34-37), ―in order that persons 
entering into agreements may not be impeded through ignorace (37: ἵ   οἱ συ    άσσο τ ς 
 ὴ   τʼ ἄ   ο    ἐ   ρ  ο τ   [l. ἐ   ρ  ω τ  ]). Collecting all property dispositions in one 
place, even those that are dorment or latent, like wives‘ katochai on their husbands property or 
children‘s property interests as recored in ―living wills‖ (cf. n541), clarified property rights, 
which in turn lowered the transaction costs of contracting. To the extent that this decreased 
the number of legal disputes, it was potentially beneficial to the state; but the connection to 





case of Article 3 of Alexander‘s Edict. Indeed, Mettius‘s concern for property rights reminds 
one of Cicero‘s contention that one of the prime responsibilities, if not raison d’être, of the 
state is the legal protection of property.
696
 
One could easily multiply the examples of Prefects and other Roman officers 
balancing the fiscal demands of their offices against a sense of good government for its own 
sake. In this context, the question of motivations matters insofar as it helps us to identify and 
analyze what the state did with respect to contracting. The fact that the Roman government 
understood part of its mission, for whatever reasons, as the support of οἱ συ    άσσο τ ς at 
the point of negotiation is of signal importance, since it forces us to look beyond the courts 
and the law to a host of other government agencies and instruments and their administrative 
functions, practices, and rules. The Prefects appear to have paid at least as much attention to 
the conditions that lead to the need for enforcement as to the provision of enforcement 
itself.
697
 Of course, since the world is not predictable, no matter how well informed one is 
about it, there will always be a need for credible third-party enforcement (cf. Chapt. 2). So, 
when it comes to asking what the state did with respect to contract enforcement, we need to 
interpret this widely, and consider both direct actions the state took when it came to 
adjudicating contract disputes and enforcing court decisions, and indirect actions which either 
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enabled parties to make better, more secure contracts (e.g., because they had better 
information about the other party) or to enforce them themselves.  
However, before we turn to what the state did, I want to draw attention to one final 
motivation. The attention paid to contract was not merely an expression of administrative, 
ideological, or market interest; it also reflected a recognition that it was a revenue stream. The 
grapheia were concessions licensed by the state,
698
 and other offices, like the katalogeion in 
Alexandria, charged fees for a number of processes associated with contracting (e.g., 12 dr. 
for dēmosiōsis). An enlightening record of these fees and taxes comes in PSI VI 688 
(unknown, post 116), an account of what it cost to foreclose on a mortgage in the early second 
century. The creditor added together with interest payments the fees he paid to avail himself 
of official enforcement, including the costs of paper, correspondence, drafting, diastolika 
(n393), payments to various officers and their hypēretai, and a special foreclosure tax (telos 
embadieas), to arrive at a grand total of 189 dr., 1 ob., which he then passed on to the debtor. 
From this account one gets a glimpse of the potential importance of such revenues to the 
entire justice system, from local scribes and middling officers to the provincial administration 
(cf. P.Oxy. XIV 1654 below).  
Nor did this potential go unnoticed by the central government. In P.Oxy. XXXIV 2705 
(Oxyrhynchos, ca. 225) we have a circular from Claudius Herennianus, the juridicus (who 
was serving pro praefecto at the time), to the stratēgoi of the Heptanomia and the Arsinoite. 
Herennianus attached documents relating to some proceedings before the archidikastēs (now 
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lost), which revealed the fact that contracts were not being ―lawfully completed‖ in the chōra. 
He therefore alerts the stratēgoi to the problem and charges them as follows (5-9):  
 
ὑ   ς φρο [τίσ ]τ    τ  τ       ω έ     ο ί  ως τ  συ    ά   τ  συ - 
τ    σθ   — οὕτω   ρ    [       ]   [   ]  στ   τ  συ βό     —   ὶ τὸ  
ὀφ   ό   ο  ὑπὲρ   τ῵  τῇ 
   προτάτῃ πό    τ῵ [ ]    ξ   ρέω   πο οθ    ,    [ό] τω   ὲ  τ῵   
ἐπὶ το ς 
πρότ ρο  π      ή[σ]  σ   ὡρ σ έ ω , φυ  χθ σο έ  ς  ὲ  τ   ᾶ  ο  τ ς 
  οί ς ἐπ ξ    σ [ω]ς ἐπὶ τ῵    ὶ   τ  τ  τ   [τὴ]  ὑπό   σ    π  θ σά τω .  
 
Take care in accordance with what had been made known (to you, i.e., in the attached 
documentation) that contracts be lawfully completed—for in this way they will be 
perfect (or valid?)
699—and that what is owed on their account be rendered to the most 
illustrious city of the Alexandrians, with the established penalties remaining in force 
against those who have trespassed previously, and like penal action of course reserved 
for those who disobey this warning in the future. 
 
The penalties to which he is referring are unclear, though they may be those that the Prefects 
threatened (and levied) against all those who had duties to deposit documents in Alexandria, 
including nomikoi, bibliophylakēs, and stratēgoi.700 What he means by ―lawfully completed‖ 
is also obscure, but the best explanation is that the acting Prefect is referring to the official 
registration of cheirographs.
701
 There are two points of interest here: that parties—quite 
predictably—only ―bought‖ as much official enforcement as they anticipated needing (cf. 
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P.Mil.Vogl. I 25, pp. 183ff.; and the uncompleted contracts in the Tebtynis grapheion); and 
second, the evident interest the Prefect had in ―selling‖ them official enforcement. In this 
connection, we may also note that contracts not only represented a way to track property 
through registration, but also transactional choke-points at which the government could hold 
up parties until certain taxes, like the engkyklion, were paid.
702
 They were therefore both a 
revenue stream in themselves, as well as an enforcement mechanism for other revenue 
streams. 
 A systematic discussion of what the government did in supporting contract is hardly 
possible here, but we may get a reasonable sense of its breadth and depth from the following 
survey.
703
 Most examples come from cases involving contracts, but some come from other 
types of disputes. While in theory the type of dispute could affect the powers used (e.g., a 
succession versus a contract dispute), this has not been shown to be the case in practice, so far 
as I know. For the time being, then, it is worthwhile to establish the range of enforcement 
powers which we know the Roman government to have deployed. That said, two factors were 
important when it came to enforcement, the direct involvement of the state itself and a 
credible accusation of violence. The government (not unsurprisingly) showed greater force 
and vigor in pursuing public debts and obligations than private ones (cf. Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Edict of Tiberius Julius Alexander), and it was also more likely to intervene, or to 
                                                 
702
 Cf. M.Chr. 213 [Oxyrhynchos, 72], with Mitteis‘s discussion in AfP 1 (1901), pp. 193-99. 
703





intervene more forcefully, if it believed that there was an element of physical violence to the 
dispute. 
 
1. Policing self-help: Hypēretai of various offices, but most often of the stratēgos, 
served summons, official orders for payment, and notices of intent to foreclose on 
parties.
704
 This process allowed for defendants or debtors to make counter-claims 
(antirhēseis). One‘s claims, of course, did not fall to the ground if one proceeded 
without going through the state, but it was certainly frowned upon and potentially 
carried a sanction. In P.Fam.Tebt. 37 (Antinoopolis, 167), for example, two brothers 
complain that creditor in the Arsinoite had seized one of their slaves ―without the 
stratēgos‖ and were holding her until they were satisfied on a claim: βί  
 ποσπάσ  τ ς  ίχ  στρ τ  οῦ συ έσχο    π[ ]ρʼ   υτο ς, ἣ    ὶ  έχρ  το του 
  τέχουσ , προφάσ     ζ τή  τος οὗ φ σ    χ    πρὸς τὸ  ἕτ ρο  ἡ ῵    
    φὸ       τί οο  τὸ    ὶ Ν   ά ω   (12-15). The language here would be 
otiose unless there was some belief that officials took a dim view of this sort of self-
help. Similarly, from BGU VII 1573.8 (Philadelphia, 141) we understand that if the 
praktores xenikōn were instructed to proceed with foreclosure before an antirhēsis has 
been officially denied, this is done at the creditor‘s risk. The state also adjudicated ex 
post facto claims of self-help, e.g., P.Oxy. I 37, a dispute by two parties, each of whom 
claimed to act in accordance with legitimate self-help in repossessing a child, while 
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accusing the other of theft or kidnapping (see Ratzan forthcoming a); and P.Flor. I 61 
(see p. 53). 
 
2. Injunctions: Officials could place injunctions of various sorts. The most interesting, 
and no doubt effective, were those issued by officers in response to petitions whereby 
other parties were forbidden from mortgaging or alienating land. This was 
accomplished simply by informing the bibliothekai not to approve any mortgage or 
sales applications. See Taubenschlag 1951:148-49 for examples.  
 
3. Arrests and summons: The state summoned people to appear before it in certain legal 
actions, but Naphtali Lewis (1983: 193) and others have drawn attention to the fact 
that such orders were at times—perhaps often—ignored. This could, however, result in 
a default judgment being given, which, as the subsequent items on this list suggest, 
was valuable to the plaintiff. Often summons were sent through the local constabulary, 
many of which orders survive (see most recently Gagos and Sijpesteijn 1996 and 
P.Oxy. LXXIV, p. 133). The state did not generally compel people to appear, though 
occasionally soldiers or guard are sent to accompany the people summoned, e.g., 
P.Oxy. LXXIV 5005 (Oxyrhynchos, III/IV; see parallels in notes), but most 
attestations are third century or later (but see SB XXIV 16005 [Oxyrhnchite, II]), and 
might in any case represent instances in which there was an accusation of violence 







4. Bonding: The state at times ordered people to put up a bond to assure appearance at 
court, often in response to specific requests of the other party (ἱ   ό , e.g., M.Chr. 
89.34, 91.iii.8, 93.51; cf.W.Chr. 177). 
 
5. Investigating, taking inventories, and fact-checking: Officers routinely ordered 
subordinates to conduct investigations on various points, and in some cases draw up 
inventories of property (logothesia; cf. Mitteis 1912: 31; Preisigke 1915 s.v. 
 ο οθέτ ς). Courts and executive officers were obviously therefore better informed 
about the facts, but the papyri suggest that the investigation itself could be an 
unpleasant or potentially risky experience, and so something to be avoided if at all 
possible, e.g., BGU I 275 (Karanis, 215), in which a man makes a report to a centurion 
concerning an attempted theft ―so that no investigation is made against me‖ (15-16: 
[π]ρὸς τὸ      ί     ζήτ σ   πρὸς ἐ ὲ  ἶ   ). 
 
6. Setting time limits: Officers and courts set time-limits to various procedures and 
appearances, which were sensitive to the urgency of the matter, the distance the parties 
had to travel, and extenuating circumstances (e.g., the need to attend to the harvest). 
See Lintias 1999.  
 
7. Adjudicating: Though it may go without saying, the Romans provided courts and 





trials at the nome level before the stratēgos, to the Prefect‘s conventus, to audiences 
before various types of magistrates and officers in Alexandria or one of the poleis 
(e.g., Antinoopolis). Interestingly, we see parties engaging in forum shopping (and 
perhaps legal arbitrage), particularly on the part of Antinoopolites (cf. BGU II 614, pp. 
211ff.). Military officers were also sometimes selected as judges in cases and 
occasionally petitioned in the first instance. 
 
8. Recognizing ownership: Though it may not seem like an enforcement measure, 
transferring ownership from one onoma to another was a valuable tool (see, e.g., BGU 
VII 1573.5-6 for such a transfer). In P.Ryl. II 176 (Hermopolis, 200-210), for instance, 
we have a bank diagraphē by which one party pays off a delinquent loan in order to 
recover eight arourai, which had been the security. The principal was 1,500 drachmai, 
and the creditor accepted 2,000 drachmai through the diagraphē in order cancel all 
claims and transfer the land back to the debtor. Though substantially more than the 
principal, the 500 drachmai apparently represented a compromise sum (as the text of 
the diagraphē clearly reveals,   θʼ (ἃς [ ρ χ  ς]) ἐχ ρίσ το [5]). Too little is 
known of the original terms or the length of delinquency to know how much was 
forgiven, much less why.
705
 One wonders to what extent the market price of the 
arourai represented an effective ceiling for debt claims, i.e., did the 2,000 dr. represent 
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the price at which this debtor would simply walk away and buy a roughly equivalent 
lot of eight arourai? Of course, there were likley other idiosyncratic, non-market 
considerations at play (perhaps family), but clearly the state‘s recognition of the 
transfer of ownership was instrumental in the recovery of the loan. Again, we may 
recall PSI VI 688 above, where the creditor invested 189 dr., 1 ob. in state 
enforcement in order to recover 4,587 dr. on 3,000 dr. in principal loaned three years 
previously (note also line 40, where 8 dr. are paid ὑπ ρέτ   ἐποχ ς ἐ β  [ ί] ς, 
which I take to mean that the foreclosure (on a different mortgage?) is being cancelled 
since the loan is going to be paid or some deal reached). 
 
9. Beating: Officers and courts could and did reinforce ―civil‖ decisions with beatings, 
e.g., P.Oxy. IV 706 above, P.Flor. I 61, and most recently P.Oxy. LXXII 4960 
(Oxyrhynchos, II), a letter in which the writer informs a priestly guild to which he 
belongs that all may now rejoice, since ―on the sixth our case was heard and we won 
and Petseis was cudgeled while it was publically proclaimed: ‗Do not make trouble, 
but abide by what has been decided‘.‖ (τῇ ἕ τῃ      ου  -   σ θ  [ ]  [ ]   ὶ ἐ    ήσ     
       ἐξ υ ο οπήθ  Π τ σ  ς ἐπ -      ρυσσο    ου “ ὴ στ σ   . . .      ’        











11. Impounding and Sequestration: By the same token, officers could order property 
held in escrow until the parties arrived at a solution. We have already seen this power 
on display in Art. 3 of the Edict of Tiberius Julius Alexander above. A particularly 
good example is found in P.Oxy. VIII 1102 (Oxyrhynchos, ca. 146), where a judge 
orders that the embargo of a party‘s revenues should remain in place until he complies 
with his orders (18-22: Ε   ί ο ος     τ῵  π ρ στ -   τω   έ ο τος 
  τ σχ σθ     τοῦ τ ς προσό ους   ὶ  ξ σ  τος  πο υ-   θ       τ ς,   
ἱ ρ ὺς   ὶ ὑπο     το ράφος· ἐπ   (l. ἐπ ὶ ἂ ) τ  ὑπʼ ἐ οῦ     υ-   σθέ [τ]  
 έ  τ   ...  πο υθή-   [σο]  [τ ]  ). We also have examples of officers sequestrating 
property during a trial, often termed   σ       , in order to force a settlement.707  
 
12. Reclaiming and recovering private property: Officers and underlings can 
occasionally be found performing police functions in confronting and forcing people 
to turn over property, e.g., BGU II 467 (Soknopaiou Nesos, ca. 176-79), in which we 
hear of a stratēgos sending out a hypēretēs in order to restore some camels to a women 
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who claimed that her brother had taken them (12-14: [ἐ]πέτ ξ ς ἕ   τ῵    π ρ[ί] σ  
ὑπ ρ τ῵  ἐπ     άσ     τὸ     π[ο]  τ στ σ [ί]  ο  τοὺς    ή ους). 
Sometimes we even find soldiers engaging in such services on behalf of private 
people. See, e.g., SB XIV 11585 (Philadelphia, 59):   ὶ π ρὶ τ῵    σθ῵  τ῵  
πο  έ ω , |       ὅτ  πέ πω στρ τ τ [         ] |        π ρ υτά,  έ   , ἵ   
συ ήσῃ | τ  π ρ    έ     τ῵  πο  έ ω . (8-11: ―And about the shepherds‘ wages, 
he said, ―I am sending a soldier . . . immediately,‖ he says, ―to seize such of the 
shepherds belongings as are still in place.‖).708 Cf. P.Oxy. XII 1588, P.Flor II 137, 
P.Flor. II 151, and M.Chr. 93. 
 
13. Evicting, confiscating and selling foreclosed property: In P.Fam.Tebt. 29 the 
chrēmatistai in Alexandria approve a motion to foreclose and order the stratēgos and 
the praktōr xenikōn to sell the security for the creditor, who resides in Antinoopolis. 
There is no suggestion that the creditor or her agents played any personal role in the 
process or were even in the nome when the sale took place. 
 
This is not an exhaustive list, and, as per above, we should include other measures that relate 
to clarifying rights and easing access to the courts. In this category, we could include: 
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14. Improving record-keeping and access to professional notarial services: The 
Romans expanded the grapheion-system, a clear policy decision linked to a general 
reorganization of the record-keeping system. See Wolff 1978: 9-29, but esp. 18-19. 
They also introduced several new record offices, including the bibliothēkē egktēseōn 
(Wolff 1978: 222-54) and three imperial archives in Alexandria (see Burkhalter 1990). 
 
15. Privileging documentation: Roman courts recognized unwritten claims, but in 
keeping with their interest in record-keeping, they put a premium on written records of 
transactions. P.Fay. 21 (Theadelphia, 134), for example, contains a decree by the 
Prefect Mamertinus in which he extends a prior decree. The prior decree made receipts 
mandatory for all debts reduced to written contracts ―because of the disputes which 
arose before me concerning them (i.e., the contracts)‖ (5-7:     τ ς   φ σβ τήσ  ς   
τ ς ἐπʼ ἐ οῦ π ρὶ το τω     ο έ-     ς). 
 
The success of these actions and investments in contract can be measured by a number 
of indices. First, along with the expansion of the grapheia there appears to have been an 
expansion in the use of written contracts. Far more types of transactions are attested in 
contracts than from the Ptolemaic period. Though this trend has to be defined against the 
record of survival and has, moreover, many contributing factors (e.g., the comparative order 
and stability achieved under Roman rule after the turbulent last decades of the Ptolemies), 
surely one of them was the increased access to competent notarial drafting and safekeeping at 





A related index is the experimental use of contracts. The transactional agreement 
represented one way of recording new types of transactions (Sec. 5.4.2), but in the Roman 
period we find all sorts of rights and responsibilities as the objects of written contracts. One 
particularly interesting example is W.Chr. 84 (Nilopolis, 177), a petition to the epistratēgos 
concerning a liturgical substitution for a priest.
709
 Priests had recently lost immunity from 
liturgical duty, but the villagers of Nilopolis reacted by reaching an ―accord‖ whereby they 
agreed to take on the liturgies of their priests (10-12:   θ  ἠξίωσ   οἱ  πὸ τ ς   -     ς 
     ξά   ο  ἐ  συ   τ θέσ ως τ ς      τουρ ί ς \ἐπ β   ο σ ς   το ς  〚  τ῵ 〛 
ἐ τ  έσ\    ). The villagers had presented this contract to a former stratēgos Potamon, who 
had ratified it (19-20: τῶ ( . τῶ) ἐ  συ   τ θέσ ως τ῵     πὸ [τ] ς     ς    ο έ ου (l. -
ῶ) ἐπὶ Ποτά ω ος   στρ τ  ήσ  τος ὑπο     τ σ οῦ (l. -ῶ)). This was, therefore, a 
written contract, and we can parallel other written synkatatheseis in P.Gen. I 42 (Philadelphia, 
224), an agreement between presbyteroi aimed ensuring that the weight of the liturgy was 
borne equally, and P.Mil.Vogl. VI 264 (pp. 191f.). What is particularly interesting in the case 
of W.Chr. 84, however, is the contractual solution the villagers found to the problem of the 
liturgy, whereby they re-inscribed a traditional social prerogative removed by the provincial 
administration into a contract. There is more to be said about this use of contract, but the point 
here is the extent to which the administration was willing to accept a re-ordering of even state 
responsibilities so long as the lines of responsibility were clear, and that contracting provided 
                                                 
709





an acceptable way in which to do this (cf. the unacceptable contractual solution in P.Oxy. IV 
706 above). 
A third index is the professionalization of litigation. We not only see more advocates, 
but much more importantly we see the fruits of Roman record-keeping in the quality of legal 
research that emerges from the papyri. We have lists of rescripts and collections of decisions 
(e.g., M.Chr. 372), and we find them embedded in petitions and presented at trial (e.g., P.Oxy. 
II 237). This is a clear improvement over the Ptolemaic period. Again, we get a glimpse of the 
way such research was done—and the legal industry it supported—from an account, P.Oxy. 
XIV 1654 (Oxyrhynchos, ca. 150), which details expenses related to searching, pulling, and 
copying documents out of official archives over the course of 4 days. Roman record-keeping 
thus not only enabled parties to determine the quality of their rights and the relative legal 
strength of their cases, but also helped stabilize the law and make it more predictable by 
creating the possibility for precedent (cf. the lack of such a possibility in Athens, pp. 255f.).
710
 
Here, then, we see an instance in which Roman innovation helped to bring down transaction 
costs on the enforcement side of the equation: for a few drachmai, one knew whether or not it 
was worth pursuing or defending a case, and if so, how best to proceed.  
Lastly, Napthali Lewis (1983: 190) and others have drawn attention to P.Yale 61 , 
from which we know that Subatianus Aquila received precisely 1,804 petitions in two days 
while at his conventus in Arsinoe. This is a tremendous number, and if routine, then quite 
amazing, as it represents a submission a minute for the 10-hour workday of the conventus. 
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More amazing still, however, is the fact that these petitions were all processed and posted both 
in Alexandria and in the nome metropolis so that petitioners could see what had become of 
their petitions and make copies, thus saving them a trip to the capital.
711
 If overwhelmed—and 
nothing about Aquila‘s edict suggests that it was—perhaps we should consider the Roman 
legal system a victim of its own success, choked with the petitions, cases, and contracts it 
encouraged and supported. 
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APPENDIX I: ―UNDER CONTRACT‖ IN ROMAN EGYPT 
We have one attestation of a singular word meant to communicate the condition of being 
―under contract,‖ or ὑποσ   ρ φος (P.Ryl. II 128 [Euhemeria, post 30]): 
 
 Σ ρ πίω   ἐπ στάτῃ φυ    ( τ῵ )  
 π ρ  Ἁτρήους τοῦ Μ . [ ...]- 
 τος ἐ   ουρ οῦ τ῵  ἐ  
4 Ε    ρί  τ ς Θ  ίστου  
   ρί ος Γ ίου Ἰου ίου θ  [ο]-  
  ρου   ὶ Τ β ρίου Κ  π[ο]υρ-  
 ίου Τρ φω ος. ἡ π ρ’ ἐ οὶ 
8 οὖσ  ὑποσ   ρ φος Σου ρ ς  
Ἁρσ θ  ος π ρ  β ά   ου- 
 σ     ότρ   φρο ήσ σ   
ἐ   τ   ποῦσ  τὸ ἐ   -  
12 ο ρ  ο   π   ά   ψο -  
χ  ω  θ  σ  (l. ψυχ  ω  θ  σ ) ὑπὸ τοῦ 
π τρὸς   τ ς Ἁρσ θ  ο(ς)  
  τ   πὸ τ ς  θ τοῦ Μ -  
16 χ ὶρ τοῦ  ϛ ( τους) Τ β ρίου  
Κ ίσ ρος Σ β στοῦ,  ὴ στο-  
χ σ  έ ος (l. στοχ σ  έ ου) ὧ  ὀφ ί     ο   
σὺ  τῇ  υ    ὶ   τοῦ 
20   τ  π ρ  ο ή ,   ὶ ἦρ    
ἐ  τ ς ο  ί ς  ου ἱ άτ -  
ο  ἄξ ο   ρ υ(ρίου) ( ρ χ ῵ )     ὶ ἃς  
 ἶχο    ς     ρ φὴ  τοῦ 
24 φόρου  ρ υ(ρίου) ( ρ χ  ς)  , β άβ[ο]ς  έ  
  ο  ἐπ  <ο> ο θ σ  [ο]   ὀ ί-  
 ο .   ὸ  ξ ῵  χθ      
τοὺς ἐ    ου έ ους  
26 ἐπὶ σὲ πρὸς τὴ  ἐσο έ(   )  
ἐπέξο (ο ).   τ χ(  ). 
 







To Serapion, epistatēs phylakitōn, from Hatres son of M--, oil-maker to Gaius Julius 
Athenodoros and Tiberius Calpurnius Tryphon in Euhemeria of the Themistos division 
(of the Arsinoite nome).  
 Soueris daughter of Harsuthmis, who is under contract to remain with me as an 
olive-carrier,
712
 (but) (instead) considered things alien (to her responsibilities), has 
abandoned the olive-mill and fled, beguiled by her father Harsuthmis as long ago as 
the 19
th
 of Mecheir of the 16
th
 year of Tiberius Caesar Augustus, he having no regard 
for what he and his wife owe me according to the contract of paramonē. She also 
carried off from my house a cloak worth 4 silver drachmai and 40 silver drachmai 
which I was keeping for the payment of rent. I have thereby suffered no slight injury. 






The contract at the basis of this complaint is a formal one for paramonē, an employment 
contract for a form of indentured servitude, whereby one typically worked off a loan or a 
debt.
714
 The plaintiff Hatres has two claims. The first is that Soueris and her father Harsuthmis 
(who was almost certainly the legally responsible party, seemingly along with his wife, since 
they were the recipients of the loan, lines 17-20) breached the paramonē contract by her 
unilaterally leaving his service before the loan was repaid. In order to underscore 
Harsuthmis‘s moral and legal responsibility, Hatres adds that the father had suborned his 
daughter to decamp. Second, Soueris is accused of ―lifting‖ certain items from Hatres‘ house 
when she left (cf. SB XIV 12084 above, pp. 398f.). As often, we are in no position to judge 
the merits of the claims, though from other similar contracts we might hazard a guess as to 
what the other side might have argued. For example, in considering the accusation of theft it is 
important to recall that such employment contracts in the imperial period varied quite widely 
                                                 
712
paremballousa: see P.Fay. 91 (Euhemeria, 99), a contract for such services. 
713
 Trans. adapted from ed. pr. 
714





with respect to provisions for interest, payment schedule, wages, taxes, training, holiday, and 
work conditions. Several in fact stipulate for payment in the form of garments, and so it is not 
inconceivable that at least some of what Soueris took represented what she felt she was 
―owed.‖715 Irrespective of her now unrecoverable view, it is noteworthy that Hatres did not 




 As mentioned above, hyposyngraphos is a hapax in the Greek corpus, appearing 
nowhere else in the documentary or literary record. From this fact we might justly conclude 
that being ―under contract‖ was not in itself a particularly salient cultural notion. That said, it 
is also a perfectly intelligible neologism, and indeed Hatres goes on to provide us with a sort 
of exegesis by telling us what he expected of a person who was ―under contract.‖717 
Unsurprisingly, Soueris was required to abide by the explicit terms of her (or her father‘s) 
contract, among them the provision (in the parlance of paramonē) that she ―remain beside 
him‖ (cf. 7: π ρ’ ἐ οὶ) and not abandon (eklipein) her workplace, the olive-mill.718 Beyond 
                                                 
715
 See, e.g., the evidence collected in Hengstl 1972; cf. Bergamasco 1995 (apprenticeship contracts). 
716
 Taubenschlag 1955: 452-58 for vocabulary of theft. Note that  ἴρ    is not included. Cf. SB XIV 12084, pp. 
398ff. 
717 ὘ ό in composition with nouns was used to create names for offices or positions, e.g., ὑποβου ό ος, 
υ πο έωρ ος, ὑπ ρχ τέ τω , ὑπ ρέτ ς; cf. Preisigke, Wörterbuch, Abschnitt 8. The designation of ―under‖ here 
denotes a power relation (cf. LSJ, ὑπό, F.1.3). We also see it at work in adjectives, though less often, to the same 
end, e.g., ὕπ ρχος, ὑπόβ  χος (―under the influence of Bacchos,‖ Philostratus, LSJ, s.v.), ὑπ  θυ ος, ὑπή οος, 
etc. The closest adjectival parallel is perhaps ὑπό   ος, which appears in Ptolemaic papyri (see Preisigke, 
Wörterbuch, s.v.). Outside of Egypt, we have a close substantive parallel in Plutarch‘s periphrastic version, see n565 
above. There is a similarity in the views of Hatres and Plutarch with respect to the illiberality of being ―under 
contract‖ (see below), but of course there is nothing of Plutarch‘s elitist priggishness in Hatres. 
718
 Cf. P.Fay. 91 (Euhemeria, 99). Ekleipein is a standard term for abandonment by lessees; see Preisigke, 





this, though, we see that Hatres had normative expectations not inscribed in the contract that 
were similarly disappointed. Thus he appears to have held Soueris accountable for what we 
might call a ―good faith effort‖ to consider what was required of her under the contract. She, 
however, ―took thought on things alien‖ to the contract, phronēsasa allotria.  
 Allotria here is not merely ―other things,‖ but specifically things foreign, and so 
improper with respect to what is rightly one‘s own, in this case her obligations under the 
contract.
719
 This phrase appears four other times, three times in connection with marriage, 
P.Oxy. II 282 (Oxyrhynchos, 29-37), P.Bon.21 (unknown, I), P.Heid.III 237 (Oxyrhyncha, 
29/30), and once with regard to slavery, P.Turner 41 (Oxyrhynchos, 249/250). The first three 
constitute a unified group, all being petitions in which a complaint is lodged against a faithless 
spouse. P.Oxy. II 282 is the most complete and so best able to shed some light on what Hatres 
may have meant by this intriguing phrase: 
 
  [  ]ξά  ρω  στρ τ  ῶ 
 π ρ  Τρ φω ος τοῦ Δ ο-  
  υσίου τ῵   π’ ὆ξυρ  -  
4 [χ]ω  π[ό]  ως. συ  βίω- 
 [σ ] Δ  [ ]τροῦτ  ρ    \ί  -  
 ου,   [ὶ ἐ] ὼ  ὲ  οὖ  ἐ-  
π χορή  σ    τῇ τ   -  
8 ξ ς   ὶ ὑπὲρ        . 
ἡ  ὲ    ότρ   φρο ήσ -  
 σ  τ ς  ο   ς συ β -  
 [σ ως]   τ  πέρ[ ]ς ἐξ -  
                                                 
719
 Kiessling, Wörterbuch, s.v. Cf. BGU II 531 (n367 above), P.Dubl.15 (p. 326f.), P.Oxy. VI 929 (Oxyrhynchos, 
late II-III), and esp. PSI XV 1554 (Oxyrhynchos, III), a letter in which the writer reports the response of a mutual 
acquaintance to one of the present recipient‘s letters:  ρ   , ἐ    ή σο  ἐ οχ ῇ | [π ρ  το ]τ ο υ· τοῦτο   ρ 
   ότ ρ[ ]ό  ἐστ  . (―It‘s enough for me if he doesn‘t bother you about this matter, for its someone else‘s 





12 [ θ ]   ὶ  π  έ< >   το 
 τ  ἡ έτ ρ  ὧ  τὸ   -  
 θ’ ἓ  ὑπό   τ  .   ὸ  ξ \῵/  
  χ[θ]     τ  τ   [ἐ]πὶ σὲ 
16 ὅπως τ χῃ ὧ  προσή-  
[   ]   ὶ  πο ῶ  ο  τ  
ἡ έτ ρ . τ῵   ὲ    ρ  
ἄ  ω  τ῵  ὄ τω   
20  ο[ ] πρ[ὸς]   τὴ    θόξο-  
    (l.   τέχο   )   [ὶ  ] θέ ξο   .   τ χ(  ).  
 
(Papyrus continues with the list of stolen items, which breaks off.) 
 
To Alexander, stratēgos, from Tryphon son of Dionysios of Oxyrhynchos city. 
I married Demetrous daughter of Herakleides, and I for my part furnished her with 
the expected things, even beyond my means. She, however, taking thought of things 
foreign to our common life together finally left, and they carried off our
720
 property, a 
list of which is appended below. Therefore I ask you to have her led before you in 
order that she may receive what she deserves and return our property. I do and will 
retain my other (rights) with regard to the other matters I have with her. Farewell. 
 
 
This petition is part of a fairly substantial archive of 43 documents relating to the family of 
Tryphon, a weaver from first-century Oxyrhynchos. Through this archive we know that 
Tryphon was married twice, the first time to this Demetrous, who re-appears in a second 
petition accused of attacking Tryphon‘s second wife Saraeus, who was pregnant at the time 
(SB X 10239). From P.Oxy. II 267, a loan contract, we learn that this second marriage to 
Saraeus was a so-called ―unwritten marriage,‖ a term that has been a source of debate for most 
of the twentieth century. Although the meaning and implications of ―unwritten marriage‖ are 
still not completely clear, the communis opinio now understands this loan contract to have 
                                                 
720
 I see no reason to interpret the first person plural in this petition as standing for the first person singular as many 
have done. The contrast of persons to me seems marked, even if potentially unintentional (cf. the revealing third 





served as a proxy for a formal wedding contract by virtue of the inclusion of terms specific to 
married life.
721
 Recent scholarship on Oxyrhynchite marriages in the first century further 
suggests that Tryphon‘s marriage-via-loan was in no way exceptional or the product of a new 
wariness after the debacle of his marriage to Demetrous (i.e., that he, ―once bitten, twice shy,‖ 
entered into his second marriage as an unwritten one with a loan in order to have more 
flexibility, treating it as a ―trial marriage‖ or ―marriage lite‖).722  
In the case of his first wife, however, we have no explicit indication of the sort of 
marriage Tryphon had, and nothing conclusive can be made of the phrase τ   ξ ς in the 
petition above: his obligations to Demetrous might have ―followed‖ on specific contractual 
obligations set out in a marriage contract or merely on those to which he had agreed in an 
―unwritten‖ marriage like his second.723  Tryphon‘s silence as to any contract here might 
suggest that there was none, but more significant for the present discussion is his assertion 
that he had lived up to the obligations of the institution of marriage itself, koine symbiōsis, not 
measuring his obligations by the terms of a written marriage contract.
724
 Unfortunately, his 
                                                 
721
 See Yiftach-Firanko 2003: 81-104 for the debate over ―unwritten‖ and ―written‖ marriage, and pp. 91-94 for a 
discussion of P.Oxy.II 267. 
722
 Gagos, Koenen, and McNellen 1992; contra Wolff 1939: 69-72. 
723
 Compare P.Tebt. I 51.5-11 (113 BCE, Kerkeosiris), a petition to Menches the kōmogrammateus from one 
Petechon, a basilikos geōrgos: συ ό τος   ο υ [     ]θ ω    | Τ [         ]ου τ῵  ἐ  τ ς [  τ] ς | [  ] ς   τ  
συ  ρ[ φ]ὴ   Α[  υπ]τί   τροφ τ     ὶ  |τ [ ]τ   χορ  ῵  πά τ    τ  [ ξ ]ς   τ          τ῵   
|[ὑπ ρχό τω  ... (―As I am living with [?]thonis, daughter of T[...]os from the same village in accordance with an 
Egyptian alimentary contract, and as I am providing her with everything that follows according to the ability of my 
resources ...‖) and P.Lond.III 1164 D; P.Iand. VII 145.9, P.Col. VIII 227, where the phrase refers back to 
contractual obligations, though not to those set out in marriage contracts. 
724
 Cf. Wolff 1939: 67. Tryphon‘s claim that he provided for her   ὶ ὑπὲρ         echoes some marriage contract 
language, cf., e.g., P.Oxy. XII 1473.11:   ὲ    ῵    ὶ ἐπ χορ   ίτω τῇ  υ    ὶ τ   έο τ    τ         





good faith attempt to abide by his marital obligations was reciprocated by a mind that 
wandered ―outside‖ the bounds of their ―common life together.‖725 Demetrous, on the other 
hand, no doubt ―carried off‖ what she had either loaned Tryphon (cf. the arrangements in 
P.Oxy. II.267) or what amounted to her dowry. Hatres apparently saw Soueris in a similar 
light, her mind as wandering improperly to things that were outside her moral and legal 
obligation to respect the terms of her contract, things which were, after a fashion, ―none of her 
business,‖726 while Soueris, like Demetrous, took what she likely thought of as ―hers.‖  
The one non-marriage attestation of this phrase is further revealing. In P.Turner 41, 
Aur. Sarapias, a woman of high status, complains to the stratēgos of the Oxyrhynchite nome 
that a slave named Sarapion, whom she had inherited from her father, had run away. She had 
entrusted him with her estate, ―thinking that he could do no wrong‖ because of his service to 
                                                                                                                                                             
I 51 (supra n723, particularly relevant given the Egyptian elements present in Tryphon‘s loan-cum-marriage 
contract, P.Oxy. II 267, on which, see Gagos, Koenen, McNellen 1992). In none of the three petitions with the 
phrase phronein allotria relating to marriage is there any clear indication of a contract. In other words, this may be 
the rhetorical tack one took if one had no contract: one sues in such cases on the basis of the institution of marriage, 
not contract. 
725
 Incidentally, this was a charge that either partner could make: in P.Bon. 21, it is a woman who accuses her 
husband of thinking outside of marriage, and claims that he has not lived up to his obligation to support her.   
726
There are, it would seem, two ways to construe allotria  in this phrase in P.Ryl. II 128: allotria could either be 
used substantively and absolutely, i.e. ―other people‘s things,‖ (cf. PSI XV 1554 in n719), or there could be a 
suppressed genitive on analogy with the likes of P.Oxy. II 282, P.Heid.III  237, and P.Turner 41 (e.g., τ ς 
π ρ  ο  ς, cf. line 20). In any case, it is interesting that this phrase appears in connection with marriage and 
paramonē. For women, the latter sometimes resembled marriage, as it could involve their residing with their 
―employers‖ without well-defined responsibilities. For a case in which the service was perhaps expected to end in 
marriage see, e.g. P.Polit.Iud.7 (Herakleopolis, 134 BCE). It seems unlikely that this was the case in P.Ryl. II 128 
since there was a primary job Soueris was expected to perform. We should therefore see the phrase as describing the 








 But this trust was misplaced, since he, ―suborned somehow by others, took 
thought of things alien to the esteem and daily upkeep which I afforded him, and ran away on 
the sly, having stolen some items of ours,‖ which Sarapias goes on to enumerate before 
requesting that he (and perhaps those who suborned him) be pursued.
728
 The same basic 
elements recur in all these instances: trust on the basis of an obligation, whether contractual, 
marital, or familial (in the ancient sense), which, from the perspective of the ―victims,‖ was 
exploited. Each of these institutions, contract, marriage, and slavery, thus afforded an 
opportunity for, and a vulnerability to, trust, as each of the victims complains of ―theft‖ from 
right under their noses. The other recurring elements are ―theft‖ and freedom. Far from 
―thinking about things foreign‖ to them, all of the unrepresented people on the other side of 
these disputes were thinking precisely on what was ―theirs,‖ and asserting their ownership by 
removing it when they left.  
The question of freedom is more complex. Soueris and Sarapion, of course, had very 
little juridical freedom. Soueris, at least, was free, but a woman and likely a minor, and 
therefore almost certainly not party to the very contract she was ―under.‖729 And yet, both 
Soueris and Sarapion exercised a sort of effective freedom in their respective acts of 
anachōrēsis. Interestingly, each apparently had to be ―suborned‖ before fleeing. The words 
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 8-10:   ὶ τοῦτο   ο ίσ σ     ὲ  φ ῦ ό  τ     -  πρά[ξ] σθ   τῶ  ἶ  ί  ου π τρ  ὸ    ὶ π -   π στ ῦσθ   
ὑπ’ ἐ οῦ τ  ἡ έτ ρ . 
728
 10-15: οὗτος   ο   οἶθ’ ὅπως ἐξ ἐπ τρ β ς τ  ω     ό-   τρ   φρο ήσ ς τ ς π ρ χο έ  ς   τῶ |  ὑπ’ ἐ οῦ 
τ    ς   ὶ χορ  ί ς τ῵      -      ίω  πρὸς  ί  τ   ὑφ  ό   ός τ         πὸ τ῵  ἡ  τέρω  ... 
729
 Cf. Ratzan forthcoming a for a study of contracts that dispose of the labor or bodies of third parties in the power 





used for this act of inducement are interesting. In the case of Sarapion, he was ―incited‖ (11: 
ἐξ ἐπ τρ β ς τ  ω ) to forget what was properly his (i.e., the bond of gratitude he should 
have felt for his master‘s esteem and care).730 Soueris, on the other hand, was ―beguiled,‖ or 
had ―her soul led away‖ (12-13: ψυχ  ω  θ  σ ), by her father. In Ptolemaic and Roman 
papyri, this latter verb is reserved for the persuasion of slaves or captives to run away (cf. 
P.Hamb. I 91 [Herakleopolite, 167 BCE; see Clarysse 2002 for re-edition] and SB XXIV 16257 
[Soknopaiou Nesos, 123]). It at once marks out Soueris as dependent, her paramonal status as 
hyposyngraphos approaching the subordination of slavery, as well as essentially free, for she 
is capable of, or susceptible to, persuasion. At root, however, psychagōgia was a magical 
notion of persuasion: these people, who are under the legal and social power of others, are 
thought of as having been robbed of their agency, paradoxically, in their ultimate exercise of 
free will.
731
 Indeed, their flight is presented as evidence of their having been compelled, as if 
by magic, to forget themselves and their station. This rhetoric argues for a depressed notion of 
the freedom of parties ―under contract,‖ and it is surely significant that the one attestation we 
have refers to Soueris, who was not even properly a party to the contract. Even so, at the 
center of the claim that her will was no longer hers there remains the grudging recognition of 
a will. 
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 Cf. note on ἐπ τρ βή ad loc. in ed. pr. 
731
 Cf. LSJ s.v.ψυχ  ω έω, with its clearly religous and magical uses in classical antiquity; cf. Phrynichos Prep. 
Soph. s.v.:οἱ  ὲ     ξ   ρ  ς τὸ  τ῵  π ί ω     ρ πο  στὴ  οὕτω    οῦσ  , οἱ  ’  ρχ  ο  τοὺς τ ς ψυχ ς 





In this connection, we could compare hyposyngraphos, the rarest of words, to one of 
its more common relatives, ὑπουρ ός. The concept embodied in hypourgos is one of 
―working under,‖ hence ―serving‖ or ―assisting.‖732 In the papyri we thus find it in accounts of 
wages paid out to day-laborers called in to ―assist‖ in various projects (ἐρ άτ   ὑπουρ  οί 
vel sim.).
733
 Most labor of this sort was likely paid on a per diem basis not set by contract, 
although this is not necessarily the case, as we do have contracts that include provisions to 
render ὑπουρ ί .734 Indeed, it may be that some of the workers listed in our accounts had 
contracts, as, for example, in the case of P.Oxy. III 498 (Oxyrhynchos, II), a labor contract in 
which some stone-cutters promise to provide ―assistance‖ to certain builders on a contingency 
basis for a set daily wage. In these attestations, however, one can detect no particular ethical 
content associated with being hypourgos akin to what we have seen invested in the idea of 
being hyposyngraphos. Partly this is because the relationship expressed is subjective, not 
objective, i.e., hypourgoi are ―under-workers‖ not ―under work,‖ while Soueris was ―under 
contract,‖ not a ―subcontractor.‖ The word therefore expresses a sort of social hierarchy, but 
not a particular relationship to the work itself. Yet is also differs because being under contract, 
or the obligation of a notionally free will, was an inherently moral disposition, as the previous 
chapters have shown. 
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 Cf. LSJ s.v. 
733
 E.g., BGU III 699, O.Bodl. II 1755, O.Stras. 704-5, SB VI 9409 (Theadelphia, 252); cf. P.Oxy. XII 1414 
(Oxyrhynchos, 271/272), a copy of senate minutes in which some linen weavers seek to modify their remuneration 
in part because of a spike in the wages they paid to their hypourgoi. 
734
 E.g., BGU I 197 (Arsinoite, 17), P.Athen.14 (Philadelphia, 22), P.Mich.II 121 Recto III.v (Tebtynis, 42), P.Gen.I
2
 





We get our most revealing glimpse of the difference between the two words from an 
unlikely source, a portion of a magical love charm in which the male caster conjures a 
nekydaimōn thus: 
 
  ὶ  ὴ ἐάσῃς τὴ        ἄ  ου    ρὸς π  ρ     β    πρὸς ἡ ο ή ,    ὲ   ίου 
   ρός,     ὴ ἐ οῦ  ό ου, τοῦ      ,    ’ ἕ    τὴ       , τ῵  τρ χ῵ , τ῵  
σπ ά χ  ω , τ ς ψυχ ς πρὸς ἐ έ, τὸ       , πάσῃ ὥρ  τοῦ   ῵ ος,  υ τὸς   ὶ 
ἡ έρ ς,  έχρ  οὗ   θῃ πρὸς   έ, τὸ       ,   ὶ  χ ρ στός  ου   ί ῃ ἡ      . 
ποί σο ,   τά  σο    ς τὸ ἅπ  τ  χρό ο  τ ς ζω ς  ου   ὶ συ   ά   σο  τὴ  
      ὑπουρ ὸ   ἶ  ί  ο , τῶ      ,   ὶ  ὴ  ποσ  ρτάτω  π’ ἐ οῦ ὥρ   ί   τοῦ 
  ῵ ος.(PGM IV.375-84) 
 
 
And do not allow her [the caster‘s female love-interest] to accept for pleasure the 
attempt of another man, not even that of her own husband, just that of mine, A; but 
drag her, B, by the hair, by the heart, by the soul, to me, A, at every hour of life, night 
and day, until she comes to me, A, and may she, B, remain inseparable from me. Do 
this, bind B for all the time of my life and help force her, B, to be serviceable to me, 





The point of the spell, of course, is to bind the woman so tightly—moving from a grip on the 
body to one on the soul, the well of intention—in order to remove her freedom of action 
altogether, making her wholly into an instrument of the caster‘s will and pleasure.736 In this 
way the victim will become perfectly ―serviceable‖ or ―subservient.‖ A person who is ideally 
hypourgos thus takes no thought as to how he or she might best be helpful or under what 
obligation he or she lies, but is merely the thoughtless extension of the person who is ―over‖ 
                                                 
735
 Trans. slightly adapted from Betz ed. 1986. 
736
 Cf. 353ff. On the use of psychē here see Betz ed. 1986: 339 (slang for female genitalia), cf. Faraone 1999: 50n48, 
58n81, who leaves the word untranslated as he finds both meanings possible or perhaps intentional. Even if the slang 
meaning is ascendant, the imagery of total mastery is in no way impaired. In his discussion, Faraone never explicitly 
addresses what seems to be a problematic or contradictory conception of human autonomy in these spells, cf., e.g., 





him or her. Being ―under contract,‖ on the other hand, entails ethical and normative 
responsibilities precisely because one was, as we saw in the case of Soueris, still free to think 
outside the bounds of the contract, and so to disrespect the ties that should bind one to the 
particular ends to which one has agreed.  
 Lastly, although Hatres does not specifically describe Harsuthmis and his wife as 
hyposyngraphoi, they are clearly obligated in a wider sense as a party ―under contract‖ with 
respect to the debt established by the contract, as we may see from Hatres‘ claim that 
Harsuthmis  ὴ στο- | χ σ  έ ος ὧ  ὀφ ί     ο    σὺ  τῇ  υ    ὶ   τοῦ     τ  
π ρ  ο ή . There is no such thing as a ―stochazomai-clause.‖ The verb stochazomai and its 
negative astochazomai appear with regularity in letters and petitions in which the author 
wishes to comment on whether or not someone‘s behavior has ―measured up.‖ Typically, the 
comment is a complaint that someone has failed to ―aim for what is right‖ ( στοχήσ  τ ς 
τοῦ    ῵ς  χο τος vel sim.).737 The often implicit standard applied is thus some basic 
popular morality, though it can sometimes be a particular or express standard, like ―the 
sacred‖ or earthly authority.738 In Hatres‘ case, the moral feeling he alludes to is the sense of 
obligation that should come with taking someone else‘s money for a declared purpose, in this 
case in return for Soueris‘s labor as per the terms of the contract, kata paramonēn. 
Harsuthmis‘s ―not respecting his debt‖ was therefore not an act whereby he breached an 
explicit provision, or engaged in one of those negative actions specifically proscribed as 
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 E.g., UPZ I 6, 12, 16; P.Tebt. III.1 798; cf. P.Ross. Georg. III 2. 
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 Sacred: UPZ I 12 (Memphis, post 158 BCE): ο τ  τοῦ|ἱ ροῦ στυχ σά   ο  | ο τ  τοῦ    ῵ς |  χο τος; 
earthly authority: P.Tebt. I 41.10-12 (Kerkeosiris, 105-90 BCE): ο  στοχ σά- |    ος ὧ   χο    π ρ  Λυσ  ίου 





constituting breach; rather, it was his underlying attitude that precipitated his act of breach in 
―deluding‖ (psychayōgein) his daughter into abandoning her work. This attitude was one that 
reflected a disturbing disregard for a fundamental principle of justice on which this, and most 
other contracts, relied: to fail to recognize indebtedness in this mindset was tantamount to not 
recognizing the archetype of obligation. It was, in other words, an act of agnōmosynē. 
 As we saw in Chapter 4, a reputation for agnōmosynē often forestalled the possibility 
of entering into contractual relations, for an agnōmōn does not have the right relationship of 
respect vis-à-vis the other party. Over the course of the Roman period, this conception shifted 
from the person to the object, in some ways mirroring the shift in the notion of breach from 
the early intransitive days of parasyngraphein and kakotechnein, which ascribed motive to the 
parties, to parabainein, which focused on the transgression of the contract itself, though with 
a heavy, if implicit, ethical condemnation for the party in breach. The idea of hyposyngraphos 
participates in this shift to a relationship with the contract itself, a movement reflected in the 
accretion of ethical content in increasingly subjective contracts, accompanied by a more 
defined notion of abstract obligation.  
 We also saw that it was agnōmosynē that ultimately drove parties to the authorities 
(Sec. 4.8). A correlative to hyposyngraphos is found in the assertion of breach before the 
authorities that the other party has ―turned its back‖ on the contract. For example, in P.Fay. 11 
(115 BCE) we find : 
 
 β σ  ίσσ [  Κ  οπάτρ     ὶ β σ     Πτο    ίω  θ ο ς] 
    ο ήτορ[σ  Σωτ ]ρ σ [  χ ίρ   ] 
 Δ  ήτρ[ ος - ca. 16 - ] 
4  άτο  ος [τ῵  π ]ζ῵  τ῵   [ το]  ο  τω  [ἐ  Ε ]- 





    ὶ τοῦ   [  ( τους)] ἐ ά   σ  [Θ οτ]  ί ῳ   έου 
 Πέρσῃ τ ς ἐ[π  ο]  ς τ῵    το  ο  τω  ἐ  
8 Θ     φ ί[  τ] ς   τ ς   ρί ος τοῦ  ρσ  οίτου 
 πυρ῵   ρ(τάβ ς) [ζ 𐅵],   ὶ ἐ  τ῵  Μ χ ὶρ    ὶ τοῦ   - 
 τοῦ τους ἄ[ ]  ς  ρ(τάβ ς)   , [ ] οίως  ὲ   ὶ ἐ  τῶ 
   ῵φ  [   ὶ] τοῦ    ( τους) ἄ   ς  ρ(τάβ ς)   , τ ς  ὲ 
12 πάσ ς (πυρ῵ ) [ ρ(τάβ ς)] οζ 𐅵,   τ  συ  ρ φ ς τρ ς,     
  ὲ    ᾶς ζ ,   ’  τέρ ς   ,   ’ ὧ  ἐ  - 
   θ   ἄ [ ]  τ    ὶ ποήσ σθ ί  ο    τὸ  
 τὴ   πό οσ   τ῵  προ    έ ω   ρ(τ β῵ ) οζ 𐅵 ἐ  το ς     τ῵  
16 συ βο  ίω[ ]  ρ σθ  σ   χρό ο ς ἢ ἐ τ  σ ί 
  ο    άστ[ ς]  ρ(τάβ ς) χ (  οῦ) ( ρ χ  ς) Γ. το τω   ’ ὄ τω  
   ὶ τ῵  τ ς  πο όσ ως χρό ω        υ- 
 θότω    ὶ ἄ  ω  ἐπ    ο ότω  π  ό ω  
20   ἐ    ο    ος π  ο ά  ς  πῃτ  έ ος 
 [ο] χ ὑπο έ      ουσίως  πο   ό   ,   τ - 
  ωτ ζό   ος τ [ὸ]   [  ]῵ς  χο    ὶ τ ς συ   - 
  άξ  ς. [  ὸ τὴ]  ἐ φ ’ ὑ [ ᾶ]ς   τ φυ ὴ  π πο- 
24   έ [ο]ς  [έ]ο     πο[σ]τ    ί  ου τὴ    τ υ- 
 ξ   ἐπὶ τ[ο]ὺς ἐπὶ τ῵  [τ]όπω  χρ   τ σ- 
 τάς, ὧ  [  σ ] ω  ὺς Δω[σ]ίθ ος, ὅπως    - 
  έξ  τ ς   τὴ    ς   [τά]στ σ     ὶ    - 
28     σά   ο  τὸ  Θέω       Δ   - 
 τρίου  ο[ ] υτοῦ  ρί [ω]σ   πρ χθ   ί  ο  
   τὸ  τ[ὴ]  ὡρ σ έ [ ]  τ   ὴ  τ ς 
  ρ(τάβ ς) υ  ( ) Γ ( ρ χ άς), τ  συ   ό     χ  - 
32  οῦ (τά   τ )    ( ρ χ  ς) Δφ,   ο ο θως τ  ς 
 συ  ρ φ  ς. το τω   ὲ    ο έ ω  
  σο    β βο θ  έ [ος]. 
   τυχ  τ . 
 
To Queen Kleopatra and King Ptolemy, gods Philometores Soteres, greeting 
from Demetrios son of ... , settler of the foot-soldiers settled at Euhemeria in 
the Themistos division (of the Arsinoite nome). In the month of Choiak of the 
50
th 
year I lent to Theotimos son of Phileas, Persian of the Epigonē, one of the 
settlers at Theadelphia of the same division of the Arsinoite (nome), [7.5] art. 
of wheat, and in the month of Mecheir of the same year another 45 art., and 
likewise in the month of Phaophi of the 51
st
 year another 25 art., making in all 
77.5 art.of wheat, in accordance with three syngraphai, the first for 7.5, the 
second for 45, whereby it was provided among other stipulations that he should 
make repayment to me of the aforesaid 77.5 art. within the periods fixed by the 
contracts (symbolaia) or pay me for each artaba 3000 drachmai of copper. 
Though this was the case, and though the periods fixed for repayment have 





made of him, refuses to pay voluntarily, turning his back on what is right and 
the agreements (synallaxeis). I have therefore taken refuge with you and entreat 
you to send my petition to the local chēmatistai, whose president is Dositheus, 
that they may select it for trial, and having summoned Theon [i.e., Theotimos] 
through Demetrios the collector to appear, that they may give judgment for him 
to be made to pay me the price fixed for each artaba … 3000 dr., making a 
total of 38 talents, 4500 drachmai of copper, in accordance with the 






The substance of the complaint is clear: Theotimos ―refuses‖ to repay the loans ―voluntarily,‖ 
thus effectively forcing Demetrios to ―take refuge‖ with the authorities in order to defend his 
rights under the contracts. In so refusing, Theotimos is said to have ―turned his back on what 
is right and the contracts.‖ We of course have no idea why Theotimos ―refused‖ to pay, nor 
for that matter why Demetrios kept loaning him wheat over the course of nearly a year (the 
first loan being in December-January of 121-120 BCE and the last in October 120) and waited 
at least two, likely three, years before turning to the authorities.
740
 Whatever the particular 
circumstances, breach here is couched in terms of freedom and volition, or rather abuses of 
freedom and perversity of will: his actions are characterized as obstinate and contemptuous 
repudiation.  
                                                 
739
 Trans. adapted from ed. pr.  
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 If we imagine the last loan as made for the 120/119 sowing season, it was likely due sometime in Pauni or Epeiph 
(June or July) 119, or it might possibly have been made payable a year later in Oct. 119. Since the petition clearly 
dates to sometime shortly after the death of Euergetes II (Physkon), it was probably submitted sometime shortly 





All of the attestations of katanōtizein appear in the context of Ptolemaic disputes.741 In 
SB VI 9108 (Aphroditopolite, 173-169 BCE), a petition by a royal farmer to the 
archisōmatophylax Noumenis, the plaintiff protests that a women from whom he had bought a 
piece of property has refused to register the contract of sale, ratifying the transfer. She 
therefore has ―turned her back on what is right‖ (12-15: ἡ [προ   ρ   έ  ]   ο χ 
ὑπο έ [ ]    τ -    ράψ    ο    τ  ωτ ζο-    έ   τὸ    ῵ς  χο ). A few decades later 
we have another petition in P.Tebt. III.2 952 (Tebtynis, ca. 145/144 BCE), this time from a 
certain Apollonios to Antipatros the superintendent of the syntaxis. Apollonios claims that he 
had gotten a judgment against his debtor Zopyros and served him notice, whereupon Zopyros 
promised to repay (21-22: τ ξ  έ ου    πο  σ [  ]  ο ).742 But then he reneged, ―having 
turned his back, he has not repaid the wheat right away (23-5:   τ -    ωτ ζό   ος ο [  
 ] θέως τὸ  πυ(ρὸ )    πο έ ω  ). Contracting meant making promises that one was 
obliged to keep, part of the general moral code, τὸ    ῵ς  χο , as distinguished from the 
―rights‖ that are established by law or contract (τ   ί     or τ   ό    ). The same entities 
that were expected to live up to ―the right‖ in keeping their contracts were of course capable 
of devising evil against them (kakotechnia), and even freely repudiating both what is right and 
the institution of contract (P.Fay. 11.21-23).
743
 And it is the institution to which Demetrios, or 
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 I have not been able to determine the precise manner in which it is used in BGU VI 1296, a private letter of 
unknown provenance from the turn of the third century BCE. 
742
 The petition says that ―Meleager‖ promised, but this is likely a mistake for Zopyros, with the scribe substituting 
the patronymic for the principal (cf. P.Polit.Iud. 9 above, pp. 338ff.). 
743





more likely his scribe, is referring in his declaration of Theotimos‘s moral bankruptcy, opting 
for the word synallaxis in this instance instead of syngraphē or symbolaion. The other two 
words for contract were more concrete, often used of the documents themselves, whereas 
synallaxis was never so used.
744
 Here, paired with to kalōs echon, contract is invoked in its 
essence, the binding of mutual obligation. In this sense, it is contract as such that is held up as 
the object of Theotimos‘s supposed contempt, and not Demetrios personally.  
The fact that Demetrios could conceive of Theotimos as spurning a contract instead of 
merely the party, and expected the authorities to find this compelling, is significant. As we 
saw at the end of Chapter 4, the moral vocabulary of contracting was part and parcel of the 
claim to be entitled to the legal enforcement of contracts. The point of departure for a contract 
suit was often the injustice born of agnōmosynē, or the turning of one‘s back on what was 
right, a repudiation of the other party or the debt one owed or both. The fundamental morality 
and economic purpose of contract both demanded that the other party be free enough to abide 
―under contract,‖ even at the risk that she might ―turn her back on it.‖ 
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APPENDIX II: A CONTRACT CASE FROM PTOLEMAIC EGYPT 
 
As seen in Dem. 56 (Sec. 5.2), breach of contract could suggest a dangerously tyrannical 
character in the ideological and political context of democratic Athens, an act that could be 
protrayed as characteristic of the sort of man who would in other circumstances presume to 
usurp the legislative authority of the dēmos itself. It is instructive to compare this to the 
rhetoric employed in P.Tor.Amen. 6-8 (Thebes, 119-116 BCE), a series of trial documents 
about a mutual agreement between two paraschitai, or embalmers, Amenothes and 
Petenephotes (on this contract, see Sec. 5.4.2, pp. 300ff.). The particulars of the division and 
dispute, i.e. who had what rights to which clients and who poached on whose territory, are 
irrelevant here, since we are interested in the way in which the two parties characterize 
breach. 
 P.Tor.Amen. 6 contains a judgment in favor of Amenothes from November of 119 
against Petenephotes for breach of the koinē homologia they had drafted in July of the same 
year. Amenothes had accused Petenephotes of collecting certain fees contrary to the 
agreement, pretending to rights he did not have under the division. The tribunal, presided over 
by Ptolemaios, one of the ―King‘s friends‖ and epistatēs of the Perithebas, had the contract 
read out and upon determining that Petenephotes had no cogent defense, concurred with 
Amenothes, commanding Petenephotes to ―not attempt to do anything similar (in the future), 
but rather to abide by the terms to which they had mutually and willingly agreed‖ (17-18: 





συ   χωρή  σ ). Sometime later, Petenephotes struck back, charging that Amenothes had 
breached the contract by collecting corpses to which he had no right, asserting that ―the 
accused, thinking himself altogether superior to what is right (and) having transgressed the 
contents of the agreement ...‖ (P.Tor.Amen. 7, sometime between 119-117, lines16-18:    ʼ 
ἐ    ο     ος π  υπέρτ ρ[ο]ς   ἡ  σ ά   ος τοῦ    ῵ς  χο τος   π ρ β ς τά τ  τ ς 
  ο ο ί  ς).745 While we may be certain that the contract itself described breach with the 
verb parasyngraphein, the charges of breach in both P.Tor.Amen. 6 and 7 are made with 
parabainein (6.14, 7.18), showing the extent to which the popular conception of breach was 
already on the point of overtaking the strictly legal language of breach. Indeed, the latent 
moral valence of transgression is of a piece with the subsequent highly charged and morally 
explicit petition of Petenephotes, P.Tor.Amen. 8. 
 In this last petition (at least in the extant dossier), filed sometime in the autumn of 116, 
Petenephotes submitted a finely detailed complaint against Petenephotes. The petition begins 
by reprising the contents of the contract in what appears to be a verbatim copy (5-39), before 
moving on to a litany of offenses (40-84). The second part may itself be divided into halves, 
with the first containing a catalog of specific instances of breach (40-64), and the second a 
broadside against Amenothes for one instance in particular, the body-snatching of Herieus, an 
eminent personage to whom Petenephotes lay claim under the contract (65-84). These last 20 
lines are worth quoting in full: 
 
       θ ς πο   ῵    ᾶ  ο  ἐπ ρρω- 
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 έ ος τ   το    ρί     ὶ τοῦτο  
ἐθ ράπ υσ   β  ίω    ῵     ὶ   το- 
68  ρ σί   τ  ὶ ἐ φ ρό [ ]  ο ς    ὶ  ποστ - 
τ  ῵  τρόπω ·   ὶ   υτ῵     ά    
ἐξουσί   π ρ τ [θ]έ    ος, ὑπὲρ   υτὸ  
φρο ῵ , ο    θ ή ο[ τος]    τ ῵  ο τ  
72 τοῦτο  ο τ  τοὺ[ς ἄ  ους] τοὺς προ- 
   ρ   έ ους θ  ρ π      ο   ʼ ἐ φ άπτ σ- 
θ     τ῵  ο  ʼ ἄ   ου ο θ  ὸς τ῵  
ἐ  τ῵  ἐ οὶ  πο    σ τ   έ ω   ω ῵ , 
76a           \το τους  
76 ἐ οὶ  ὲ   θή ο τος,        [   ]     θ         ο ς  ου 
τὸ  βίο ·   ὶ τ       [             ]τ      ἐ θ ίβω  
  τ   ω ὼς π  [τὸ]ς τ ο ῦ    ῵ς  χο - 
τος, π ρ συ  ρ φ῵[ ]    ὶ τ      τ ς 
80   ο ο ί ς    στ    [έ ]    ὶ   τ  ω- 
τ ζό   ος τ    ʼ   τ [ ]ς ἐπίτ      ὶ 
ἐ  ο θ  ὶ τ θέ   [ ]ο ς τ  ἐξ  ο ουθοῦ - 
τ    τ῵  ἐ πίτ    ὡ ς ἂ   ἴ τ ς  β σ   υ- 
84 σί   π ρ  χό   ος. 
 
Amenothes, much encouraged by his audacity, cared also for this man [sc. Herieus] 
(having engaged) in a violent contest (with me), carried away by some sort of 
autocratic passion and in a revolutionary manner. And, conferring on himself a 
superfluity of means, thinking only of himself—since it was not his right either to care 
for this man or the others aforementioned or to lay hands on them or any other of those 
from the villages assigned to me, but they belonged to me ... [robbing me?] of my 
livelihood—and oppressing (me), despising all that is right, breaching what was set 
out in the agreement, and turning his back on the penalties in it and reckoning of no 
account the penalties that thus accrue to him, as if he were someone in the grip of 
kinglessness. 
 
Although throughout this dispute we see the recurrence of many of the themes discussed 
above, in particular the repeated appeal to ―what is right‖ (τὸ    ῵ς  χο ), what is 
particularly striking about this passage is the political rhetoric ranged against Amenothes. The 
―violent contest‖ in which he is engaged with Petenephotes is evidence of a character 
transported by autokrasia and apostasis. This version of authadia (cf. ὑπὲρ   υτὸ    





that here refers to the resources he now commands after having cared for Herieus, but whose 
overtones of power seem unescapable—that he feels utterly unfettered by the rules of 
morality, the contract, and even the king. Pestman has suggested that the hapax  β σ   υσί  
was meant as a comment on Amenothes‘ alleged disregard for the Fiskalmult, payable to the 
king (cf. 8.17). Wilcken, on the other hand, read it in a political sense, understanding 
Petenephotes to mean that ―wenn kein König ist, kann jeder das Recht beugen; Amenothes 
beträgt sich, als wenn es keinen König, den Schützer des Rechts, gäbe‖ (UPZ II 196, p. 212). 
Pestman is right to connect the particular disdain for the Fiskalmul to the charge of 
abasileusia, as one follows on the other in short order, but surely wrong to limit the resonance 
of the charge to just the penalty. It is, rather, the peak of the crescendo that started some 20 
lines earlier, the final unmasking of an autokrasia that recognizes no power above itself, not 
even that of the king‘s justice in his own court. 
 If we compare this to the rhetoric in Dem. 56, we discover an interesting set of 
similarities and differences. In both there is a political discourse of contract that links respect 
for a private ordering to respect for the public order generally. The difference, of course, is 
that the ideology of order is radically different in each case, democratic in the one, royal in the 
other. Whereas in Demosthenes‘ Athens the ultimate charge was harboring tyrannical 
aspirations, here in Ptolemaic Egypt it is the revelation of revolutionary tendencies. Again, 
there is a discourse of freedom in both situations. In Dem. 56, the emphasis is on the freedom 
of parties to agree on terms, and for the need to hold them accountable to that freedom, and in 
particular the plaintiff to the penalties to which he had freely agreed. Though the judges in 





Amenothes, there is no such emphasis on freedom of contract here as there is in Dem. 56. As 
Pestman notes, the judges as merely quoting the contract back to Petenephotes (P.Tor.Amen., 
p. 59; cf. 8.38), and there is no special value attached to   ό τ ς there.746 Instead, the 
argument of freedom in these petitions is entirely about transgressive and anarchic freedom, 
not the freedom of contract and responsibility. The charge of abasileusia is thus a claim that 
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APPENDIX III: Attestations of Parasyngraphein in Papyri until 300 CE 
 Document 
  
Date Prov. Doc. Type Contract Transaction Form Parabainein?  
1 P.Enteux 
 
59 222 BCE Magdola petition protocol? lease pres. inf. 
 
2 P.Petr. II 47 210/209 Arsinoite contract homology loan aor. subj.  
 







4 SB XIV 11969 170-116 
Tamauis 
(Arsinoite) 
contract ? ? ? ? 












6 119 Thebes 
trial 
transcript  
homology agreement pres. part. Y 
8 P.Tor.Amen 
 
7 119-117 Thebes petition homology agreement pres. part. Y 
9 P.Tor.Amen 
 






10 P.Lond III 880 113 Pathyris contract homology division pres. part. 
 















lease pres. subj. 
 




loan pres. inf. 
 










15 BGU VIII 1732 80-30 Herakleopolis contract homology cession pres. part. 
 
16 BGU VIII 1733 80-30 Herakleopolis contract homology cession pres. part. 
 
17 BGU VIII 1740 80-30 Herakleopolis oath homology cession fut. inf. ? 
18 P.Oxy. XLIX 3482 73 Oxyrhynchos contract homology cession fut. inf. Y 
19 BGU VIII 1738 72 Herakleopolis oath homology cession fut. inf. Y 
20 SB XX 14997 70-41 Oxyrhynchos contract homology cession pres. subj. 
 
21 BGU VIII 1731 68/67 Herakleopolis contract homology cession pres. subj. 
 
22 P.Oxy. XIV 1644 63/62 Oxyrhynchos contract homology settlement pres. subj. 
 




lease pres. part. 
 
24 BGU IV 1118 22 Alexandria contract synchōrēsis lease pres. part. Y 
25 C.Pap.Gr. I 3 14 Alexandria contract synchōrēsis wetnursing pres. part. Y 
26 BGU IV 1116 13 Alexandria contract synchōrēsis lease pres. part. Y 
27 BGU IV 1122 13 Alexandria contract synchōrēsis labor pres. part. Y 







29 BGU IV 1119 6/5 Alexandria contract synchōrēsis lease aor. subj.  Y 
30 BGU IV 1120 5 Alexandria contract synchōrēsis lease aor. subj.  Y 
31 BGU IV 1121 5 Alexandria contract synchōrēsis lease pres. part. Y 
32 BGU IV 1117 3 Alexandria contract synchōrēsis lease aor. subj.  Y 
33 P.Koeln III 147 
30 BCE-
15 CE 
Alexandria contract cheirograph lease pres. subj.  Y 
34 PSI X 1120 
25 BCE-
25 CE 
? contract ? paramonē aor. subj.  
 





contract homology sale fut. ind. 
 
36 P.Hamb. III 217 1-50 Oxyrhynchos contract homology cession aor. subj.  
 
37 P.Mich. XVIII 784 18 Oxyrhynchos contract homology cession 
fut. inf. and 
pres. subj.  
38 PSI X 1118 25/26 Oxyrhynchos contract homology cession 
fut. inf. and 
pres. subj.  
39 C.Pap.Gr. I 14 26 Oxyrhynchite contract homology wetnursing pres. part. 
 







41 SB VI 9109 31 Tebtynis contract homology sale/cession pres. subj. 
 
42 P.Ryl. II 159 31/32 Oxyrhynchos contract homology cession 
fut. inf. and 
pres. subj.  










44 P.Tebt. II 383 46 Tebtynis contract homology division pres. subj. 
 
45 P.Mich. V 323-325 47 Tebtynis contract homology division pres. subj. 
 





47 P.Mich. V 326 48 Tebtynis contract homology division pres. subj. 
 
48 P.NYU II 15 68 Oxyrhynchite contract homology cession pres. subj. 
 





subj. (or fut. 
ind.) 
 
50 P.Lond II 140 69-79 Arsinoite contract homology sale pres. subj. 
 
51 P.Mich. X 583 78 Bakhias contract homology sale pres. subj. 
 
52 P.Ryl. II 161 81 
Soknopaiou 
Nesos 
contract homology sale pres. part. 
 
53 PSI XIII 1320 82-88 
Soknopaiou 
Nesos 
contract homology sale pres. subj. 
 
54 PSI VIII 897 93 Oxyrhynchos contract homology cession pres. subj. 
 
55 P.Oxy. II 270 94 Oxyrhynchos contract homology surety pres. subj. 
 
56 P.Stras. IV 266 100 Oxyrhynchos contract homology cession pres. subj. 
 
57 SB XX 14336 91-108 Oxyrhynchos contract homology cession pres. subj. 
 





59 P.Mert. III 109 100-199 Oxyrhynchite contract homology hypothek pres. subj. 
 
60 BGU I 350 103-115 
Nilopolis, 
Arsinoite 







61 CPR I 146 100-299 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. ? 
62 CPR I 11 108 
Ptolemais 
Euergetis 
contract homology division pres. subj. Y 
63 P.Oxy. LII 3690 139 Oxyrhynchos contract homology cession 
fut. inf. and 
pres. subj.  
64 P.Oxy. XVII 2134 170-186 Oxyrhynchos contract cheirograph mortgage pres. subj. 
 
65 CPR I 89 200-299 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. ? 
66 CPR I 103 200-299 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. Y 
67 CPR I 203 200-299 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. ? 
68 CPR I 123 200-249 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale? pres. part. ? 
69 CPR I 124 200-249 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. ? 
70 CPR I 133 200-249 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. Y 
71 CPR I 142 200-249 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. Y 
72 CPR I 143 200-249 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. Y 
73 CPR I 144 200-249 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. ? 
74 CPR I 148 200-249 
Arsinoite or 
Herkleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. ? 












76 CPR I 64 227 
Peenamis, 
Herakleopolite 
contract homology sale pres. part. Y 
77 CPR VI 73 222-235 Herakleopolite contract homology sale pres. part. Y 
78 SPP XX 47 238 Herakleopolite contract homology cession pres. part. Y 
79 SB XIV 11703 250-299 Herakleopolite contract homology sale pres. part. Y 
80 P.Neph. 
 
29 200-399 Herakleopolite contract homology sale pres. part. Y 
81 P.Sakaon 
 
43 327 Theadelphia petition contract? ? ? 
 
